Articles published in the journal are indexed and abstracted in the following databases:
Scopus, ERIH PLUS, Central and Eastern European Online Library (C.E.E.O.L.), Political Science Complete (EBSCO), CSA Worldwide Political Science Abstracts (ProQuest), the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (ProQuest), International Political Science Abstracts / Documentation Politique Internationale (SAGE), the Czech National Bibliography (National Library of the Czech Republic), World Affairs Online (Fachinformationsverbund Internationale Beziehungen und Länderkunde) and the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ).

CONTENTS

Tertiary Scholarship Schemes as Institutionalised Migration of Highly Skilled Labour: The Mixed Evidence of Development Effectiveness from the Czech Republic

JIŘÍ HEJKRLÍK, ONDŘEJ HORKÝ-HLUCHÁŇ, TEREZA NĚMEČKOVÁ

Abstract: Providing scholarships has become an integral part of the global higher education and so has research on its impacts. This article examines the tertiary scholarship scheme of the Czech government for providing scholarships to students from the global South as a part of its development cooperation programme with a double goal. Firstly, it examines the programme's development effectiveness from the perspective of migration studies, and secondly, it investigates the underlying motivation factors which influence the students' decisions on where they will stay after their studies. A survey among students and graduates of the scheme was triangulated with quantitative data obtained from official sources. The results show a mean values of 45 percent for brain gain, meaning that almost half of the graduates do return back home after their studies, yet this situation is aggravated by a significant share of brain waste. The major factors that influence students' migration decisions were established to be economic factors, the utility of the studies and the ease or difficulty with which they can find jobs in their home countries.

Key words: brain drain, brain gain, scholarship schemes, migration, high-skilled labour, development effectiveness, development cooperation

————————————

Regardless of the political and institutional changes, the tertiary scholarship schemes for students from the global South[1] have been an integral part of the Central and Eastern European development policies for more than seven decades, and their *raison d'être* has never been practically challenged. This observation is even more relevant in the aftermath of the so-called migration crisis, in which Central and Eastern European citizens and politicians display strong xenophobic attitudes against migrants from the global South, and particularly those from the Middle East and Africa. Providing scholarships as a part of the development cooperation was led by various motives in the past. As some argue,

after the end of the Cold War, *"Scholarships to students from the South stopped [serving] as a key battlefield for attaining political and economic goals"* (Altbach 2005: 66). Yet government scholarships are far from being outdated in a world of growing re-politicisation of aid where "new" donors such as China and India take advantage of tools gradually abandoned by the "old" donors (de Haan – Warmerdam 2011). Besides that, in times of rising competitiveness on the global labour market, one can also consider such schemes as an instrument of migration of highly skilled labour, which is currently experiencing a new wave as skilled migration is seen as one of the key elements for economic growth and innovation (Bailey – Mulder 2017: 2689).

Notwithstanding these transformations, there seems to be a long-term research gap on the overall development effectiveness of such programmes. It was only in the post-Cold War context that the effectiveness of the scholarship schemes, now fully considered as a part of the host countries' development cooperation programmes, was recognised as a relevant research and policy issue for donors (see, for example, Commission of the European Communities 2008). Consequently, an increasing number of scholarship providers have recently invested time and resources into evaluations of the scholarship schemes, tracing the scholarship programmes' alumni and examining how their post-scholarship experiences reflect the real or expected progress toward the policy objectives of the scholarship programmes (for a review of this, see Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK 2014).

The Czech case analysed here is rather an example of the long-lasting lack of evidence of the development effectiveness of the Czech(oslovak) scholarship scheme that started already in the 1950s. The decades of Czechoslovakia (before 1992) and the Czech Republic (since 1993) providing scholarships have left thousands of Czech and Slovak-speaking graduates of Czech, Slovak and Czechoslovak universities in virtually all the countries of the global South. Nevertheless, in the mid-2000s the study of the scheme's effectiveness commissioned by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which was in charge of the scheme, was the very first study to question its development effectiveness and emphasised the difficulty of making an assessment of the development effectiveness of the scheme without any collection of data on the students' migration decisions after their graduation (Jelínek – Dessieová – Náprstek 2004: 22). The assumed brain drain effects were later criticised in an international policy document regarding the special review of the Czech development cooperation, which was carried out by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD DAC 2007).[2] The following external evaluation (Horký et al. 2011), also commissioned by the Czech MFA, attempted to collect the missing data through a survey, but in general it was more directed towards assessing the then current scholarship scheme procedures than evaluating the scheme's development effectiveness.

This article eventually contributes to research on the development effectiveness of government scholarship schemes for tertiary students from the global South by exploring the Czech case. When measuring development effectiveness, we track the progress towards the set development goals. As many other donors, the Czech Government justifies the existence of the scheme by its contribution to increasing human development, eliminating poverty and enhancing the socio-economic development of developing countries (MFA 2012: 1). While there is no doubt that university education is a valuable asset for the personal development of scholarship holders at the individual level, this article builds on the assumption that a scholarship scheme is efficient from the development perspective at the national level only if the individuals use their newly acquired skills and competences primarily in their countries of origin. Such an assessment requires an exploration of the graduates' migration paths and hence this interdisciplinary paper is situated between development and migration studies. The primary goal is to assess the extent to which successful graduates return to their countries of origin, i.e. the countries of the global

South. The second, interrelated goal is to identify the factors that drive their decisions upon the completion of their studies in the Czech Republic.

To meet these goals, the article is organised as follows. The first part discusses the four brain-related migration concepts which are used as a theoretical basis for the examination of the development effectiveness of the government scholarship scheme: the concepts of brain drain, brain gain, brain circulation and brain waste. It also presents the theoretical background for the scrutiny of factors that determine students' migration strategies after they complete their studies (push and pull factors). The second part analyses the path dependence of the Czech government scholarship scheme and links the problem of the low development effectiveness of the scheme with the inherent lack of gathered data for its possible assessment. The third part presents the methodology, operationalisation and data of our research and its limitations in a situation of reduced access to official data which cover the period of 2002–2011. The fourth part presents the results of the effectiveness analysis based on a triangulation of quantitative with qualitative data based chiefly on surveys and focus groups. The fifth part investigates and categorises the most relevant factors that influence students' decisions to leave or remain in the Czech Republic after their studies. The conclusions then summarise the findings, present the current trends, discuss their political implications and question the link between the unavailability of data inherent to scholarships schemes and their development effectiveness within the current context of international development cooperation.

SCHOLARSHIP SCHEMES AS INSTITUTIONALISED MIGRATION OF HIGHLY SKILLED LABOUR: THE MAIN CONCEPTS AND FACTORS

Even though the aim to assess the development effectiveness of a tertiary education scholarship programme situates this paper in development studies, the assessment itself requires the use of concepts native to migration studies. In this perspective, this article considers scholarship schemes as a form of institutionalised migration of highly skilled labour, and as its theoretical background it borrows the four brain-related concepts of brain gain, brain drain, brain circulation and brain waste from migration studies.

Highly skilled individuals are primarily beneficial to a society where their knowledge and competences are being used. As it deals with government scholarships for students from the South, this article builds on the assumption that in the absence of externalities, scholarships yield higher development effectiveness only when the students successfully complete their studies, return home and actively use their knowledge in their country of origin – which is also the official goal of the scheme.

As applied to the tertiary education scholarship scheme, the term *brain drain* is then reserved for situations in which its graduates decide to stay in the host country or a third country with no intention of returning to their country of origin. Contrariwise, the term *brain gain* (officially declared as the main goal of most government scholarship schemes) is reserved for situations in which successful graduates return home immediately or shortly after their studies.

Brain drain is, in general, understood as the *"international transfer of human resources [that] mainly applies to the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from developing to developed countries"* (Docquier – Rapoport 2009), as the basic physiology-inspired concept of highly skilled labour originally considered international migration as a zero-sum game. As Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) argued, brain drain is a negative externality imposed on the population residing in the country of origin, and it can be analysed as a zero-sum game where rich countries get richer and poor countries poorer. However, such a pessimistic view has been rather challenged lately. It has been acknowledged that positive externalities may alter the final development effectiveness of the given brain drain. The latest research stresses that brain drain can in principle be accompanied by positive feedback even for the countries of origin, such as remittances

from migrant workers, their return to their country of origin after they have accumulated savings or new qualifications in the host country or third country, and even the participation of these migrants in scientific and business networks promoting the circulation of technological and industrial knowledge (Nechad 2018: 63).

We acknowledge the existence of the phenomenon of *"beneficial brain drain"* (Beine – Docquier – Rapoport 2001), or *"reverse brain drain"* (Maimunah – Mageswari – Roziah 2014) but we also agree with Docquier and Rapoport (2008) that there is a *"strong negative total effect of brain drain for most developing countries"*, though there is also a suggestion of moderate gains for some large middle-income developing countries – which, however, is generally not the case of the beneficiaries of the Czech scholarship scheme.

The concept of *brain circulation*, which was defined by Dawson (2007) as *"deferred brain gain"*, is applied in this article to situations in which graduates gain their first practical experiences after their graduation in the host country but still return home after a limited period.

Finally, the fourth term – *brain waste* – stands isolated from all three of the concepts mentioned so far. When applied to scholarships for foreign students, it is reserved for situations in which the students do not successfully complete their studies in the host country for a variety of reasons, regardless of where they go afterwards. In this regard, such a situation presents both sunk costs for the government providing the scholarships and opportunity costs for the students applying for them. However, from another perspective the term can also be reserved for situations in which graduates do not use their acquired education in their country of origin (Özden 2006).

To sum it up, for both epistemological and empirical reasons, we overlook the potential positive externalities of brain drain and stick to the basic acknowledgment that the scholarship schemes are efficient in terms of development only when the foreign students successfully finish their studies, return to their homelands and use their new knowledge, skills and experience back home. The combined share of brain gain and brain circulation hence serves as a proxy for development effectiveness.

The understanding of development effectiveness would not be policy-relevant without understanding the underlying reasons of the migration strategies of the scheme beneficiaries. In addition to the prevalence of the four above-mentioned concepts, this article further investigates the prevalence of a wider set of social, cultural and economic factors, at the individual, university or national level and beyond, that determine the propensity of students to remain in the host country, return home, or move to a third country after their studies.

It builds on five categories of factors adapted by Baruch, Budhwar and Khatri (2007) for North-South scholarship programmes: (1) *the student's adjustment process in the host country*, (2) *the student's satisfaction with the university* (or with his or her studies in general), (3) *cultural differences*, (4) *the student's ties with his or her home country* and, finally, (5) *the situation on the labour market* (in both the host and the home country). We narrowed down these five categories into four in the end, combining the first two into one called the *"adjustment process in the host country"*.

Each category contains a number of factors. The first category, that of the adjustment process, focusses on social factors such as the language barrier in day-to-day life (which is essential in countries such as the Czech Republic, where the majority of the population still rather does not understand English, and international students sometimes come to the country to study in English only without having any knowledge of the local language), problems encountered by foreign students at the national level such as the obstacles posed by various administrative processes (such as those related to visas or health care), and problems encountered at the university level (the language barrier, a different teaching environment, etc.). The second category deals with cultural factors. In our research we

focus on general cultural differences observed by the students and graduates, and also on their experiences with racism and xenophobia in particular. The third category focusses on individual factors which could be summed up as factors tying students to their home countries, such as the need of financial support from (or going to) the student's family, experiences of family separations and notions of studying abroad as a future benefit to the development of home country. The last, fourth category deals with various economic factors (in particular with employment opportunities in the home countries).

There is a vast literature on research of various migration factors. Nechad (2018: 60) adds several to those mentioned already: wage differences, propitious policies for the immigration of the better-educated, differences in the quality of life, education for children, interaction with other professionals, political stability, and job security, among others. Some other authors, such as Koubi et al. (2016) or Beine and Parson (2014), focus on long-run climate change factors, which increasingly influence migrants' decisions these days. Nafari et al. (2017) identified, in total, 15 migration factors from the 21 factors they initially selected by reviewing the literature.

In general all these factors can be further divided into "push and pull factors". First introduced by Lewin (1951), these factors encompass the motivation factors of students both before they decide to study abroad (Mazzarol – Soutar 2002; Parkins 2010) and after graduation. Applied to our research, push factors motivate graduates to leave the host country and possibly return home; meanwhile pull factors motivate them to stay in the host country (Baruch – Budhwar – Khatri 2007). Such a distinction helps to identify whether a student's trajectory is more influenced by the home or the host country beyond the mere area of possible intervention in the adjustment of the scheme, and hence it can contribute to drawing the political recommendations, depending on the ability of the government to influence the most relevant identified push and pull factors.

THE PATH-DEPENDENCE OF THE CZECH GOVERNMENT SCHOLARSHIP SCHEME FOR STUDENTS FROM THE SOUTH

The Czech government scholarship scheme dates back to the 1950s. Yet in spite of the major political changes over the last 70 years, including the end of the Cold War and the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993, it has a surprisingly strong path-dependency that persists beyond the variations in its geographical focus and the scale of the programme. As a part of the "socialist bloc" Czechoslovakia developed different forms of cooperation with selected countries of the Third World, and the provision of tertiary scholarships became one of its essential modalities (for details see Holečková 2010: 26). The motivation was not only to enhance the human capacities in emerging developing countries but also to intensify their inclination to the socialist model of economic and political development (Jelínek – Dessieová – Náprstek 2004: 11). The government scholarship holders originated mostly from "non-European socialist countries" (Northern Vietnam, Mongolia, and, later, Laos and Cambodia) and also "countries of special interest" (Algeria, Guinea and Mali). Scholarships were also awarded to members of various national liberation movements of that time (Jelínek – Dessieová – Náprstek 2004: 12).

The development of the programme led to the establishment of a special university for students from the Third World in 1961, which came to be called the University of 17th November; it was only the third such university in the Soviet bloc after the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia in Moscow and the Herder Institute in Leipzig (Holečková 2010: 26). However, the resentful climate in Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring of 1968 was expressed by increasing racist attacks on foreign students and gave evidence of the intolerance of the Czechoslovak society toward the otherness of the students from the Third World. Also, the rising costs and low home return rate led to a gradual transformation of several departments of the school into departments of Charles University, and in 1974 the University was officially closed (Holečková 2010: 27). Despite this, the interest

in scholarships for foreign students rose again in the 1980s with the new "countries of special interest" such as Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen and Nicaragua. By the end of the 1980s the number of students accepted for studies in Czechoslovakia each year reached the unprecedented number of 850, and from the 1960s to 1992, in total, about 20,000 foreign students benefited from the scholarship programme (Jelínek – Dessieová – Náprstek 2004: 12–14). Also by the end of the 1980s, the development aid of Czechoslovakia reached possibly as high as one percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Halaxa – Lebeda 1998). However, the expectations of the massive scholarship programme were considered unfulfilled even before the fall of the Iron Curtain (Holečková 2017) and the *"experiment"* was labelled as *"not too successful"* by former insiders who emigrated to the West (Pick 1979: 10). Unfortunately, we lack data about the extent of the brain gain from the pre-1990 period. Yet many of the scholarship recipients stayed in Czechoslovakia and some of them even became a part of the Czech political elites.

By the end of 1992, Czechoslovakia disappeared from the political map, and the newly established Czech development assistance programme re-emerged in a new political and institutional framework induced by the accession of the Czech Republic to the OECD in 1995. Yet in spite of the vast socio-economic changes in Czechoslovakia in the early 1990s, the scholarship scheme was only reduced in scale and never interrupted, unlike all the other bilateral aid modalities. Following the official restart of the Czech bilateral development assistance programme in 1995, the main motivation for the scholarship provision became the official government commitment to contribute to poverty alleviation and the sound socio-economic development of developing countries (MFA 2010: 6). Nevertheless, the scholarships continued to be used as tools of promoting foreign policy interests, especially with countries where the Czech Republic had no permanent diplomatic missions. While there was a strong path dependency in the list of priority countries before and after 1990 (Opršal – Harmáček – Syrovátka 2016), in the latter period the geographical focus was spread beyond the former socialist-leaning developing countries. However, it is important to note that since the 1990s, the number of annually accepted students per year has never reached the level from the socialist era.[3]

In 2012, the government approved a new strategy of the programme, which was valid for the period of 2013–2018 (MFA 2012) and which pursued the scale of the programme trends in terms of availability of new scholarships at 130 per year. However, it aimed at more efficiency, mainly in the selection process of candidates and the care for students during their studies. It also introduced study programmes taught solely in English (previously students had to first learn the Czech language to be accepted to Czech/Czechoslovak universities), which was expected to increase the completion rate. As of 2017, there were 597 government scholarship holders enrolled in this programme from 52 different developing countries. Meanwhile the programme consumed 110 million CZK, the equivalent of 4.7 million USD (MFA 2018: 13). However, the new strategy did not follow the recommendations of the earlier evaluation report commissioned by the MFA (Jelínek – Dessieová – Náprstek 2004) to monitor the departures and prolonged stays as well as the successful graduations and premature terminations of studies of the students after they stop receiving scholarships. In spite of the long-term doubts about the effectiveness of the programme since the Cold War, this continuing feature unfortunately does not improve the prospects for a more accurate evaluation of the development impacts of the scholarship scheme than that which is presented in the following parts.

METHODOLOGY, OPERATIONALISATION AND DATA

As for the first research goal, and as explained above, the development effectiveness of the scheme is measured as a combined share of brain gain and brain circulation. We acknowledge that both phenomena are not easily assessed without continuously tracking

all or at least a representative sample of the scheme's graduates in order to get evidence of whether they returned to their country of origin, or circulated between their country of origin and another country of the North. Unfortunately, as noted already, this is not the case of the Czech Republic. Under such circumstances we can possibly get such results if we know the extent of brain waste, that is, the number of students who do not complete their studies, and brain drain, that is, the number of those who complete them and stay in the Czech Republic. Then we can easily calculate the development effectiveness by subtraction.

Unfortunately, the official data we received from Czech authorities were not sufficient even for the second possible approach to our research. The Czech Ministry of Interior (MoI), which is in charge of migration statistics, released for the purpose of our research some quantitative data on the graduates' migration status for the year 2005 only (as no other such research has been done by them for other years). The Czech Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoE), which is in charge of the scholarship holders' data, provided us with data on scholarship holders for the period of 2002–2011. Since the scholarship scheme does not regularly monitor the migration status of its graduates, in fact the official data we received from the Czech authorities only provided us with data on brain waste. Such a situation led us to triangulate these data with estimates about the prevalence of the migration patterns from three surveys carried out among scholarship beneficiaries, the scheme's alumni and the Czech diplomatic missions in the South dealing with scholarship students at least at the initial level. We also compared our results with the estimates of the previous research done by Jelínek et al. (2004).

The surveys of scholarship beneficiaries (students and graduates) have been carried out using online tools. Since the personal data of both the students and graduates are protected by the Act on the Access to Data, the Czech MoE and universities could not release the necessary contact details for them. Hence, we had to contact the respondents by using personal links and social media. We also used the snowball method to enlarge the response pool.[4] We acknowledge that our sample is not perfectly representative. Moreover the snowball method may induce an overrepresentation of certain categories like nationality, university or study programme. Therefore, we do not present any analysis carried out within the sample. Yet the overall return rate was relatively successful. Out of 508 students registered in the programme as of March 2011, 172 completed the questionnaire (34 percent of the students). Out of the 137 alumni for whom we managed to obtain contact information, 32 completed the questionnaire. Thus, in total, 204 questionnaires filled out by past and current students were analysed. The uncompleted surveys were excluded from our analysis.

As for Czech diplomatic missions abroad, we directly contacted them with a specific questionnaire. Out of 52 addressed embassies that administer or used to administer the selection process of the scholarship candidates, 27 completed our questionnaire (a 52 percent response rate). This way, we used no less than five different official and non-official sources that provided us with intervals of the prevalence of migration strategies based on "real" numbers and estimates by the respondents. Those figures were triangulated, as shown in Table 1.

As for the second research goal, the social, economic and cultural push/pull factors identified in the literature review were complemented by additional factors that were identified in preliminary interviews with selected students and graduates living in Prague, which led to the synthesis of the factors presented in Table 2. These factors were then submitted to the respondents (students and graduates) for an evaluation of their perception of them, and the mean value of the responses was calculated.[5] To refine the findings from our quantitative surveys, we also organised two focus groups held in March and May of the same year with the current scholarship holders to provide us with complementary qualitative data that are used in the following analysis when indicated. One focus group

with 32 participants was organised in the centre of Prague; however, students of universities outside of Prague participated in it as well. The second group discussion was organised at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, which hosts a large number of scholarship holders every year. 12 students of the Faculty of Tropical AgriSciences out of 16 studying government scholarship holders participated in this group.

