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International Relations in the Czech Republic: Where Have All the Women Gone?

BLANKA NYKLOVÁ, KATEŘINA CIDLINSKÁ,
NINA FÁROVÁ

Abstract: In this article, we strive to explore what are some of the causes of the scarcity of women researchers in Czech international relations in comparison to the representation of women students in the field. To answer this question, we analysed a set of semi-structured interviews with international relations students and accessible syllabi using the conceptual framework of Sandra Harding's gendered universe, which differentiates between the operations of gender on the individual, structural and symbolic level. We identified some gendered barriers that might be blocking women researchers' access to the field. On this basis we suggest that the lack of women researchers in the field parallels the situation in other social sciences and humanities disciplines, but the situation in international relations is further exacerbated by the local circumstances of the foundation of the discipline, which shaped it as a predominantly masculine field with a specific gender-blind version of doing research and academic careers.

Key words: international relations, working/study environment, research field, academic career, gender, women researchers, Czech Republic.

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Where have all the women researchers in Czech international relations (IR) gone? How does their scarcity affect the content of local IR? Could the lack of women researchers be attributed to the presentation of the discipline and its academic output and vice versa? What does it mean and feel like to be an IR student (including PhD candidates) and how is the experience gendered? And how have Czech universities and research centres responded to the on-going dialogue between feminist/gender studies and IR that has been developing since the 1980s at the latest (Hutchings 2008)? These are some of the questions behind our empirical research into the experience of IR students with gender as an analytical category and part of their discipline at an IR department of a major Czech public university.

In general, the reasons for researching the apparent dearth of women in not only Czech IR can be categorised as falling into one of two categories. First, there are normative reasons, most importantly the justice-related one assuming that since capacities necessary for the execution of IR are distributed evenly across society, all groups, including women, should be represented evenly and if that is not the case, there are probably barriers in place that need to be removed. Second, there are reasons concerning the possible and actual impact of the gender imbalance in IR. Since society remains gendered, men and women are socialised into a hierarchy of roles with different sets of skills, capacities and interests. As a result, women are underrepresented in IR as a men-dominated discipline and they are much more likely to be missing from certain subdisciplines, such as theory-building,

and be overrepresented in fields such as feminist IR. The perspectives of groups other than white men have been historically marked as particular, as opposed to white men's "universal" or even "objective" standpoint (Rees 2011; Schiebinger 1989, 1993). At the same time, organisation studies shows that given the hierarchy gender represents, women in masculine environments (both in terms of whose knowledge is valued more and who is mainly represented) need to achieve a certain number in order to even be able to voice a perspective that differs from the "universal" one (Acker 1990, 2006). In other words, the lack of women, who are more likely, for instance, to focus on feminist epistemology than men, is highly likely to result in limiting the scope of the discipline afflicted by such a lack.

IR is part of the social sciences and humanities (SSH). As such, it reflects the patterns regarding the make-up of the student and faculty body present in other disciplines (European Commission 2016; Kázmér 2018), i.e. there are many more women among BA students than among PhD candidates and researchers in IR. Similarly, women are underrepresented in the higher echelons of the academic hierarchy and overrepresented in administrative positions at universities and research institutes. These phenomena seem to be relatively universal as, e.g., the TRIP faculty surveys suggest (Teaching, Research and International Policy Project 2018). Nevertheless, there are few detailed studies into the reasons for the dearth of women in global IR, and there are no such studies available for the particular Czech context. This is why some in the local IR community who see the lack of women among its researchers as a problem designed a large research project within which our study was conducted. A complete absence or a low representation of women means a lack of role models for women students who could substantially increase the women students' motivation for pursuing an academic career (McAlpine et al. 2012) while it also seems to affect disciplinary knowledge (Saini 2018; Schiebinger 1999).

As researchers in the field of feminist sociology and science and technology studies, we use a conceptual framework that is informed by Sandra Harding's gendered universe (Harding 1986), which differentiates between the operation of gender on the individual, structural and symbolic level. Using semi-structured interviews as our primary source of data we strive to access the structural and symbolic levels as they are reflected on the individual level. We strive to, first, summarise the structural barriers stemming from the position of IR as an SSH discipline; second, analyse three types of gendered barriers – symbolic, institutional and individual – that we identified in the semi-structured interviews and that seem to hamper women researchers' access to the field of IR studies; and, third, ponder the overall situation in Czech IR from a gender studies perspective – showing gaps and lacks caused by not fully using the potential of gender as an analytical category, which seems to be at least partly related to the lack of women in the field. The goal of the article is to map how IR in the Czech Republic is gendered and suggest possible reasons for the low representation of women among scholars and researchers in the discipline, which is at odds with the representation of women students among all IR students.

The article is structured as follows: after summarising our theoretical inspirations, we introduce the research methodology; next, we focus on the structural barriers specific to the field of SSH and the disciplinary barriers that seem to dominate IR. Against this backdrop, we present our analysis of the conducted interviews together with our interpretation of the effects the identified problems may have on the numbers of women and researchers from disadvantaged groups in general; in the conclusion we ponder the wider implications of the present situation for the field of IR, suggest some measures to remedy it, and identify areas where future research is needed.

THEORETICAL INSPIRATIONS: GENDERING THE IR FIELD

Mainstream international relations emerged as a research field at a time when feminist theories and gender studies managed to get a foothold in the academia, mainly in the

USA and the UK. This has, nevertheless, not led to a systematic thematic and conceptual cross-fertilisation between the two disciplines, let alone a fully embraced integration of gender as a critical perspective and analytical category readily applied by IR researchers where appropriate, although several key feminist researchers have been active in the field since the late 1980s (e.g. Cohn 2007; Elshtain 1987; Ruddick 1990; Tickner 1992).¹ Rather, IR has only recently started to explore the terrain opened up by gender studies and feminist theory (Blanchard 2003; Hutchings 2008). The discipline has been dominated by men and it has therefore been easier for women to gain entry into the discipline via subdisciplines aligned with gendered expectations of women and femininity such as peace and conflict studies. The TRIP project suggests that in international comparison, women in IR focus predominantly on international organisations and human rights while men researchers rather focus on IR theory and international security (TRIP 2014a). Another aspect supporting the mentioned division concerns the prevailing paradigm – while most women IR researchers in the TRIP identify as liberal and embrace constructivism, the majority of men researchers identify as conservative and espouse realism (TRIP 2014b).

Similarly, the delayed introduction of both (critical) IR and feminist and gender studies to Czech universities, which was only enabled by the change of the political regime in 1989, did not lead to any cross-fertilisation, and even an increased interest in the gender dimension of IR did not manage to significantly affect the local IR research agenda, even if the interest in it was prevalent elsewhere (see Narain 2014).

Now why should we care? This question seems to be all the more pertinent at a time when gender studies (GS) as a discipline is under an unprecedented attack (Hark 2016; Kováts 2017; Nyklová – Fárová 2018). While the whole questioning of an SSH discipline should not go without ardent attention of the whole SSH branch and academy as such, the answer to the question may be relatively simple. The practice of IR affects and is affected by global politics of security, access to political power and political economy, which are all fundamentally gendered, and it is therefore not possible to omit gender as an analytical category from the analysis of IR (Anderson et al. 2014; Steans 2003). Yet the answer may go much further. GS is a discipline grounded in feminist theory (see Sjoberg 2006, 2011). The epistemological implications of using GS in IR are what promises to have the most transformative effect on IR. Feminist challenges to IR theory building should lead to redefining the very scope of the IR field, the questions asked and actors' acknowledged agency (Enloe 1989; Hutchings 2008; Tickner 2001). On a more practical level, taking GS and feminist theory seriously should result in an increased self-reflexivity of the field scrutinising who contributes to the discipline in what ways and what the reasons for and implications of over- and underrepresentation of specific groups (social, ethnic, demographic, etc.) might be. A related practical realm is represented by feminist pedagogy strategies and explorations of how to best introduce GS concepts when teaching IR (Mertus 2007; Parisi et al. 2013; Stienstra 2000).

Many of the mentioned studies are critical of the failures to transform feminist theory and GS from a marginal perspective into an actual stable part of IR. What seems to have been achieved is a compartmentalisation of the GS perspective, a phenomenon where women, when underrepresented, are often put in charge of issues concerning women with insufficient resources and a very limited capacity to affect decision making (Roth 2004; Roth – Horan 2001). If we look at the broad field of IR, we can see a similar situation with feminist scholarship and practice limited to specific subfields such as development studies, international organisations research, and peace and conflict resolution studies, where women are present in higher numbers (TRIP 2018). At the core of this compartmentalisation seems to be the mistaken identification of gender issues with women and, more specifically, with characteristics and attributes stereotypically associated with femininity (Acker 1990, 2006; Kanter 1977).

Feminist IR shares an interest in the subjects that produce knowledge with feminist science and technology studies (STS), the field in which the authors of this article are based. Feminist STS challenges neo/positivist epistemological positions with the concept of standpoint and situated knowledges (Haraway 1988). Having shown that objectivity is a construct, this tradition relies on intersubjectivity and questions the hierarchies of knowledge in science and research theory and practice. One of the goals here is to analyse processes which lead to marginalising knowledge of underprivileged groups and their challenging of and contribution to mainstream knowledge building (e.g. Rossiter 1993). These groups include women as the historical bias still prevails and merits a focus on women's position within knowledge production. In addition to this epistemological focus, feminist STS addresses ethical issues, in practice related to the well-being of students, teachers, research participants and others, with special attention paid to effects of power.

Besides the theoretical input of feminist STS, our research is also informed by feminist sociology of gender. This broad field studies how gender gets constructed and reconstructed in everyday interactions of individuals, and their self-concept and life trajectory; in institutions and the division of labour; and also on the symbolic level, which is best represented in language for Sandra Harding (Harding 1986; Šmídová 2007).

As the university and science are defined as the sites of ultimate knowledge in modern societies, the ways in which they contribute to the maintenance of gendered hierarchies as the symbolic bastions of the least contested form of knowledge need to be scrutinised in great detail. As Harding claims: *"If we are not willing to try to see the favored intellectual structures and practices of science as cultural artifacts rather than as sacred commandments [...], then it will be hard to understand how gender symbolism, the gendered social structure of science, and the masculine identities and behaviors of individual scientists have left their marks on the problematics, concepts, theories, methods, interpretations, ethics, meanings, and goals of science"* (Harding 1986: 39). It is for this reason that the make-up of who is acknowledged as a knowledge producer and what that means in terms of division of labour and individual opportunities merits our attention.

METHODOLOGY

In order to identify and analyse the barriers that might prevent women researchers from entering the field of IR, we decided to carry out a qualitative study of a public university IR department. Qualitative research does not aim to be representative/generalisable but rather to capture the scope and nature of issues pertinent to the field of choice. Thus, the barriers associated with little integration of gender as an analytical category and feminist perspectives as an integral critical lens for the study of IR may be assumed to also apply to other IR departments as our overview of accessible syllabi suggests. The department in question was selected because of its wide scope of subdisciplines and a strong research focus as well as its stable collaboration with the contracting institution. Over the course of several months in 2018, we conducted ten semi-structured interviews with a group of women and men students we managed to recruit for the research via several points of access (see below). Although the sample is relatively small, the continuous team meetings to discuss and examine the conducted interviews proved the sample was saturated as new interviews stopped providing new information (Guest et al. 2006).

The research process started with choosing a department that would be accessible and willing to take part in the project. The heads of departments we contacted promptly agreed and so we sent out an invitation for their students to take part in a qualitative study with a brief description of the objectives of the study. This first recruitment attempt did not lead to recruiting any research participants. We therefore contacted a lecturer at a department interested in the project that shared their views on the situation in the discipline and helped us organise a seminar for students. With this help, we were eventually able to conduct ten interviews. Since the focus was on barriers, we also strived to find

individuals who left the discipline. The research participants were five men PhD candidates, one woman MA student and four women PhD candidates. Based on a review of literature on gender-related issues in IR as well as on the long term expertise of the research team's department, we constructed an interview guide that focused on the following main issues: one's study path and visions of future employment, work and internship experience, science (e.g. what it means to be a good researcher) and disciplinary characteristics (e.g. the percentage of men and women at the department and in the discipline), sexual harassment, bullying and gender sensitivity, and academic mobility. The limitations of the study include the fact that the students who granted us an interview were all at least partially interested in the issue of GS in their discipline and they were able to give up about two hours of their free time for the interview.

Analytically, we used thematic analysis, which is used for identifying themes in data through a process combining inductive and deductive coding (Braun – Clarke 2006). Thematic analysis allows the researchers to analyse the content of the interviews – e.g. to see which themes tend to emerge repeatedly while accounting for who tends to mention them, and to note similarities and differences in even big qualitative data sets – and is easy to use in team research (Nowell et al. 2017). Once the themes were identified from initial codes, we outlined their structure and checked for adequacy with the raw data. We then selected the themes clearly related to gender issues and decided to use Harding's theoretical framework to group the themes in a clear manner. The interviews were anonymised and so was the institution.

In order to contextualise our findings, we conducted a literature review of three Czech journals dedicated to IR: the *Czech Journal of International Relations*,² *Defence & Strategy*³ and *Global Politics*.⁴ These journals were selected because they print Czech language articles and thus may foster local academic discussion. We looked for articles on GS and feminism/feminist theory in order to establish how and whether these topics affect the recorded local academic debates. As there is a single comprehensive overview of the status and numbers of women in international politics as it is practiced and as a field (Borčány 2017) and it does not include information on the numbers of women in individual stages of higher education (HE), we listed the relevant departments in the Czech Republic and asked them for data regarding their student bodies. As the first round of requests was in vain, the Institute of International Relations Prague tasked an intern, Kristina Berdar,⁵ with collecting the data from individual departments. Finally, we also looked into the literature and topics required for the PhD level final state exam at the universities where this information is available. This was done to see whether the feminist/gender perspective is understood as marginal and therefore not a necessary part of the final exam or whether it is reflected in the questions as part and parcel of the discipline. After coding the interviews, we integrated the findings with the insights from the other sources to identify key themes in these based on a combination of inductive and deductive coding.

We will now focus on some of the structural and disciplinary barriers that follow especially from two sets of data. First, we present an analysis of the broader SSH field conducted by the Gender and Research department of the Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences (Cidlinská et al. 2018; Vohlidalová 2018) as its findings are also applicable to the IR field. Second, we present the data we were able to gather on the numbers of students and researchers in the discipline.


STRUCTURAL BARRIERS: SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

In Europe, female PhD graduates in SSH have outnumbered their male counterparts (e.g., in the field of humanities and arts, women represent 55%; in the field of social sciences 51%) but the percentage of female researchers is still not at 50% (European Commission 2016). In the Czech Republic, in SSH women represent 63.3% of graduate

students, while only 25.3% of researchers are women (Tenglerová 2017: 20–21). There is also strong vertical and horizontal segregation in representation of men and women in the SSH field in academia. In other words, women in SSH tend to be more junior and less likely to hold tenure than their male counterparts, and men and women tend to focus on different areas (see above). With respect to representation of women in academic leadership, the Czech Republic performs very poorly in all academic fields compared to other EU countries (Kázmér 2018). The imbalance in the proportion of women among university students and among academicians is more pronounced in SSH than in STEM. Moreover, women in SSH and STEM tend to quit their academic career at different stages. While in STEM it is largely in the postdoctoral phase, SSH women researchers tend to give up on their academic ambitions already during their doctoral studies (Cidlinská 2018; Kázmér 2018: 22–24; Tenglerová 2017: 21).

