International Organizations and the Delegation of Power: The Rules of Power Distribution in Security Organizations
Abstract
This article deals with the rules of power distribution and the delegation of power in international security organizations. More specifically, the paper describes and evaluates the delegation of power in the security regimes of the UN, NATO, and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The paper proceeds from a hypothesis drawing on existing research. According to this hypothesis, the security regime of the UN is marked by a substantial delegation of power, but we can observe only weak power delegations in NATO and the CFSP. So while the UN's security regime can be considered supranational, NATO and the CFSP represent intergovernmental regimes. The analysis carried out in this paper confirms the hypothesis. In comparison with existing literature, however, the paper submits much more precise and concrete findings. Moreover, the paper also forwards a rather unique conceptual and methodological approach for studies of power distribution in international organizations (IOs). In this way, it contributes towards the general study of IOs, which is currently rather stagnant.
Keywords
International organizations, supranational institutions, security organizations, UN, NATO, EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
Author Biography
Jan Karlas
He works in the Department of International Relations at the Institute of Political Science Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences at Charles University (FSV UK). He currently serves as the head of the department. He studied international relations at FSV UK and at Central European University in Budapest. In the past, he worked at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. His research focuses on global cooperation and institutions.