As for assessing the development effectiveness as such, we are aware of the limitations of the data, yet on the other hand, there is a concurrence of estimates from some of the sources of data, and we present the findings in intervals that are relatively narrow, as compared to the lack of any previous estimates of the effectiveness of this multi-million government expenditure. In the same vein, the prevalence of migration factors may be partly skewed by the insufficient representativeness of the sample, yet it is largely sufficient to point out the most important factors and draw some policy conclusions.

The assessment of the development effectiveness of the Czech government scholarship scheme

The triangulated estimates of the prevalence of the four migration patterns are presented in Table 1. Among the students who had to estimate the pathways of their schoolmates, a clear majority (67 percent) expected that the combined brain gain and brain circulation would be in between 50 and 70 percent. The Czech diplomatic missions that keep contacts with the graduates estimated that the combined brain gain and brain circulation would be in between 30 and 100 percent (with a mean value of 65 percent). These estimations are in line not only with the preliminary research carried out by Jelínek et al. (2004: 22), who estimated the range of brain drain to be only in between 20 and 50 percent, but also with, e.g., some estimates made in Canada, which ranged between 30 and 47 percent for the brain gain only (CIDA 2005: 47). All these estimates roughly correspond with the data provided by the MoI for 2005. In this year, 60 percent of all 103 of the

Table 1
Triangulation of the data

Category / Source	Brain gain	Brain circulation	Brain drain	Brain Waste
Survey among students and graduates	50–70		30–50	
Survey of Czech missions	30–100 (mean 65)		0–70 (mean 35)	
Survey among graduates (Jelínek et al. 2004)	50–70		20–50	
Ministry of Interior (2005)	0–75	0–33	7–40	
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (2002–2009)				18–71
Combined estimated interval	50–70		20–40	18–71
Estimated mean value	45	15	30	N/A

Note: All the values are in percent. A grey background indicates original data, and a white background derived values.

Sources: Own surveys and calculations, Jelínek et al. (2004).

programme's alumni (regardless of whether they were successful or not) left the country (their destinations being unknown); the rest stayed in the Czech Republic. Half of those who stayed started officially working in Czech Republic, 40 percent continued in their studies because they had not finished their study programme within the time span of the scholarship programme (and thus they lost their scholarship), and the remaining 10 percent had already acquired their permanent residence permit. Based on this sample, the combined brain gain and brain circulation estimates do not exceed 75 percent, and the brain gain varies between 7 and 40 percent.

The calculations show that the combined brain gain and brain circulation could vary between 50 and 70 percent, and the brain drain between 20 and 40 percent, which is more than expected. The finding of the relatively vast extent of brain circulation based on the 2005 data with an estimated 33 percent maximum could be considered as a new finding that deserves additional research. This indication was supported during the group discussions when a student put it this way: *"I think that most of us want to get home after [our] studies; however, for some of us it is either necessary or favourable to gain the first practical experience either here or in another country"* (Focus Group 1). Unfortunately, based on the available data, no conclusion could be derived as to where the graduates gain their first practical experiences – whether they return to their country of origin immediately, stay in the North or go to another country in the South. The sample of respondents who already graduated at the time of the survey was too small for any reliable conclusions to be derived from it. We only have some indices that can be used to draw conclusions from the survey among the current students. Slightly more than half of them (55 percent) responded that they want to look for their first practical experiences elsewhere than in their home country (24 percent in the Czech Republic, 31 percent in another country), and the rest (45 percent) wanted to return home immediately. These estimates indicate that unlike in the case of the estimated migration patterns of their schoolmates, the current students are more eager to return to their homelands immediately after their studies, implying a rising brain gain effect at the expense of the brain circulation as well as the brain drain. This indication was partially confirmed during the group discussions, where some students made the following observation: *"Currently, there are no good employment opportunities for us in Europe, but there are good opportunities in our home countries, which, unlike Europe, are experiencing economic growth"* (Focus Group 2). We have to keep in mind, though, that as Spilimbergo (2009) found out when looking at the German case, the number of students who return home after completing their studies is greater than the number of students who initially intended to do so. On the other hand, the situation on the European labour market is changing and as of 2018, especially in the Czech Republic, employment offers have multiplied and wages have risen significantly.

The findings on the extent of brain waste (understood here as the number of students who fail to complete their studies) are more disturbing. According to official data provided by the MoE, only 29 percent of the scholarship holders complete their studies successfully before their scholarships expire, meaning that less than one third of the students finish their studies without any additional semester. As for the rest, 18 percent leave the university before the end of the scholarship and 53 percent drop out of the scholarship system, mainly due to exceeding the expected length of the studies – as many Czech students do. Unfortunately, due to inconsistent data it was not possible to calculate the ratio of those students who drop out of the system but manage to successfully complete their studies on their own expenses.[6] However, the data provided by the MoI show that in 2005 as much as 14 percent of those who did not qualify for further scholarship support continued in their studies at their own expenses. The lack of more recent data not only hampers any research efforts but also indicates a substantial flaw in the monitoring system of the Czech state authorities. Nevertheless, to sum it up, the brain waste could be, based on our estimations, only as high as 18 percent, but most probably

it is higher, and it could reach as high as the alarming figure of 71 percent. Such a high percentage naturally decreases the overall development effectiveness of the scheme, regardless of whether the students eventually return home or not, simply because they do not acquire the desired knowledge.

The results of our research indicate that despite obvious problems in the design and administrative implementation of the scheme, the development effectiveness of the programme could be considered as relatively high since the brain gain and brain circulation combined range between 50 and 70 percent. However, due to the high dropout rate (brain waste), the outcome in terms of development effectiveness could be considerably decreased in the end. This leads us to the diagnosis that there is only "mixed evidence" of the development effectiveness of the Czech tertiary education scholarship scheme for students from the South.

THE IDENTIFICATION OF FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MIGRATION STRATEGY OF SCHOLARSHIP HOLDERS

The last part of the article identifies the most relevant factors that influence students' migration decisions after they complete their studies by analysing data from the surveys carried out among current students and graduates. These factors are synthesised in Table 2.

While Baruch, Budhwar, and Khatri (2007) identified the difficulties of the process of adjusting to the local environment in the host country as the most important group of factors that push the students and graduates from the host country back to their country of origin, our survey has not confirmed this finding. The respondents have primarily focussed on the issues related to the language barrier and administration procedures in the Czech Republic as these often present the biggest challenge to deal with. These factors were highlighted as significant by only 23 and 22 percent of them, respectively.

The language issues play a different role in countries where English is not an official language, as is the case of the Czech Republic. Most of the scholarship holders study in the Czech language after they complete one year of an intensive language course, so the local language knowledge could be considered as a strong integration element, i.e. a pull factor that encourages them to stay in the host country. On the other side, there are students who study in English only and are not required to complete the one-year intensive course in the Czech language and since most of the Czech population still lacks an efficient knowledge of this language, it could be regarded as a strong push factor that pushes them to return to their home country.

As for the administrative procedures, special attention has been paid in our surveys to the issue of visas, as 30 percent of the respondents reported serious difficulties with obtaining, or prolonging them. In general, during the focus groups, administrative problems with the Foreign Police, which issues temporary residence permits, were highlighted frequently. As a participant put it, *"We have a valid resolution on the scholarship provision; however, we need to go regularly to the Foreign Police to ask for the prolongation of the residence permit. Sometimes, also, our visa expires before we complete the academic year. We do not understand why both the visa and residence permits are not linked to the validity of the resolution on the scholarship provision"* (Focus Group 2). Or as another one added, *"You queue [for] hours at the Foreign Police to get to an official who does not speak any other language than Czech and makes you feel humbled for not understanding all the requirements"* (Focus Group 2). This barrier is regarded as much more difficult and stressful than the administration procedures and the environment at the universities, which were identified as a serious problem by only 17 percent of the respondents.

The second group of factors, dealing with cultural differences, is also characterised by a very low significance for the respondents. Only three percent of the respondents consider the racism and xenophobia in the Czech Republic as a significant factor for their decision as to whether they will stay in or leave the country, and no more than nine percent see

Table 2
The main factors of migration by scholarship recipients

Category	Factor	Direction	Prevalence
Adjustment process	Language barrier in day-to-day life	Push/Pull	23%
	Humiliation during administration procedures (for visas, etc.)	Push	22%
	Serious problems encountered at the university (language barrier, bad teaching environment, missing prerequisites)	Push	17%
Cultural differences	Everyday racism and xenophobia	Push	3%
	General cultural differences	Push	9%
Ties with the home country	Financial support from/to the student's family	**Push/Pull**	**57%**
	Negative experience of family separation	Push	17%
	Studying abroad as a benefit for the development of the home country	**Push**	**61%**
Labour market	Unemployment in the home country	Pull	32%
	Ease of finding a job in the home country	**Push**	**78%**
	Use of knowledge acquired abroad	**Push**	**82%**
	A higher salary in the home country due to studies abroad	**Push**	**51%**
	A temporary stay in the Czech Republic as a beneficial experience	Push/Pull	13%

Source: Own survey and calculations. Factors with a prevalence > 50 percent are highlighted.

general cultural differences as relevant for their decision. This result is in line with Baruch, Budhwar, and Khatri (2007) but in contradiction to the findings produced by Soon (2009), who considered differences in lifestyle as the largest positive factor in a student's intention to return home. In the case of the Czech Republic, this could be accounted to the relatively large presence of scholarship holders from culturally and geographically close areas, such as South-East Europe, who do not perceive negative cultural differences in the Czech environment, quoting *"the myth of the Prague student"* in the Balkans (Tesař 2013). In any case, factors identified as "cultural" are not a strong predictor for the post-study departure (or lack thereof) of the majority of the students.

The third group of factors, which is related to the students' ties with their home countries, ranked as the second-best explanation in the study by Baruch, Budhwar, and

Khatri (2007), and it has also been assessed as the second most important group of factors in our survey. Unlike the experience of separation from one's family, which was highlighted by only 17 percent of the respondents, one's dependence on the financial support from his or her family ranked very high, with 57 percent of the responses stating that it is a major factor. The explanation for this finding could be found in the fact that the scholarship support in the Czech Republic is rather low (compared to living expenses, especially in the capital) and work opportunities for foreign students are rather rare since work opportunities are limited for non-EU citizens. Most of the respondents (61 percent) also highlighted the students' moral obligation to use the knowledge gained abroad as a benefit for their home countries, a factor that contributes to brain gain.

Finally, the perceived situation on the labour market in the country of origin has been identified in our survey as the most important group of factors. The factors regarded as the most significant were the following: the (high or low) chances to use the acquired knowledge and skills in the country of origin (82 percent), the general easiness or difficulty of finding a job in the home country (78 percent) and the level of salaries for high-skill labour in the home country compared to the level in the Czech Republic (51 percent). Having some temporary experience in the host country was regarded as beneficial for one's future career by only 13 percent of the respondents. We have already tackled the issue of the changing balance in the world economy and its potential influence on the migration patterns of scholarship holders. Even though comparable studies are not available for both the pre- and post-crisis periods, there seems to be a significant shift in the migration factors caused by the fluctuating situation on the labour markets in many countries in the global North, which stand in contrast with the high and continuous economic growth in many countries in the South. The changing economic balance appears as even more important since in contradiction with past research, we have identified the labour markets and the financial links with the home country as more important than cultural and lifestyle factors.

CONCLUSIONS

This article contributes to filling the research gap on the development effectiveness of government scholarship schemes of countries of the North that provide scholarships to students from the global South from the perspective of the migration patterns of their graduates. On the case of a minor scholarship scheme in a country without substantial diasporas, we have shown the relative irrelevance of brain circulation when it is understood as repeated migration. Instead, our article brought attention to the underestimated phenomenon of brain circulation in the sense in which it is understood as a form of deferred brain gain.

Despite the triangulation of the best available data, we could establish only intervals for estimations of the extent of the brain-related phenomena with mean values of 45 percent for brain gain, 15 percent for brain circulation and 30 percent for brain drain, figures that look more positive than expected. In addition to that, brain waste, which can partly overlap with the preceding categories, would be at least 18 percent high, which leads us to the final diagnostic of mixed evidence of the development effectiveness of the Czech tertiary education scholarship schemes for students from the South, which is similar to the corresponding diagnostics for many other countries of the North.[7]

However, our analysis of the factors that influence the students' migration decisions upon completion of their studies gives a slightly different picture from that of the existing literature (Baruch – Budhwar – Khatri 2007; Soon 2009). The "soft" factors like cultural differences and adjustment procedures in the host country were identified as relevant only by a minority of the scholarship holders in our surveys while the economic factors were identified as the most prominent for them regarding their immigration decisions. The respondents from the South have also strongly highlighted the utility of their studies

and the ease of finding a job at home after their studies. However, one has to bear in mind that the economic situations on both the home and host markets change very dynamically. Therefore, what is considered as the most relevant push factor among students and graduates at a particular period of time (i.e. the employment possibilities in the home country) could be potentially assessed differently a couple of years later. Consequently, the slowly narrowing economic gap between the countries in the South and the countries in the North could be then expected to contribute to even higher brain gain and hence to the development effectiveness of the scholarship scheme. However, the prominence of these external factors related to geopolitical shifts leaves little space for the Czech government to improve the development effectiveness of the scholarships scheme beyond the improvement of the legal design of the programme.[8]

Despite this positive trend, it is not possible to give a yes/no answer to the question of the overall development effectiveness of the Czech scholarship scheme because it is a political question to decide what threshold a scholarship scheme must reach to be labelled as efficient. Nevertheless, with brain gain and brain circulation possibly as low as 50 percent, and this situation being aggravated by a brain waste of at least 18 percent, it is highly questionable whether all the expenses should be counted as Official Development Assistance rather than discarded as a part of the "inflated aid" that was criticised by the European development NGOs (see CONCORD 2017).

The exploration of the Czech case also shows that the absence of reliable data on the status of the former scholarship holders as an inbuilt feature of the scholarship scheme is a fundamental obstacle for assessing its effectiveness. Since many students finish their studies after they leave the scholarship scheme (i.e. they continue studying on their own expenses or terminate their studies and change to another university), the Czech MFA should adjust the system so that it would have access to the most reliable data on the former students' study success and migration status. While these data may not confirm the development effectiveness of the scholarship scheme, at least they would also help the MFA to build a database and keep track of the former scholarship holders as possible "ambassadors" of the Czech interests abroad. This all is to emphasise that a strong focus on monitoring is a necessary precondition for the effectiveness of the tertiary education scholarship schemes not only in terms of their contribution to global development, but also in terms of their contribution to foreign policy interests.

---

[1] We use the term "global South" or simply "South" as a contemporary proxy for the countries of origin of the students eligible for the tertiary education scholarships. This term is not equivalent with the term "Third World", which was mainly used before the end of the Cold War, since some formerly socialist countries in Eastern and South Eastern Europe have become entitled to development aid and scholarships as a part of the Official Development Assistance (ODA).

[2] In spite of a lack of policy change, the problem of scholarships was entirely left out from the first regular peer review by the OECD DAC (2016).

[3] The number of annually accepted students dropped to only 150 in 1994–1996 (Jelínek et al. 2004: 14) to gradually increase again up to 250 within the period of 2003–2007 (Government of the Czech Republic 2003: 1). The scheme of the programme which was valid for the period of 2007–2013 decreased this number to only 130 (Government of the Czech Republic 2007: 1).

[4] The snowball method did not include only students and graduates, but also intermediaries such as the study administrators at some universities and faculties.

[5] To ensure the comparability of the data, only 102 out of the 204 sufficiently completed questionnaires were included in the factor analysis.

[6] Public higher education in the Czech Republic is free and there are no tuition fees for curricula in the Czech language and some curricula in English. The fees for an extended length of study are relatively low, so the main costs for the students that do not complete their studies as expected consist of living expenses. These are generally covered by their work or contributions from their families abroad.

[7] These findings are in line with the latest evaluation of the Czech scholarship scheme by Feřtrová et al. (2018).

[8] Among the factors with a prevalence of more than 50 percent, the government can only indirectly tackle the dependence of the students on financial support from their families, which complements the low scholarships by increasing the students' financial resources. Yet the effect of tackling this push/pull factor would be ambiguous:

it would decrease the perceived debt of the graduates to their families, but that would reduce the students' incentives to stay in the North to send remittances to their families but also their incentives to return to the South to "pay back" their families for their education in their home country.

Literature

• Altbach, Philip G. (2005): Globalization and the University: Myths and Realities in an Unequal World. In: *The National Education Association 2005 Almanac of Higher Education.* Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, pp. 63–74, <http://doi.org/10.1023/B:TEAM.0000012239.55136.4b>.
• Bailey, Ajay – Mulder, Clara (2017): Highly Skilled Migration between the Global North and South: Gender, Life courses and Institutions. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 16, pp. 2689–2703, <http://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1314594>.
• Baruch, Yehuda – Budhwar, Pawan S. – Khatri, Naresh (2007): Brain Drain: Inclination to Stay Abroad after Studies. *Journal of World Business*, Vol. 42, pp. 99–112, <http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jwb.2006.11.004>.
• Beine, Michel – Docquier, Frédéric – Rapoport, Hillel (2001): Brain Drain and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence. *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 64, No. 1, pp. 275–289, <http://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00133-4>.
• Beine, Michel – Parson, Christopher (2014): Climatic Factors as Determinants of International Migration. *The Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 117, No. 2, pp. 723–767, <http://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12098>.
• Bhagwati, Jagdish Natwarlal – Hamada, Koichi (1974): The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets and Unemployment: A Theoretical Analysis. *Journal of Development Economics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 18–42, <http://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3878(74)90020-0>.
• De Haan, Arjan – Warmerdam, Ward (2011): New Donors and Old Practices: Does the Rise of China Challenge Aid Effectiveness? In: *EADI General Conference 2011: Rethinking Development in an Age of Scarcity and Uncertainty*. York, England: European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.
• Docquier, Frédéric – Rapoport, Hillel (2009): Documenting the Brain Drain of «la Crème de la Crème»: Three Case-Studies on International Migration at the Upper Tail of the Education Distribution. *Journal of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 229, No. 6, pp. 679–705.
• Halaxa, Petr – Lebeda, Petr (1998): Mnohostranná rozvojová pomoc České republiky [Multilateral Development Assistance of the Czech Republic]. *Mezinárodní politika*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 7–9.
• Holečková, Marta E. (2010): Universita 17. listopadu a její místo v československém vzdělávacím systému a společnosti [The University of 17th November and Its Position in the Czechoslovak Educational System and Society]. In: Sklenářová, Sylva (ed.): *Možnosti a meze výzkumu dějin vysokého školství po roce 1945: sborník z konference*. Hradec Králové: Gaudeamus, pp. 25–27.
• Holečková, Marta E. (2017): Konfliktní lekce z internacionalismu: Studenti z "třetího světa" a jejich konfrontace s českým prostředím (1961–1974) [Conflictual Lessons of Internationalism: Students from the "Third World" and Their Confrontation with the Czech Environment (1961–1974)]. *Soudobé dějiny*, Vol. 20, No. 1–2, pp. 158–175.
• Horký, Ondřej – Němečková, Tereza – Krylová, Petra – Hejkrlík, Jiří – Jílková, Klementina (2011): *Vyhodnocení programu vládních stipendií pro studující z rozvojových zemí: Zvýšení efektivnosti a nové nástroje podpory terciárního vzdělávání [Evaluation of the Programme of the Government Scholarships for Students from Developing Countries: An Increase in Effectiveness and New Instruments for Supporting Tertiary Education]*. Prague: Institute of International Relations.
• Jelínek, Petr – Dessieová, Květa – Náprstek, Martin (2004): *Analýza poskytování vládních stipendií ke studiu na veřejných vysokých školách občanům z rozvojových a jiných potřebných zemí [An Analysis of the Provision of Government Scholarships for Studying at Public Colleges and Universities for Students from Developing Countries and Other Countries in Need]*. Prague: Institute of International Relations.
• King, Kenneth – McGrath, Simon A (2004): *Knowledge for Development?: Comparing British, Japanese, Swedish and World Bank Aid*. London: Zed Books.
• Koubi, Vally – Spilker, Gabriel – Schaffer, Lena – Bohmelt, Tobias (2016): The Role of Environmental Perceptions in Migration Decision-Making: Evidence from Both Migrants and Non-migrants in Five Developing Countries. *Population and Environment*, No. 38, Vol. 2, pp. 134–163, <http://doi.org/10.1007/s11111-016-0258-7>.
• Lewin, Kurt (1951): *Field Theory in Social Science*. New York: Harper & Row.
• Maimunah, Ismail – Mageswari, Kunasegaran – Roziah, Mohd Rasdi (2014): Evidence of Reverse Brain Drain in Selected Asian Countries: Human Resource Management Lessons for Malaysia. *Organisations and Markets in Emerging Economies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (9), pp. 31–48, <http://www.om.evaf.vu.lt/cms/cache/RePEc_files/article_55.pdf>.
• Mazzarol, Tim – Soutar, Geoffrey (2002): Push-Pull Factors Influencing Foreign Student Destination Choice. *The International Journal of Educational Management*, Vol. 16, pp. 82–91, <http://doi.org/10.1108/09513540210418403>.
• Nafari, Javid – Arab, Alireza – Ghaffari, Sina (2017): Through the Looking Glass: Analysis of Factors Influencing Iranian Student's Study Abroad Motivations and Destination Choice. *SAGE Open*, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 1–19, <http://doi.org/10.1177/2158244017716711>.