If we focus on the HE sector where IR departments are dominantly placed, we can see that women are overrepresented on lower and less stable positions and disappear as we move up in the hierarchy. The survey we use here showed that academicians' job satisfaction was closely linked with their satisfaction with career prospects, i.e. the feeling that they have some prospects in their current job (Vohlídalová 2018: 13–14). There is a significant connection between career prospects and funding for work positions. Vohlídalová's survey showed that economic stability and security only comes with an associate and a full professorship in HE. All lower positions typically mean short-term contracts (55.7% of all respondents) (Vohlídalová 2018: 18). This is mostly caused by the system of funding, where not only grant money but also institutional funding is distributed through competition, i.e. it is uncertain. The share of academicians fully or mostly paid from grant funds is relatively small in HE (less than 18%) and in SSH it is much more common to be wholly or mostly paid from institutional funds (Vohlídalová 2018: 43), which might imply greater stability. However, when it comes to starting one's research career and career prospects, it means there are fewer grant opportunities in SSH in general, which is problematic since grant projects of senior researchers are a prerequisite for creating positions for beginning researchers, i.e. doctoral candidates and postdocs. The generally lower amount of funding in the SSH field (see Chart 1) also means that new stable positions are either not established at all or established very slowly. This results in petrification of the present personnel structure and further harms the career prospects of beginning researchers.

Chart 1
Percentage of state funding of the public academic sector (including HE institutions) by discipline



Source: Science and Research indicators, Czech Statistical Office 2017.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS PART OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

To get a better picture of the situation in the IR field, departments teaching IR and related disciplines⁶ were contacted in several rounds. However, it soon transpired that accessing these types of statistics would not be an easy task: out of the institutions we contacted, only Masaryk University in Brno, Charles University in Prague, Palacký University Olomouc, and University of West Bohemia in Pilsen publish or were able to provide us with at least some of the required figures.⁷ The missing data was supplemented by some data from the Ministry of Education, but this data did not include information on security and European studies – see Table 1 for an overview. The statistics show that women's domination in student bodies has prevailed for the past 18 years and has been increasing on all levels but this has not translated into women's representation among academics.

Table 1
Student population distribution 2000–2018; percentages of women among the total numbers of students at the given level

| | BA level of study | | | MA level of study | | | PhD level of study | | |
|------|-------------------|-------|----|-------------------|-------|----|--------------------|-------|----|
| | Men | Women | % | Men | Women | % | Men | Women | % |
| 2000 | 481 | 696 | 59 | 953 | 1451 | 60 | 139 | 94 | 40 |
| 2018 | 1999 | 3432 | 63 | 1230 | 2575 | 68 | 83 | 84 | 50 |

Source: Ministry of Education of the Czech Republic.

Based on openly accessible information on the faculties of the reviewed institutions, we learnt that out of all of their 184 employees (both internal and contract) only 24.5% were women. All of the heads of the respective departments (100%) were men. In his study into the position of women in Czech international, European and security policy, Vít Borčány provides an overview of numbers of women at IR departments and think tanks. He states the “*sociodemographic trends [i.e. the high proportion of women among especially BA and MA students] will probably only have an impact in the long term*”⁸ (emphasis in original, Borčány 2017: 16). However, when it comes to the situation of research and faculty staff, this assumption seems to be incorrect as the statistics from the monitoring reports on the position of women in Czech science have shown (Kázmér 2018: 10–11).

As the conceptualisation of the operation of gender in society by Harding suggests, figures such as those presented in this section on the make-up of the student and faculty body can only suggest general trends regarding the division of labour: if we look beyond the research staff, faculty and students, we can see that unlike the positions of heads of departments, the positions of secretaries and assistants are dominated by women.⁹ However, the link between the numbers of men and women and actual gender sensitivity is not a straightforward one. While the statistics may shed some light on the actual access of men and women to power and decision making in an institution, there is not a straightforward connection between such descriptive representation and content produced by an institution.¹⁰ Thus, the basic comparative statistics looking into men/women ratios may serve but as the first indicator of general equality, as the access to especially leading positions should be equally distributed in a society with gender equality (Norris – Inglehart 2003).

In order to establish whether the lack of women researchers and scholars is accompanied by a lack of attention paid to gender as a category and feminist theory, we decided to investigate the requirements on PhD candidates regarding their state exams and syllabi,

and examine the local scientific production in the IR field. While the information as to the actual questions/areas of inquiry for state exams is usually not readily accessible, we were, e.g., able to look into the list of literature required for the two PhD specialisations at Masaryk University. Both include books with chapters that specifically focus on feminist approaches to the matters at hand. It does not seem, however, that gender relations and their impact on IR topics would be of special focus. Similarly, when it comes to the syllabi, feminist theories and gender seem to be mostly relegated to facultative courses (when present at all) and may be expected to form part of critical studies classes.

The local academic production and its reflection of the salience of gender as an analytical category proved to provide a more straightforward clue. As described in the Methodology section, we reviewed three Czech language academic journals dedicated to IR. Using their search engines, we looked for the words “gender” and “feminis”/“feminis*”. We then focused only on original academic articles with these words. Based on this search, the first article specifically outlining the relation between GS and IR was published already in 1998 in the *Czech Journal of International Relations* (Kodíčková 1998). The second article striving to provide its readers with introductory information on the link between feminism and IR was published in *Global Politics* (Kryštofik 2003). Finally, the journal *Defence & Strategy* featured an empirical study on the use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war from a feminist perspective (Ptáčnicková 2013). The last text, by Iveta Ptáčnicková, was explicitly welcomed by the journal’s editor: “*We may expect this contribution on an untraditional topic will raise a discussion and draw the attention it deserves*” (Frank 2013: 3). Unfortunately, the search suggests this has not been the case.¹¹

The presented search for accessible articles on gender and feminism in IR has already hinted that the topic does not seem to be a mainstream one for the local IR community. Similarly, the fact that IR departments do not have sex segregated statistics for their student bodies does little to suggest the gendered division of labour and its reproduction are a concern for those running the departments. In a society dominated by a hierarchy of the only two widely acknowledged genders (heterosexual feminine and heterosexual masculine – see Butler 1999), this situation supports the reading of underrepresentation of one of the genders as one that inevitably leads to the erasure or at least ignoring of issues and attributes associated with it. This pertains to the actual work environment as women face a double standard in men-dominated environments: they either fail to be perceived as feminine when they manifest the same characteristics as those identified with successful professional masculinity or they fail to be perceived as professional when they manifest characteristics associated with femininity (Kanter 1977; Křížková 2003). This phenomenon does not only affect work environments but also the environment of the classroom, where women students are typically not assessed in a gender-neutral way (Mertus 2007; Parisi et al. 2013; Stienstra 2000), which may have effects on their self-perception and visions of their professional future. At the same time, the lack of women among the faculty and especially among those making the decisions may impact the content of knowledge seen as core to the given discipline although there does not seem to be an open hostility to gender topics in the university programmes. In the following section, we turn to the results of the thematic analysis of the interviews conducted with the students of an IR department.

THE GENDERED UNIVERSE OF CZECH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

How do graduate students reflect on the structural barriers and the hints at disciplinary and institutional barriers identified above? Are their perceptions of their discipline gendered? And if so, on what level(s)? To answer these questions, we now turn to the three most salient themes that emerged from the interviews: gender sensitivity, the rivalry culture at the given department, and differences in self-representation of men and women.

We offer here their analysis and interpretation framed by the categorisation of functioning of gender penned by Harding (1986).

Gender blind, gender sensitive: Roots of gender inequality

The symbolic level of functioning of gender can be typically studied on how language and conceptual thinking are structured and with what consequences. The first theme we would like to address here is therefore gender sensitivity and how it transpires from the interviews in two respects. Firstly, how and if it affects the students' perception of the department as a place of research and instruction. Secondly, how and if it affects the students' thinking about the discipline. Here, we were interested in their research experience and imaginations of the discipline. Gender sensitivity thus pertains to at least two areas: the work environment, and the content of knowledge produced and research done within the scope of the discipline. As explained above, their connection is not a straightforward one, but gender sensitivity may be seen as lacking if it only pertains to one of the two realms.

Given the bias in our sample, as only people willing to share their views of gender and inequalities in general agreed to talk to us, we expected the research participants (RPs) to have some basic academic knowledge about gender. The RPs were indeed very open and willing to discuss gender-related issues with us. This was most importantly manifested when discussing the roots of inequalities the RPs perceived in their discipline as well as in their respective specialisations. Our discussions of the topic of socialisation, which was raised by many of the RPs, at least partially confirmed the assumption of our RPs' knowledge of GS. Socialisation was indeed the most frequently named root cause of gender inequality as it gets expressed in the classroom and later (although for many of the RPs, less clearly) in the discipline itself. As a man PhD candidate put it:

There are cultural issues [...] the way women are brought up here,

later adding:

It's really important to establish relations with one's supervisors and, [because of socialisation] this may be more difficult for women fellow students, to be active [...] even from my own classes I rather remember the active students. [...] It's more difficult for my women colleagues.

While there is clearly a belief in the link between social conditioning and one's gendered subjectivity, there seems to be much less agreement on the link between the symbolic realm represented by the university as the site of knowledge, and the reiteration and inscription of the hierarchical nature of the gender dichotomy, i.e. some of the means through which the criticised gendered socialisation is delivered. This inadvertently limits one's imaginations as to how perceived gender inequality could be remedied on institutional level since it is believed to be the result of an external factor, i.e. socialisation. In turn, most of the RPs agreed that there is little, besides setting up a crèche or a kindergarten, the institution could do about this problem.

The theme emerging from how the RPs approached and enacted gender in their accounts is remarkable not just for the relative openness the students manifested towards issues of gender but also in how they more or less acknowledged there is gender inequality in their field. In the light of these concessions, perhaps the most interesting feature is that the RPs did not reflect on the symbolic functioning of gender. Specifically, the role of language and symbolism in the university's operation and staffing, and areas researched and theoretically engaged with by university faculty was not acknowledged as having much importance as the RPs' comments on divisions within their discipline illustrate. The most widely used dichotomy deployed by them is that of *soft* and *hard* topics. While some recognize that this dichotomy is gendered, they only do this to deny there is any

essential core to its gendering. Thus, they are aware of the cultural tendency to associate similar dichotomies with either pole of the gender binary, including its hierarchical ordering – in this particular case, *hard* is symbolically associated with masculinity and deemed superior to *soft*, which associated with femininity (Prokhovnik 1999). The RPs readily discerned the gendered nature of the dichotomy and stressed that they did not believe women would be rather associated with soft topics and men with hard ones or at least that there are any reasons why this should be so. Yet none of them acknowledged how such symbolic dichotomies help to maintain the gender divide on the other levels, where the RPs identified the sources and expressions of the perceived gender inequalities. This is important, as not reflecting on the symbolic salience of similar descriptors may contribute to obscuring the actual work that needs to be done in order to challenge the clearly present gendered perceptions of the field's divisions, such as those that are present when a woman researcher wishes to propose an IR theory. In a similar vein, a woman PhD candidate suggested that the perceived horizontal segregation within the discipline means that even though women pursue certain topics that were not historically dominated by men, this should not be regarded as problematic as it means the topics get addressed and women get space in the discipline:

Critical [IR] women researchers focus on security studies issues associated with gender such as women in war because they feel such topics are underrepresented but as a result they are not exactly because the women researchers take them up.

While the RP recognises that there is compartmentalisation in her field, she does not question its inherently problematic dynamics, i.e. the fact that it works to effectively maintain extant power hierarchies by keeping the core of the given activity/field intact and immune to the critique offered (Roth 2004). The gender of the knower is understood as irrelevant and it therefore suffices when previously ignored topics are covered by anyone, disregarding inequalities related to the gender of the knowledge producer. The gendered hierarchy of knowledge and topics thus seems to be immune to critical analysis. The hierarchy is further downplayed by invoking the concept of complementarity, which is frequently used to justify the gender binary itself. The shift in focus to how the discipline works globally then works towards obscuring the fact that little attention is paid to gender and feminism in the curriculum, research and the very operation of the local IR academic community.

This observation is further strengthened by the fact that while the students are open to the concept of gender, they have only a very vague or no idea as to how it could broaden/change/challenge their academic work and specifically their own research, as is apparent from this quote:

I do not take it [the gender perspective] into consideration, because I have an absolutely macro approach. I do not do microanalysis. I treat the [state] actor de facto as a black box. [...] I do not care about the [men/women] ratio. [...] It is simply a violent state actor and I attribute an agency to it. I look at the actor just as we are used to looking at the state: 'the state has decided that, the state has done, the state said, the non-state actor has done, the non-state actor said'. You also do not ask yourself if you consider gender when you research the state. You attribute a gender-neutral agency to it.

The interviews strongly suggest there is no pressure exerted on the students from their senior colleagues and supervisors to consider how gender and feminist perspectives could improve their work and when and how they should consider deploying them. The very fact that some view the position of women as strong through relying on horizontal segregation of the subdisciplines and topics within the broader IR field suggests that the power aspect of hierarchies should be paid attention to when methodologies are discussed, as this is one of the weakest points of the instruction at the given department, and it was

identified as such by several RPs. At the same time, the “male-stream” IR has been at the centre of feminist critique for at least three decades – at least since the publishing of the 1988 special issue of *Millennium* on women and IR – and continues to be so, and it is therefore a relatively easy segment to implement into the curriculum (Sjoberg 2009; Tickner 1998). Translating the theoretical input of various approaches into methodology might help remedy the pragmatic approach to gender and feminist theory the students manifest. It may be argued that the interviewed students are gender sensitive on a pragmatic level, i.e. they are aware of the dearth of women in their discipline and at their department but they lack insights into the symbolic functioning of gender that follows from critically engaging with feminist theory (in general or in feminist IR). The current situation thus may contribute to the perpetuation of the present gendered hierarchies precisely because the gender perspective is not really engaged with in the parts of study that have to do with theory and methodology. This in turn affects even the understanding of the inequality identified by the students and the possibilities of challenging it.

The “macho” rivalry culture

If we want to answer the question “Where have all the women gone?” we must also focus on how gender is constructed and reconstructed at the structural level (Harding 1986). That means, in our case, what the role of the IR department itself is.

The interviews with the students from the IR department show that there is a huge rivalry at the department. In academic environments, competition at some level can be useful but this does not seem to be the case here. The students recounted that there are at least two separate and (hostilely) competing groups at the department that fight over power, influence and money. These groups are not ashamed to use practices like manipulation, denigration, cheating, or threats. Some students try to stay outside these groups although there is great pressure exerted especially on PhD candidates (both men and women) to join one of the “teams”. Because of this rivalry culture, some PhD candidates are actually ready to leave the department once they have finished their degree. Some of them have even experienced burnout and mental breakdown because of how stressful the environment is.

