The Iranian Nuclear Program: The Security Model in the Nuclear Strategy and the Deterrence Theory Perspective

Abstract

Using the empirical case of the Iranian nuclear program, the presented text
is intended to test and conceptualize the security model of nuclear
weapons proliferation, as it was outlined by Scott Sagan. As a byproduct of
alternative explanations, the security model offers an implied interpretation
rather than a clear conceptualization. A defensive reaction to a perceived
threat from another nation is inherently expected within the security model.
The security related but offensive intent is not appropriately covered by the
model, though. Assuming that a defensive purpose requires a present
danger from the other nation and the ability of a prospective arsenal to
effectively challenge this danger, the two parts of the article's body are
respectively devoted to two issues: first, it is examined whether the threat
perceived by Iran actually exists, and second, the ability of the arsenal to
deter opponents is subsequently addressed within the framework of
nuclear strategy.