• Nechad, Abdelhamid (2018): A Geo-Economic Approach to Brain Drain in Morocco. *Journal of Economic and Social Development*, Vol. 5, No.1, pp. 58–68, <http://www.jesd-online.com/dokumenti/upload/separated/Vol_5_No_1_Paper7.pdf>.
• Opršal, Zdeněk – Harmáček, Jaroslav – Syrovátka, Miroslav (2016): The Allocation of Czech Foreign Aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Influence of Historical Relationships. *International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies*, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 325–143, <http://doi.org/10.1504/IJEPEE.2016.081401>.
• Özden, Çaglar (2006): Educated Migrants: Is There Brain Waste? In: Özden, Çaglar – Schiff, Maurice (eds.): *International Migration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain*. World Bank, Washington, DC, pp. 227–244.
• Parkins, Natasha C. (2010): Push and Pull Factors of Migration. *American Review of Political Economy*, Vol. 8, pp. 6–24.
• Soon, Jan-Jan (2009): When Do Students Intend to Return? Determinants of Students' Return Intentions Using a Multinomial Logit Model. *University of Otago Economics Discussion Papers*, No. 906.
• Spilimbergo, Antonio (2009): Democracy and Foreign Education. *American Economic Review*, Vol. 99, No. 1, pp. 528–543.
• Tesař, Filip (2013): *Můžeme, chceme, dokážeme? Česká ekonomická, veřejná a kulturní diplomacie a Balkán [Can We, Do We Want to, Are We Able to Do It?: Czech Economic, Public and Cultural Diplomacy and the Balkans]*. Prague: Institute of International Relations.

Documents
• CIDA (2005): *Evaluation of the Canadian Francophonie Scholarship Programme (CFSP), 1987–2005.* Quebec, Canada: Canadian International Development Agency, <http://www.oecd.org/derec/canada/37778524.pdf>.
• Commission of the European Communities (2008): *Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration: Increasing Coordination, Coherence and Synergies. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions* (2008/611(COM)). Brussels, Belgium: Commission of the European Communities, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-global-approach-migration-20081008_en_2.pdf>.
• Commonwealth Scholarship Commission in the UK (2014): *A Study of Research Methodology Used in Evaluations of International Scholarship sSchemes for Higher Education*. London, UK, <http://cscuk.dfid.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/evaluation-research-methodology-study.pdf>.
• CONCORD (2017): *AidWatch 2017: EU Aid Uncovered: How to Reach the Target on Time.* Brussels: CONCORD Europe.
• Dawson, Laura (2007): Brain Drain, Brain Circulation, Remittances and Development: Prospects for the Caribbean. Caribbean Working Paper No. 2. Ontario, Canada: The Centre for International Governance Innovation.
• Feřtrová, Marie et al. (2018): *Zpráva z vyhodnocení programu poskytování vládních stipendií pro studenty z rozvojových zemí v období 2013–2017 [Evaluation Report of the Programme of the Government Scholarships for Students from Developing Countries in the Period 2013–2017].* Prague: Edreo.
• Government of the Czech Republic (2003): *Czech Government Resolution No. 773/2003.*
• Government of the Czech Republic (2007): *Czech Government Resolution No. 712/2007.*
• MFA (2010): *Koncepce zahraniční rozvojové spolupráce České republiky na období 2010–2017 [The Conception of the Development Assistance of the Czech Republic for the Period of 2010–2017].* Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.
• MFA (2012): *Strategie pro poskytování vládních stipendií studentům z rozvojových zemí pro období 2013–2018 [The Strategy for the Provision of the Government Scholarships for Students from Developing Countries for the Period of 2013–2018].* Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.
• MFA (2018): *Informace o zahraniční rozvojové spolupráci ČR v roce 2017 [Information about the Czech Foreign Development Cooperation in 2017].* Prague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.
• Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Assistance Committee (2007): *Development Cooperation of the Czech Republic: DAC Special Review.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, <http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/45367897.pdf>.
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Assistance Committee (2016): *OECD Development Cooperation Peer Reviews: Czech Republic.* Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
• Pick, Otto (1979): Czechoslovakia's Presence in Black Africa. *Radio Free Europe Background Report*, No. 66.

Do Not Throw Them in the Same Basket: China and Russia From the Perspective of US Engagement

PAVEL HLAVÁČEK

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has applied a policy of engagement towards China and Russia. During the administration of Barack Obama, this approach led to two different outcomes: while the American relations with Russia reached their lowest point, and international sanctions were imposed on Russia during Obama's term, in the case of China, the US relations with it were better in this period than prior to the election of Barack Obama. The goal of this article is to determine why this occurred. I come to the conclusion that China and Russia adopted different forms of engagement in regard to the US. While China has been working on its power and prestige in close cooperation with the United States, and therefore it should not be labelled as "revisionist power", Russia has tried to re-establish its power potential and international prestige in opposition to the United States. Therefore Russia can be called a "revisionist power".

The American engagement towards China and Russia is a process about which experts conduct debates relatively often, but without any definitive conclusion (Deyermond 2013; Goldberg 2014; Walt 2017). While for some, both of the aforementioned countries represent examples of *"revisionist powers"* that have become *"geopolitical rivals"* of the United States (Mead 2014: 69), for others, this is marked as a *"colossal misreading of modern power realities"* (Ikenberry 2014: 80).

The debate has been revived once again when the new National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) were released in 2017 and 2018 respectively. According to the NSS, there are three sets of challengers who are actively competing against the United States and its allies and partners: *"the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups"*. The administration of Donald Trump came to the conclusion that the United States must *"rethink the policies of the past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners"* (2017: 3). Also the NDS (2018: 2) confirms that it *"is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their*

authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over other nations' economic, diplomatic, and security decisions".

The main argument of this essay could be summed up in two reciprocal claims. Firstly, we should not put China and Russia into one category, because they do not represent the same challenge for the United States. And secondly, while the policy of engagement may not have produced the results that had been expected, it should not be replaced by a completely new strategy. We may find the reason why when we look at the strategic documents of the previous administration of the United States. Barack Obama declared in his first National Security Strategy (2010) that he would *"[deepen the] cooperation with 21st century centers of influence"*, including China a Russia, *"on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect"*. In the case of China, such cooperation was expected to result in *"a positive, constructive and comprehensive relationship"*, because the US government at the time welcomed *"a China that takes on a responsible leadership role [...] to advance priorities like economic recovery, confronting climate change, and nonproliferation"* (NSS 2010: 43). In a similar manner, Obama's administration sought a *"stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship"* with Russia, because it had an interest *"in [achieving] a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia that respects international norms"* (NSS 2010: 44).

In the case of China it is a matter of debate to what extent China is integrated within the rules and norms of the international system. However, today it has a far more intense cooperation with the United States than at any previous time since the normalization of their relationship. On the other hand, currently the US-Russian relations are far from where President Obama hoped they would be. They have been all but deepened. Russia has invaded its neighbouring countries and has turned out to be neither peaceful nor prosperous. From these observations, we may conclude that the US engagement toward Beijing has so far been relatively successful, while the US engagement toward Moscow has not been so successful. It is because China has demonstrated its resolve to become a "status quo" power, while Russia has developed characteristics of a revisionist power.

Since the thesis of this paper contradicts the general assessment of the role of China in world affairs in the strategic documents of the United States (NSS 2017, NDS 2018), let us briefly focus on the academic debate on whether China is a revisionist or status quo power. It should not be surprising that there is no consensus on this (Friedberg 2011; Kastner, Saunders 2012; Lind 2017; Legro 2007). To a certain extent this inconclusiveness can be attributed to the fact that "revisionism" and "status quo" are very vague terms. Alastair Johnston (2003: 10) once complained that it is *"disturbing how little thought [...] has gone into determining whether a state is status quo or revisionist across the totality of its foreign policy preferences and actions"*.

Generally, liberal thinkers and politicians believe that engagement is the right way and the only way to accommodate China within existing rules and norms. Joseph Nye (1996) claimed that China will follow its national interest but the United States *"can affect how the Chinese define that interest"*. If a policy of engagement is applied in this case, *"the prospects for conflict diminish"*. In turn, John G. Ikenberry believes that it is the current president of the United States who has been pursuing a revisionist policy and challenging the liberal order of the last 70 years (2017: 1).

The realist school of international relations tends to be pessimistic about the idea that China might eventually be engaged and become a responsible actor. For this school, a conflict of interests between China and the US seems inevitable. Also in its view, the Chinese ascendance to power has become more challenging for the United States than other threats. For Condoleezza Rice (2000: 56), *"China is not a 'status quo' power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor"*. Perhaps the most explicitly pessimistic in this respect is John Mearsheimer. For him, all rising powers are technically revisionist because they want to achieve their regional hegemony. Therefore,

the Chinese rise will not be peaceful (Mearsheimer 2014). Others are not sure about whether a war with China is inevitable, yet they still feel that *"intense security competition is likely to result"* from its rise (Walt 2018; compare with Mead 2014 and Kissinger 2012). Similar assessments of China can be found among neoconservative thinkers. For Robert Kagan (1997) *"Chinese leaders chafe at the constraints on them and worry that they must change the rules of the international system before the international system changes them"*.

In the following passages, I will attempt to assess in what way it has been possible to (un)successfully integrate (engage) China and Russia in the existing structure of the international order, so that they would become standard partners of the USA who would not be interested in a revision of the norms and rules of the current international system ("status quo powers" if you like). This work stems from the assumption that the major qualitative shift in the relations of China and Russia with the United States has occurred during the presidency of Barack Obama (2009–2017): while in the case of China, its relations with the USA remained the same as they were prior to Obama's election (if they have not actually improved), the US relations with Russia, on the other hand, drastically deteriorated. More precisely stated, the author of this text places emphasis on the question of why the American strategy of engagement towards Russia failed while the US strategy towards China succeeded in reinforcing their mutual relations.

To answer the above question, I will proceed in the following steps: in the theoretical section, I will present the concept of engagement, which I will subsequently apply to the relations of the USA with China and Russia. At the beginning of each of the two following sub-sections, I will then summarize the US-Chinese and the US-Russian mutual relations, respectively. I will observe the engagement at four levels: the diplomatic, military, economic and cultural levels. In conclusion, I will then argue that in one of the two cases the American engagement did not work while in the second case it has hitherto borne "fruit".

THE STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT

When Barack Obama met with the journalist Thomas L. Friedman in April 2015 and was asked about the US concept of foreign policy, the president responded: *"You asked about an Obama doctrine. The doctrine is: We will engage, but we preserve all our capabilities"* (Friedman 2015). These few words describe the general direction of American foreign policy not only under Barack Obama, but also since the end of the Cold War. Engagement aspires to the creation or maintenance of close relations with former enemies, not their containment. The aim of such a strategy is to incorporate the target countries into the existing structures of the international order and to make them status quo powers.

This shift – from containment to engagement – is well illustrated by the document National Security Strategies of the United States of America (NSS). While in his NSS, George Bush Sr. still only rarely used the term "engagement", (NSS 1990: 5, 13; 1991: 9, 27; 1993: 3, 6–7, 14) in the NSS created during the government of Bill Clinton, on the other hand, it became one of the most used terms (NSS 2001: Chap. 1; cp. NSS 1996: 40). And this tendency is also repeated in the NSS 2010 from the times of Barack Obama, where "engagement" has become one of the most common words (2010: 11–12, 32–34).

With this, as the framework for discussion regarding American foreign policy has changed after 1989, a very lively debate has developed among experts about the American role in global politics. Its level has been somewhat undermined by the fact that the term "engagement" does not have a clear and coherent definition. According to Robert L. Suettinger (2000: 18, 20), as a result of its overuse or the lack of a definition for it, a fundamental consensus has completely disappeared in regard to how the term itself is understood.

In the most general sense of the word, "engagement" is *"a synonym for involvement overseas, the opposite of disengagement or isolation"* (Rock 2000: 21). The specific instruments of engagement are various: the effort to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against terrorism, measures for the support and stabilization of democratic regimes, environmental protection, the fight against drug smuggling and the drug trade, expansion of the free market or the US's access to it, and others (NSS 1996; NSS 2010).

It is possible to view engagement from two basic points of view: either at a general level such as that of a *Grand Strategy* – i.e. a synonym for American internationalism (Rock 2000: 21; Terem 2017: 124) – or in a limited concept as a bilateral policy of one state (the *sender*) towards selected countries or groups of countries (the *receivers*, or *target states*) (NSS 2000; NSS 2010). However, this article draws on the concept of engagement as a strategy towards "unsavory regimes" (Resnick 2001: 559; cp. Litwak 2000: the 1st chapter) that are not satisfied with the international system. These countries are offered various suggestions (*incentives*) and rewards (*concessions*) so that they may be incorporated into the functioning structure of the world order. Evan Resnick (2001: 559) defines engagement as *"the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic and cultural)"*. The opposite of engagement is isolation or disengagement. A government that conducts a policy of isolation could have the same goals as in a case of engagement: namely the reduction/ /removal of conflicts/tensions. However, it attempts to reach the same goals with different means: a reduction and/or a complete termination of contacts with the target state in the areas of mutual interests. Both engagement and isolation can be complemented by either a policy of containment or a policy of appeasement. By "containment" we mean an attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state by blocking its territorial expansion or the expansion of its sphere of influence into other territories or states, while a policy of appeasement is the opposite: an attempt to influence the target state by ceding territory and/or a geopolitical sphere of influence to it (Resnick 2001: 562).

According to Resnick, the success of an engagement strategy is conditioned by three factors:

1) The scope of mutual contacts between the initiator and the recipient must be low at first, so that the beginning of the engagement by the government of the target state is perceived as a positive change. If the level of contacts is already high, then the consequences of the engagement for the recipient are not felt in any way.

2) The recipient's motivation to obtain material or prestige sources must be high because they meet the needs for which the target country has not yet received resources. As a result of this, there is no motivation to return to the *status quo* prior to the engagement or to search for other methods to acquire the lacking prestige and material goods.

3) The target state must consider the initiator (the sender) and the international order it represents *"as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires"* (2001: 561). This means that the acceptance of the norms of the existing order is considered by the target state as the correct step that would create potential for the anticipated prestige and material resources to continue to flow. Autocratic or totalitarian states (for example, Nazi Germany or the USSR under Stalin), which stand outside the existing order, would not sense the benefits of engagement and would thus not be motivated to accept the existing norms as their own (2001: 561).

Once these three conditions are fulfilled, we may move to specific dimensions of engagement. There is no exact definition of what kinds of indicators represent different levels of engagement. Resnick himself uses a modified version of the list of components drawn up by Dean Guldenhuyes (1990: 17–18). They both distinguish four broad dimensions of engagement: the diplomatic, economic, military and cultural dimensions.

ANALYSING ENGAGEMENT

Based on the above theoretical discussion of engagement, we may deduce three developmental stages of successful engagement that can be observed in international relations: the initial, intermediate, and final stage. In the idealized initial stage, the target state has a limited number of available contacts with the engaging state, it enjoys only a low international prestige, and it is only minimally integrated in the international order. In the intermediate stage, we can see a gradual establishment of good relations between the two states, the growing international prestige and economic expansion of the receiving state, and its integration with selected elements of the international order. In the final stage, the receiving state enjoys good relations with the engaging state as well as with other major members of the international community, it is established as a relevant power in the existing order, and it is fully identified with the order. The movement from the initial, through the intermediate, and to the final stage means that the strategy of engagement made a (potentially) revisionist state into a status-quo power. The three stages of a successful engagement are summed up in the following table.

Table 1
The Three Stages of Successful Engagement

Initial stage	Intermediate stage	Final stage
Low engagement (limited amounts of contacts).	Gradual restoration of standard diplomatic relations.	High engagement (standard relations with all states of the world).
Low international prestige.	Growing prestige in global politics, economic expansion.	Establishment of a power status in the framework of the existing order.
Lack of integration in the international order.	Incorporating selected elements of the existing order.	Identification with the existing order.

Source: Author.

The main purpose of engagement is to establish an *"increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and target state"* (Resnick 2001: 563). Therefore, to infer about the stages of engagement we can draw on quantitative indicators of the contacts between the two countries. For instance, let us look at the diplomatic level. If the number of visits between representatives of the sender and the target state is higher than in the previous period, it indicates that the target state has been successfully engaged. On the other hand, if the number of visits decreases, then the engagement is stagnating. The same can be said about the numbers of contacts in the other dimensions: the economic, military and cultural dimensions.

All the indicators of engagement are not of equal importance. For instance, the amount of foreign trade and investment usually far exceeds the amount of aid from the development assistance and humanitarian aid. Therefore, trade and investments will influence the general level of the mutual relationship more than aid. Similarly, one may also argue that the military dimension will affect the outcome of the engagement more deeply than the cultural dimension.

Finally, we should be aware that the level of engagement may vary from one area to another and from one indicator to another (Guldenhuyes 1990: 18). That means that the target state may in theory be very comfortable in establishing or enhancing the links in

the economic area but still may be – for a number of reasons – far less enthusiastic in the promotion of the cultural dimension of the engagement. If this would be the case, it needs to be explained why the target state is reluctant in one area and not the other one. The indicators of engagement used in this study are summed up in the following table.

Table 2
Possible Indicators of Engagement

Diplomatic contacts	• The numbers of summit meetings with and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of the sender state in the target state and vice-versa • Promotion of the target state's potential membership in international institutions and regimes
Military contacts	• The numbers of visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa • The numbers of military cooperation, exchange and training programs • The existence of confidence- and security-building measures
Economic contacts	• The level of trade agreements and investment • The level of development and humanitarian aid
Cultural contacts	• The number of travel and tourism links • The number of academic exchanges

Source: A modified version of tables from Geldenhuys (1990: 17–18) and Resnick (2001: 559–560).

The following part of this paper uses the above introduced conceptualizations of the stages and indicators of engagement to study the recent relations between the USA and China and between the USA and the Russian Federation. The goal is to ascertain the major differences between the two sets of relations and acquire a better understanding of why the engagement of the USA with China was much more successful than its engagement with Russia.

All the data in this paper that are used for its evaluation of engagement are publicly available. Most of them are statistics processed by the government of the United States. They can be found either on the websites of the White House or on the websites of the Executive Departments (particularly those of the State, Defense and Commerce). The other data from the economic or cultural sector come from the US Census Bureau.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE US ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA

The cases of the US engagements with China and Russia are very different. China has been expanding its contacts with the USA since the beginning of the 1970s while Russia has done so only since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the Chinese communists had a very strong motivation to accept the engagement with the USA as their own since it confirmed the principal position of their party but also their long-term position that China is indivisible (i.e. the engagement implied that the USA does not recognize the independence of Taiwan). On the other hand, Russian leaders had to reconcile themselves with the fact that the country they had previously ruled (the USSR) no longer existed, and that the Communist Party was no longer the ruling Party. In the case of China, the changes have been initiated and executed by the political elites without substantial pressure from the public. In the case of Russia, the engagement with the USA was

accepted in a period when there had been a steep decline in the standard of living, an unprecedented rise in crime and an overall loss in Russia's international prestige.

These differences are significant, and we need to bear them in mind when thinking about the US engagement with the two countries. However, both China and Russia represent significant global actors who had been perceived as enemies by the United States in the past. Furthermore, China and Russia had only minimal contacts with the government of the USA before these two countries ceased to be labelled as "enemies" by the US administration. And finally, the degrees of prestige of China and Russia and their integration within the international order had been low and limited in this time period. These qualities allow us to consider that both Sino-American and Russo-American relations had once been in what we conceptualize here as the initial stage of engagement with the USA. In the following two sections, we will look at how the US engagements with China and Russia developed in terms of the stages and indicators of engagement.

The US Engagement with China

The US engagement with China started with the normalization of diplomatic relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China (PRC) during the presidency of Richard Nixon (1969–1974). Nixon considered the PRC as one of the partners of the USA in the policy of containment of Soviet power. Economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries were successfully initiated in this period, although their general impact on the relations was relatively low.