Even the big package of money that came to the department did not help to calm the atmosphere down. There is still a lot of competition and arguments about money. Maybe I could stay there, but I would like to escape from this stressful environment. I stopped feeling like it. (a man PhD candidate)

The students also believe that this competitive environment is a consequence of a “macho” culture that operates at the department. According to the students the “macho” culture is characterised by male-domination (and overrepresentation of men), a hostile atmosphere, aggression and rivalry and fraternity at the same time. These characteristics refer to one specific local form of hegemonic masculinity (Wetherell – Edley 1999) that is perceived as dominant in the department. This type of networking is also especially impenetrable for women, as men who belong to either of the teams often support each other, build networks and make important decisions connected to the present and the future of the department on an invisible and informal level, as the next citation shows:

To get there [to the department] you need to know someone. From this perspective, this is like a tribal structure. The only thing that gets you in the right place is connections. It all comes from the fact that you’ve already grabbed some beer together or that you’ve made some important decision at lunch. It is a limited circle of people and you will not meet many women there. (a man PhD candidate)

Personal relationships are crucial in this type of environment. If you are not able or you do not want to build these unhealthy relationships, it is very complicated to succeed

in this place. As the students claim, at the department there are also no vacancies because all the positions are filled by the older (male) generation or by male classmates from the time when the department was founded. And if there is an opening it is difficult to hire someone new because everyone in the IR field knows what the atmosphere at the department looks like.

The macho culture also entails an accentuation of hierarchies of positions and relations, including the hierarchies of different types of masculinities. Our RPs described a phenomenon of “vassalage”, where strong loyalty and quid pro quo are expected of students in exchange for the lecturer’s assistance with research and studies or the arrangement of a job for the student. These kinds of social bonds and personal relationships between men have gender consequences, especially for women who cannot take part in these networking practices (van den Brink – Benschop 2011).

Another part of this “macho” culture is omitting and devaluing gender and feminist topics and approaches. The students are aware of the fact that these topics are recognised internationally but not nationally. Especially security studies is described as “*a boys’ club*” or as “*boys playing soldiers*” (women PhD candidates) and is seen as a space where gender studies has no place. When this is combined with the lack of interest in family or work-life balance policies that is also present, it is no exaggeration to claim that the culture described above is hostile to women researchers. The extreme importance of personal relations at the department further complicates the situation of women going on maternity and parental leave and then trying to re-enter the discipline after the career break. Since it looks harder for women to build relations at the department and they may fail to establish them, they may easily have nowhere to go back to. The RPs’ accounts suggested that such a scenario is not uncommon as they said the young women researchers they remember mostly did not return after their parental leave and disappeared from research. Some comments that our RPs cited as common at the given department suggest it is not welcoming for mothers-researchers: “that one will have kids”, “you know, a woman on maternity leave”. Both students and lecturers regularly laugh at such remarks.

At the structural level, the “macho” culture indirectly defines only a certain place for women in this abstract system of division of labour. There exists an underlying assumption that women do not want to be a part of these structures because it is not natural for them to be in the centre of a rivalrous environment for they are not as tough as men are. This is often used as an excuse for why there are almost no women in IR and the department. A related phenomenon seems to be that of providing women with employment opportunities in non-expert areas, mainly administrative ones. It appears that even highly scholarly productive women students/early career scholars have a much heavier administrative workload compared to their men counterparts. As one woman PhD candidate put it: “*I don’t know why it is so. Maybe women decide they have to embrace a support role.*” The gendered division of labour is thus attributed to decisions made by those navigating it rather than to the culture of the workplace.

As we can see, the culture of the department contributes to the gendered division of labour that is a product of the symbolic level (Harding 1986), and in combination with the individual level described in the next chapter, it reinforces the gendered universe hostile to women researchers.

Femininity and IR: An uneasy fit

The mentioned assumption prevailing at the department claiming that women are not tough enough seemed to be connected with another assumption: that women’s intellectual capacities are different than men’s, which makes women less suitable for being researchers. This assumption can be tracked across all three levels of Harding’s gendered universe. In this section, we focus on the individual level of identity and self-presentation linked to

behavioural and mental patterns, the level which was the most accessible through the interviews.

Pronounced sexist beliefs regarding women's and men's intellectual capacity are not prevalent in SSH. However, the analysis of our interviews shows that women's intellectual and research capacity in IR is underestimated at the given department, as the following quotes illustrate.

When I started, I heard that two men lecturers spread rumours about me, claiming I was not good enough. But I have never taken any classes with them. [...] Most people are fair but some lecturers sometimes say that women do not do as good research as men do, that it shows on the diploma theses, and that men write better, and are more daring while women rather deliver a literature review. (a woman PhD candidate)

None of our men RPs mentioned having their intellectual capacities questioned. Some of the men students also stated that they believe women's intellectual capacities are questioned even more when they are attractive. Moreover, it transpired that this approach was not solely limited to lecturers but was also held by some students:

They admitted a PhD candidate, very beautiful, young, slim, and a man doctoral student told me that he was positive she was not intelligent and that her supervisor definitely admitted her because he has an affair with her [...]. Similarly to presumption of innocence, there is also something such as presumption of intelligence or lack thereof. As a woman, you always have to prove to somebody that you are good while it's taken for granted when you're a man. (a woman PhD candidate)

This RP also stated that throughout her studies she learnt from similar hints from her lecturers and fellow men students that she needs to shed her "femininity" if she wants to be taken seriously as a researcher. In this case, femininity was defined as sexual attractiveness, i.e. the possibility to dress the way the student likes. This suggests that women students face an identity conflict at the researched department, a conflict typical for women building their careers in gender non-traditional professions such as the one of a researcher (Pifer – Baker 2016). Science and research, an area not associated with care but intellectual performance, is coded as masculine (Harding 1986). It seems, however, that the atmosphere at the researched department exacerbates the conflict. Although the women students who became targets of sexist comments from their men lecturers and fellow students do not take them seriously and see them, e.g., as "silly", such comments impact the standing of women and men in the workplace and their chances for professional and career development, as we demonstrate below. The fact that some lecturers, i.e. role models, make such comments also means that they legitimise them for the students.

Moreover, it appears that women's research potential is not only underestimated because of beliefs in their different (lower) intellectual capacity but also due to the different academic self-presentation of men and women, which is also a product of the gendered universe. As a rural discipline (Becher – Towler 2001), IR stresses self-presentation and makes it crucial. In such disciplines, one's own opinion, interpretation and argumentation constitute an integral part of theory building and disciplinary knowledge as such. Rural disciplines accentuate interpretative, argumentative and critical skills (Becher – Trowler 2001: 118). Critical skills here mean not only critical thinking but also critique of the work, thoughts and procedures of others, both predecessors and contemporaries, including colleagues and fellow students.

The gendered universe then leads men to focus on self-assertion and competition while women are led to cooperation, consensus and even obedience (Harding 1986; Renzetti – Curran 2003). This makes it more difficult for women to start a conflict, especially with those with authority such as distinguished IR experts. This means women may attack other people's work less, which may be at the root of the idea that women

“are less daring than men”, which then may make the impression that women are less capable researchers. Our RPs readily identified socialisation as one of the potential sources of why women are less represented among IR researchers. In connection with the willingness to criticise others’ work, we also need to take into account that one’s readiness to criticise others depends on one’s self-esteem. Hitherto research shows that in general, men feel more self-assured when it comes to their intellectual performance and even tend to overestimate their performance (Grunspan et al. 2016) while women are more critical of themselves, especially women in gender non-traditional professions and positions (Tao – Gloria 2018). Such feelings are further fostered by those surrounding them. This is why IR women students (but also others in a hierarchically lower position such as juniors, while the grounds for misrecognition may combine) may tend to criticise others less, and less forcefully put forward and defend their own ideas, as one of our RPs describes it:

Sometimes I’m afraid to say my own suggestion in the research team. I’m ashamed to show up in the teams. I’m afraid my ideas are not good enough. That’s probably the biggest problem for me. (a woman PhD candidate)

Women’s more critical perspective on their own intellectual performance compared to men is also reflected in differences in self-assured self-presentation: self-criticism leads to less self-assured and distinct public speaking. In addition, the gendered universe results in a double standard so that a self-assured man is perceived differently than a woman acting in the very same way. In the case of a woman, self-assuredness equals a deviation from a gender norm that is usually sanctioned (Basow 2016). The way of speaking combined with different cultural expectations of men and women substantially affects our perceptions of the contents. At the researched department our analysis has shown that what men say is given more attention and is seen as more important than what women say, as the following quotes show:

The men can often speak about something in a self-assured way but when you then think about it, you realise that what they said was not good at all but at the moment of speaking they spoke with such confidence that they persuaded everyone. (a woman PhD candidate)

When you say it in a deeper voice, they may be more prone to pay attention to you [laughing]. (a woman PhD candidate)

Self-presentation and perception by others are connected with career prospects and the very possibility to start and keep a research career. When sources are scarce, gate keepers’ perception of one’s self-presentation becomes all the more salient. Any form of handicap in such a fierce competition, e.g. in the form of one’s different self-presentation compared to the norm of the given discipline, may substantially impact the individual’s chances of engaging in a research career. It is clear from the described phenomena that women are those at the greatest disadvantage in this respect as this quote shows:

When we go for lunch together, PhD candidates and lecturers, we compete even in banal conversations. You have to keep in mind that it’s all about contacts and showing yourself. It is very demanding. And I feel the men don’t have much of a problem with it. (woman PhD candidate)

We see that when considering the barriers for academic careers of women on the individual level, we can identify the reflection and influence of barriers on the symbolic (underestimation of characteristics coded as feminine) and structural (dominance of men in the relevant networks and in gate-keeper positions) levels of the gendered universe. It seems that due to this mixture of barriers it is more difficult for women to feel like

capable researchers and to be seen as such researchers by others, which has an impact on women's career prospects.

Additionally, we also need to note that while it is easier for men in a strongly masculine environment to get engaged in the academic community and build the needed relations, it does not mean that such an environment suits all men. There were several men in our sample who did not identify with the dominant "macho" masculinity, which seems to be the norm at the given department. These men seem rather uninterested in staying at the given department. In the long-term perspective, not only women but men who do not identify with the dominant masculinity will leave the department. Given the small scale of the Czech Republic and the discipline, such a situation at one workplace may impact the shape of the whole discipline in the country.

CONCLUSION: WAYS FORWARD?

The research at hand primarily engaged with the views of individual students and their sense making of their past and future educational and professional trajectories but our interpretation inexorably concerns all three layers of the gendered universe as outlined by Harding. The barriers we strived to identify affect individual life trajectories but are the result of interaction of the other layers and therefore cannot be conceived of – or successfully addressed – as affecting only, e.g., the symbolic level of language without any consequences for the division of labour (meaning, for instance, the chances of acquiring a postdoctoral position for different groups of students) and individual experience.

The present study has first identified several possibly problematic areas concerning gender aspects in local IR as a research discipline and a field of human activity. Some are linked to the structural issues stemming from the position of the discipline within the Czech academic setting. As an SSH discipline, the IR field suffers from petrification of its departments. It is extremely difficult for its PhD graduates to find openings that would lead to having a career in research. This becomes a highly gendered problem and a problem for achieving a semblance of gender equality at the department once we consider the fact that the founders of the researched department were all men and the second "generation" was recruited from their students/informal mentees, i.e. also mostly men. This situation seems to be replicated in most other IR departments in the country as the percentages of women among faculty and specifically in the university hierarchy seem to suggest.

We strived to interpret the interview data for graduate and postgraduate students with the operation of the gendered universe (Harding 1986) in mind. Investigating the individual themes identified throughout our analysis made it clear that the symbolic level of the functioning of gender at the given institution, which is closely linked to the university's standing in social hierarchies, is mostly ignored by the research participants, which leads to the lack of imagination about possible solutions on institutional level. Our research participants did not reflect on the symbolic functioning of gender, such as the role of language and symbolism in the functioning, staffing and areas researched and theoretically engaged with by university faculty. The key issue seems to be a lack of familiarity with gender as a research category and the related incapability to distinguish certain dynamics concerning the discipline on a personnel as well as epistemological level as gendered.

Given the absence of substantive attention paid to the insights from feminist IR at the very least and GS as such, it is not surprising. On the contrary, the presence of so many students who seem to endorse most of the ideals of gender equality is remarkable given the negligible amount of attention GS is paid in the curriculum. However, this negligence is reflected in the lack of ideas of how GS could be used in the students' own work, which means the potential is not tapped. The masculine culture of the department downplays sensitivity to gender-related nuances and issues, which then leads to marginalising women

students and their performance and output compared to their men counterparts. This negatively impacts their professional development opportunities and chances for staying in research.

The gendered universe conceptual framework allows us to see how the symbolic bias against women as knowledge producers, specifically in an individualistic discipline such as IR, is reflected and furthered on the level of division of labour and on the individual level. In terms of the institution, women and non-conforming men are disadvantaged in fostering relations in networks crucial for one's career development. The lack of gender sensitivity means that both men and women students fail to see systemic obstacles and tend to individualise them, which is especially paradoxical in the case of parenting. On the individual level the greatest hindrances are gender characteristics developed through socialisation in a gender conservative country, such as the Czech Republic, and the incompatibility of the feminine characteristics with the normative image of a capable researcher.

The presented study together with findings regarding the academic environment in the Czech Republic led to a formulation of several recommendations that might help improve the presently largely absent gender equality in the IR discipline. This is crucial especially because the departments are in charge of educating future generations of both IR researchers and practitioners. The recommendations are the following: include classes that specifically focus on GS and feminist theory in the syllabi; explore feminist approaches to teaching IR; given the petrification of the department and the slim chances of opening new stable positions, we also recommend the use of shared working positions; introduce a simple and reliable means for settling disagreements and dealing with possible acts of bullying and other such behaviour.

In order to establish the overall situation in Czech IR, the present case study would need to be expanded to other departments. In addition to the methods used, a thorough analysis of the output of the local IR academic community from a critical perspective focused on the category of gender should be conducted. This might help shed some light on what – other than women – is missing from Czech IR.

¹ There is a range of readers and overviews of feminist IR available – see, e.g., Sylvester (2011); True (2010).

² See: <https://mv.iir.cz/index> - this journal also publishes articles in English.

³ See: <https://www.obranastrategie.cz/en/>.

⁴ See: <http://www.globalpolitics.cz/en>.

⁵ Here, we would like to thank Kristina Berdar for her relentless effort to collect and organise the data.

⁶ Namely Security Studies, European Studies, and International Area Studies; where possible, we did not include Political Science as it is not primarily concerned with interaction between and among states.

⁷ For the University of West Bohemia's Department of Politics and International Relations, we only obtained summary figures stating that as of 2016 there were 236 women students and 177 men students, and 64 women graduates as compared to 34 men graduates. The other institutions were: the Metropolitan University in Prague, the Cevro Institute, the University of Economics, Prague, and the College of International and Public Relations Prague.

⁸ Translated and commented on by Blanka Nyklová.

⁹ For instance, the Institute of Political Studies at Charles University has an all-women administrative staff: <https://ips.fsv.cuni.cz/IPSFSV-175.html> (site accessed on 28 October 2018).

¹⁰ This has been studied in detail both in connection with the political realm and in media studies (Macharia et al. 2015; Vochocová 2008; Van Zoonen 2000).

¹¹ The search is not exhaustive in terms of mentions of gender and feminist theory in relation to IR as, e.g., Pavel Barša has dedicated a profound analysis to the challenges offered by feminist theory in his books (Barša 2002, 2011). Moreover, some IR authors have published on the topic elsewhere (Horký 2008) just like some feminist authors have written on the relation between GS/feminism and IR (Krulišová – Kolmašová 2019 [in review process]; Kolářová 2009, 2010). Nevertheless, the presented search comprises sources most readily accessible to those interested in IR, i.e. including students.

