International Organizations and the Delegation of Power: The Rules of Power Distribution in Security Organizations

Abstract

This article deals with the rules of power distribution and the delegation of
power in international security organizations. More specifically, the paper
describes and evaluates the delegation of power in the security regimes of
the UN, NATO, and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
The paper proceeds from a hypothesis drawing on existing research.
According to this hypothesis, the security regime of the UN is marked by a
substantial delegation of power, but we can observe only weak power
delegations in NATO and the CFSP. So while the UN's security regime can be
considered supranational, NATO and the CFSP represent intergovernmental
regimes. The analysis carried out in this paper confirms the hypothesis. In
comparison with existing literature, however, the paper submits much more
precise and concrete findings. Moreover, the paper also forwards a rather
unique conceptual and methodological approach for studies of power
distribution in international organizations (IOs). In this way, it contributes
towards the general study of IOs, which is currently rather stagnant.