After the end of the Cold War, the significance of the PRC for American foreign policy declined. Not only did the United States remain the sole superpower, but the Chinese leadership itself plunged into international isolation to a marked degree. This isolation was largely caused by, firstly, the Chinese government violently ending the anti-government demonstrations on Tiananmen Square and, secondly, by the Chinese military threatening the government in Taiwan (Saunders, Bowie 2016: 664). In this period, an often-contentious debate ensued between American political elites about what position to adopt towards China. Regardless of whether the debate was in the White House or the Capitol, or whether the politicians were from the Republican or the Democratic Party, a pragmatic approach always predominated in the end, according to which the best method for approaching the PRC was engagement and the development of greater contacts (Christensen 2015: 30). Thus, despite all the disagreements, the contacts between the two countries have slowly but continuously increased after the end of the Cold War. The positive shift in the mutual relations is well illustrated by the terms used to describe China in the American political discourse. The relations with China shifted from being a *"close, friendly, and cooperative relationship"* (NSS 1987: 15) under Ronald Reagan to being a *"strategic partnership"* (Clinton 1998) during the presidency of Bill Clinton. This reversal was initially criticized by George Bush Jr., who, while still the Governor of Texas, proposed labelling China as a *"competitor, not a strategic partner"* (Bush 1999). However, insofar as China was accepted into the WTO (2001) – because of which it had to open its market and accept the principles of the free market – it became a *"responsible stakeholder"* (NSS 2006: 41) even during the George Bush Jr. presidency (Chu 2001; Rabin 2010).

A very dynamic period in the Sino-American relations started with the election of Barack Obama. At that point, the US relations with China were already markedly defined and institutionalized. Thus Obama cannot be labelled as the initiator of the American policy of engagement with China. However, he continued in the established trend and brought the relations to a new level. Obama became the first president of the USA to visit China in the first year of his presidency. During this trip to Asia in November 2009, Obama declared his intention *"to make clear that the United States is a Pacific nation"* and that he would be deepening the US's *"engagement in this part of the world"* (Obama 2009).

However, in several speeches in the Fall of 2011, Obama declared the so-called *"Pivot to Asia"*, which was later referred to as the *"rebalance"* (Obama 2011); it was one of the most ambitious changes in American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. According to the plan for it, the United States – after completing the mission in Afghanistan and Iraq – decided to focus its attention and resources primarily on the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century (Clinton 2010, 2011). The *"Pivot to Asia"*, however, was not only about reinforcing existing relations, but also about limiting China's efforts to expand its sphere of influence. Various statements of President Obama mentioned that in future years, the United States would strengthen its bilateral relations with American allies and increase the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region in such a way that 60% (up from 50%) of the American navy and air force would be concentrated in this region (Christensen 2015; Canrong 2016).

Obama repeatedly assured other politicians that the "rebalance" is not directed against any specific countries, although his initiative arrived at a time when there was an increase in the number of armed incidents between China and its neighbors in the South China Sea (e.g. Vietnam, Malaysia or the Philippines) as well as in the number of armed incidents between China and the USA (Goh 2016). Therefore, we may interpret the "Pivot" as a form of containment linked to Chinese power, and as an *"attempt to warn China away from using heavy-handed tactics against its neighbors and provide confidence to other Asia-Pacific countries that want to resist pressure from Beijing now and in the future"* (Lieberthal 2011). Reciprocally, the Chinese elite perceived the American *"Pivot to Asia"* negatively, as in their opinion it contrasts with the conciliatory tone that Obama presented during his visits to Beijing (Saunders, Bowie 2016: 667–668).

However, despite the occasional disputes, the governments in Washington and Beijing have never indicated that they would like to restrict their mutual contacts. In the military dimension, for instance, in 2015 alone there were 7 high level engagements, 16 recurrent, academic and functional exchanges and 3 joint and multi-lateral exercises between the two countries (Annual Report to Congress 2016). The reasons for this phenomenon are not entirely clear. However, according to some, the representatives of the People's Army of China support the cooperation with their American counterparts because they have learned many things from it, particularly in the areas of anti-piracy activities, humanitarian operations, and non-military evacuation operations (Saunders, Bowie 2016: 667–668; Green 2016, Kan 2014).

Perhaps the best example of how contacts between the two countries have been growing and deepening is the economic exchange between them. In the early 1980s there was almost no exchange between them. But in 2015, the United States was the largest trading partner of China, and China the second largest trading partner of the United States (after Canada). The mutual trade increased from $33 billion in 1992 to over $659 billion in 2013. China has also gradually worked itself into the position of the largest exporter to the USA, and the United States is currently the second largest exporter to China (after South Korea) (US Census Bureau 2016).

Finally, the numbers related to the cultural exchange (be they in the areas of education, research or tourism) also show a significant expansion of mutual contacts. Let's point out just a few facts: in 2015 Chinese students formed the largest foreign student community in the USA (approximately one third of all foreign students there). There has also been a steep increase in the number of Chinese tourists in the United States. In the period of Barack Obama's election in the USA, approximately 650 thousand Chinese visited the USA, but about five years later this figure already reached 1.8 million. Also, while in 2000, slightly less than 60 thousand Chinese studied in the USA, about 14 years later the numbers of Chinese students grew by more than 400% (i.e. to 305 thousand) (Open Door Report 2014, 2016). The deepening of the cooperation between the USA and China is apparent at all the monitored levels. At the same time, it is apparent that the power

potential of China has grown, and the United States also aims to contain the Chinese ambition to expand its sphere of influence. The "Pivot to Asia" shows an exemplary demonstration of the fact that Washington is threatened by the effort of China to shift the border of its island territory in the East China and South China Seas.

Thus, we can conclude that the US engagement with China moved from the initial stage, which occurred at the beginning of the 1970s, to its intermediary state in the 1990s. This is evident both from the steady growth in all possible indicators of engagement and from the active participation of China in the institutions of the current international order, such as the WTO. It is remarkable that the values of the quantifiable indicators of the US engagement with China have not stopped growing despite the simultaneous strategy of the US to contain the growth of China's geopolitical influence. This suggests that the engagement between the two countries is well established in the intermediary stage without any signs of regress in terms of mutual contacts.

The US Engagement with Russia

During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991–1999), the United State of America formally terminated the policy of containment, while Russia experienced a loss of the international prestige it had in the period of the Cold War. A former enemy of the West (the USSR) ceased to exist and its successor state, the Russian Federation, declared its willingness to establish good relations with Western states. Despite the difficulties Russia had been then undergoing, this period appears as relatively conflict-free. This mode of relations seemed to occur also at the beginning of Vladimir Putin's presidency. It is interesting to note that George Bush Jr. invited President Putin to the White House as early as in November 2001 and took him to his Texas ranch during this visit. Also, in 2001, Russia was among the first states to express their support for the US-led war against terror.

However, the post-Yeltsin era has been marked by a gradual increase in the economic power of Russia, but also in security tensions with Western states. Russia profited financially from the steep growth in the price of oil, which made oil a key item of Russian exports. Russia also began reacting negatively to the expansion of NATO in Europe and the series of so-called "colour revolutions" in the countries of the former USSR. Also, for Russia, the building of American missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic remained unacceptable, while American diplomacy harshly judged the Russian participation in the conflict in Georgia (2008). In 2009, after both Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush ended their presidencies, the relations between the USA and Russia moved into one of the worst moments since the end of the Cold War. Edward Lucas, the British correspondent for Eastern Europe of the magazine *The Economist*, thus began to speak of a *"new cold war"* (Lucas 2008).

When Barack Obama became the president of the USA in 2009, his initial steps towards Russia have been very similar to those made by his predecessor. Obama believed that it would be possible to conduct a *"Russian reset"*, i.e. to forget about the tensions and return to the relations of the period before the election of George W. Bush (Shuster 2010). Indeed, initially, the military cooperation between Russia and the US at this time developed at several levels: those of common military exercises, bilateral meetings of army representatives, intelligence sharing, port visits and conferences organized by special interest groups (e.g. universities and military academies) (Nichol 2014; Sonenshine 2014). However, all these contacts ended in the spring of 2014 because of the two countries' diametrically opposed understandings of the security situation and the role of NATO in Europe. For Russia, NATO has become a threat, which is obvious in the latest National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (RFNSS 2015).

The development of the American relationship with Russia during Barack Obama's administration is well illustrated by the two National Security Strategies of the USA from

this time period (NSS 2010; NSS 2015). In the first of these documents, Russia is marked as an important partner with which the United States has an interest in cooperating in four areas: maintaining the system of nuclear non-proliferation, the fight against violent extremists in Afghanistan, a deepening of trade and investment, and promotion of the rule of law, accountable government and universal values (NSS 2010). Also, the National Military Strategy of the United States of America from 2011 confirmed that the government of Barack Obama intended to increase the dialogue and military-to-military relations with Russia, especially in the areas of *"strategic arms reduction [...] counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, space, and Ballistic Missile Defense,"* and finally it also welcomed Russia's *"more active role in preserving security and stability in Asia"* (NMS 2011: 13).

Nonetheless, in the NSS from 2015, Russia is spoken of the most often in connection with the aggression of Russian units in Ukraine (2014) and the necessity to impose and uphold diplomatic and economic sanctions against Russia (NSS 2015: 25). The document also mentioned that Russia *"has repeatedly demonstrated that it does not respect the sovereignty of its neighbors and it is willing to use force to achieve its goals"* (NMS 2015: 2). It is evident that in the period after the publication of the NSS 2010, a fundamental re--evaluation took place. The Russian annexation of Crimea and support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine (the regions of Donbas and Luhansk) (2014), as well as the two countries' different positions on the ongoing conflict in Syria, have been only the apex of the long--term stagnation of the mutual relations.

Also, the economic exchange between the two economies remained very limited during the Obama presidencies – in terms of both commercial exchange and foreign investments. Prior to the introduction of the sanctions, Russia was (in 2013) the 23rd largest trading partner of the United States. On the other hand, the United States was among the ten largest trading partners of Russia, but it was still far behind the Netherlands, Germany and Italy, China, and even Turkey in this respect. Expressed in terms of numbers, only 0.71% of the total American exports were directed to Russia (in 2013) and only 2.74% of the Russian exports travelled in the other direction (Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives 2012). It has been anticipated that once Russia would enter the WTO, it would significantly contribute to the growth in foreign investments in Russia, particularly in Russian services and telecommunications. Nevertheless, whether the Russian membership in the WTO had positive effects cannot be evaluated because of the sanctions on Russia since 2014 (Belton 2012).

The stagnation of the Russo-American relations is well illustrated by tourism. The numbers of Russian citizens who visited the United States of America each year were never breath-taking. The numbers reached their maximum in 2014 (about 343 thousand) and then fell sharply by 24% in the following year (261 thousand). Such numbers placed Russians in 32nd place on the ranked list of nationalities visiting the US as tourists – ahead of Peruvians, but behind Jamaicans and Filipinos (Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2011, 2014, 2015; Powell 2015). The situation is similar with academic exchange. The largest number of Russian students came to the United States in the academic year 1999–2000. Since then, the in-flow of Russian students has been slowly decreasing. Prior to the sanctions, Russian students did not even reach the level of the 25 nationalities with the largest numbers of foreign students in the USA (Open Doors Report 2016; IIE 2013, 2016).

Thus, during the Obama presidencies, the ability of the USA to engage Russia deteriorated. Soon it was apparent that the attempt to "reset" the relations was unsuccessful. The series of disputes peaked following the Russian aggression toward Ukraine (in 2014), against which the government of the USA protested, and which it refused to recognize. In this period, the US administration abandoned its policy of engagement in regard to Russia, moved toward a policy of isolation (disengagement) in regard to it and began to limit the mutual contacts at all the aforementioned levels: the

diplomatic, military, economic and cultural levels. This means that the US strategy of engagement with Russia has failed; it was on the move from the initial to the intermediary stage in the 1990s, but then it was put in question during the 2000s, and finally completely abandoned after 2014.

Successes and Failures of the US Engagement

We have two former enemies of the United States who have been engaged by it, yet these engagements came to different outcomes. The US engagement towards China has functioned because it has paid off in the long term for the Chinese. Since the time when the Chinese government normalized its relations with the USA, no one (or almost no one) doubted that the PRC is the sole representative of the Chinese people. The close relationship with the USA has contributed to the fact that this has successfully started the economic growth in China, restoring the country's prestige and material resources. In other words, China has gained its great power status precisely because of the fact that it began to connect to the existing structures of the international order. It would be too idealistic to assert that the US engagement with China has led to China's identification with the norms and rules of the current international system. China has not become a status quo power. Essentially the military activities of China in the South China and East China Seas, just like the unfriendly relations between Beijing and Taipei, or China's disagreements with the United States in the economic dimension of the engagement, have invoked a serious and justified dissatisfaction with the further developments in the region. One might justly claim that there have been outward differences between the first and second terms of President Obama, and also that Obama's personal relations with Chinese representatives (the presidents Hu Jintao and Xi Jingping) have evolved (Li 2016). Nonetheless, nothing changes the fact that the American engagement in the years 2009–2017 has enriched China at all the verified levels: it has been enriched politically and economically, the US improved the equipment and the level of experience of its army, and China continuously sent more of its people to the USA (whether as tourists or students). Disagreements between the two countries exist, but both governments see more benefits in the high levels of engagement.

The Russo-American relations are a completely different story. The two countries' diplomatic contacts have always been relatively numerous, but their economic, military and cultural cooperation after 1991 has never reached its full potential. Precisely during the 1990s, when Russia was the most inclined toward cooperation with the USA, we have seen the fall in the standard of living and the rise in crime in Russia. Over the course of the 1990s, Resnick's second condition for a successful strategy of engagement was not present in this case, because the contacts with the USA did not fulfil their promise to meet the material needs and the lust for international prestige in Russia (compare with Resnick 2001: 561). Russia, however, has gradually restored much of its international prestige and increased its standard of living approximately after 2000 with the ascendency of Vladimir Putin. Be it for this or some other reason, the Russians have perceived their rise as progress despite rather than thanks to the cooperation with the USA. This sentiment is in conflict with Resnick's third condition for a successful strategy of engagement, according to which the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of material or prestige resources (Ibid.).

The above mentioned difference is essential for our understanding of why the US engagement towards Russia has failed. The more Russia has been emancipated in international politics, the more it has replaced the foreign policy of the USA with its own policy (see, for example, the war against Georgia). And this has been precisely understood by the Russian political elites as well as the greater public as evidence of Russia's success. Obama's "reset" could not succeed because its intent was to return the Russo-American relations to the period prior to the election of President Bush, i.e. to the era when the

mutual relations were significantly asymmetrical and not in the interest of Russia. The Russian government's restoration of Russia's international prestige and the growth in the standard of living have not contributed to the expansion of Russia's contacts with American politicians, business people, soldiers or "common" citizens, but by demonstrating Russia's own ability to stand in competition with them. Therefore, Russia and China should not be put into the same basket. Although both represent potential challenges for the United States and its role in world politics, the ways they responded to the US strategy of engagement were different. While China has been working on its power and prestige in close cooperation with the United States, Russia has tried to re-establish its power potential and international prestige in opposition to the United States. This makes the term *revisionist power* much more appropriate for Russia than for China.

CONCLUSIONS

Many scholars, pundits, and policymakers have argued in the recent years about the successes and failures of the American foreign policy towards the "rival powers" of China and Russia. In the previous lines and paragraphs, I have indicated that it would be a simplification to label both of them as "revisionist" and to say that previous efforts to engage them that were embodied in the US strategy of engagement have failed. The argument of this article might be situated somewhere between the position of the "pessimists" (Mead 2014; Mearsheimer 2014; Walt 2018) – who expect an inevitable revival of power politics and a rise of illiberal powers – and that of the "optimists" (Ikenberry 2014; Nye 1996), who believe that former enemies can be fully integrated within the international order, and that conflicts between great powers can be avoided.

My approach, adopted from Evan Resnick's framework, assumes that if there is a willingness to deepen the cooperation and the number of contacts is on the rise, the target country moves away from "revisionism" and to the "status quo". This approach sees engagement as a process that has no predestined or irreversible outcomes. Such an approach is simple in its design but measurable, and its most important characteristic is that it enables one to make clear distinctions between the US relations with China and Russia respectively.

However, such an approach is not without possible objections to it. As has been said in the article, Resnick does not consider the "time factor" in his calculations; nor does he consider the differences in the initial stages of engagement. Furthermore, there are no exact criteria to determine the exact stage of engagement, which leaves quite a large space for interpretation. Finally, I would also suggest that indicators of engagement could also be questioned. For instance, the whole framework could be enlarged so as to include data stemming from other fields of cooperation. That would probably not change the general idea presented in this paper. But it might bring new "light" on particular issues of engagement.

Literature
• Belton, Catherine (2012): Russia Joins WTO After 19 Years of Talks. *Financial Times*, August 22, 2012, <https://www.ft.com/content/113bd1be-ec6c-11e1-81f4-00144feab49a>.
• Canrong, Jin (2016): *How America's Relationship with China Changed Under Obama*. World Economic Forum, December 14, 2016. Retrieved from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/america-china-relation ship/>.
• Christensen, Thomas J. (2015): Obama and China. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 5 (September/October 2015), pp. 28–36.
• Chu, Shulong. (2001*): U.S. and China in the Early 21st Century: Cooperation, Competition, or Confrontation?* Nuclear Policy 2nd Workshop, April 12, 2001, <http://nautilus.org/projects/nuclear-policy-2nd-workshop/u-s-and-china-in-the-early-21st-century-cooperation-competition-or-confrontation/>.
• Deyermond, Ruth (2013): Assessing the Reset: Successes and Failures in the Obama Administration's Russia Policy, 2009–2012. *European Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 500–523, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2013.7 77704>.
• Friedberg, Aaron L. (2011): *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

• Friedman, Thomas (2015): Iran and the Obama Doctrine (Thomas L. Friedman's Interview with Barack Obama). *The New York Times*, April 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-interview.html?_r=1>.
• Geldenhuys, Deon (1990): *Isolated States. A Comparative Analysis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Goh, Evelyn (2016): Southeast Asian Strategies Toward the Great Powers: Still Hedging After All These Years? *The ASAN Forum Online*, January-February 2016, Vol. 4, No. 1, <http://www.theasanforum.org/southeast-asian-strategies-toward-the-great-powers-still-hedging-after-all-these-years/>.
• Goldberg, Jeffrey (2016): The Obama Doctrine. *The Atlantic*, April 2016 Issue, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.
• Green, Jerold D. (2016): What Works in the Military Realm of U.S.-China Relations? *Pacific Council on International Policy*, August 10, 2016, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/newsroom/what-works-military-realm-us-china-relations>.
• Ikenberry, John G. (2014): The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order. *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 80–90.
• Ikenberry, John G. (2017): The Plot Against American Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2017, Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 1–7.
• Johnstone, Alastair I. (2003): Is China a Status Quo Power? *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 5–56, <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228803321951081>.
• Kagan, Robert (1997): What China Knows That We Don't: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment. *Weekly Standard*, January 20, 1997, <https://carnegieendowment.org/1997/01/20/what-china-knows-that-we-don-t-case-for-new-strategy-of-containment-pub-266>.
• Kan, Shirley A. (2014): U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, October 27, 2014. Congressional Research Service – Report for Congress, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf>.
• Kastner, Scott L. – Saunders, Phillip C. (2012): Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities. *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 56, Issue 1, pp. 163–177.
• Kissinger, Herny (2012): *On China* (reprint). London: Penguin Books.
• Lanxin Xiang (2011): Washington's Misguided China Policy. *Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 7–24.
• Legro, Jeffrey W. (2007): What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power. *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 515–534, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592707071526>.
• Li, Cheng (2016): Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama Administration. Brookings Institution, August 30, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relations-under-the-obama-administration/>.
• Lieberthal, Kenneth (2011): The American Pivot to Asia. Why President Obama's Turn to the East Is Easier Said Than Done. *Foreign Policy*, December 21, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-american-pivot-to-asia/>.
• Lind, Jennifer (2017): Asia's Other Revisionist Power. Why U.S. Grand Strategy Unnerves China. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 2, pp. 74–82.
• Litwak, Robert S. (2000): *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy. Containment After the Cold War*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
• Mead, Walter R. (2014): The Return of Geopolitics. The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers. *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2014, Vol. 93, No. 3, pp. 69–79.
• Mearsheimer, John (2014): Can China Rise Peacefully? *National Interests*, October 25, 2014, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204>.
• Nichol, Jim (2014): *Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests*. Congressional Research Service – Report for Congress, March 31, 2014, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33407.pdf>.
• Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1996): We Can't Afford to Lose China Again. *Lost Angeles Times*, December 29, 1996, <http://articles.latimes.com/1996-12-29/opinion/op-13495_1_human-rights>.
• Powell, Laura (2015): Is Now the Time to Visit Russia? *CNN*, January 26, 2015, <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/20/travel/russia-travel/>.
• Power, Jonathan (2016): Obama's Success in Foreign Policy. *World Policy Blog*, January 12, 2016, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2016/01/12/obamas-success-foreign-policy>.
• Project Atlas (2015): International Students in China, <http://www.iie.org/Services/Project-Atlas/China/International-Students-In-China#.WIfXB_nhDIV>.
• Rabin, Anna (2012): US-China Relations in the Bush Era – Strategic Partners or Competitors? *INPec Magazine*, 1 February, 2012, <https://inpecmagazine.com/2012/02/01/us-china-relations-in-george-w-bush-era-hu-jintao/>.
• Resnick, Evan (2001): Defining Engagement. *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 551–566.
• Rinehart, Ian E. (2016): *The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service – Report for Congress, March 24, 2016, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44196.pdf>.
• Rock, Stephen R. (2000): *Appeasement in International Politics*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
• Saunders, P. C. – Bowie, J. G. (2016): US–China Military Relations: Competition and Cooperation. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 5–6, pp. 662–684, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1221818>.