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Central and Eastern Europe and the Decline of Russia in the United Nations Administrative Bodies: 1996–2015

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Abstract: In international organizations, states seek representation not only in decision-making and political fora but also in the administrative bodies, or secretariats. This article maps the representation of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the secretariats of 36 bodies of the United Nations (UN) system in the years 1996–2015. The CEE region is interesting due to the deep political divide between Russia and the Western-oriented new EU member states. Using new empirical evidence regarding the participation of CEE countries' citizens on the professional staff of the UN bodies, we show that Russia has dramatically lost much of its representation in the UN administration over the last twenty years. In contrast, a number of other CEE countries have considerably improved their position in it. In spite of that, the countries of the entire CEE region belong to those with an overall weak representation in the administrative bodies of the UN.

Key words: staffing, United Nations, international organizations, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia.

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States have an interest in being represented in the staff of international organizations (IOs). IO staff members are not *mere* administrators devoid of political relevance. The professional staff performs vital functions and often exercises considerable influence over international outcomes (e.g. Eckhard – Ege 2016). Precisely because of that, IOs often have rules for national representation and seek to ensure a broad regional balance in the composition of their administrative bodies. The staffing of IOs is a highly political matter (Barnett – Finnemore 2004; Kellow – Carroll 2013; Novosad – Werker 2018; Xu – Weller 2008). This is best visible when it comes to the selection of the heads of IOs, most notably the Secretary-General (SG) of the United Nations (UN), but states consider it important how IOs are staffed on all levels of the administrative hierarchy.

In this paper, we seek to provide a robust account of the patterns of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries' representation in the professional staff of several dozen international secretariats. In addition to presenting novel empirical evidence of interest to those studying the region, our target is also to address an interesting puzzle with possibly broader relevance. Historically, the CEE region has formed one of the two key poles of the UN system. The Eastern European Group (EEG) with the Soviet Union as one of two

superpowers was positioned against the US-led Western group, formally known as the Western European and Others Group (WEOG). The CEE region is specific in that after the end of the Cold War it effectively split in two. On one side of the divide is Russia with several of its closer allies. On the other side is the group of Western-oriented countries of Central and Eastern Europe, today the *new* members of the European Union (EU). For convenience, and to avoid confusion with established abbreviations, we will refer to these eleven CEE states that became the new members of the European Union (EU) as CEEU.¹ Of course, there are also several countries in the region that are not firmly attached to either Russia or the CEEU, but in general, today this split constitutes one of the key conflict lines in the UN system. What used to be the Soviet Caucus, and what today formally still is the *Eastern European Group* within the UN system, is now divided into two blocs.² This fact has rather direct consequences. Most recently, in 2016 and 2017, the region proved unable to nominate a suitable candidate for the highest position of the UN SG in a situation in which the EEG was supposed to have *its turn* (Thakur 2017; Weiss – Carayannis 2017: 310; Standish 2016).

Russia, by far the most powerful member of the EEG, is not one of only two superpowers anymore. Yet, it pursues its interests with a renewed assertiveness, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It also retains one of the five gems in the institutional crown of the UN system, namely a permanent membership in the UN Security Council. At the same time, the CEEU countries have developed autonomous foreign policy orientations after the end of the Cold War. This autonomy is naturally projected also into their search for adequate representation in the UN staff. Representation in the staff of IOs is, globally speaking, a zero-sum game where states can only increase their representation share at the expense of others (Novosad – Werker 2018). Given the geopolitical divide cutting through the EEG region, which of the sides has been more successful over the last two decades? What is the result of the conflict between Russia and the CEEU states over representation in the staff of IOs?

To address these questions, we present in this article extensive new quantitative evidence on the representation of Russia and the CEEU countries in 36 UN system bodies over the last twenty years. The dataset covers the secretariats of most of the widely known global IOs, including the UN Secretariat, but also the administrative bodies e.g. of the World Health Organization, UNESCO, the International Labour Organization, and many others. The quantitative evidence on the compositions of the professional staffs of IOs is supported with evidence from a series of interviews with high-ranking diplomats in Geneva. Furthermore, to map Russia's interest in the UN system, we supplement the analysis with an overview of the UN-related material recently made available via the online archives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The most prominent finding of our inquiry is that there is a major declining trend in Russian representation in the UN administration, where by representation we mean the percent share of the professional staff positions held by the citizens of a country. The decline of Russian representation is visible throughout the period and across virtually all UN system bodies. At the same time, this trend is closely matched by the rise in the representation of the other CEE countries, clearly indicating a representation shift in favour of the smaller CEEU states. This is closely in line with the existing rules and principles of staffing in the UN, but clearly in opposition to Russia's interests. While the Russian Federation retains its unique position at the apex of UN decision-making, notably in the Security Council, on the everyday working level it has lost tremendously over the last two decades. In spite of its (self-proclaimed) rising power status, salient economic growth throughout the 2010s, and increasingly assertive unilateral and bilateral, but also multilateral foreign policy, its representation in the professional bodies of the global bureaucracy has decreased by more than 40%. In some IOs, including the UN Secretariat, its representation declined by more than 60%. In contrast, the CEEU countries have gained

representation in UN bodies, even though they still belong to the lowly represented UN members in global comparison.

The paper starts with a section outlining, theoretically and empirically, the reasons for which states seek representation in IO administrations. Second, we present a brief outline of our empirical strategy. Third, the following section discusses the situation of Russia in administrations of the United Nations system bodies. Finally, an analogous analysis is performed on the CEEU countries, identifying common regional trends but also substantial variation across CEEU members' staffing patterns.

INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF STATES

International organizations and their staff are to a large extent controlled by their member states, especially the most powerful ones (Stone 2011). Yet, in many regards they also enjoy considerable autonomy and influence of their own (Bauer – Ege 2015). Perhaps the best way to capture this complex relationship is through the principal agent framework (PA), which is widely used in the literature on IOs. The framework sees member states as the *principals* delegating specific tasks and authorities to IOs, and the IOs and their bureaucracies as the *agents* (Hawkins et al. 2006; see also, e.g., Conceição-Heldt 2010; Dijkstra 2012; Pollack 1997; Elsig 2011; Karlas 2015). The principals have the capability to set the political course for IOs by defining their mandate and policy guidelines. At the same time, the agents exercise possibly considerable discretion in how the mandate is implemented. Quite often, IOs are able to go beyond mere implementation and monitoring of policies agreed upon by states and become genuine agenda-setters and norm-shapers (Barnett – Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2013; Eckhard – Ege 2016). After all, the very purpose of the creation of IOs is that they develop unique, specialized knowledge and expertise. Thanks to the asymmetric information situation thus created, they obtain an advantage in the relationship with the states, their principals. This may be less so the case when it comes to the most powerful member states, which are able to monitor and control the work of the IOs most closely (Dijkstra 2015; Grigorescu 2010). But the perceived neutrality of the IOs, combined with their expertise, often gives them a definite advantage in establishing relevant facts of international cooperation (Abbott – Snidal 1998; Barnett – Finnemore 2004).

Central to the influence of IOs on political outcomes is the autonomy and discretion of their bureaucratic bodies, the staff of IOs (Reinalda – Verbeek 1998). It is the autonomy of personnel policies combined with autonomy in budgetary matters that gives IOs the ability to handle their mandates in an impartial manner. It is this perception of impartiality that gives IOs their power (Barnett – Finnemore 2004: 2). In line with that, staff members are not allowed to take instructions from their states of origin, as stipulated in Art 100 (1) of the UN Charter. Also, IOs rely at least to some extent on internal socialization processes within which their staff are supposed to develop supranational loyalties to the organization mission in place of or in addition to their original national loyalties (Murdoch et al. 2018; cf. Hooghe 2002).

Nevertheless, the reality is more complex, and it is widely understood that the staff members cannot be expected to completely lose their national affiliations and affections. As famously proclaimed by Nikita Krushchev with regard to the UN staff and its impartiality, “*while there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men*” (quoted in Hammarskjöld 1961: 329). In a similar vein, but with an interesting twist, Luard, a historian of the United Nations, vividly describes how the US government and the FBI exerted massive pressure on the UN and its first SG Trygve Lie. During the McCarthy campaign, they sought to prevent the UN from employing any US nationals with questionable national loyalties (Luard 1984: 19).

All this illustrates that staffing is naturally a point of major contestation, another playground on which states compete for power and control over IOs (Novosad – Werker 2018;

Parížek 2017). States seek to influence policy-making or, at the very least, maintain informal information channels by strategically positioning their citizens in the hierarchies of IOs (Stone 2013: 125; Chwiero 2013). Kleine even speaks of national fiefdoms within segments of international bureaucracies (2013). The authors of this text have conducted a series of interviews with senior diplomatic staff at the permanent missions to the UN in Geneva. Our interview evidence strongly confirms these intuitive insights, as virtually all the interviewees, including those from the CEEU region, highlighted IO staffing as an important part of their diplomatic agenda.³ Representation in the professional staff of IOs is a scarce resource which states fight for.

Of course, the representation in IO staff is principally different from representation in a decision-making or legislative body of an IO. There the representatives of states are simply supposed to reflect in their behaviour and decision-making their states' foreign policy orientations as closely as possible (Rapkin et al. 2016: 79). The link between the representatives and the represented is extremely strong and direct. With representation in staff, the situation is much subtler. Probably no one expects the staff of IOs to actively prioritize the interests of their countries on a day-to-day basis. Representation in international staff corresponds much more closely to the notion of mirror (or descriptive) representation, whereby the composition of a political or administrative body reflects the composition of the underlying population, but the accountability between the body and the population is absent or very indirect (Rapkin et al. 2016: 80). The body thus mirrors in its composition the underlying constituency, but its members are not expected to actively represent any particular interests. This notion of mirror representation also closely corresponds to the notion of passive representation in public administration research, which is often applied to the study of administrations under the label of representative bureaucracy (for a discussion of passive and active representation, see Meier 1975, 2018).

To moderate the countries' struggle for representation in professional staff, many IOs have formal systems of quotas for their bureaucratic bodies whereby a part of the appointments is subject to geographical distribution rules. So, for example, the UN Secretariat uses a formula that allocates 55% of positions based on assessed budgetary contributions, 40% based on the sovereign equality principle, and 5% based on the population sizes of countries. Many other IOs of the UN family adopt the same or a slightly modified system (United Nations Joint Inspection Unit 2012).⁴ The International Monetary Fund, to take another example, has a similar formula-based system (International Monetary Fund 2003).⁵ After all, the UN Charter also stipulates geographical distribution of the staff as an important requirement, whereby “[d]ue regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible” (Charter of the United Nations, Art. 101(3)). All this is meant to make sure that no single state or group of states can dominate the bureaucratic body of an IO, as this would risk the very legitimacy of the IOs' work.

This issue of distribution and representation has a national but also a regional dimension. Many IOs are too small for meaningful staffing patterns to exist on the level of all individual member states. Within the 36 UN system bodies that we map, there are 15 that have a professional staff of less than 200 and as many as 26 bodies with a staff of less than 500.⁶ Of course, such small individual IOs cannot be representative with regard to the entire UN system membership. The notion of regional, in addition to national, representation is also deeply enshrined in the UN through the system of regional voting and representation groups. As mentioned earlier, the regional system translates also to the highest levels of staff allocation, where the most senior staff and the heads of IOs are concerned, including the UN SG. After all, such concerns with representation on regional, and not only national level, are quite natural. While particular representation biases and irregularities on the micro level of individual, especially smaller states may go unnoticed,

significant under- or over-representation of entire geographical regions testifies to systemic problems. Our interview evidence suggests that this is fully in line with how the member states themselves perceive the problem. It may not be necessary that a specific state is represented in the secretariat of an IO as long as its neighbours and regional partners are. Regional partners very often share many interests, a language, a common working culture, etc. So, for example, one representative to the UN of a CEEU country argued that “[the regional balance] ensures that even when there is no [citizen of our country – omitted for anonymization], anyway our region as such is represented.”⁷

All this has been at least to some extent discussed in the several recent works mapping the representation of states in IOs’ secretariats (Parížek 2017; Novosad – Werker 2018; Eckhard – Steinebach 2018; Parížek – Stephen 2019b; cf. Christensen – Yesilkagit 2018). States seek to be *represented* in the secretariats of IOs, even if the staff members are not supposed to actively promote the interests of their countries of origin. If it is not possible or practicable for all individual states to have their own nationals on the staff of a particular IO, it is still important to at least have there citizens of the unrepresented countries’ close neighbours and regional partners.

However, such a straightforward logic of national and regional competition for representation in the staff of IOs fails when it is applied to countries of the former Soviet bloc. With the end of the Cold War, the formerly highly cohesive EEG split into two parts, with the first, large part being constituted by the CEEU countries, and the other by Russia. The core of our theoretical and empirical puzzle is that it is not at all obvious what the outcome of this change should be in terms of staffing patterns.

ACCOUNTING FOR STAFFING PATTERNS IN IOs: EMPIRICAL DATA

In this section, we briefly outline our empirical strategy for addressing our research question as presented in the Introduction: *What is the result of the conflict between Russia and the CEEU states over representation in the staff of IOs?* The core of our approach lies in the collection of new empirical data on the presence of citizens of CEEU countries and Russia in the staff of 36 bodies of the UN system. The data has been extracted semi-manually from the appendices of the Personnel Statistics yearly reports of the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions and, later on, the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (UNCEB).⁸

This data source is unique in its empirical coverage. First, it includes most of the widely known IOs, starting with the largest one, the UN Secretariat, and continuing with many large functional IOs, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and so on. It also covers many smaller and often less known IOs, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and even hardly known technical bodies, such as the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) or the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund (UNJSPF). The UNCEB reports do not cover only three IOs that are formally parts of the UN system: the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization.⁹ Second, the data source covers the years 1996–2015, effectively capturing the post-Cold War period.¹⁰ The dataset we created based on these UNCEB personnel statistics reports amounts to 3582 country-IO-year observations, mapping the representation of both Russia and the eleven individual CEEU states across all the bodies for which information was available and across the entire time-span covered in the data source.

One important weakness of the data source is the absence of full information on the representation of individual countries’ citizens across the levels of the IO bureaucracies’ hierarchies. In other words, we do not know how many of the professional staff members from each country work at which level. Nevertheless, previous research using this data source has shown that in the aggregate, across many IOs and all the countries of the

world, there do not seem to be any systematic differences in the staffing patterns across professional staff levels (Parížek 2017; Parížek – Stephen 2019b: 15–16). Furthermore, we should also highlight that we only map the representation of countries in the professional staff of IOs, the globally recruited professionals with a specific expertise demanded by UN bodies for the implementation of their mandate. We do not include the locally recruited staff of the General Services category, as the patterns of geographical distribution of this staff are likely to closely reflect the locations of IOs' activities.¹¹

Our new empirical evidence will enable us to map how the individual countries of the region are represented in the staff of the UN bodies and what changes their representation patterns have undergone over the time-span of twenty years.

As we will show later, we empirically identify a major declining trend for the representation of Russia in the UN administrations. We will argue that an intuitive explanation for such a decline could be the waning interest of Russia in multilateralism and the UN system. In other words, it could be that our empirical observations are entirely accounted for by a possible (tacit) withdrawal of Russia from the UN system. An additional component of our empirical strategy will thus lie in the identification of possible trends in the Russian interest in the UN over the last twenty years. To do so, we quantitatively analysed the material recently made available in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive, containing all public and media output by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that is pertinent to international politics.¹² The archive effectively covers the period from the year 2000 until today.¹³ Through the archive interface, we were able to identify more than 40,000 outputs tagged as related to the United Nations. These were extracted from the archive and a small sample of them was checked for their actual UN-related content, confirming the validity of the procedure. To provide a relative measure of the importance of the UN on the Russian agenda, we also applied the same procedure to output related to the three key contemporary global actors with approximately equally sized economies representing the three current global political and economic giants, namely the US, China and the EU. The same actors can be also seen as representing the rest of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, with the EU including the United Kingdom and France. In total, there were close to 16,000 such entries pertinent to these individual countries (and the EU). To obtain a relative measure of the importance of the UN on the agenda, we then scaled the numbers of entries for the UN in each year to the sum of the numbers of entries for the three key actors. This way, we will be able to assess the trends in the Russian interest in the UN system.

