The Competence, Willingness, and Empowerment of Counterinsurgency Forces in Northern Mali in 2012–2013

Abstract

In 2012, Islamist violent non-state actors in northern Mali succeeded in
fighting against the Malian army, and they got the entire north Malian
territory under their control. This paper seeks to answer the question of
why the Islamists were dislodged and the territory was brought back under
the control of the Malian state only after a time gap of one year. Using the
theoretical conception of an enemy-centric approach, the criteria of
competence, willingness, empowerment, and the successful execution of
the counterinsurgency military operation are conceptualized. The paper
uses this research framework to analyze the actions of the three
counterinsurgency actors – Mali, ECOWAS/CÉDÉAO, and France – and
explains the above-mentioned gap. The research shows that IVNSAs were
eliminated and the ability of the (Malian) state to control the territory was
restored only when the counterinsurgency actor (France) was able to
accomplish the given criteria of competence, willingness, and
empowerment simultaneously.