- Shambaugh, David (2001): China or America: Which Is the Revisionist Power? *Survival*, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 25–30, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330112331343025>.
- Shuster, S. (2010): U.S.-Russia Relations: In Need of a New Reset. *Time Magazine*, March 16, 2010, <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971651,00.html>.
- Sonenshine, Tara (2014): U.S.-Russian Cultural Relations Are on Ice, Too. *Defense One*, April 21, 2014, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/04/us-russian-cultural-relations-are-ice-too/82918/>.
- Suettinger, Robert L. (2000): The United States and China: Tough Engagement. In: Richard N. Haass – Megan L. O'Sullivan (eds.): *Honey and Vinegar Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy*. Washington D.C: Brookings Institute Press, pp. 12–32.
- Sytas, Andrius (2017): Baltic States Seek More NATO Help Ahead of Russian Exercise. *Reuters*, February 9, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltic-nato-russia-idUSKBN15O2HZ>.
- Terem, Peter (2017): Globálne mocnosti – vybrané aspekty amerického líderstva. *Politické vedy*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 105–131, <http://www.politickevedy.fpvmv.umb.sk/archiv-vydani/2017/1-2017/peter-terem.html>.
- Walt, Stephen (2017): Barack Obama Was a Foreign-Policy Failure. *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/18/barack-obama-was-a-foreign-policy-failure/>.
- Walt, Stephen (2018): The World Wants You to Think Like a Realist. *Foreign Policy*, May 30, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/30/the-world-wants-you-to-think-like-a-realist>.

Documents

- Annual Report to Congress (2016): *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2016*, <https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf>.
- Bush, George W. (1999): *A Distinctly American Internationalism*. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, November 19, 1999, <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/wspeech.htm>.
- Clinton, Bill (1998): *Remarks on Action Against Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia and Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China*, June 3, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=56072&st=&st1=>.
- Clinton, Hillary (2010): *Remarks at Press Availability*. National Convention Center in Hanoi (Vietnam), July 23, 2010, <https://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm>.
- Clinton, Hillary (2011): America's Pacific Century. *Foreign Policy* October 11, 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/>.
- IIE (2013): *Open Doors 2013 Report*, <https://www.iie.org/Why-IIE/Announcements/2013-11-11-Open-Doors-Data>.
- IIE (2016): *Academic Level and Place of Origin: Previous Years*, <https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Open-Doors/Data/International-Students/Places-of-Origin/Academic-Level-and-Place-of-Origin>.
- NMS (2011): *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, <https://www.army.mil/e2/rv5_downloads/info/references/NMS_Feb2011.pdf>.
- NMS (2015): *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf>.
- NSS (1987): *National Security Strategy of the United States*, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1987.pdf>.
- NSS (1990): *National Security Strategy of the United States*, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1990.pdf>.
- NSS (1991): *National Security Strategy of the United States*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1991/>.
- NSS (1993): *National Security Strategy of the United States*, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1993.pdf>.
- NSS (1996): *A National Security Strategy for Engagement and Enlargement*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-1996/>.
- NSS (1997): *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/1997.pdf >.
- NSS (2000): *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2000-2/>.
- NSS (2001): *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*, <http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2001.pdf >.
- NSS (2010): *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/>.
- NSS (2015): *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2015/>.
- NSS (2017): *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2017/>.
- Obama, Barack (2009): *President's News Conference with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan in Tokyo*, Japan, November 13, 2009, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=86903&st=&st1=>.
- Obama, Barack (2011): *Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament*. November 17, 2011, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=97064&st=&st1=>.
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives (2012): President Obama's Signature Paves Way for Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Moldova. <https://ustr.gov/Russia#>.
- Office of Travel and Tourism Industries (2011): *International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation*, <http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2011_Visitation_Report.pdf>.

• Office of Travel and Tourism Industries (2014): *International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation*, <http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2014_Visitation_Report.pdf>.
• Office of Travel and Tourism Industries (2015): *International Visitation to the United States: A Statistical Summary of U.S. Visitation*, <http://tinet.ita.doc.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Visitation_Report.pdf>.
• Open Doors Report (2016): *The Power of International Education. IIE at a Glance: Making a Difference*, <https://p.widencdn.net/0kxflz/IIE-2016-Annual-Report>.
• RFNSS (2015): *Russian Federation: National Security Strategy*, <http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Otras Publicaciones/Internacional/2016/Russian-National-Security-Strategy-31Dec2015.pdf>.
• U.S. Census Bureau (2016): *Trade in Goods with China*, <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html>.
• U.S. Department of State (2016): *US Relations with China. Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs*, <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm>.

State Responsibility in the Cyber Age: The Course towards Indirect Evidence

LUCIE KADLECOVÁ

Abstract: The problem of attributing responsibility for cyber-attacks is almost as old as cyberspace itself, yet it remains one of the most troublesome issues of that domain. It is often impossible to uncover direct evidence that would reveal the identities of the attackers. Investigators must therefore rely on other, more indirect avenues of proof. The aim of this exploratory study is to develop a basic categorisation of indirect evidence that can be used to attribute state responsibility for cyber-attacks in international relations. To do so, the article works with international legal concepts but transposes them into the analysis of international relations. The categorization of indirect proof is based on the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008, which provides one of the richest arrays of this kind of evidence. The analysis identifies four kinds of indirect evidence: level of coordination, level of preparedness, state relations with the national hacker community, and state conception of cyber-security.

———————————

The cyber operations during the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008 might initially appear to be a strategically unimportant example of an attack in cyberspace that was overshadowed by the military campaign on the ground. The kinetic military operations lasted five days and were characterised by conventional warfare that was constrained by the limited communication environment. However, cyber-attacks on Georgian websites played a crucial *"if not decisive"* role in the overall campaign (Deibert – Rohozinski – Crete-Nishihata 2012: 4), as control of cyberspace quickly became a strategic advantage in the conflict. Security experts immediately became concerned about the identities of the perpetrators of the cyber-attacks on Georgia. Although the Kremlin has never acknowledged any involvement of Russia in activities against Georgia in cyberspace in August 2008, a number of state representatives and cyber experts, together with most of the media, either directly or indirectly pointed their fingers at the Russian government in connection with this matter.[1] On what basis could these actors claim what they claim?

We are often in lack of convincing direct evidence which would allow us to attribute responsibility for cyber-attacks in terms of international law. Yet, many international actors do not hesitate to attribute responsibility in political terms, and with political consequences. It is clear that key actors in international law and international relations understand the issue of attribution in different ways – international law perceives it through the work of international courts of justice and lawyers who apply binding international legal rules while international relations are based on the (oftentimes rather

pragmatic) behaviour of governments and international organisations, and the work of politicians, journalists or, for example, activists. They have different understandings of what is viable and legitimate in their fields. There are various methods which define states' behaviour within international relations which, however, might not be necessarily supported by international legal norms. On the other hand, states oftentimes acknowledge international legal governance, but their reaction is political in the end. In this regard, this article works with international legal concepts, but transposes them into the analysis of international relations. As such, the article at hand is an exploratory study which aims to highlight and examine the importance of indirect evidence, which is an international legal concept, in the political attribution of state responsibility for cyber-attacks in international relations.[2] The goal of this article is to introduce a basic categorisation of indirect evidence which could serve as a starting point for future research on the given topic. In other words, accepting that direct evidence is mostly unavailable, the article asks which indirect evidence might be available to reliably establish attribution in international relations.

Attribution and state responsibility in other contexts than cyber security are amongst the most fully developed concepts in international relations and law. However, given the peculiar characteristics of cyberspace, where attributing the cyber-attack to a particular perpetrator can become a highly difficult political issue, there exists only a paucity of well-argued sources that would focus on the key role of indirect evidence. Nevertheless, the debate on the topic has been evolving quickly lately and there are certain works which deserve to be highlighted at this point. The most significant contribution in this regard is, without hesitation, *Tallinn Manual 2.0* by Professor Michael Schmitt (2017) and his team of experts, who, among other things, formulated several rules for attribution of cyber operations by various actors and, subsequently, state responsibility for such operations. Although the rules of *Tallinn Manual 2.0* are non-binding, the book is, to date, one of the most authoritative sources in legal writing on how international law applies to cyber operations. Recent works by Professor Nicholas Tsagourias (2016) and Kubo Mačák (2016) must also be mentioned as valuable contributions to the latest debate on non-state actors and attribution. Two studies by Richard Andres and Scott Shackelford (2010–2011) and Jason Healey (2011) should be mentioned too as they address the threshold of proof necessary to constitute responsibility, which is important for this study. Still, none of these most recent works on attribution and state responsibility addresses the importance of indirect evidence enough and thus, this article aspires to contribute to filling the above-described gap in the literature.

The importance of indirect evidence in the attribution of state responsibility in cyber-space will be illustrated on the case of the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. Although that case is a decade old, it is an example which involved the richest variety of indirect evidence of different kinds given that the cyber campaign accompanied military attacks on ground and thus served as a force multiplier. Moreover, because of the lapse of time between the campaign itself and the publication of this article, there is a sufficient number of quality sources for the discussion, as other potential cases for a study of this sort such as the 2015 cyber-attacks against Ukrainian power grids would not provide such an advantage. The Russian-Georgian war was a typical example of the high degree of care with which cyber-attacks are usually prepared and of the timing and coordination of cyber and kinetic operations. The alleged good relations between the Kremlin, Russian organised crime and Russian youth organisations can serve as further possible indirect proof of certain involvement of Russian government in the cyber-attacks during the war. Because the Russian government has rejected all accusations of its involvement in the cyber-attacks, and no substantive direct link between the perpetrators of the attacks and the Russian government has ever been found, the chance that direct evidence would be uncovered to establish state responsibility in this case is marginal, as it is in the majority

of similar cases. The Georgian case thus emphasises the importance of indirect evidence and illustrates the broad range of its types.

This article begins by examining the concepts of attribution and state responsibility within the international legal framework applied to cyberspace. In that context, the article surveys the most often proposed doctrines of state responsibility attribution: the effective and the overall control doctrine. The following analytical section has five subsections. The first sub-section introduces the security and political context of the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. The following four sub-sections identify four different categories of indirect evidence of state responsibility for cyber-attacks: level of coordination, level of preparedness, state relations with the national hacker community, and the state conception of cyber-security.

ATTRIBUTION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN CYBERSPACE

The cyber-attacks on Georgia during the Russian-Georgian conflict in the summer of 2008 most probably contributed to the current widespread trend of tagging cyberspace the "fifth domain" of military combat alongside land, sea, air, and space. However, unlike in the cases of these four historically codified domains, a suitable international legal regime of cyberspace which would regulate it and include both *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* has appeared to be elusive so far, notably regarding the crucial issues of attribution and state responsibility. Modern technological advancement and its subsequent use in practice raises a range of international relations and legal concerns. For instance, cyber warfare deeply challenges the nature and understanding of the traditional perception of warfare. The attribution of a kinetic attack launched through conventional weaponry is obviously much easier to determine than the identity of a perpetrator of a cyber-attack. Alternatively, the transnational character of cyber-attacks leads to questioning of the current treaty framework, which is helpful but not sufficient since it does not properly cover issues such as state responsibility and sovereignty in cyberspace. The problems regarding defence against or launching of a cyber-assault are numerous, but the most fundamental issues are associated with attribution of these attacks and state responsibility for them. Although it can be technically possible to trace the geographical location of the attacker and so attribute the attack to some extent, it is difficult to actually determine who was sitting in front of the computer screen in the moment when the attack was launched; it could be a state representative, a group of hackers or an individual. Therefore, one of the critical challenges to the international relations and legal systems is keeping up with technological development.[3]

In the realm of international law, we could localise two principal competing doctrines of state responsibility – the effective control doctrine and the overall control doctrine. The two standards of state responsibility differ on whether the state must directly control the operation planning or not.

The doctrine of effective control originated in the International Court of Justice's *Nicaragua case* between the Republic of Nicaragua and the USA from 1984. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) asserted that the responsibility for the actions of private actors – both entities and individuals – might be attributed to the state only if the government executed its effective control over these actors. Since the USA did not have effective control over the paramilitaries in Nicaragua, the ICJ could not find Washington responsible for the activities of the contras (ICJ 1986). Hence, in order for a state to be found responsible for the conduct of private actors under the effective control doctrine, based on the *Nicaragua case*, it must explicitly delegate at least part of the tasks to such non-state actors (Tikk et al. 2008: 21). The effective control standard was reaffirmed in practice by the Court in the *Bosnian Genocide case* in 2007 so that Serbia was exculpated from the genocide in Srebrenica (ICJ 2007, paragraph 406). However, in contrast to the effective control doctrine, in its judgment in the *Tadić case* the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that the effective control

standard is inconsistent with the practice of states and is not in accord with the logic of principles of state responsibility (Tikk et al. 2008: 21). The ICTY (1999) concluded that if a state participates in the organisation and coordination of private actors, in addition to supporting them, it possesses sufficient overall control over them and so the conduct of the non-state actors can be attributed to the state.[4]

Given the secretive nature of cyberspace and cyber-attacks, the flexible overall control doctrine appears to be much more suitable for this kind of environment. According to this doctrine, it should be sufficient to find a proof of an operational control or support coming from a state, rather than a government's complete control over a cyber-attack. The following section employs the overall control doctrine in an analysis of the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008.

CYBER-ATTACKS AND THE RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT

This section analyses the cyber-warfare in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 and distils four different categories of indirect evidence from it. The analysis works mainly with secondary sources, such as publications from Project Grey Goose and other publications by recognised cyber experts (e.g. Dmitri Alperovitch [2009], Jeffrey Carr [2008], Jart Armin [2008a, 2008b], Eneken Tikk [et al. 2008] or Ronald Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski and Masashi Crete-Nishihata [2012]). The following analysis will begin with an introduction to the political and security background to the Russian-Georgian conflict in cyber-space in 2008. Later on, this section will introduce four different types of indirect evidence that can be used to attribute state responsibility for cyber-attacks.

Background to the conflict

After two months of intensive military activities and exercises on both sides of the frontier, the conflict escalated on 7 August 2008 when Georgian forces launched an assault against separatist forces in South Ossetia in order to subdue their provocation.[5] A day later, on 8 August, Russian troops entered South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel while launching an airstrike against Georgian territory. Moscow justified its decision by its right to protect Russian citizens in South Ossetia. Tbilisi viewed Russia's behaviour as an act of military aggression and reacted with a declaration of a state of war. The hostilities officially ceased on 12 August when President Saakashvili and President Medvedev agreed on a six-point ceasefire drafted by French President Sarkozy on behalf of the European Union. The peace agreement was officially signed by both sides of the conflict on 15 and 16 August (Deibert – Rohozinski – Crete-Nishihata 2012: 7–8).

The dispute between Georgia and Russia was not, however, limited only to operations in the air, on the ground, and at sea. It was the first time that an international political and military conflict was accompanied by orchestrated cyber-attacks of such a scale.[6] Georgian websites became a target of the first cyber-attacks several weeks before the actual operation on the ground began. The most serious assault preceding the war took place on 19 July 2008, when the website of President Saakashvili was unavailable for 24 hours. This was caused by a heavy distributed denial of service[7] attack (Tikk et al. 2008: 36). The peak of the attacks in cyberspace took place in the week beginning on 8 August, coinciding with the rise of military operations on the Russian-Georgian borders. The cyber-attacks became well-orchestrated and coordinated with the development on the ground by that time. The last serious cyber-attack against Georgia's websites was registered on 27 August, only a couple of days after the peace agreement was signed.

It remains unclear exactly what role the Russian government played; whether the Kremlin encouraged the cyber operations against Georgia, coordinated them as an element of a wider political strategy, or simply tolerated them while they were launched by third parties. Nonetheless, there still exist enough clues from various sources which suggest at least some level of involvement of the Russian authorities in the cyber operations against

Georgia. These clues include the four types of indirect evidence that provide enough space for a political decision on attribution to be reached in this case.

Timing and coordination

The first category of indirect evidence is the timing and coordination of the attacks taking place in cyberspace and on the ground. Although some minor cyber-attacks on Georgian websites had been launched a couple of days or weeks before the Russian troops entered Georgian territory, the major wave of assaults in cyberspace was coordinated with the main military operation. It appears that the organisers of the cyber-attacks had advanced knowledge of what the Russian military intentions were and subsequently, they were given notice about the Russian campaign on the ground while the assaults were being executed. The cyber-attacks of the largest scale commenced at the same time that the Russian military began its operations, and they ended just a while after the Russians accomplished the aims of their campaign so it almost indicates that the operation in cyberspace supplemented those on the ground (Bumgarner – Borg 2009: 6). Asmus (2010: 167) also takes note of a high degree of *"discipline, coordination, command, and control"* in the cyber-attacks against the Georgian financial and banking sector, which closely followed the kinetic operations on the ground.

John Bumgarner and Scott Borg (2009: 6) from the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit also point out the telling choices of the targets for the cyber-attacks, as in most of the cases, attacks against these targets would have brought benefits for Moscow. They claim that during an ordinary military assault the communication facilities and media stations are usually destroyed or at least damaged by airstrikes or bombs. In the case of Georgia, they were spared physical damage and were put out of order by cyber-attacks instead. A tangible example is the case of the city of Gori, where the official websites and news sites were shut down before the Russian military aircraft even reached the city (Menn 2008). Thus, it seems that quite a widespread consensus exists that the operations in cyberspace and on the ground appear coordinated from the beginning in regard to both timing and the choice of targets.

Level of preparedness

The second category of indirect proof which indicates a close cooperation between the civilian cyber perpetrators and Russian military staff is the level of preparedness of the cyber-attacks. Not only were the attacks on the ground and in cyberspace close in time. The cyber-attacks, after they were launched, skipped the mapping and reconnaissance stage and immediately started employing the right kind of packets that were well suited for the particular website attacks (Bumgarner – Borg 2009: 3). Moreover, many of the attackers' activities at the beginning of the campaign, such as setting up new websites or registration of new domain names, were carried out with noteworthy speed and readiness. This development suggests that the preparation stage and steps such as the writing of necessary attack scripts must have been done in advance. Bumgarner and Borg (2009: 3) point out that the signal to launch the cyber-attacks was most probably given even before the general public and media were notified about the situation on the ground.

The argument concerning the high level of preparedness of the attacks is further elaborated when one studies the defacement of Georgian official websites. The website of the National Bank of Georgia was defaced during the Russian-Georgian war and replaced with a collage which displayed a gallery of 20th century authoritarians and dictators, including Mikheil Saakashvili. Furthermore, the websites of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the President of Georgia were defaced with a collage of photographs portraying President Saakashvili and Adolf Hitler in identical postures during their public appearances (Tikk et al. 2008: 7). The preparation of this kind of defacement requires time in order to create the design and find the appropriate photo material.

Even the distribution of malicious software and information on how and which Georgian websites were to be attacked can arouse suspicion. Posting cyber-attack tools on specially designated websites was the main method for attackers to expand the cyber campaign. The fact that the attacked websites' vulnerabilities were discovered and exploited signals a certain level of planning, targeted reconnaissance and technical sophistication (Tikk et al. 2008: 38–39). Moreover, although the two types of cyber-attacks launched against Georgian websites – defacement and denial of service – are usually considered to have a rather unsophisticated nature, in this case, the operations were carried out in a highly sophisticated way. Cyber security researcher Jart Armin (2008a, 2008b) even notes that the character of these attacks strikingly reminds one of the methods usually employed by the organised cyber crime mob Russian Business Network (RBN)[8] in order to avoid investigation and put the blame on other suspects.