The combination of these two data sources, complemented with interview evidence, will enable us to provide an account of the staffing patterns in the CEE region across a large number of important IOs.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE SECRETARIATS OF UN BODIES

Russia, as the heir to the USSR, has always enjoyed a prime position in the system of IOs, most notably in the UN, which it co-founded as one of the winners of World War II. From the early days, the Soviet Union has also taken a keen interest in the working of the international administrations, and especially the UN Secretariat. Its approach, however, was primarily defensive. While Trygve Lie and Dag Hammarskjöld were building up the new international civil service, broadly with a support from the US and Western European allies, the USSR sought to restrict the independence of the IOs' secretariats, or, most importantly, the UN Secretariat as such, insisting that it should be controlled by the Security Council (Luard 1984: 19). On repeated occasions, the Soviet leadership tried to curtail the powers of the Secretariat. The most notable case of this was its proposal to replace the position of the UN SG with a *troika* of under-secretaries general coming from the West, the East, and the non-aligned movement, respectively (Dallin 1962). In general, the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc have been historically reserved towards the idea of


an impartial, supranational civil service that would supposedly be devoid of the previous national loyalties (Ziring et al. 2005: 143).

Of course, Russia's attempts to influence the functioning of the UN, like those of the US and other major powers, have always been substantiated with power: both material economic and military power, but also institutional power in the form of its permanent UN Security Council membership (Barnet – Duvall 2005). Russia is not just one among several powerful UN states. From the very beginning, the only other non-Western power among the permanent members of the UN Security Council has been China. Until 1973 the Chinese seat on the SC was held by Taiwan (the Republic of China). Even after the transition of the seat to the People's Republic, China as a member of the SC maintained significantly less pronounced multilateral ambitions, due to its primary focus on internal matters (cf. Wuthnow 2010).

With the end of the Cold War, the position of the Soviet Union and, later, Russia quickly deteriorated. The Soviet Union dissolved and its economic breakdown was associated with a dramatic drop in its industrial production and a *de facto* collapse of its military power, at least when seen in the perspective of its former superpower status (Trenin – Lo 2005; Lo 2002; Mankoff 2009). At the same time, its institutional power, notably in the form of its permanent UN SC membership, remained untouched. In spite of a long period of decline, Russia started to regain its economic power and also its international ambition around the turn of the millennia. In 2008/2009, it became a founding member of the BRICS group (Lo 2015; MacFarlane 2006). Partly on the wave of high oil and gas prices, it started to invest significantly in the renewal of its military power, and of course its economic influence started to rise again as well (Legvold 2007; Mankoff 2009).

In spite of that, we find that the renewed influence and assertiveness of Russia in international and multilateral affairs since the 2000s does not translate into a strong position in international bureaucracies. In the following, we present a series of charts mapping the representation of Russia in international secretariats, or, more precisely, on their professional staff. Figure 1 shows the overall shares of Russian nationals across all

Figure 1
Per cent (%) share (left) and total number (right) of Russian nationals
in the professional staff of 36 UN system IOs




the 36 UN bodies combined. The data show that over the examined twenty-year period, Russia lost more than 40% of its representation share, dropping from above 3% of all UN professional staff in the mid-1990s to less than 2% in the mid-2010s. This represents the single biggest loss of representation in staff out of all the UN members, which is further highlighted by the fact that Russia's representation in the staff was not very sizable to start with (at least when compared to its overall power position in the system). In their research, Parizek and Stephen show that other countries lost representation in the staff of IOs over the last twenty years as well, and this holds especially for a number of economically advanced states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Yet, as they show, all the other major losers of representation started at much higher positions, such as the United States with more than 10% of the staff in the mid-1990s, or are, in general, much smaller than Russia, as, for example, the Netherlands and Denmark (Parizek – Stephen 2019b).¹⁴

The relative decline of Russia needs to be interpreted in the light of a massive increase in the overall size of the staff of the IOs. That means that Russia has not lost much of its absolute representation, as for the last twenty years it has stayed at around 550 professional staff members across all UN bodies. Yet, it completely failed to catch up with the dramatic expansion in the overall size of the UN's administrative bodies.

It is interesting to consider not only the aggregate picture but also the varying situations in different IOs. While in the appendix to the article (Figures A.1–A.3), we provide a complete account for all the individual UN system bodies covered, in Figure 2 we offer a view on six of the largest IOs, illustrating three more widely applicable patterns of Russian representation. The first pattern is that of the UN Secretariat. Russia has been

Figure 2
Large UN system bodies and Russian representation (per cent share) in staff over time



relatively strongly represented in the UN Secretariat in the mid-1990s, with around 6% of the staff. Yet, over the twenty years its share declined sharply towards just above 2% of all staff; this represents a relative loss of around 60–70%. A similar pattern is visible in the IAEA, for example, and partly also in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, see Figure A.1 in the appendix). The second identifiable pattern is visible in the traditional large functional IOs, such as the WHO and UNESCO, but also in the ILO. In these IOs, Russia started at around 3%, and its representation declined to between 1% and 2% of the professional staff. Finally, the third pattern is visible in the highly development-assistance-focused and budget-heavy IOs such as UNICEF and UNDP (but also, e.g., FAO, UNHCR, and WFP). In these IOs, Russia had barely any professional staff in the mid-1990s and then its representation in them slightly grew or remained stable at below 1%. In spite of this variation in Russia's representation in staff across IOs, there is an overarching pattern whereby either Russia has massively lost its representation over the twenty years, or it never actually had it.

It is important to note that the massive decline in Russian nationals' representation in UN bodies' staff is by no means driven by a lack of Russian interest in multilateralism or the UN. On the contrary, Russia considers multilateralism as one of its key tools in the strategic toolbox for the promotion of its interests (Dorskaya 2016; Oleandrov 2012). To get a close view of the variety of perspectives on the UN in Russian professional circles, we conducted a screening of relevant Russian-language scholarly literature. Searching for content pertinent to Russia's foreign policy and the UN system, we identified at least three strands of literature on how Russia perceives the UN and its position in it. They all point at the persistent prominence of the UN in the hierarchy of Russian foreign policy agendas.


First, in the eyes of (of course not only) the Russian scholarly works, the UN and the UN Security Council are a playground of high politics *par excellence*. It represents the great power principle whereby the management of global affairs is in the hands of a restricted club of great powers. In this vein, for example, Oleandrov analyses the UN as an institution laid down on the principles of democracy, but also realism. The former relates to the ability of each state (regardless of its position vis-à-vis the others) to voice its position or concern regarding any question. The latter recognizes the preponderance of great powers in international politics (Oleandrov 2012).

Second, and related to that, the UN represents the key principle of multipolarity, as conceptually put into opposition to unipolarity and especially the US unipolar moment of the post-Cold War period (Krauthammer 1990). It is thus critical for the prospects of Russia's (and, to some extent, Chinese) attempts to actively challenge the dominance of the US and its European allies. So, for example, Litvinova notices that it is in the interests and capabilities of both the United States and Russia to use the UN mechanisms in order to achieve their goals (Litvinova 2006). This notion of multipolarity is also frequently referred to by the authors of the leading Russian professional foreign policy-oriented journal *Russia in Global Affairs*. The United Nations is the organization that reflects the power hierarchy of the current world order. In this respect, they put an equal sign between the UN and the Security Council (Lomanov 2008; Lukyanov 2008).

Third, the UN is also seen as an important manifestation of the multilateralism principle and norm. While Russia is often portrayed in (Western) media as acting primarily unilaterally or bilaterally, Russian scholarly literature highlights multilateralism as an important element of Russia's overall foreign policy approach and global problem-solving efforts. So, for example, Oleandrov (2012) and Dorskaya (2016) go back in history in order to trace the important role that Moscow played in multilateral initiatives, such as nuclear disarmament or security resolutions, and Sadkov, Chubarec, and Aronov (2015) suggest an important leadership role for Russia in common global problem-solving and in the call for UN reform.

This picture identified in the Russian-language scholarly debates is also supported by primary data on Russian foreign policy output in the form of public attention dedicated to the UN by top Russian foreign policy officials and especially by the Russian Federation president(s) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As we have presented earlier in this text, to evaluate the interest of Russia in the UN system over time, we have counted the number of references to the UN system in the news archive of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To provide a calibrated relative measure of Russia's interest, we divided the number of references to the UN by an analogous count of references to the United States, China, and the European Union. The results of this estimation of the relative Russian interest in the UN are depicted in Figure 3. The graph shows a fairly stable ratio of the references to the UN up until around 2005, followed by a rise in the prominence of the UN relative to the references to the three powers. This is in line with the increased multi-lateral orientations of Russia as well as other rising powers in the 2000s and 2010s. Most importantly, we certainly cannot observe any decline in the interest of Russia in the UN. In fact, if anything, a rise in the prominence of UN can be observed in the data, as indicated with the linear model plotted through the graph.¹⁵

Figure 3
Interest of Russia in the UN, relative to key states, as recorded
in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs media output



A testimony to the Russian interest in institutionalized cooperation and multilateralism lies in that Russia itself has been very active in institution building in the last decade or so. Together with other non-Western powers, it has participated on the creation of a number of regional as well as global initiatives. The most obvious example is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). As compared to other Russian-led and initiated regional institutions, the EEU has a clear-cut structure and goals, with the main goal being to create a space with guaranteed free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers (Gussarova et al. 2017; Ostrovskii 2017). Yet, it seeks to establish an economy-driven organization that will not intervene in the political affairs of its member-states. Perhaps the most prominent non-Russia-centred regional IO that has Russia as an important member is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the global level, as a direct manifestation

of its clear contested multilateralism strategy (Morse – Keohane 2014), Russia has been among the five BRICS members that founded the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Russia is also a member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, though there the role of China is significantly stronger than that of any other member (cf. Cooper 2017).¹⁶

One could possibly argue that precisely this interest in new multilateral cooperation schemes may have a negative effect on the Russian presence in the UN system, as it could drain prospective applicants for positions in the UN system towards the regional and global institutions Russia participates in. We should note, though, that these bodies are only several years old, while the decline of Russia's representation in the UN has been visible for the last 20 years. Furthermore, the secretariats of at least the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are so far very small (Serrano Oswald 2018: 4).

Our evidence confirms that Russia is losing interest neither in the UN as such, nor in multilateralism more broadly. When we observe a massive decline of Russian citizens' share of the professional staff of UN bodies, that decline certainly cannot be ascribed to any lack of interest in the UN system on the part of Russia. Instead, the decline appears to be driven by the staffing rules and norms of the UN system, whereby an increasing space is provided for the representation of the CEEU members. Historically, their levels of representation were extremely low. As we show in the next section, this is changing, and they are slowly gaining representation in the UN staff at the expense of Russia.

CEEU COUNTRIES' RISE AND CONTINUING UNDER-REPRESENTATION IN THE BUREAUCRACIES OF THE UN

During the Cold War, the position of today's CEEU countries in the UN system was not particularly pronounced, most notably due to the *de facto* subordination of their foreign policies to that of the USSR (e.g. Dejmek 2002). The composition of the regional (and voting) groups of the UN system closely respected this principle. All the Soviet satellites, together with the USSR, formed the Eastern European Group as the main geopolitical adversary of the Western block, which was formally aligned within the Western Europe and Others group, as mentioned earlier in the text.


In the area of the staffing of IOs, the Eastern European countries shared with the Soviet Union a suspicion towards the notion of an independent international civil service. For example, they, in general, insisted on fixed term-contracts for their citizens within the UN system, with a clear end-date and a point of return to the national administrations, as opposed to the principle of lifetime UN-based individual careers (Ziring et al. 2005: 143). In some cases, such as that of Ceausescu's Romania, the suspicion towards the UN translated to a *de facto* complete withdrawal from the UN staff.¹⁷

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the situation changed radically. Many of the former Soviet satellites reversed the geopolitical course and effectively reoriented themselves towards their former adversaries in the WEOG. This process culminated later on in the CEEU states' NATO and EU accessions. The former Soviet bloc entered the post-Cold War period and the new millennium split into two blocs of countries with divergent geopolitical orientations. Naturally, their newly acquired autonomy led to the CEEU countries' autonomous behaviour within the IOs. It also translated into their (belated) struggle for recognition and representation in the IOs' professional staff. While their representation in the bureaucracies of the UN system may have been side-lined by the CEEU countries' focus on representation within the institutions of the European Union as their top priority, in recent years they have been increasingly seeing their representation in the UN bodies as highly important. Some CEEU countries are currently devising national strategies for the promotion of their nationals in the IOs' secretariats. The Czech government, for example, has recently

adopted the Strategy for the Employment of Czech Citizens in International Organizations (vláda ČR [Government of the Czech Republic] 2017). Our interviewees from the CEEU region unanimously declared achieving an improved position for their respective countries in the UN bodies' administration as an important part of their agenda.¹⁸ As summarized by one CEEU country's ambassador to the United Nations, "we are a member in a given international organization, we make a contribution to the budget, and we take part in the decision-making. We have a legitimate claim for a fair share of our compatriots on the staff of the organization".¹⁹

This new post-Cold War approach also translates visibly, if not on a massive scale, to the quantitative patterns of CEEU countries' representation in IOs' staff. In the following set of charts, we again use the same Personnel Statistics reports of the UN Chief Executive Board for Coordination that we referred to earlier and used in the charts depicting the position of Russia. Figure 4 replicates the graphs from Figure 1, depicting with the full line the representation of Russia across all UN bodies – as a % share of all staff (left) and in absolute numbers (right). However, here we also add, in dashed lines, the analogous information for the sum of staff members who are nationals of the CEEU countries. The left chart shows the rather prominent increase in the representation of the CEEU countries in UN bodies, as it rose from around 1.5% of the total UN staff in the mid-1990s to around 2.5% in the mid-2010s, an increase by around 60%. It also shows that around 2005 the new EU members from the former Soviet bloc managed to surpass Russia in their representation share. The right figure depicts the absolute numbers of staff from CEEU countries, which rose from around 250 to more than 800.


Figure 4
Percent (%) share (left) and total number (right) of Russian (full line) and CEEU (dashed line) nationals in the professional staff of 36 UN system IOs



This overall trend of a sizable increase in CEEU representation is visible also across individual IOs. In Figure 5, we show the same information about Russia's representation in six key IOs that was depicted previously in Figure 2, but again add the corresponding information for the CEEU members. Today, in all the IOs except the UN Secretariat, CEEU countries are significantly more represented than Russia. In the development-

assistance-focused UNICEF and UNDP, this has been the case from the early 1990s, as the Russian representation in these bodies was negligible. In UNESCO and the WHO (and also, e.g., in the ILO, see Figure A.1 in the appendix), the CEEU countries started with a much lower representation than Russia in the 1990s, but they jointly surpassed Russia in representation after the turn of the millennia. The one IO where CEEU countries are heavily represented in the professional staff is the Vienna-based IAEA. Today, in the IAEA CEEU nationals constitute around 8% of the staff. We should note here again that we only consider the globally hired professional staff in the analysis, and not the locally recruited general services staff, such as administrative and technical support. Finally, there is only one IO in which the CEEU countries have just matched Russia in their representation, and that is the United Nations Secretariat, by far the largest body of all the IOs in the UN system. Clearly, the region has seen a representational re-shuffle, whereby the CEEU countries have been able to achieve representation at the expense of Russia.

Figure 5
Large UN system bodies and Russian and CEEU representation in their staff over time




The overall regional trends should not obscure the major variation across the CEEU states, however. In Figure 6 we provide disaggregated data for four individual countries of the region: Croatia, Czechia, Poland, and Romania. We selected these four to illustrate the divergence of the representation patterns. Figure A4 in the appendix provides evidence for all the CEEU countries individually. The left chart in Figure 6 again shows the percent share of the CEEU countries in the UN staff. It highlights that only a part of the CEEU group has recorded a relative increase in representation. In the chart, the countries that achieved such an increase are Romania (dotted line) and Croatia (dot-dashed line). From

those not visualized, a larger rise has been experienced by Bulgaria and, to a smaller extent, also by Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic states (see Figure A4 in the appendix). In contrast, Poland (full line) and Czechia (dashed line) in Figure 6, as well as Hungary (not depicted, see Figure A4), have barely improved their positions over the years. In fact, Poland has even lost a representation share.

The right chart in Figure 6 documents that in spite of the slow rise or stagnation of representation understood as a *share* of all staff, the *absolute number* of staff members has risen for all the depicted CEEU countries. For some, the rise has been fast and outpaced the overall growth of the secretariats' sizes. These are the states whose representation share increased as well – in the graph, Romania and Croatia are two such states. For Poland and Czechia, even if the total numbers of their citizens working for the UN increased, that rise merely matched the overall expansion of the secretariats. As seen in the chart, Czechia (dashed line), with its 10 million inhabitants, now has half the staff representation of Croatia (with just over 4 million inhabitants) and one third of the number for Romania (with around 20 million inhabitants).

Figure 6
The representation of four selected individual CEEU countries
in the UN professional staff; per cent (%) share (left) and absolute numbers (right).
The four countries are Poland (full line), Czechia (dashed), Romania (dotted)
and Croatia (dot-dashed line)



Interestingly, it seems that the cross-country differences are not associated with the parallel processes of the drafting of suitable candidates into the structures of the EU. In other words, the drain of talent toward Brussels is not the cause of this variation. This could be an immediately plausible explanation for the lack of success of some members in getting their citizens into UN structures. After all, our interview evidence strongly suggests that generating successful candidates for professional positions in the UN system, especially at higher levels, is no small challenge for CEEU countries, as the competition for posts is often extremely intense.²⁰ Hence, a relatively larger share of candidates successfully obtaining positions in EU institutions could weaken the supply of applicants for positions in the UN system, which, in any case, is still scarce.

Nevertheless, our data indicate that this lack of supply of qualified candidates is not the distinguishing feature across the CEEU members.²¹ To see this, we can compare the relative representation of CEEU countries in the staff of the UN with that of the EU.²² The data for the representation in both institutions are provided in Table 1. The first two

Table 1
Representation of CEEU countries and Russia on the staff of UN
and EU administrative bodies

| Country (iso3 code) | EU profession- al staff (2016) | UN profession- al staff (2015) | Population (million) | EU profession- al staff (2016), per million citizens | UN profession- al staff (2016), per million citizens | UN per capita represent- ation rank |
|------------------------|---|---|-------------------------|---|---|--|
| Bulgaria | 724 | 139 | 7.18 | 101 | 19.36 | 59 |
| Czechia | 512 | 55 | 10.55 | 49 | 5.21 | 129 |
| Estonia | 246 | 17 | 1.31 | 188 | 12.98 | 81 |
| Croatia | 250 | 103 | 4.22 | 59 | 24.41 | 48 |
| Hungary | 750 | 97 | 9.84 | 76 | 9.86 | 94 |
| Lithuania | 394 | 38 | 2.91 | 135 | 13.06 | 80 |
| Latvia | 273 | 24 | 1.98 | 138 | 12.12 | 85 |
| Poland | 1440 | 119 | 38 | 38 | 3.13 | 149 |
| Romania | 1306 | 142 | 19.83 | 66 | 7.16 | 107 |
| Slovakia | 400 | 54 | 5.42 | 74 | 9.96 | 93 |
| Slovenia | 283 | 39 | 2.06 | 137 | 18.93 | 60 |
| Russia | – | 549 | 144.1 | – | 3.81 | 141 |
| | Sum = 6578 (excl. Russia) | Sum = 1376 | Sum = 247.4 | Average = 96.45 (excl. Russia) | Average = 11.67 | Median = 89 |

columns show the absolute numbers of staff from CEEU countries working in the European institutions (2016) and the UN system (2015), respectively. The last three columns offer for each country a per-capita expression for its EU and UN staff, and the country's global rank based on its per capita representation in the UN system. In this overview, the CEEU countries' per capita representations in the UN and in the EU are clearly positively connected.²³ For example, Poland has the lowest representation from the CEEU region both in the staff of the EU and in that of the UN bodies in per capita terms. In this respect, it is followed, again both in the EU and in the UN, by Czechia. In fact, in the UN Poland ranks only in the 149th place out of the 190 countries considered, with 3.1 professional UN staff members per million citizens. This is very close to the score of Russia, with 3.8 staff members per million inhabitants. Czechia ranks only slightly better than Poland, as it ranked 129th, with 5.2 professional UN staff members per million citizens. In comparison, smaller CEEU countries, but also Bulgaria, tend to fare relatively better. Yet, even the globally highest-ranking CEEU states, Croatia and Slovenia, only rank 48th and 60th, respectively. For the entire region, including Russia, the median ranking in per capita representation in the UN is as poor as 89.

The reasons for this enormous variation in representation in UN staff across the CEEU countries most likely have to do both with the supply of motivated and talented

applicants for UN jobs and with the technical and political support the prospective applicants receive from their national administrations (Eckhard – Steinebach 2018).²⁴ On the supply side, it is possible to theorize a negative relationship between the level of economic wealth of a country and its citizens' interest in applying for a position in an international secretariat. The less wealthy the countries, the more likely their qualified citizens are to seek an international job with better career prospects. Of course, there are limits to this logic, as historically by far the most highly represented countries in the world are also those with the highest per capita incomes, as found by previous studies (e.g. Novosad – Werker 2018). In addition, the entry requirements for UN positions are demanding and applicants from countries with better education systems and better functioning institutions in general are likely to enjoy important advantages in the process (Parížek 2017).²⁵

A complementary perspective would see the differences as driven by the overall support the prospective applicants receive in their home countries. This has at least two dimensions. The first is institutional support, especially in terms of training, encouragement, and, of course, political backing, typically within structures of the ministries of foreign affairs.²⁶ The second has to do with ideational support, as the multilateral agenda may be presented in a country with varying levels of respect and prioritization. For example, the UN system may have been raised high in terms of its public profile in the poorer countries of the region as a genuine source of development assistance (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania) or as a mediator in a devastating conflict, such as in the case of the Balkan states (in our dataset, Croatia and Slovenia). We do not have the empirical data to substantiate such arguments systematically, however, and further studies should explore these factors qualitatively.

It should be noted that individual citizens of some countries of the region were also successful in reaching the highest echelons of the UN hierarchy. This was the case with the Bulgarian Irina Bokova, the head of UNESCO in 2009–2017, or the Slovak Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs of the UN, Miroslav Jenča. These partial successes, however, are clearly obscured by the failure of the region to nominate a suitable candidate for the highest position in the UN system, the SG, as we mentioned in the introduction. Although numerous individuals from the region announced their candidature for this position, including the already mentioned Bokova, the Slovak Miroslav Lajčák, and the Serbian Vuk Jeremić, in the end the bid was won by the former Portuguese Prime Minister António Guterres, the current SG.

Today, the region as a whole continues to fare poorly in its representation in the UN staff. So in spite of the continuing (and slow) rise of the CEEU countries identified here, their global standing is rather weak. As noted by a previous study, middle-income countries belong among those that are often under-represented in the UN system staff, and they are surprisingly frequently more under-represented there than low-income and least-developed countries (Parížek 2017; Ziring et al. 2005: 139). It seems the CEEU countries are a good case of this broader pattern.

CONCLUSIONS

Much literature today addresses the effects of the major power shifts in global politics on IOs and the global order in general (Kahler, 2013; Stephen 2014). Often institutions are seen as mechanisms that maintain the privileges of the established powers in the face of the challenge raised by the rising powers, which are frequently associated with the BRICS group. In our text, we study the position of one of the BRICS, Russia, in the administrations of a large number of the most important contemporary IOs. We show that in spite of its self-proclaimed rising power status, Russia has, over the last two decades, tremendously lost its representation in the bureaucracies of global IOs.

The representation lost by Russia has been gained by its former satellites, which are now the new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe. While historically

these countries followed the lead of the USSR, the breakup of the Soviet bloc enabled them to search for their own genuine representation in global bodies. This has also translated into their improved representation in the bodies' administrations. Yet, the countries of the CEEU region vary strongly in how successful they proved to be in acquiring higher shares of positions for their nationals. Clearly, while IO rules have helped lift the representation of the CEEU region significantly, some countries fared much better than others. It is a matter for further qualitative research to systematically explore the differences across the CEEU states. Based on such research, some policy advice for governments could be proposed, which would aim at increasing their ability to secure for their citizens a higher share of seats in the UN bodies' and general IOs' secretariats.

In conclusion, we would like to highlight the substantive relevance of the study of international administrations – a field that has until very recently been largely neglected in mainstream international relations (Ege – Bauer 2013). International administrators are often powerful actors, although their power and legitimacy do not stem from material resources but rather from their expertise and impartiality (Barnett – Finnemore 2004). In the long term, this notion of impartiality is hardly reconciled with situations of highly uneven representation of states in the IOs' staff. IOs with such uneven patterns of staffing, especially when they are visible, are likely to face serious legitimacy problems (Parizek – Stephen 2019b; cf. Christensen – Yesilkagit 2018). This paper sought to advance our understanding of the outcomes of possible clashes between states' powers and their interest in having a fair representation share.

¹ In the empirical analysis, we only consider Russia on one hand and the eleven new EU member states from the EEG, i.e. Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, on the other.

² The remaining members of the EEG are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro, Moldova, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, of course, Ukraine. We intentionally leave these countries out of our analysis in order to identify as clear a divide between Russia and the CEEU group as possible.

³ We interviewed 6 high-ranking diplomats in total, typically the permanent representatives of countries to the UN or their deputies, from the countries under consideration in this paper. Yet, in the development of our argumentation we also rely on more than 30 interviews with top UN-affiliated diplomats from other regions of the world.

⁴ As it turns out, even IOs that do not have a formal quota system develop very similar patterns of actual (empirical) staffing as those with exact rules (Parizek 2017). Part of the reason clearly lies in that only a small portion of professional positions are typically subject to these geographical representation criteria. In the UN Secretariat, for instance, only around 25–30% of professional positions are subject to this formal requirement (see e.g. A/71/360, Table 2a, with the number of positions under the geographical formula rules). But a broader explanation is that the patterns of staffing tend to reflect the patterns of the distribution of power in the international system.

⁵ Momani (2007) presents an interesting discussion of how Russia obtained one of the sole seats on the Board of Executive Directors of the International Monetary Fund in the early 1990s. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this study.

⁶ We elaborate on the logic of our sampling further in the text.

⁷ Interview with a CEEU country deputy permanent representative to the UN, 3. 11. 2017. Similarly, another representative (Interview 6. 11. 2017) highlighted the advantage of staff members being from the same region in terms of getting insider information about processes in the IOs, as compared to staff members being from different regions, especially regions that are very distant from each other culturally and geographically.

⁸ The analysed documents were those from ACC/1998/PER/R.9 up to CEB/2016/HLCM/HR/20. The documents are available at <http://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system-human-resources-statistics-reports>.

⁹ For the delimitation of the UN System, see <http://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system> (last access 10. 12. 2018).

¹⁰ As highlighted by one anonymous reviewer, it would be very interesting to also see the patterns of change in staffing during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath. However, in spite of our best efforts, we were unable to identify data sources that would provide for a comparable mapping of the staffing of UN bodies prior to 1996.

- ¹¹ In addition to the globally recruited professional staff, IOs also employ a large number of locally recruited general services staff (e.g. administrative support) as well as national professional staff, who are only allowed to work in the given country, not internationally, and are often hired for specific projects.
- ¹² The archive interface is accessed via the search menu [поиск] at: <http://www.mid.ru/ru/home>; its use involves searching for specific keywords and date limits (last access 14. 12. 2018).
- ¹³ The starting date was chosen as the earliest point with robust data availability in the archive.
- ¹⁴ They also highlight that some of the obvious candidates for a rapid rise in representation in IO staff have, in fact, not been very successful – the most notable case being China, which hardly increased its (low) share over the twenty-year time-span at all. More broadly, they highlight the declining relevance of economic power (and budgetary contributions) as determinants of IO staffing patterns in the post-Cold War period (Parizek – Stephen 2019b).
- ¹⁵ We do not seek to interpret the linear model as indicating a trend in a statistical sense, due to the low number of observations and high data variability, and also due to the step-function pattern visible in the data.
- ¹⁶ An important reason for Russia's activity in these alternative institutional fora has been the dominant positions of the United States and other OECD countries in many of the key global IOs, including the Bretton-Woods institutions (for an overview of several key global economic IOs, see Parizek – Stephen 2019a). We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this.
- ¹⁷ Interview with a CEEU country's deputy permanent representative to the UN, 3. 11. 2017.
- ¹⁸ Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 3. 11. 2017. Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 6. 11. 2017. Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 7. 11. 2017. Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 23. 11. 2018. Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador and deputy permanent representative to the UN, 23. 11. 2018.
- ¹⁹ Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 3. 11. 2017.
- ²⁰ Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador to the UN, 7. 11. 2017. Interview with a CEEU country's permanent representative to the UN, 3. 11. 2017.
- ²¹ The supply of qualified candidates appears to be an important factor globally, however (Eckhard – Steinebach 2018).
- ²² The data on representation in the European Commission are taken from https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european-commission-hr-key-figures_2017_en.pdf.
- ²³ The Pearson correlation coefficient r with all the CEEU countries included reaches around 0.35, but once we exclude Croatia, which only accessed the EU relatively recently, it jumps to 0.68. We should note, however, that with such an extremely small number of observations the correlation coefficient barely provides more than a simple descriptive account.
- ²⁴ Interview with a CEEU country's ambassador and deputy permanent representative to the UN, 23. 11. 2018.
- ²⁵ Interview with an ambassador of a CEEU country to the UN, 6. 11. 2017.
- ²⁶ Interview with an ambassador of a CEEU country to the UN, 3. 11. 2017. Interview with a deputy permanent representative of a CEEU country to the UN, 3. 11. 2017. Interview with an ambassador of a CEEU country to the UN, 6. 11. 2017. Interview with an ambassador of a CEEU country to the UN, 7. 11. 2017.