Social networks quickly became the attackers' main source of spreading malicious software and instructions as well as recruiting new people and discussing further development. Almost all of these blogs and forums were written in the Russian language.[9] An example of such a website is stopgeorgia.ru (or alternatively stopgeorgia.info as a redirect), which listed a number of targeted Georgian websites and provided denial of service tools for free download. Danchev (2008) uses the example of stopgeorgia.ru to illustrate that next to the dedicated hacktivists behind the attacks there is also the mass of the unskilled but keen script kiddies who might even serve to mask the real perpetrators. The website stopgeorgia.ru was also studied as part of research carried out by Project Grey Goose, an in-depth Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) initiative launched by a group of independent cyber experts on 22 August 2008 and led by Jeffrey Carr. Its key purpose was to study the ways in which the cyber-attacks against Georgian networks were conducted and whether the Kremlin was involved or whether it was purely an initiative of Russian patriotic hackers (Carr 2008: 2). While the researchers from Project Grey Goose claim that evidence such as that of advance preparation and reconnaissance suggests that Russian military or government officials primed hackers for the cyber-attacks, they also add that they could not find any direct proof which would confirm the link between the Kremlin and the stopgeorgia.ru website administrators or the attackers on Georgian computer networks in general. Nevertheless, they still defend their opinion and note that *"it is not reasonable to conclude that no such connection exists"*, pointing to the fact that past experience has already demonstrated support by the Russian government for Russian hacker attacks and its passive consent to the attacks, which was implied in its refusal to stop them (Carr 2008: 8; also see Krebs 2008).

State relations with the national hacker community

The relations between the government of the suspected state and the national hacker community represents the third possible type of indirect evidence that can be used to attribute responsibility for cyber-attacks to states. Russia is traditionally known for its distinctive features of a huge reliance on cyber-crime structures, such as the aforementioned RBN, and technologically educated individuals from youth organisations such as *Nashi*, which is controlled by the Kremlin, and one has to bear in mind that the boundary between the two might often be very thin (Smith 2012: 3).

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an unstable economy and limited labour market opportunities resulted in many highly educated and technologically qualified Russian individuals starting their own cyber-crime activities. These factors combined with a lack of legal enforcement and a power vacuum then contributed to the boom of cyber-crime business in Russia (Kadlecová 2015), including clandestine activities for the Russian government in the post-Soviet era (Alperovitch 2009). Oleg Gordievsky, a former KGB Colonel until his defection to the British MI6 in 1985, openly explained to the public at an international conference in 1998 how hackers convicted of cyber-crimes in Russia are

occasionally offered an alternative to imprisonment – employing their technological skills and working for the Russian FSB (Krebs 2008). Khatuna Mshvidobadze (2011) highlights another example of such suspicious Russian cyber activities – the Russian internationally-known "hacker schools", where tuition fees are often paid by unspecified donors. One of such hacker education institutions in Russia is supposedly run by the former Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) in Voronezh. Moreover, *Khaker: Computer Hooligan Magazine* is particularly popular among the young generation in Russia, where any print content unacceptable to the Kremlin usually suffers from serious existential obstacles (Mshvidobadze 2011). Hence, it appears that Russia has a great potential to preserve its status as a cyber-crime power.

Furthermore, the Russian government does not rely merely on social trends and the development of Russian society but it attempts to influence and control the young generations, which also have a strong cyber security potential, through youth organisations and movements. The most notorious one is the Youth Democratic Anti-Fascist Movement "Ours!" (*Molodezhnoye Demokraticheskoye Antifashistskoye Dvizhenye* in Russian), also known as *Nashi*. *Nashi* was founded in 2005 with two main goals: firstly, it was meant as a counterweight to the growing popularity of Nazi ideology in the Russian Federation. Secondly, it was supposed to be a political tool to help Russia avoid a similar youth revolt like the one which evolved during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 (Atwal 2009). Although it officially claims to be funded by Russian business elites, speculations exist which claim that it gains its finances from the Kremlin (Carr 2011, Betz – Stevens 2011: 32). The purported link between *Nashi* and the Russian government is also based on other strong evidence. For example, in the late 2000s Vladislav Surkov, the then First Deputy Chief of the Presidential Staff and one of the closest co-workers of Vladimir Putin, was a very keen supporter of *Nashi*. He even proclaimed the intention to use *Nashi*'s computer skills to enhance the will of the Kremlin in Russian cyberspace and to *"ensure the domination of pro-Kremlin views on the Internet"* (Carr 2009: 21). A practical example of this proclamation was reported in February 2009, when the Russian media published a story uncovering how the government encourages and funds the establishment of Russian youth organisations that are to get involved in cyber operations, including hacking and the subsequent suppression of opposition groups (Carr 2009: 21). Similarly, in 2009 Sergei Markov, a then State Duma Deputy, released the information that his assistant, most probably Konstantin Goloskov, a *Nashi* Commissar, had participated as one of the leaders in a cyber-attack against Estonia two years earlier (Carr 2009: 22). Thus, it appears that the Kremlin might be taking advantage of its very good relations with the youth organisations and their technologically educated and talented individual members as well.

The state conception of cyber-security

Russia's official approach toward cyber security might also offer a clue as to whether the Russian government was or was not involved in the cyber-attacks on Georgia, thus forming the last type of categorisation of indirect evidence introduced in the article. As early as September 2000, the *Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation* defined three major objectives: the first of them is common to most of the world – *to protect strategically important information* (Security Council of the Russian Federation 2000). However, the other two objectives distinguish Russia from most of the democratic world: *"to protect against deleterious foreign information and to inculcate in the people patriotism and values"* (Smith 2012: 2–3). This doctrine has then settled a broader Russian cyber security framework for both the military and civilian spheres for the next decade.

The Russian public stance on issues of cyber security might be illustrated by the examples of two documents – the *Concept of a Convention on International Information*

Security (Russian Federation 2011) and the *Convention on Cybercrime* (Council of Europe 2001). The former was released in September 2011 and it defines the key issues which concern Russia in cyberspace. As Keir Giles (2012: 64) notes, the document sets Russia apart from the Western approach when it perceives *"the use of content for influence on the social-humanitarian sphere"* as a threat while most of the other countries consider a hostile code to be a real danger in this respect. The Concept also touches upon Internet sovereignty, which is a bone of contention for Russia, along with several like-minded states, and the rest of the world. Russia advocates that a state should control all Internet resources which are based within its physical frontier and subsequently it should manage its cyberspace according to the local legislation. This step would cause each state to define its own regulations of the Internet, which, as argued by the West, would undermine human rights as well as the interoperability of the Internet (Giles 2012: 65–66).

The Russian military command has adopted a similar approach. Security experts notice that the Russian armed forces have recently put a growing emphasis on cyber-attacks in their military doctrine, acknowledging their strategic value (e.g. Giles 2011: 50). Russia has accordingly adopted a broad cyber warfare doctrine, paying particular attention to offensive cyber weapons. The Russian cyber warfare approach is developed as a "force multiplier" (Schaap 2009: 133), a military tool which, when employed together with other combat forces, increases the potential and effect of that military force. In theory, this would mean that Russia's cyber strategy includes disruptions of the enemy's critical infrastructure, civilian and military communications capabilities or financial markets prior to or alongside a traditional military campaign on the ground (Schaap 2009: 133). Therefore, the combined kinetic and cyber campaign against Georgia in the summer of 2008 appears to be the first diffident implementation of the Russian military cyber strategy in practice. Although the attack focussed mostly on the suppression of Georgian strategic communication, not the national critical infrastructure, it still caused enormous psychological harm and contributed to the destabilisation of Georgia's nation in a critical time of danger.

CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this exploratory study was to articulate a basic categorisation of indirect evidence that can be used by international actors to attribute responsibility to states for attacks in cyberspace. Cyber-attacks committed by non-state actors that were supported by governments in various manners and on various scales have generally been more common in the past several years. States use the non-state actors to hide behind them so as to avoid accountability for malicious cyber campaigns. Hence, there is an urgent need for states which become victims of such cyber-attacks to start invoking state responsibility and thus narrow this grey area if they want international norms to apply to this new domain. So far, it seems that the only reliable way to determine state responsibility is to analyse indirect proofs which have the potential to build a strong attribution beyond a reasonable doubt in a number of cases.

The article works with the international legal concepts of attribution and state responsibility and transfers them into an analysis of international relations. It begins from the assumption that the overall control doctrine of state responsibility is more suitable for cyberspace in international relations than the effective control doctrine. In the overall control doctrine, it suffices to find a proof of an operational control or support coming from a state to invoke state responsibility, which lowers the necessary threshold of evidence. Thus, our judgement could draw from the more common indirect evidence rather than from the oftentimes lacking direct evidence.

The proposed categorisation of indirect evidence is based on an analysis of the Russian--Georgian conflict of 2008. On the one hand, the Russian government and officials have officially denied any engagement in the cyber-attacks and there is no first-hand evidence

proving their involvement. On the other hand, as a number of pieces of indirect evidence illustrate, it is most likely that the Kremlin encouraged the attacks and provided the attackers with the necessary information to coordinate the cyber and kinetic operations. This particular case study was chosen because it provides one of the richest arrays of indirect evidence of various kinds, illustrating the flexibility of this form of proof in comparison to investigating cyber-attacks solely with a focus on direct evidence.

The first category of significant indirect proof which can be considered during the process of attribution is the timing and coordination of the cyber-attacks. The more the attack's timing is orchestrated and the more it appears to be well-coordinated overall, the higher the probability of a state's involvement. A telling sign is how well the cyber-attacks are coordinated with events outside of cyberspace, especially when they are not publicly predictable, as a conventional military campaign would be. In such cases, the cyber-attacks can easily supplement the operations on the ground and multiply their effect. Without at least a certain degree of exchange of information between a sponsoring state and the perpetrators, a cyber campaign cannot be well-timed and coordinated.

A similar logic can be observed in regard to the second category of indirect proof – the level of preparedness. A number of different types of cyber-attacks require time for situation mapping, reconnaissance and implementation so that they reach the necessary sophistication and maximum psychological effect. For instance, the right offensive graphics or collage of pictures posted on a defaced ministerial website may cause not only a denial of information to citizens, but also an offensive effect targeting the citizens' psychology. To reach a certain level of sophistication in this respect, the perpetrators would need to receive intelligence from a state source and plan such cyber-attacks well in advance.

The third category of indirect evidence to investigate is the long-term relations between the state institutions and the national hacker community. For example, in countries with a long and prosperous history of criminal networks, criminal mobs oftentimes follow up on their usual activities with their malicious activities in cyberspace and thus might become convenient partners for a sponsoring state, especially if they can build on previously established contacts. A similar example is the case of youth organisations with a pro-government ideology and government contacts which unite young people with a talent for IT who are eager to support their state's activities.

Finally, the fourth category of indirect proof is the state conception of cyber security. The political, non-military national strategies and concepts of cyberspace are the first indicators suggesting the state's approach and behaviour in the cyber environment. Even more telling is the study of the military doctrines of the state, as they may indicate whether the state has inclinations toward building and using offensive cyber weapons or employing cyber-attacks as a force multiplier alongside conventional warfare.

The analysis provides the reader with a categorisation of indirect evidence which, however, has a limited impact. This article focussed only on one cyber campaign, thus offering only a limited number of types of indirect evidence, and not necessarily an exhaustive list of indirect evidence types. Thus, adding other categories to this categorisation of indirect evidence based on an analysis of a broader spectrum of individual cases from practice might certainly become a useful and much needed goal of future studies on the topic. Future research might also focus on other major cases of cyber-attacks – for example, the 2010 Stuxnet worm used against the Iranian nuclear programme, and the 2015 cyber-attacks against Ukrainian power grids, which can both potentially offer further indirect evidence for related studies.

---

[1] For example, the chief of Georgia's National Security Council Eka Tkeshelashvili (Shachtman, 2009), David J. Smith (2012: 1–2) from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Khatuna Mshvidobadze (2011), a senior associate at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies and the geopolitical intelligence

platform Stratfor (2008). An official statement published on Google's blog on 11 August 2008, as the blog was temporarily replacing the attacked website of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that *"a cyber warfare campaign by Russia is seriously disrupting many Georgian websites, including that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"* (MFA of Georgia 2008).

[2] *"Indirect or circumstantial evidence relies on an extrapolation to a conclusion of fact (such as fingerprints, DNA evidence, and so on). This is, of course, different from direct evidence. Direct evidence supports the truth of a proclamation without need for any additional evidence or interpretation"* (Cisco 2017).

[3] The importance of the attribution problem in international relations has recently been illustrated by initiatives of the international community to create organisations specifically dedicated to this issue. The Atlantic Council suggested the creation of the Multilateral Cyber Attribution and Adjudication Council (MCAAC) already in 2014 (Healey et al. 2014: 10–12). In 2017, Microsoft proposed the creation of the International Cyberattack Attribution Organization (Microsoft 2017). Finally, RAND suggested establishing the Global Cyber Attribution Consortium (Davis et al. 2017). The proposals for these three organisations differ in the expressed opinions on the inclusion of states or the organisations' enforcement role; yet, they all suggest an increasing interest in resolving the attribution problem.

[4] For more details on the theoretical and systematic reasons behind the application of the overall and effective control doctrines, see Cassese (2007).

[5] For a description of the tensions directly preceding the war see Iashvili and Yusin (2008) or Belov (2008).

[6] Previously, there were some minor operations in cyberspace which accompanied a conflict on the ground, and some occurred as far back as the 1990s. For example, Chechen separatists were using the Internet to spread anti-Russian propaganda during the first Chechen war in 1994. During the second Chechen war, the Kremlin was accused of hacking activities against Chechen websites. Moreover, cyber operations were conducted against NATO, US and UK computers during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Or to give a current example, Israeli and Arab hackers launch cyber attacks against each other every time a political situation related to Israel and Palestine escalates nowadays (Tikk et al. 2008: 5).

[7] A denial of service attack is an operation where *"multiple compromised systems are used to target a single system causing a denial of service"* (Harrison Dinniss 2012: 294).

[8] The roots of the RBN can be traced back to the 1990s, though it experienced the greatest boom of its activities in the first half of the following decade. As a service provider for cyber crime, the RBN was considered to be a middleman for a wide range of malicious internet activities such as malware hosting, phishing, gambling or spamming. The RBN activities publicly vanished in the autumn of 2007; however, according to some suspicions, its network has still been operating secretly in recent years. For more details about the RBN activities in general see Bizeul (2007).

[9] Bumgarner and Borg (2009: 3) mention that there was only one such forum on which the written communication was not in Russian – in this case, it was in English. An interesting fact to consider in connection with this topic is that Russian is a minority, but officially unrecognised, language in Georgia.

Literature

• Asmus, Ronald (2010): *A Little War That Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Atwal, Maya (2009): Evaluating Nashi's Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 61, No. 5, pp. 743–758, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130902904878>.
• Betz, David – Stevens, Tim (2011): *Cyber Space and the State: Towards a Strategy for Cyber-Power*. London: Routledge, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.825434>.
• Cassese, Antonio (2007): The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia. *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 649–668, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chm034>.
• Davis, John S. II – Boudreaux, Benjamin – Welburn, Jonathan William – Aguirre, Jair – Ogletree, Cordaye – McGovern, Geoffrey – Chase, Michael S. (2017): *Stateless Attribution. Toward International Accountability in Cyberspace*. Santa Monica: RAND, <https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2081>.
• Deibert, Ronald – Rohozinski, Rafal – Crete-Nishihata, Masashi (2012): Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 3–24, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611431079>.
• Giles, Keir (2011): 'Information Troops': A Russian Cyber Command? Tallinn: 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO CCD COE.
• Giles, Keir (2012): Russia's Public Stance on Cyberspace Issues. Tallinn: 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, NATO CCD COE.
• Harrison Dinniss, Heather (2012): *Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511894527>.
• Healey, Jason (2011): *Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber-attacks*. Issue brief, Atlantic Council, Cyber Statecraft Initiative.
• Healey, Jason – Tothova Jordan, Klara – Mallery, John C. – Youd, Nathaniel V. (2014): *Confidence-Building Measures in Cyberspace*. Washington: Atlantic Council.

• Kadlecová, Lucie (2015): Russian-Speaking Cyber Crime: Reasons behind Its Success. *The European Review of Organised Crime*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 104–121.
• Mačák, Kubo (2016): Decoding Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Article on State Responsibility: Attribution of Cyber Operations by Non-State Actors. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 405–428, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krw014>.
• Schaap, Arie (2009): Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and Use under International Law. *Air Force Law Review*, Vol. 64, pp. 121–174.
• Schmitt, Michael (ed., 2017): *Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524>.
• Shackelford, Scott – Richard, Andres (2010–2011): State Responsibility for Cyber-attacks: Competing Standards for a Growing Problem. *Georgetown Journal of International Law*, Vol. 42, No. 4, pp. 971–1016.
• Smith, David (2012): *Russian Cyber Operations*. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Cyber Center.
• Tsagourias, Nicholas (2016): Non-State Actors, Ungoverned Spaces and International Responsibility for Cyber Acts. *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 455–474, <https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krw020>.
• Tikk, Eneken – Kaska, Kadri – Rünnimeri, Kristel – Kert, Mari – Talihärm, Anna-Maria – Vihul, Liis (eds., 2008): *Cyber-attacks against Georgia: Legal Lessons Identified*. Tallinn: NATO CCDCOE.

Documents

• Alperovitch, Dmitri (2009): Fighting Russian Cybercrime Mobsters: Report from the Trenches. Presented at *Black Hat USA 2009*, <http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-09/ALPEROVITCH/BHUSA09-Alpe-rovitch-RussCybercrime-PAPER.pdf>.
• Armin, Jart (2008a): Georgia Cyberwarfare – Attribution & Spam Botnets. *RBNExploit*, 8/2008, <http://rbnexploit.blogspot.co.uk/2008/08/rbn-georgia-cyberwarfare-attribution.html>.
• Armin, Jart (2008b): Georgia Cyberwarfare – Continuation…. *RBNExploit*, 8/2008, <http://rbnexploit.blogspot.co.uk/2008/08/rbn-georgia-cyberwarfare-continuation.html>.
• Belov, Pavel (2008): Russia Is Prepared to Protect Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Force of Arms. *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 60, No. 17–18, 20. and 27. 5. 2008, p. 6, originally published in *Kommersant*, 26. 4. 2008.
• Bizeul, David (2007): Russian Business Network Study. *Bizeul.org*, 20. 11. 2007, <http://www.bizeul.org/files/RBN_study.pdf>.
• Bumgarner, John – Borg, Scott (2009): Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign against Georgia in August of 2008. *US Cyber Consequences Unit*, <http://registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-Campaign-Overview.pdf>.
• Carr, Jeffrey (2008): Russia/Georgia Cyber War – Findings and Analysis. *Project Grey Goose: Phase I Report*, 17. 10. 2008, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/6967393/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-I-Report>.
• Carr, Jeffrey (2009): The Evolving State of Cyber Warfare. *Project Grey Goose: Phase II Report*, 20. 3. 2009, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/13442963/Project-Grey-Goose-Phase-II-Report>.
• Carr, Jeffrey (2011): 7 Reasons Why China Isn't the Biggest Cyber Threat (And Who Is). *Jeffrey Carr's Blog*, 29. 6. 2011, <http://jeffreycarr.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/7-reasons-why-china-isnt-worlds-biggest.html>.
• Cisco (2017): CCNA Cyber Ops SECOPS, Official Cert Guide. Indianapolis: Cisco Press.
• Council of Europe (2001): Convention on Cybercrime. Eur. T.S. No. 185.
• Danchev, Dancho (2008): Coordinated Russia vs Georgia Cyber-attack in Progress. *ZDNet*, 11. 8. 2008, <http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/coordinated-russia-vs-georgia-cyber-attack-in-progress/1670>.
• Iashvili, Aleksandr – Yusin, Maksim (2008): Russia Will Protect Its Citizens. *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, Vol. 60, No. 28, 5. 8. 2008, pp. 12–13, originally published in *Izvestia*, 14. 7. 2008.
• ICJ (1986): Nicaragua Judgment: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), ICJ 14.
• ICJ (2007): Genocide Case: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), ICJ 108.
• ICTY (1999): Tadić Case: Prosecutor v. Tadić. No. IT-94-1.
• Krebs, Brian (2008): Report: Russian Hacker Forums Fueled Georgia Cyber-attacks. *The Washington Post*, 16. 10. 2008.
• Menn, Joseph (2008): Expert: Cyber-attacks on Georgia Websites Tied to Mob, Russian Government. *Los Angeles Times*, 13. 8. 2008.
• Microsoft (2017): An Attribution Organization to Strengthen Trust Online. Microsoft Policy Papers, <https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RW67QI>.
• Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia (2008): Cyber-attacks Disable Georgian Websites, 11. 8. 2008, <http://georgiamfa.blogspot.co.uk/2008/08/cyber-attacks-disable-georgian-websites.html>.
• Mshvidobadze, Khatuna (2011): The Battlefield on Your Laptop. *Radio Free Europe*, 21. 3. 2011, <http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/2345202.html>.
• Russian Federation (2011): *Concept of a Convention on International Information Security*, 28. 10. 2011, <http://rusemb.org.uk/policycontact/52>.
• Shachtman, Noah (2009): Top Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber-attacked Us – We Just Can't Prove It. *Wired*, 11. 3. 2009, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/georgia-blames/>.

• Security Council of the Russian Federation (2000): Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation [Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации]. In Russian at <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/6/5.html>, in English at <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-os-sndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!OpenDocument>.
• Stratfor (2008): Georgia, Russia: The Cyber-Warfare Angle, 12. 8. 2018, <http://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/georgia-russia-cyberwarfare-angle>.

Vedat Yorucu and Özay Mehmet: The Southern Energy Corridor: Turkey's Role in European Energy Security.

"Turkey is like a hamburger, on the upper ban Russia gas, on the lower ban east Mediterranean and Caucasian gas and in the middle Southern Gas Corridor (…) [sic]" (p. 79). This quote represents the heart and soul of the reviewed book, in which Professors Yorucu and Mehmet aim to defend the capacity of the Turkish Republic to become a hub in the Southern Energy Corridor between the energy-rich regions in the South-East and Europe. The authors, however, forget that a hamburger does not necessarily pose a tasty bite for everyone.

Vedat Yorucu is a Lecturer in Economics at the Eastern Mediterranean University in Cyprus. He deals with energy security and trade-issues. Özay Mehmet is a Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. He specializes in the economic development of the Asian Tigers, Turkey and Cyprus. The economic background of the co-authors is clearly visible throughout the book, which focusses especially on the economic aspects of hydrocarbon transportation such as infrastructure, market, and prospects of monetisation.

The main point their book makes is that due to the increasing energy needs of both the EU and Turkey, the two players should cooperate in order to find the most economical way to satisfy their rising demand. The main goal of the book is then to explore – or, more precisely, defend – the role Turkey could play as a transit country for the European Union. To reach this objective, the book very well presents the existing Turkish energy infrastructure, the local energy market, and an empirical pricing model of the domestic gas demand. Then the reader is introduced to several hydrocarbon sources (the Caspian basin, Russia, the East Med, Iraq, Iran, and the Red Sea) that could be potentially connected to the European market via Turkey. Later, using the economic "level of risk analysis", the authors examine these sources from an economic as well as a geopolitical perspective.

Altogether, the monograph consists of ten chapters organised into four parts. The first and second part are focussed on the role of Turkey in the energy security of Europe and its possible role as an energy hub. They highlight the country's dual position as a rapidly growing consumer and a future transiter. The third part deals with the energy potential of the Eastern Mediterranean, and also with boundary disputes powered by the discoveries of hydrocarbons in this area. It also identifies and evaluates specific national and trans-national pipeline projects as well as economic and engineering details of the possibly emerging Turkish hub. Finally, the fourth part is devoted to EU-Turkey relations. It highlights the importance of the Southern Energy Corridor in securing Europe's future energy requirements, and calls for a more rational energy partnership between the two players.

The most important contribution the monograph brings is its overview of the recent state of affairs at the Southern Energy Corridor, which, at some time in the future, could possibly connect the EU with the energy-rich regions in the South-East. The authors, with their "level of risk" classification, suggest that Turkey, given its existing energy infrastructure, offers the most appropriate and cheapest way to enhance European energy security, provided that the EU strengthens its interconnection with Turkey, and drops its "pipedream" of establishing an undersea pipeline between Cyprus, Greece and Italy (pp. 130–131). In fact, the Turkish Republic is currently connected to Russian, Azerbaijani,

Iranian, and Iraqi hydrocarbon sources. In the future, it could also serve as a transit country for the gas originating in Egypt, Israel and Cyprus.

This is an impressive potential, but there are some issues that need to be discussed in this regard. First, offering an alternative route for the Russian gas is welcomed, but the European energy security would be best enhanced by searching for different suppliers rather than different routes.[1] Second, these days, the transportation of Iranian and Iraqi hydrocarbons still faces severe security and political obstacles. And third, the Azerbaijani option is so far foreseen to provide only a limited amount of gas for Europe (specifically 10 bcm, p. 31).

This is why the authors prominently devote attention to the question of the East Med gas piping. The so-called Levantine Basin is a hydrocarbon-rich, mostly offshore area located between Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus with significant natural gas reserves exceeding the Algerian reserves by almost one third (p. 103). So far, only Israel and Egypt are drilling the East Med gas, and only for domestic consumption (Ministry of Energy 2013; Eni 2018). But prospectively, a surplus of the gas could be exported. On several occasions the authors highlight that transporting these resources to Europe in any other way than via Turkey (e.g. via the Israel-Cyprus-Greece-Italy undersea pipeline or an LGN terminal) would be economic nonsense. Although this claim is probably true, the economic considerations do not always prevail when the actors involved are confronted with the (geo)political realities, especially in sectors deemed strategic.[2] In this context, a proposed solution that would involve exchanging Cypriot gas for water (p. 131) would be quite cheap when viewed from a purely economic perspective, but incredibly costly in terms of selling it to the Greek Cypriot public due to both strategic and legal concerns.[3]

Additionally, another questionable issue is whether the EU believes that its energy security would truly be enhanced by piping all South-Eastern hydrocarbons only via Turkey, given the Turkish internal political and security development (Austvik and Rzayeva 2016). This point now gains an even bigger importance because in August 2018 the Caspian states – after more than twenty years of disputes over the status of the Caspian Sea – finally reached an agreement that could allow for building an undersea gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, Turkey and Europe (Soukup 2018). It is to be noted that the authors of the book considered this deal unlikely (pp. 48, 52).

The monograph also argues that in the long term perspective, economic forces (labelled as "rational choice") sooner or later prevail over bilateral disputes – and the authors then serve as advocates of this idea throughout the rest of the book. The authors admit that it is written not with the intention to neutrally evaluate the pros and cons of Turkey serving as a possible regional energy hub, but in defence of Turkey's role as such. As the Professors themselves put it, *"This monograph is dedicated to the idea that Europe and Turkey are obliged to become energy partners"* (p. 1). From my perspective, this is an unfortunate approach. Although in many of the points they make, they might be right, at least the cover-box of their "burger" should have been made in a more appealing form. For a reader, it is always better to think that they are allowed to form their own opinion instead of being forced to accept someone else's view.

Amidst the monograph's other weaknesses I can point out its rather short length of 146 pages, which didn't allow the co-authors to evolve a deeper argumentation in support of their perspective. For example, the description of Turkey's view on the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone in the Mediterranean is underdeveloped. In my opinion, it would be interesting to read a more thorough discussion of the Greek/Greek Cypriot and Turkish argumentation, but – true enough – such a discussion would probably exceed the scope of the econocentric focus they have chosen. Finally, I have to note that there are also several inconsistencies (for example, the name of the Syrian president Assad is sometimes spelled "Esad" and at other times "Asad", pp. 65, 116–117), typing errors ("peace-peaking" mission, p. 140), and mistakes ("the European Court of Justice" is mentioned

in place of "the International Court of Justice", p. 95) that skipped the attention of the editors.

The monograph represents the 60th contribution to the Springer series "Lecture Notes in Energy", which aims to cover new developments in the study of energy, and is meant to provide a bridge between advanced textbooks and the forefront of research. Its model readers, according to Springer, include those *"wishing to gain an accessible introduction to a field of research"*, and those *"with a need for an up-to-date reference book on a well-defined topic"* (Springer 2018). I can sum up that the book indeed fits these criteria, and I would recommend it for everyone interested in the energy security of the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as those focussing on Greco-Turkish/Cypriot-Turkish relations. It offers a concise overview of the current state of affairs in the field of energy security in the region, and a brief Turkish glimpse of it. However, readers hungry for a thorough analysis of the possible Turkish role in the Southern Energy Corridor should address themselves not only to this "fast food", as it would be appropriate to supplement it with another dish.

Martina Dočkalová

---

[1] See, for example, Starr (2017).

[2] For example, Poland plans to cut itself off from its oldest natural gas supplier, and also its biggest rival, Russia, after 2022, following a massive investment in energy infrastructure (an LNG terminal, a new pipeline from Norway). See Martewicz (2018).

[3] Although the Turks repeatedly offered to supply water to the Republic of Cyprus, these calls remain unheard for the associated water pipe is regarded as illegal and sometimes even addressed as "the third Turkish invasion" of Cyprus. See Kathimerini (2015); Demir (2017).

Literature
• Austvik, Olle Gunnar – Rzayeva, Gulmira (2016): Turkey in the Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Mossavar Rahmani Center for Business & Government. Harvard Kennedy School, <https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/mrcbg/files/66_final.pdf>.
• Springer (2018): Lecture Notes in Energy, <https://www.springer.com/series/8874>.

Documents
• Demir, Adem (2017): Turkey 'Ready' to Send Water to Southern Cyprus. Anadolu Agency, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/turkey-ready-to-send-water-to-southern-cyprus/815543>.
• Eni (2018): Zohr: Production Underway in Record Time, <https://www.eni.com/en_IT/operations/upstream/exploration-model/zohr-egypt.page>.
• Kathimerini (2015): Ο αγωγός νερού Τουρκίας κατεχομένων πάει στην Βουλή, <http://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/200065/?ctype=ar 2015>.
• Martewicz, Maciej (2018): Poland Waves Goodbye to Russian Gas After 74 Years. *Bloomberg*, 8. 2. 2018, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-08/poland-bets-on-lng-norwegian-gas-as-divorce-with-russia-looms>.
• Ministry of Energy (2013): Natural Gas Begins to Flow from Tamar Gas Field, <https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/natural_gas_tamar>.
• Soukup, Ondřej (2018): Dohoda pěti států umožní stavbu plynovodu přes Kaspické moře. *Hospodářské noviny*, 14. 8. 2018.
• Starr, Stephen (2017): Turkey's Massive Gas Pipeline a Double-Edged Sword for Europe. The €11bn TurkStream Gas Project Will Put Turkey and Russia in a Position of Power. *Irish Times*, 22. 7. 2017, <https://www.irishtimes.com/business/energy-and-resources/turkey-s-massive-gas-pipeline-a-double-edged-sword-for-europe-1.3162748>.

BOOK REVIEW

Allyson Jule: Speaking Up: Understanding Language and Gender.

1st edition. Bristol: Multilingual Matters, 2018, 127 pages, ISBN 978-1-78309-959-7.

The book *Speaking Up: Understanding Language and Gender* represents a not very typical example of current problems in the context of international relations. The unusual connection of gender, as a social variable, with language and speech in general, may seem to be outside this field completely, but the opposite is true. Despite the fact that the author does not explicitly describe reality in an international context, each chapter contains passages dedicated to the field of international relations. The reason may be simple – Jule tries to force the reader to think about the problem in depth. In order to achieve this, she teaches the reader to think about the implications that gender and language can have for the international community.

Allyson Jule, PhD, is a Canadian academic and a Professor of Education and the Dean of Education at Trinity Western University in Langley, British Columbia, Canada. She is also the Co-Founder and Co-Director of the Gender Studies Institute, and is on the Advisory Committee of the International Gender and Language Association (IGALA). In 2011 Jule won TWU's Davis Distinguished Teaching Award and in 2016 she became one of the top 10 Canadian professors of the year. She is the only TWU professor who was awarded the prestigious 3M Teaching Fellowship for her remarkable academic results. In her researches, Jule specialises in gender – with a connection to language, education and/or religion, and a focus on how gender assumptions affect the way people speak in various contexts. She authored and edited many excellent publications, the most famous being *A Beginner's Guide to Language and Gender* (2008) and *Shifting Visions: Gender and Discourses* (2015). Allyson Jule's main aims are to end female silence in the classroom and to create a more just world.

In her latest publication, Jule has outlined two main topics: *"How language represents, reveals, constructs and sustains attitudes to gender"* and *"how language users speak in ways that contribute to their gendered-inflected lives"*. Simply put, Jule, in her book, explores how gender influences the way we communicate in a domestic or international environment. According to Jule, *"gender is a major part of who we are and why we behave in certain ways, and so it is worthwhile to consider the many places that gender and language intersect"* (4). This intersection is present not only in the private sphere, but also in the public sphere, which is probably more internationally visible thanks to the global audience for news media. In news media, problems of gender-linguistic inequalities can be easily found in various contexts: *"Islamic terrorism and violence, the refugee crisis, gender-based violence on university campuses and in conflict zones, increasing poverty in developing countries, [and] shifts in geopolitical alliances",* among others (9). Jule's book aims at presenting the complexity of this problem by using a bottom-up approach – going from a detailed understanding of the roots to international impacts of language-gender relations.

Both of the main topics set by Jule include historical and societal impacts on gender expression in language: or more specifically, they include traditional views of what criteria a good woman must meet and what criteria a good man must meet in order to meet general expectations. Meanwhile, the way we communicate predestines our other activities. Jule, however, suggests that our own decisions, activities, and/or life plans are largely influenced by what society expects us to do. As Jule states, *"he [Otto Jespersen,*

1922] believed that the greatest orators of history were men because of innate abilities in them that were rarely found in women" (8). The relationship of gender and its subsequent language use in practise has a significant impact on the building of our own identity, working or private relationships and living preferences. Today's perception of this relationship, however, locks people into metaphorical cages, which represent a long-lasting, historically-conditioned trend. But the one who becomes free of the cage is then out of the norm for the rest of society. Jule therefore asks: Do we want a world in which we have strictly divided divisions of femininity and masculinity, or will we begin to build together an equitable and just world?

"Language plays a complex part in reflecting, creating and sustaining our own genderedness and the genderedness of others" (20). Language and our speech in general, in conjunction with gender as a social variable, are overlapping in contexts in which we build our social awareness of the world. This applies to different areas that affect the way we live our lives – the school environment, the working environment, the religious community, the media… In all these contexts there are rooted gender assumptions and expectations that show significant differences. Women are expected to be informal, emotional and sophisticated, while men are expected to be strong, formal and decisive. Furthermore, language plays an important role in both social and political life. In many countries, language is still a tool of oppression and control governing the distribution of power in a state. Women and sexual minorities are thus considerably disadvantaged in many areas – power is predominantly accumulated in the hands of heterosexual men, who also adapt their style of speech to this purpose. This is so not only in totalitarian regimes, but also in the strongest democracies today: for example, *"the whole world witnessed the connection of gender and language watching America under Trump: for example the way he dismissed his opponent, Hillary Clinton, and other women, mocking a woman's appearance and discarding women's voices entirely"* (10). He used a powerful masculine rhetoric to win the elections. And he succeeded. This raises the question: can social success be partly based on the social linguistic structures? The answer is still unclear.

The book itself is divided into two main chapters, of which the first – "Understanding Gender and Language Use" – discusses the basics of the subject itself. Jule already demonstrates on the first pages what kind of gender expectations we have in the structure of written and oral speeches. The feminine rhetoric used in the first chapter fulfils the expectations of the style *"to write like a woman"* (mainly using personal stories, anecdotes, and an informal style of speech), which does not correspond to the style *"to write like an academic"* (mainly a formal style of speech, and distance from the reader). Both types of style find a target audience for which the style choice is a problem they can not identify with. We face these and similar language challenges daily in different social areas – from politics, through education and the work environment, to religious communities. We expect the woman to stand out and express herself differently from the man because she is biologically predestined for different activities. But biology is just one argument for what causes this complex and historical problem. Therefore, the author offers an insight into the very core of the problem and shows that the gender-language-social status relationship is much more complicated than it seems at first glance.

The complexity of the subject is demonstrated in the first part of the book, where the reader becomes familiar with feminism as a theoretical approach that forms the basis for understanding the whole issue. From the historical point of view, it is complemented by a detailed analysis of the sex-gender relationship using ideas of the most successful feminist authors (for example, Deborah Cameron, Judith Butler, Mary Talbot, and many others). An important part of the chapter describes the political ambitions of feminists, from the time when the feminist movement was primarily active only in France (the national perspective), to the time when feminism started to be a global movement

fighting for equality (the international perspective). Jule closes the chapter with a brief description of the relationship between neoliberalism, the new feminism and globalisation, which is more than key to the application of the issue to present times.

An important part of the book titled "Language as Gendered" discusses how gender is reflected in our communication, and how it subsequently influences the social hierarchy and our social status. Besides sexism, the central theme is the relationship between language and power, in regard to which Jule works mainly with the research carried out by the author Robin Lakoff (1975). Demonstration of power, according to Lakoff, is particularly evident in the masculine speech that is typical for the public sphere, while the feminine language most commonly used by women fits more into the private sector. This disparity again shares the same global historical background that has created the current rigid social standards, and which expects male rhetoric to be used more effectively in the public sphere, while female rhetoric is to be more productively used in the private sphere. Jule, however, draws attention to this simplification and recommends evaluating rhetoric styles in broader contexts. Jule admits, though, that there are genuinely significant differences between feminine and masculine language styles, which can be used or even abused as a communication tool, regardless of gender. In this case, Jule recommends using critical discourse analysis, which can help uncover the link between what is said and what is meant in various domestic or international contexts.

The second large chapter of the book, "Understanding Gender and Language Use in the World", provides a brief insight into the practise in which the relationship between language and gender often appears around the world. The author has chosen five social areas to demonstrate this occurrence – *media and technology, education, the workplace, religions* (specifically Judaism, Christianity and Islam) and *relationships in general*. Most of the attention in the chapter is paid to media, which on a global scale contribute to the current generation of gender trends and expectations. This is particularly noticeable in the advertising and marketing of western media, which vastly abuse gender stereotypes and create consumer femininity and consumer masculinity, which build our identities in a rigid way. Moreover, *"media often portray women as helpless, gullible and even invisible, which supports the cultural misogyny that is then deeply rooted and maintained in us"* (52). Media, on the other hand, can also be properly used for raising the international awareness of gender inequalities. Famous campaigns like *Ban Bossy, HerForShe* or 2018's *#Metoo* and *#TimesUp* movements help reveal current problems connected to gender and language, which are present not only in Hollywood, but also in the workplace and in religious communities worldwide.

Specific features of the gender-language relationship are reflected in the work environment. An important concept of the chapter is *the glass ceiling*, which represents an imaginary boundary between top social and work success and women, who often (even nowadays) are unable to reach this peak. According to the author, the public may be afraid of a strong and visible woman – society accepts it if a woman has an important position, but she stands in the background, or, on the contrary, if she performs publicly, but from a minor position. The combination of *strength and visibility* is often denied to women, which also maintains our gender stereotypes in society. The glass ceiling is mainly visible in global politics. Top political positions of power which would involve leading a country are also affected by global gender stereotypes, probably in the biggest possible way, which leads to a more challenging path for women to get to the top. According to Jule, greater possibilities for women in politics are surprisingly found in Africa and Asia, as the world already witnessed top level female political leaders on these continents. In the West, though, the situation is more complicated. The main reason for the lack of female leaders is obvious: top political positions require much time and energy, and in the conventional way, women's time and energy are supposed to be devoted to their families. This is the current world's majority opinion. Meanwhile,

"the lives of Angela Merkel of Germany, Theresa May of Great Britain, Nicola Sturgeon of Scotland and Hillary Clinton in the US are under constant public surveillance" (71). As Hillary Clinton lost the US presidential elections in 2016, women all around the world witnessed that today's world is still not ready for powerful and, at the same time, visible women.

In religious matters, gender issues are globally manifested most particularly in Islam, which in many countries significantly destroys women's social status. However, gender issues are also relevant in Christianity, Judaism or other religions – one example is the descriptions of God, Allah and Yahweh in the male gender, which contribute to the superiority of masculinity in the international perspective. Although religious books themselves describe women and men as equal in many passages (even the Qur'an), men's interpretation of these texts greatly degrades male-female equality, and men therefore stand in the centre of attention. From this point of view, women are *"on the edge"* of social attention, not only in islamic countries but also in European or Asian states. Today's religious perceptions are globally based on the same principle – these gender-based problems within religious communities are evident and common all around world. In connection to Islam, Jule states: *"They [Middle Eastern feminists] have sought to challenge the idea that Islam needs fixed gender roles and contended that the fixation on gender roles impedes women from controlling their own sexuality"* (88).

The language we use to build and develop our relationships includes gender stereotypes as well. According to Jule, our co-existence is based on socio-historical foundations that are deeply rooted in global society. Consequently, we arbitrarily move around in these stereotypes and act and communicate according to them, because we identify with them and they fit us well. We use language for two different purposes – to build new relationships and to control those already created. If an individual is aware of the power of speech, he/she can use either masculine or feminine rhetoric regardless of their biological sex and take advantage of the benefits that these speech strategies offer. In the international context, the consequences can be either very positive, or dangerously negative – that is the real power of the right language use.

The main stumbling blocks of the book are the prevalence of theory over empirical information and a lack of coherence. Jule wrote the book in an interesting way, but also in a confusing and very difficult way in certain places, which requires maximum concentration and an undisturbed environment on the part of the reader. The reader must read the book as an academic text whose attractiveness disappears in some places. This may be caused by the purely theoretical nature of the book, which, in spite of the high amount of detail, discusses the historical and social causes of gender inequalities in linguistic expressions in the world, but lacks empirical states that would suggest possible solutions to these inequalities. Although in the conclusion, the author herself describes the issue as very complex and challenging, and states that it is not possible to establish a universal process that would lead to change in this regard, *Speaking Up* would be more interesting if it also included case studies of successful changes to a more just world, and a motivation to help in carrying out such changes. Another drawback is the depth of the research in individual chapters. If the author chose fewer research areas to analyze (for example, only media and religion), the book could serve as a guideline for other, similar researches on similar themes. In this aspect, *Speaking Up* works somewhat superficially, especially in the second part of the book.