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Appendix

List of UN system bodies covered

Table A1
Overview of UN bodies with their total professional staff and professional staff from CEEU¹

| IGO body | Total professional staff 2015 | CEEU professional staff 2015 |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| UN | 11,495 | 309 |
| UNICEF | 3580 | 37 |
| UNDP | 2494 | 43 |
| UNHCR | 2409 | 45 |
| WHO | 2072 | 45 |
| FAO | 1525 | 37 |
| WFP | 1417 | 13 |
| IAEA | 1323 | 106 |
| ILO | 1080 | 25 |
| UNESCO | 989 | 39 |
| UNFPA | 672 | 10 |
| WIPO | 601 | 18 |
| PAHO | 441 | 1 |
| UNAIDS | 405 | 2 |
| ITU | 402 | 18 |
| ICAO | 375 | 7 |
| UN Women | 374 | 4 |
| IFAD | 330 | 0 |
| UNFCCC | 283 | 14 |
| UNIDO | 249 | 14 |
| UNRWA | 202 | 2 |
| WMO | 171 | 6 |
| ITC | 168 | 5 |
| IMO | 148 | 5 |
| UNICC | 117 | 4 |
| UNJSPF | 97 | 5 |
| UPU | 79 | 5 |
| UNU | 72 | 1 |
| ITCILO | 62 | 2 |
| ICJ | 56 | 2 |
| UNWTO | 44 | 1 |
| UNITAR | 31 | 2 |
| ICSC | 21 | 0 |
| UNSSC | 15 | 0 |
| UNOPS | 11 | 0 |

The representation of Russia and CEEU states across UN bodies

Figure A1
Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line)²




Figure A2
Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line)
(continued)






Figure A3
Representation (% share) of Russia (full line) and CEEU countries (dashed line)
(continued)



Aggregate representation of individual CEEU states

Figure A4
Representation (% share) of individual CEEU countries in all IOs' staff combined



¹ The list does not include ICAT, with data for 1996–2006 only.

² Figures A1–A3 do not include PAHO, UNICC, UNSSC, and UNU, for which no data for display are available.

Threat and Security Production at Václav Havel Airport Prague

SARAH KOMASOVÁ

Abstract: Building on empirical qualitative research, this article explores the nature of security and threat resulting from the contemporary security practice at Václav Havel Airport Prague. The article, building on Actor-Network Theory, interprets a security check as a chain of translation, the possibility of threat deployment as a program of action, and activities aiming to disable threats as a security antiprogram. Deployment of threats is further conceptualised as a failure of a security chain implementation, its design, threat program expectation, and the sole existence of a particular program. Considering inflight explosions as the main threat to be identified, the article proceeds by finding divergences between travellers and employees regarding the subject of protection, and analyses the notion of terrorism present in practice as well as its consequences. Security is then identified as a service of agency take-over. The article indicates the importance of security agency and the ANT-based inquiry enabling its exploration.

Key words: security, threat, airport, ANT, Václav Havel Airport Prague, passengers, employees.

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Airport security influences the lives of millions of passengers daily. While the increasing aerial mobility with increasing passenger and cargo numbers is making aviation mundane on one hand, the growing concerns about terrorist attacks produce both public and official demands for exceptional security measures on the other. As such, airport security is a domain where public perceptions interact with expert knowledge, resulting in priorities and spending decisions (Gierlach – Belsher – Beutler 2010, 1540); therefore airport security becomes a civil security phenomenon, where the nature of security itself is negotiated on a daily basis, establishing its content and shaping its agency through on-site performance. This article, building on empirical qualitative research, explores the nature of security and threat resulting from the contemporary practice of security provision at Václav Havel Airport Prague (LKPR).¹

The article answers the question of how threat and security are enacted and understood in LKPR by actants included in the process, building on Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which enables one to approach the fluidity of airport security content by examining its setting-specific performative characteristics. Through ANT, the security provision is understood as a sequence of interrelated transformations which gradually alter the ontological nature of an entity. As such, the article in its conclusions provides not only an empirical insight into the practice in place, but also goes beyond the state of the art by proposing an innovative understanding of the security provision process. Therefore, it contributes more generally to the research of security performativity by proposing a distinct manner of security framing and a possible mode of analysis.

Compared to research options working either with an objectivist understanding of security or a discursive analysis of security phenomena, ANT permits one to tackle the complexity of reality networks encompassing but not exclusively restricted to humans and their thought work. ANT also enables one to understand security as a heterogeneous phenomenon. Within the context of International Relations (IR), employment of ANT might be seen as a response to the limitations of the Copenhagen School (Balzacq 2010; Buzan – Wæver – Wilde 1998), and the call for greater interest in material aspects of security present, e.g., in the work of Claudia Aradau or Peer Schouten (Aradau 2010; Schouten 2014). ANT thus enables one to approach interactions of humans and non-humans (Aradau 2010; Balzacq – Cavelti 2016; Nexon – Pouliot 2013; Porter 2013), or to focus on practice (Balzacq – Cavelti 2016; Barry 2013; similarly it proposes a solution to the unpleasant problems of the agent-structure debate (Bueger 2013; Nexon – Pouliot 2013; Porter 2013). This is an issue which has been materialised, in IR especially, by the interest in the concept of assemblage, either derived from the work of Bruno Latour (Bueger 2013) or, by following a different route (usually Bourdieu), building on the work of Gilles Deleuze (Williams – Abrahamsen 2014).

Although this article follows this route as well, it works directly with a Latourian inspiration and goes beyond solely employing the notion of assemblage, building particularly on the notion of the chain of translation explained in the following section. Simultaneously, it follows the preceding interest in these concepts of Marieke de Goëde, Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster (Bellanova – Fuster 2013; Goëde 2018), with significant emphasis on the possibility of building an inductive account deeply rooted within empirical practice and, contrary to the objections of some IR authors (Barry 2013; Nexon – Pouliot 2013), of basing an abstract understanding of the topic on it. On the other hand, ANT is rather a description style than a technological system analysis tool.

With respect to the existing IR literature on airport security, the contemporary work has primarily focused on the distinct spatiality of airports, emphasising both the movement and its connection to security (Adey 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010; Pascoe 2001) while concentrating fully on airport security, and inquiring into the private-public divide and the risk environment resulting from public-private mergers. Studies on these topics were conducted by Mark Salter (Salter 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2013), Lippert and O'Connor (2003), and Hainmüller and Lemnitzer (2003). Interactions between humans and technologies, and data processing have been studied by Peer Schouten (Schouten 2010, 2014), Matthias Leese (Leese 2014, 2015, 2016; Govert Valkenburg and Irma van der Ploeg (2015), and many others. However, little attention has been paid to *“the control of the microscale movements that occur in border zones and airports”* (Adey 2004: 1365). Specifically, neither threat nor security has been handled as a consequence of systems presently in place. Similarly, the contemporary theoretical background mostly reduces the research either to a problem-solving approach, or a general inspiration by the material turn embracing the notion of security assemblage (Salter 2008c). But, as put by Peer Schouten, *“The study of the production of security should involve investigating the processes through which activities, behaviours and spheres or fields are established as (in)secure”* (2010: 5), which is the goal of this article.

The article structure is as follows: first, the ANT background and a particular case-specific employment of this framework are presented, followed by practical field research details and the methodological solutions implemented. Subsequently, the notion of threat and security identified at the LKPR is presented in two distinct sections. The first section is further divided into segments dealing with threat programs, endangered actants, and the danger of system failure, and a section analysing the identified terrorism notion. The second section presents the role of security measures, actants deemed to be protected, and finally the positive delimitation of the security provided.

ACTOR-NETWORK THEORY

In regard to the presented research goals, ANT is a theoretical-methodological framework focusing on entity performance where the activity itself is seen as a defining characteristic for an entity delimitation (Latour 1987: 89, 1999: 120, 2005: 71, 2013: 230). ANT emphasises the heterogeneity of the entities involved, which might include humans as well as material entities and, less remarkably, also ideational factors (Latour 2005: 76). In order to strengthen the notion of entities' equality a specific term – actant – was coined (Latour 2005: 54).²

The actant's agency – the ability to make a difference and transform others – is necessary for the actant's conception; without agency, there is no actant (Latour 2005: 53). The emphasis on action provokes ANT's interest in exploring the ways of mutual influences among multiple actants. Showing indirect actant connections, ANT traces the chain which enables one thing to influence another or to be transformed into another. Such a chain is referred to as the chain of translation, chain of reference, or chain of transformation (Latour 1999: 70, 2013: 78; Law 2002: 98). Every transformation between two points is seen as a total rupture from the preceding ontological state; the parts of the chain are seen as active elements shaping the outcome, as actual actors (Latour 1999: 60). The chain of translation therefore represents an interrelated sequence of transformations which gradually alter an entity's ontological nature. The chain of translation can be employed to clarify the process of information abstraction or generalisation – in the original context, the concept was used to describe the establishing of scientific knowledge (Latour 1999). Translation enabled by the activity of chain elements has an important productive effect.

Regarding this notion, ANT employs the idea of program and antiprogram. A program is a script, an expectation of an activity to be realised (Latour 2008: 152, 168). Unlike a chain of translation, a program of action does not focus on the ontological shift but on the realisation of an action's expectation. ANT examines how these programs are realised, i.e. which actants produce and shape the action, and how, and also what prevents actions from being realised – namely which actants are composed into an antiprogram, and how they disable a target activity (Latour 2008: 152, 168).

The conceptualisation of a proposed action as program or antiprogram is then strictly a matter of perspective. This notion is exploited as a leading process in understanding the threat environment and its transformation into the state of security. In this interpretation, the article stems particularly from the notion of program and antiprogram as introduced in the article *"Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts"* (Latour 2008: 152, 168), though this notion was previously mentioned in *"A Convenient Vocabulary for the Semiotics of Human and Nonhuman Actors"* (Akrich – Latour 1991). The notion is also employed in Latour's later work (Latour 2013: 392) under a different name.

Providing an account of reality in terms of relationality, ANT enables constructing non-hierarchical maps of networks and mutual interactions (Latour 1987: 180, 2005: 45). The relational notion of reality assumes a symmetrical approach to information about reality provided by individual actants. This endeavour is embodied in the term of symmetrical anthropology, which is seen as a methodological goal (Latour 2009: 35). This stance entails an effort to map an environment or a process on the basis of actants' voices from the field, not on the basis of the researcher's prior normative evaluation. As such, ANT counters the premature deconstructive criticism (Latour 1986: 264, 199: 268, 2005: 49).

THREAT AND SECURITY

This article uses the chain of translation to capture the airport security control process. Airport security is seen as produced by the translation of an actant from a general potential threat background into a secure ontological status by using a sequence of active

control elements enabling movement between security provision stages (Latour 1993: 10, 78, 1999: 73). Even though this article does not cover translation procedure details, it builds on the notion of an ontological rupture between the entity statuses before and after the control. The security checks, performing the translation, alter the incoming actant's identity, which entails uncertainty and the possibility of a threat, into a certain status characterised as a dichotomy of security and threat. The system then applies this notion to particular material entities, be they objects or persons.

The article focuses on the way this translatory activity shapes the initial environment of ontological uncertainty and the security provision product. The article also analyses how environments – the uncertainty involving a danger and the secure environment – are produced by a presence of a particular translatory chain which is now practiced at LKPR. The article proceeds in this direction in accordance with ANT expectations, paying special attention to activity, material actants, and particularly the provision of a symmetrical, non-hierarchical account where all actants are treated equally.

The term chain of translation was already partially employed in a similar manner by Rocco Bellanova and Gloria González Fuster (Bellanova – Fuster, 2013), and more closely by Marieke de Goede (Goede 2018). De Goede, building especially on ideas proposed by Latour in *Pandora's Hope*, focuses on one instance of translation, and highlights the process of information abstraction producing a threat presence. Unlike in her conceptualisation, which is more faithful to Latour's original form in some aspects, the emphasis in the present text lies on the stabilised practice and the gradual act of ontological transformation of the object, the change of its identity.

In relation to this conceptualisation, the event of a threat realisation or full threat employment is understood here as a *program of action*. This program of action is countered by the *antiprogram* of airport security, which intends to prevent its performance (Akrich – Latour 1991: 260–261). Importantly, the program of action entails a full plan of a threat employment. Within the actual system, this program of action is usually expected to use an actant; this actant is to be labelled as a threat by the chain of translation in place. The existing chain of translation is shaped by expectations of possible programs of action.

Security is then a state where the threat program of action is not present, and which is in practice realised through enactment of the antiprogram, which is deemed eligible to ensure the threat's absence. As Latour and Akrich write, antiprograms are “[a]ll the programs of actions of actants that are in conflict with the programs chosen as the point of departure of the analysis; what is a program and what is an antiprogram is relative to the chosen observer” (1991: 261). We may therefore interpret security as a program preventing the realisation of a threat.

This perspective reflects the self-perception, narrative and technological composition of the living actants in the field as well as their technological counterparts, which are designed and set up to *counter* threat employment. Although security and threat might be produced at the same time as a result of a productive dichotomy in accordance with ANT's demands for reproducing the standpoints of actants encountered in the field, this perspective is employed because the alternative solution would be a result of very different fieldwork. ANT emphasises the actors' viewpoints; employing a perspective which counters this notion could be understood as an a priori criticism negatively perceived by ANT (Latour 1986: 264, 1999: 268, 2005: 49).

The contemporary security antiprogram is based mostly on sorting incoming actants by their characteristics, translating those not sharing threat material qualities into secure entities assigned to the secure space of the Security Restricted Area (SRA), and excluding the rest from the realm of security. This process is based on the expectation of threats' material manifestation based on previous accidents. The actant materiality therefore determines the threat identity assignment. Specific material features, and the agency of matter further determine the enrolment of (technological) actants capable of constituting

ideally defining and unique characteristics of a threat. This technological choice is influenced by the technological and knowledge network available at the time of the threat's emergence. The system is therefore structured as a consequence of the knowledge network, threat historicity and their materialities.

In consequence to this notion, the possibility of threat deployment emerges in multiple contexts derived from the fieldwork – as a system failure, meaning either a failure in the performance of a particular chain of translation, a failure to detect particular material characteristics, or a failure to counter an unexpected program of action; and lastly as the very existence of a program of action.

On the contrary, airport security is produced as a response to the framing of constantly emerging new threats. Chains of security translation are established to counter particular threat materialities and to produce spaces and actants deemed free of these. This allows for understanding security as the absence of particular actants and consequently programs of action implying a threat. However, translatory procedures produce a notion of security beyond the notion of threat exclusion. This perception is created not only by the smooth cooperation of multiple actants but also by the credibility of a system which allows for taking the content of the security for granted (Latour 1986: 242). As such, airport security is produced not only as a negative notion based on the absence of a viable threat program, but also as a positive end-product which is thought to be generally trusted. For example, an Israeli research found that a *“majority of 83 % of the passengers felt that the security check contributed to their sense of safety during flight”* (Hasisi – Weisburd 2011: 879) The situation at LKPR also shows an enhanced feeling of added value promoted by the security system. The positive notion of security, encompassing a distinct and explicit content, is provided to the actants protected.

DATA AND METHODS

Following the ANT framework, the inquiry is based on a mix of qualitative methods, employing an inductive analytical approach fully building on the empirical grounding. The above-proposed conceptualisation of threat and security is therefore a result of fieldwork. The empirical inquiry was shaped by ANT focuses, paying particular attention to ongoing action, technologies, materialities and their interactions with humans, and especially to connections, and relationality and means of its realisation among all the actants present. However, specific ANT concepts and the manner in which they are employed to explain security production have been derived from actions witnessed. The realisation of this process points at the possibility to travel up the ladder of abstraction using an ANT-based fieldwork, showing the explanatory value proposed by ANT.