If the reader perceives the book as a theoretical textbook that provides insight into areas in which language and gender difficulties are present, then *Speaking Up* might be a good start for further empirical research. Jule's high expertise and rich experience offer a basis for a comprehensive and detailed understanding of the very roots of the gender-linguistic problem that can be applied to areas where inequality is found by the reader. Thanks to Speaking Up, we can work with a different view of gender asymmetries in

global society and find the reasons that brought us into these rigid tracks. In this aspect, Jule's book is an exceptional asset for those who are fighting for an equal world and who are not afraid to look the truth in the eyes.

Alexandra Madarászová

Literature
• Lakoff, Robin (1973): Language and Woman's Place. *Language in Society*, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 45–80.

Zygmunt Bauman: Strangers at Our Door.

1st edition. Polity, 2016, 120 pages, ISBN: 978-1-509-51216-4.

The author of the book *Strangers at Our Door*, Zygmunt Bauman, was a sociologist and philosopher who was born in Poland in 1925. He was one of the most influential and famous sociology professors in the modern age. In this book he focusses on the theme of the refugee crisis. While describing the current situation, he analyses the origins and effects of the panic surrounding it, and shows how politicians use the fear of people. The conclusion he reaches is that instead of underlining barriers we should try to build bridges and find a solution that will bring both sides closer.

The book was published in 2016, one year after the biggest migration crisis in Europe started, as a reaction to the migration flow into the continent. The book consists of six chapters without any preface or introduction. Although the chapters are self-contained rather than interconnected, there is a common line between them that maintains the main idea that the author wants to develop. For us, the strangers wishing to immigrate to Europe are like uninvited guests that have knocked at our door since the beginning of time. They tend to generate fear among the local population because they are unknown. The whole situation is a politically correct game between the opinion makers (politicians) and the submerged human mind (society and ordinary citizens). The aim of the book is to obtain an overall perception of the migration crisis, show the roots of the hate and mistrust among the people and also suggest possible solutions to the problem of reaching the desired target – cooperation and dialogue leading to a prosperous society. The 117 pages of the book resemble a large collection of citations of articles and statements from politicians. The text is readable, and because of the fact that the main ideas are repeated throughout the whole book, the reader understands well the mission and thoughts that the author wants to emphasise.

The first chapter begins with a historical approach and a description of how society in general perceives strangers. From the beginning of modern times, people escaped from wars and knocked on the doors of others seeking help. For the people behind these doors those unknown people have always been seen as "strangers". Foreigners cause fears in the societies they travel to because they are "alien", unpredictable and completely different from the people we meet every day. We know the people we know, and know their cultural formula, and also, we fear the fact that strangers could change our life habits. When strangers are among us, new situations and problems appear and we, as a society, are not ready for them.

Every new wave of immigrants will cause a so-called breakdown of the order (system). According to Bauman, the system is a state in which the relationship between causes and consequences is stable. That makes strangers who are not foreigners understandable and predictable and allows the people in the society to proceed well through every individual situation. With immigrants coming into this system, however, this stability is disrupted.

The policy that politicians pursue in regard to foreigners is one of segregating and maintaining a distance (this is beneficial to the politicians) rather than building so-called bridges between cultures and opportunities for better communication. This leads to mutual distrust, alienation and harassment between the locals and the foreigners. This double-sided indifference does not lead to a successful solution to the problem. The chapter concludes with some words from Pope Franz delivered in 2013: *"today's society lives in a culture of well-being that forces us to think only of ourselves, and thus, we*

become indifferent to others" (24). Bauman says this leads to a so-called globalisation of indifference.

The second chapter shows that a declaration of a state of emergency allows police to enter flats and houses without a court order, dissolve demonstrations and gatherings, and also declare a curfew, as is evident from the example of France. Such situations help the government to maintain the image of an actor that will keep its promises and protect its citizens. However, according to the author, this is not about lightening the concerns of its citizens, but rather the opposite. Politicians play cards when people feel insecure. The well-known statement from the Hungarian prime minister that "all terrorists are migrants" is an exact proof of how his government is abusing the migration crisis to effectively fight for survival. Political statements of this sort are well thought out. Politicians are aware that in order to make their statements more attractive, they have to lose logic. The author also states that identifying a "migration problem" with a security problem actually helps various terrorist groups to reach their targets.

The author talks about the three possible impacts of stigmatisation of people who try to integrate into the new society. The first is the painful strike of a stigmatised man who undergoes suffering and humiliation, which leads to his self-concealment and self-denial. The second reaction is that the stigmatised person perceives their stigmatisation as something that is undeserved, painful and insulting, and therefore requiring revenge. This revenge can force the society to renounce its original verdict, and the stigmatised person can thus get back his or her stolen self-esteem. The third reaction that may occur is a mixed one. A person can be cut off from the majority society by his or her alienation and protected by his or her own imagination, and at the same time perceive him- or herself as a full-fledged human being when it is just the others who appear to be inhuman.

This chapter also highlights the ideas of Pierre Baussand and Jean-Claude Juncker, who say that social exclusion is the main cause of the radicalisation of young Muslims in the European Union. Those who organise and commit terrorist attacks are the same people that the refugees were previously escaping from. Bauman argues that in order to eradicate radicalisation, the West should use its greatest weapons against terrorism, which include social investment, social inclusion and integration.

The third chapter deals with the government of strong men and women, and highlights the idea that the governments of the democratic countries are governments of a firm hand. The chapter also deals with the relationship between the average citizen and the government, which has a real impact on people's preferences regarding public policy. Certain questions are relevant to this: To what extent is a citizen interested in political issues? Does the citizen see a certain situation as threatening? Does the citizen expect that politicians will protect him/her from the chaos of this situation? The author concludes the chapter with the idea that *"the unforgivable [sin of] democracy in the eyes of the growing number of its alleged benefactors is its inability to meet what is expected of it and the subsequent excuses that there is no other option, which means that the government 'cannot do anything else'"* (53).

The fourth chapter addresses the issue of migration in terms of history. As they say, from the historical point of view, on a regular day, our ancestors met only with the people they knew. This was how culture and the world were shaped. The situation has changed in recent years. There is only one way that leads to mutual well-being and cooperation. The second option that occurs, leads to collective extinction. We still do not realise that the choice between survival and extinction depends only on our decisions regarding how we can live side by side with other people, how much solidarity we have with others, and how much we want to cooperate with foreigners who do not share our opinions.

The next chapter begins with some criticism of Viktor Orbán and his attitude towards migrants. According to George Konrad, his strict policy leads him to be illiberal towards his country's citizens, but at the same time he is also incompetent and non-liberal in

relation to the people who are looking for salvation in his country. This leads many people to have the following view: Orbán being non-liberal towards his own nation is not correct, but his being non-liberal towards others is right.

The last chapter deals with the different views of anthropologists regarding the problem of immigration and also tries to discover the roots of the hatred directed toward immigrants. It first explains Plato's thoughts on this issue. Then it moves to the ideas of Arendt and Kant, who believed that moral consciousness, the ability to distinguish good from bad, is inherent to all people because everyone is able to think rationally. What is the main difference between thinking and acting? If I think, I am my own "self," but when one begins to act, this individual is a member of "public" society (this means that this person is one of many). Meanwhile the order of logical / empirical reasoning is reversed when it is not the task of evidence to prove the truthfulness of knowledge, but it is rather the task of evidence to prove that the knowledge is in accordance with a certain faith. Also, the most common viral moments are those that come out of the subconscious, while hate, fear of others, and rage come out of the unconscious.

Finally, Bauman states that the essence of Gadamer's philosophy is that in creating a common framework, or horizon, the essential element is conversation. This involves an exchange of views between different dialogues. We should thus try to agree on the solutions despite our different dialogues. Conversation and understanding require a consensus that all understandings involve something like a common language, although it is a common language that is created only during the process of understanding itself.

On the last page, Bauman quotes Appiaha when arguing that we should focus on the conversation model in regard to the migration problem – and especially on conversations between people who lead different ways of life as the world is becoming more populous: *"In the next half of the century, the population will reach nine billion. Depending on the circumstances, cross-border conversations may be uplifting, perhaps painful: in any case, they will be inevitable"* (86).

To sum it up, as Bauman says, whether we like it or not, the migration crisis and the current state of the world will bring opportunities that we will have to react to, and we will have to choose between the options that might occur depending on our behaviour. Bauman's book is intended for the general public. It describes what is happening against the background of the migration crisis, how the whole image of this phenomenon is being created and what influences the media's coverage of the issue and creates the opinion on migration of the whole society, which is mainly characterised by mistrust and fear of the people coming into our territory. In my personal opinion I find the book quite optimistic. It leads us to think about the causes and consequences of rejection and closed-mindedness. We have to be aware of the possible structural changes that immigration will bring and try to focus on its positive outcomes, and not see only the negative aspects.

Nikola Medová

INTERNATIONAL LAW

62 490

BÍLKOVÁ, Veronika, 1975–
Global prohibition regimes and international law / Veronika Bílková. – Passau; Berlin; Prague: rw&w Science & New Media, 2017. – 217 pages.
ISBN 978-3-946915-19-5 (paperback)

62 594

EUROPEAN
European convention on human rights and general international law / Edited by Anne van Aaken and Iulia Motoc. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. – xxvi, 321 pages. – (European society of international law series).
ISBN 978-0-19-883000-9 (hardcover)

62 488

PROTECTING
Protecting vulnerable groups: the European human rights framework / edited by Francesca Ippolito and Sara Iglesias Sánchez. Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2017. – xii, 481 pages. – (Modern studies in European law; Vol. 51).
ISBN 978-1-50991-548-4 (paperback)

62 585

RAVASI, Elisa
Human rights protection by the ECtHR and the ECJ: a comparative analysis in light of the equivalency doctrine / by Elisa Ravasi. – Leiden; Boston: Brill Nijhoff, 2017. – xxxiv, 435 pages. – (International studies in human rights, ISSN 0924-4751; Vol. 118).
ISBN 978-90-04-34367-2 (hardcover)

62 599

USE
The Use of force in international law: a case-based approach / edited by Tom Ruys and Olivier Corten with Alexandra Hofer. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018. – xi, 948 pages.
ISBN 978-0-19-878436-4 (paperback)

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS / RELATIONS

62 506

BINDER, Martin
The United Nations and the politics of selective humanitarian intervention / Martin Binder. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xiii, 297 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-42353-1 (hardcover)

62 501

BRECHER, Michael
Dynamics of the Arab-Israel conflict: past and present: intellectual Odyssey II / Michael Brecher. –

[Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xix, 410 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-47574-5 (hardcover)

62 568

CABADA, Ladislav, 1973–
Security, foreign and European policy of the Visegrad group / Ladislav Cabada, Šárka Waisová et al. – Praha: Togga, 2018. – 326 pages.
ISBN 978-80-7476-140-9 (paperback)

62 578

CRISES
Crises in the post-soviet space: from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the conflict in Ukraine / edited by Felix Jaitner, Tina Olteanu and Tobias Spöri. – London; New York: Routledge, 2018. – xix, 270 pages. – (Post-Soviet politics).
ISBN 978-0-815-37724-5 (hardcover)

62 503

EUROPEAN UNION
The EU, promoting regional integration, and conflict resolution / Thomas Diez, Nathalie Tocci, editors. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xxvii, 336 pages. – (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics).
ISBN 978-3-319-47529-5 (hardcover)

62 601

FOREIGN
Foreign policy in post-apartheid South Africa: security, diplomacy and trade / edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Kudrat Virk. – London: I.B. Tauris, 2018. – xxviii, 500 pages.
International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2018), pp. 954–955.
ISBN 978-1-78831-083-3 (paperback)

62 537

HAVLOVÁ, Radka
Untangling the Mayhem: crises and prospects of the Middle East / Radka Havlová (ed.), Kristýna Stejskalová, Karolína Najmanová, Jan Chudoba, Aneta Hlavsová, Yvona Novotná, Jana Samadová, Radka Havlová, Kristýna Tamchynová. – Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018. – 265 pages. – (International relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas; Vol. 3).
ISBN 978-3-631-74092-7 (hardcover)

62 576

MCMAHON, Patrice C.
The NGO game: post-conflict peacebuilding in the Balkans and beyond / Patrice C. McMahon. – Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2017. – xiv, 221 pages.
International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2018), pp. 933–935.
ISBN 978-1-5017-0924-1 (paperback)

62 544

NORDIC
Nordic states and European integration: awkward

partners in the North? / Malin Stegmann McCallion, Alex Brianson, editors. – Cham Springer, 2018. – xiii, 143 pages. – (Palgrave studies in European Union politics).
International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 2 (2018), p. 448–449.
ISBN 978-3-319-57561-2 (hardcover)

62 511

SEVIN, Efe
Public diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy in the US, Sweden and Turkey / Efe Sevin. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xix, 248 pages. – (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy).
ISBN 978-3-319-49333-6 (hardcover)

62 586

SZWED, Stefan
Poland, Germany and state power in post-Cold War Europe: asymmetry matters / Stefan Szwed. – London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. – xv, 306 pages. – (St Antony's Series).
ISBN 978-1-349-95351-6 (hardcover)

62 484

ŠEPTÁK, Miroslav, 1984–
Mezi demokracií a autoritářstvím: rakouská vnitřní a zahraniční politika v letech 1931–1934 / Miroslav Šepták. – Praha: Academia, 2018. – 521 pages. – (Historie).
ISBN 978-80-200-2806-8 (paperback)

62 543

VOLLAARD, Hans
European disintegration: a search for explanations / Hans Vollaard. – [London]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. – xiii, 265 pages. – (Palgrave studies in European Union politics).
ISBN 978-1-137-41464-9 (hardcover)

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

62 602

FRIEDMAN, Ofer
Russian "hybrid warfare": resurgence and politicisation / Ofer Fridman. – London: Hurst & Company, 2018. – xi, 237 pages.
ISBN 978-1-84904-881-1 (hardcover)

62 502

CHANDLER, David, 1962–
Peacebuilding: the twenty years' crisis, 1997–2017 / David Chandler. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – viii, 243 pages. – (Rethinking peace and conflict studies).
ISBN 978-3-319-50321-9 (paperback)

62 504

MULCHINOCK, Niall
NATO and the Western Balkans: from neutral spectator to proactive peacemaker / Niall Mulchinock. – [London]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xxiv, 293 pages.
ISBN 978-1-137-59723-6 (hardcover)

62 545

PEACEBUILDING
Peacebuilding at home: NATO and its "new" member states after Crimea / Arnold H. Kammel, Benjamin Zyla (eds.). – Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2018. – 226 pages. – (AIES-Beiträge zur Europa- und Sicherheitspolitik; Vol. 5).
ISBN 978-3-8487-4705-4 (paperback)

62 584

SCHARRE, Paul
Army of none: autonomous weapons and the future of war / Paul Scharre. – New York: London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018. – ix, 436 pages.
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 3 (2018), p. 196.
ISBN 978-0-393-60898-4 (hardcover)

62 571

SYRIAN
The Syrian uprising: domestic origins and early trajectory / edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Omar Imady. – London; New York: Routledge, 2018. – xii, 343 pages. – (Routledge / St. Andrews Syrian studies series).
ISBN 978-1-138-50050-1 (paperback)

62 505

VIOLENT
Violent non-state actors in Africa: terrorists, rebels and warlords / Caroline Varin, Dauda Abubakar, editors. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xxiii, 340 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-51351-5 (hardcover)

STATE / POLITICS

62 514

BETWEEN
Between state and non-state: politics and society in Kurdistan-Iraq and Palestine / Gülistan Gürbey, Sabine Hofmann, Ferhad Ibrahim Seyder, editors. – [New York, NY]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xi, 278 pages.
ISBN 978-1-349-95065-2 (hardcover)

62 596

KAPUR, S. Paul
Jihad as grand strategy: islamist militancy, national security, and the Pakistani state / S. Paul Kapur. – New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017. – 177 pages.

International Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 4 (2018), pp. 936–937.
ISBN 978-0-19-976852-3 (hardcover)

62 577

MIERZEJEWSKI, Dominik
China's selective identities: state, ideology and culture / Dominik Mierzejewski, Bartosz Kowalski. – Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. – vii, 235 pages. – (Global Political Transitions; ISSN 2522-8730).
ISBN 978-981-13-0164-3 (hardcover)

62 603

POLITICAL
Political change in the Middle East and North Africa: after the Arab Spring / edited by Inmaculada Szmolka. – Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017. – viii, 446 pages.
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, Is. 3 (2018), pp. 523–525.
ISBN 978-1-4744-1530-9 (paperback)

THEORETICAL ISSUES

62 507

DE KEERSMAEKER, Goedele
Polarity, balance of power and international relations theory: post-cold war and the 19th century compared / Goedele De Keersmaeker. – [Cham]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – xi, 247 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-42651-8 (hardcover)

62 510

PASHAKHANLOU, Arash Heydarian
Realism and fear in international relations: Morgenthau, Waltz and Mearsheimer reconsidered / Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. – Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – ix, 174 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-41011-1 (hardcover)

62 573

PROTEAN
Protean power: exploring the uncertain and unexpected in world politics / edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, Lucia A. Seybert. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. – xviii, 355 pages. – (Cambridge studies in international relations; 146).
ISBN 978-1-108-44125-4 (paperback)

62 513

VOSKRESENSKIJ, Aleksej D.
Non-western theories of international relations: conceptualizing world regional studies / Alexei D. Voskressenski. – [New York, NY]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. – x, 270 pages.
ISBN 978-3-319-33737-1 (hardcover)

AUTHORS OF THIS ISSUE

MARTINA DOČKALOVÁ,
born in 1985, is a Ph.D. candidate at the Department of International Relations and Area Studies of Panteion University in Greece. She focuses on enduring rivalries and their evolution, with a special emphasis on linkages between domestic and international politics. She worked as a researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Athens, and completed several internships and study programmes in Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt.

JIŘÍ HEJKRLÍK, Ph.D.,
born in 1976, is Vice-Dean for Education and Quality at the Faculty of Tropical AgriSciences at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague. He specialises in the quality assurance of higher education and capacity building of higher educational institutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. He is also a member of the Department of Economics and Development, where he focusses on international agricultural development.

PAVEL HLAVÁČEK, Ph.D.,
born in 1980, earned his university degree (a Master's Degree in Political Science) at the Department of Political Science and European Studies, Palacky University in Olomouc. Later he continued with studies (gaining a PhDr. & a Ph.D. in Political Science) at the Department of Political Science and International Relations, the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, where he currently works as a full time professor. As a student he held a short term internship at the University of Portsmouth (2002), Valdosta State University (2004) and Universidad Pablo de Olavide (2004–2005). His research area is focused primarily on US foreign policy and security issues of the East Asia region. He has repeatedly been a visiting professor at Hanoi University in Vietnam and the National University of Mongolia.

ONDŘEJ HORKÝ-HLUCHÁŇ, Ph.D.,
born in 1980, is Senior Researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague. His research has focussed mostly on development cooperation policies in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently he is a Visiting Researcher at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, where he has worked on research dealing with policy coherence for sustainable development.

LUCIE KADLECOVÁ,
born in 1989, is a researcher and Ph.D. candidate at Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. She has recently been a visiting researcher on a Fulbright scholarship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge, USA. Previously, Lucie worked at the National Cyber Security Centre of the Czech Republic and was a trainee in the Cyber Defence Section of the NATO Headquarters and the Cabinet of the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy at the European Commission in Brussels. She holds an MA in International Peace and Security from the War Studies Department at King's College London.

ALEXANDRA MADARÁSZOVÁ,
born in 1993, she is a graduate of the Faculty of International Relations of the University of Economics in Prague and is currently a doctoral student in the field of International Political Relations. Her research is focussed on feminism and gender, globalisation and actors in international relations. She is highly familiar with topics of technological innovations in connection to international security as well.

NIKOLA MEDOVÁ,
born in 1990, she is currently a Ph.D. student at Palacký University in Olomouc at the Department of Development and Environmental Studies. She focuses on the Middle East with a specialisation in Turkey, Islam and the role of women. Her bachelor's thesis was written on female genital

mutilation, and her master's thesis titled "A Comparison of the Role of Women in the Bible and the Quran and the Implications for the Present" highlighted the main possible explanations of its topic in various books discussing women's status.

TEREZA NĚMEČKOVÁ, Ph.D.,
born in 1979, is Deputy Head of the Department of International Business at Metropolitan University Prague. Her research interests cover the economic development of Africas with a special focus on the measuring and rise of income inequalities (the middle class/poverty) and human development. She also has a special interest in Morocco.