The fieldwork consisted of full participant observation, observatory activities and a set of interviews with general airport security control employees, management, passengers and other relevant security actants. The research was conducted at LKPR in 2017. The first stage of the research (participant observation) took place from 6 to 8 July 2017; after undergoing the appropriate training, the author took part in security searches, which provided first-hand experience of the system internality, and enabled her to inquire about the chain of translation and understand security control's productive effects. Furthermore, this stage enabled the author to witness otherwise inaccessible translation points, and interaction between employees and travellers, and particularly to experience interactions between humans and specialised technologies. A non-participant observation was conducted from 10 July to September 29. An external examination of the system helped the author increase her understanding of how the system is shaped by the technologies in place, how the technological solution context shapes processes and legislation, how it produces unintended consequences and particularly how it frames the notion of security and threat.

The interviews broadened this experience by adding the accounts of system operators and their material counterpart actants, and the perspectives of travellers who are the

subjects as well as contracting parties of the whole process. 41 in-depth open-ended interviews with Security Control employees (Bezpečnostní kontrola – BEK), 10 interviews with BEK Management, Administration and Control employees (BEK M&A&C), 167 shorter semi-structured interviews with travellers, and five in-depth open-ended interviews with other security actants were conducted. The participant sampling and observations were guided by sampling for variance. This interview form reflected the time possibilities of the airport environment, where longer and therefore less guided interviews were made possible by the airport management and shift schedule, whereas the screening and departure organisation prevented longer interviews with passengers, with variability covered. The actant-topic relationship was strong: for the employees the research question and the whole airport security phenomenon represented an important part of everyday work, and in many cases also a crucial life experience. In these cases, the interviews involved broad, thoughtful ideas and contributed to the whole inductively-oriented research activity. For travellers, the issue concerned was not usually an important part of their lives, and therefore the more closed framing in these cases rendered more specific reactions.

The interviews have been conducted in Czech, English, and French by the author, interpreted for Russian, Chinese and Arabic-speaking travellers, and given in written form for Korean travellers. The acquired data was treated in accordance with ethical recommendations. To emphasise the airport employees' anonymity, the interview recording dates were replaced by random numbers.

All the interviews have been transcribed manually. Based on the transcript examinations, some codes have then been induced with an expressed idea set as a coding unit. After the trial coding and adjustment of the inductively derived coding scheme, the whole data corpus has been coded using these data-driven inductive codes. Subsequently, an analytical choice was made to integrate a specific list of codes into the analysis. These codes have been chosen so as to provide accounts of a threat and security nature. The selected codes have been internally examined using the logic of thematic analysis (Boyatzis 1998), and their inner meaning, variation and relations were interpreted. When needed, further sub-coding was implemented in order to enhance the understanding of the codes' dimensions.

Subsequently, relations and co-occurrences among the codes, sub-codes, and cases were inquired into, forming the results presented. During this phase, the idea of a security check as a chain of translation, as well as the notion of security and threat deployment, crystallised from the data, emerging from the examination of the security check sequence and its productive consequences. The understanding of security and threat deployment as a program of action and an antiprogram has developed in a similar way during the analysis of technology performance with respect to incoming actants. Lastly, some indicative quotations have been selected for the purposes of the results presentation: These serve only as an illustrative representation of salient results based on their broad presence within the data. All cases with a unified contrasting view to a chosen quotation or presented point are mentioned in the text.

RESULTS

The notion of threat and security reconstructed during the analysis is presented as follows. Firstly, the dimension of a possible threat program is introduced; this part explores what is considered a possible action to be undertaken. This section introduces the variance of dangers and threats, and partially also the inherently connected possible modes of threat employment in airport practice. Secondly, the possibility of threat realisation in regard to the security system is examined by tackling the possible mode of threat deployment building on the identified presentation of threat realisation as a system failure. Such a failure means either a malperformance within a particular chain of translation or a failure in ability to detect a particular material characteristic representing a design failure, a failure

to counter an unexpected program of action, and the presence of a program of action itself. This cornerstone conceptualisation is related to the remaining sections. Finally, the understanding of terrorism is examined.

The second section involves security analysis – the second actant present in the field. Three basic analogic dimensions have been identified here: firstly, the role of the security antiprograms is presented, and particular ideas, approaches, and procedures taken in order to avoid threat deployment are analysed, with the threat examination being taken into account. Secondly, the notion of actants rendered as protected by the security control system is explored. Lastly, the analysis presents the image of the security provided. Here the security is analysed in regard to its positive delimitation, exploring its substantive nature as the end point of the security translation.

THREAT

The Threat Program of Action in the Terrain

In accordance with the general trend, the leading threat program of action empirically identified at LKPR mostly focuses on the possibility that an explosive system could be placed within a safeguarded area or airplane and detonated. Within the terrain studied, employees consider explosions a predominant threat, and travellers consider them a leading specific threat program of action.

The danger of explosion is tangible given two important material aspects. Firstly, an explosion is seen as an ultimate threat to the inflight employment. Here, the airplane materiality shapes an inflight explosion as a main source of concern. This concept, which is endorsed in the terrain, stems from general observations. For example, McCrie and Haas pointed at the advantageous choice of an airplane as a target given its propensity to total destruction, and therefore its particular vulnerability to explosions (2018: 55). Similarly, Nilsson's examination of terrorist tactics noted that inflight employment enhances the explosion's destructive effect so that it inflicts more casualties independently of the tactics enacted (2018: 10).

Secondly, given its historicity, the security check has been conceptualised so that the focus has predominantly been on the idea of a kidnapping involving a hand-held metallic weapon, and therefore on countering threats represented by metallic items. Furthermore, explosive materiality is rendered as difficult to counter due to the explosives' varying chemical composition and varying shapes, which make explosive detection particularly challenging (Cormier – Fobes 1996: 2–3). The trend of a new threat emergence is also embodied within contemporary European legislation, particularly in the Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1998 stipulating the obligatory inclusion of innovations – such as explosive threat detectors (ETD), liquid threat detectors, or random sampling – within the chain of security translation focusing especially on this potentiality (European Union 2015).

The idea of an inflight explosion or an explosion in the SRA thus emerges as a program of threat action which is prone to a system failure, either due to a failure in performance caused by operating the system on the edge of possibilities of particular chains of translation, or as a potential complete failure to detect a specific new, material characteristic. A contrasting idea is an explosion in a public hall where the aircraft multiplier effect might not be expected, yet the program of action seems not to face any substantial antiprogram compared to inflight employment. This represents threat deployment as a consequence of a failure to counter an unexpected program of action. Furthermore, the traditional understanding of airport security as in-flight protection is questioned here. In the terrain, the traditional stance is slightly predominant among employees, given their focused tasks (BEK Employee 1 2017; BEK Employee 2 2017), whereas passengers, concerned with personal protection, are more inclusive to terminal

security, even though also feeling most endangered during the flight itself (Czech traveller 1, 2017). This difference reflects the broader security shift toward soft target protection comprising control delocalisation as well as space and crowd surveillance as a reaction to non-hardened target attacks (Ahmed 2018: 380; Bigo 2008: 17; Klausner – Ruegg – November 2008; Nishiyama 2018: 2).

Within the field, employees sometimes discuss the idea of a non-weaponised threat deployment, e.g. using only blackmail, bare hands, or everyday items purchased in a duty-free store, with other threats being mentioned only occasionally (BEK Employee 3 2017; BEK Employee 4). The corresponding program of action is based on the idea of an unexpected program of action. It is therefore mainly emerging as a contrast to the contemporary system logic based on the SRA, which mostly expects that the threat item's absence is a sufficient security guarantee. The idea of threat deployment without a threat item smuggled in seems to be a go-to circumvention of the security system. This framing of threat does not mean that the airport security network does not consider other options but rather that the enacted security antiprogram is either considered efficient, as, for example, in the case of metals screening (BEK Employee 4 2017), or enforced by a different part of the system, and therefore is not seen as pivotal by the BEK employees.

Lastly, passengers might consider goods and especially drug trafficking a part of the BEK's interest. Here, the expected program of action more or less misses with antiprograms in place, given that such findings are rather collateral hits allowed by materialities of trafficked actants (Representative of Customs Administration 2017). Still, such a program of action expects to take advantage of a system failure, and some interviewed passengers understand security control, particularly the ETD, as primarily targeted on drug screening (Slovak traveller 1 2017; Czech travellers 2).

Means of a Threat Program Realisation

When a threat program realisation process is examined in closer detail, a system failure is a leading source of threat presence for employees and LKPR management as well as for travellers. A system failure is overwhelmingly rendered as a possibility that a forbidden item might be brought into the SRA – either due to a failure to employ an existing procedure correctly or due to an unexpected program of action. The mere presence of an item which should have been labelled as a threat in the SRA is presented as a source of danger. Such an item with a threat identity is inherently dangerous,³ given its material agency enabling it to cause harm. Such a failure is not framed as a mistake but as a result of a perpetrator's malicious activity, which enables one to consider the situation as a security matter. In most cases, the nature of this item is not expressed, and the threat is related to a general notion of breaching the SRA.

A similar idea is also included within the considerably less popular notion of an unauthorised intruder in the SRA. The threat identity of the actant – living or not – leads to the expectation that it will be identified within the chain of translation, and proposes an agency for it, an inherent program of action to be countered by the security antiprogram. The influence is then twofold and the conceptualisation of a threat identity is also understood as a result of the actant's agency. However, the two notions might be significantly detached in practice. For example, a presence of an unexamined liquid in the SRA is rather a case of the former than the latter, even though the conceptualisation of the liquid as a threat is a consequence of the latter notion.

The mere presence and legal entry of a suspicious person, for example, might be a threat source, and it is de facto also caused by a system failure. Importantly, given his or her widely recognised agency, a dangerous person can be further classified in regard to their system function. The main categories emerging here are a professional, an employee, a nad've perpetrator, and a lunatic. A professional is rendered by human actants as a person equipped with superior knowledge, means and motivation (BEK Employee 8 2017). The

professional's knowledge makes him or her a threat which might not be averted (BEK Employee 3 2017; Russian traveller 2 2017). A professional therefore employs a system failure to detect a specific material characteristic, or to counter an unexpected program of action, and as such might employ a program of action which deterministically would not be countered by the airport security anti-program. A professional's advantage is their understanding of the chain of translation applied and of threat identities included in this system. The position of an employee is similar. An employee represents an inner threat due to the combination of their limited knowledge of the airport and particularly their access that could allow them to circumvent some parts of the security procedure (BEK Employee 8 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017; Observation 1 2017).

On the other hand, a *naďve* perpetrator might be theoretically detected by the chain of translation concerning brought material actants, but completely disables the possibility of suspicious behaviour identification, as they do not share the behavioural features of a suspect. A *naďve* perpetrator employs a system failure by disabling the ability of the chain of translation to detect a particular characteristic of identity. Such a person is considered a possible threat, but is also strongly emphasised as an important reason for an equal approach to all passengers, which contrasts with the use of profiling (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK M&A&C 1 2017). The advantage of a *naďve* perpetrator argument also relies on the fact that this framing is non-conflictual toward the passenger, which was also mentioned by the management (BEK M&A&C 2 2017; BEK M&A&C 3 2017).

The last kind of person saliently present within the threat map is a lunatic. Similarly to a *naďve* perpetrator, a lunatic is more difficult to reveal and particularly unpredictable given their "*lunatic*" irrational nature, which again disables the ability of the chain of translation to assign a correct threat identity to him or her. A lunatic penetrates the system primarily by their determination (which also constitutes their key defining characteristic), mostly not on the basis of their invisibility, but rather on the basis of their disregard for consequences (BEK Employee 10 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017). A lunatic as a term has a significant agency in framing a cornerstone concept of terrorism.

Terrorism

Terrorism was present both in the interviews and within the airport security network as an ultimate threat or an ultimate reason and motivation for the threat program realisation, combining aspects of threat perception with further uncontrollability and the emotional dread proper to terrorism itself, as has been mentioned in existing studies (Avdan – Webb 2018: 2; Lee – Lemyre – Krewski 2010: 263). The distress experienced in relation to the perceived ultimate nature of terrorism made some passengers seemingly intentionally avoid mentioning this particular type of danger; or it made them call upon their beliefs in destiny and/or predestination, and pray to their deity for generally safe travels, while avoiding a direct terrorist threat label (Russian traveller 3 2017; Saudi traveller 2017). Such responses highlight the emotionality in passengers' perceptions of terrorism. Complex answers reflecting the notion were rare. Although the field might consider terrorism an aggregating notion connecting most possible programs of action, aspects of intentionality potentially leading to the realisation of such a program seem to be missing.

In the comprehensive answers provided, terrorism was most frequently defined in connection to a particular attack (passengers usually mention the 9/11 attack, and employees the Richard Reid attack [American traveller 1 2017; Israeli traveller 1 2017], or a particular tactic – namely bombing (Czech traveller 4 2017)). The interviewees rarely mentioned the political nature or motivations of such attacks. This observation is in consonance with the terrorist threat perception research by Lee, Lemyre, and Krewski, who pointed out that their interviewees mostly "*mentioned a specific attack or referred to an attack in general terms (25.2%). Others thought about different types of terrorism or weapons that might be used in an attack (19.5%)*" (2010: 251). If terrorism in the

field contained a dimension beyond the idea of a specific threat deployment mode or a concrete instance, the ideational dimension could be then described as Islamic (BEK Employee 1; German traveller 2017). This is again in consonance with the findings of Avdan and Webb, who point out that violent acts perpetrated by Muslims tend to be more frequently classified as terrorism also within the North American public (2018: 3).

Nevertheless, this notion was at the same time contested with efforts to avoid cultural preconceptions (BEK Employee 10 2017). For example, one employee reported the following during a passenger inspection: *“He told me that 95% of people with this turban are not terrorists.”* This was met with an answer: *“That is true, Sikhs usually are not terrorists”* (Participant observation 1 2017). Here an effort for cultural understanding strives for multicultural acceptance, which at the same time meets the probability misconception and underlying idea that terrorism is culturally rooted. Importantly, this framing is present not only on the part of the employee, but on the passenger’s part as well.

The second ideational feature of terrorism is its unnaturalness (Saudi traveller 2017). The characterisation of terrorism as deviant reveals a real partisanship of a lunatic character as was described above. A lunatic in this sense is in fact a terrorist. Both the lunatic and the terrorist perform terrorist activities; it is just that in the case of the lunatic, they are not labelled as such (BEK Employee 1 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017). As one passenger explained: *“one crazy person is running around with a knife, then it is in the news in particular when he says something about Allah”* (German traveller 2017). The connection between terrorism and psychological conditions has been already broadly researched and despite some weak evidence that terrorists might express, for example, a *“lack of empathy”* (Argomaniz – Lynch 2018: 8), *“the idea that terrorists, in general, must be sociopaths or psychopaths has little empirical support”* (Nilsson 2018: 2). The use of this label enables one to explain that a terrorist attack is so hard to avert since its irrational nature renders it unpredictable (BEK Employee 3 2017; BEK Employee 9 2017). This notion is strengthened by the allusion of the lunatic to lone-wolf attacks that cannot be predicted by intelligence services (Barnea 2018: 219).

Although the cultural and unnatural rendering of terrorism then ultimately does not identify terrorism as a political matter, both notions are engaged in an interesting dialectic. As was already noted, the lunatic label enables one to depoliticise and delegitimise the terrorist act (Larsen 2018: 3; Salter 2008b: 245). At the same time, this notion is conversely employed to counter the idea of terrorism’s cultural rooting. Labelling a terrorist as a lunatic (along with pointing to their exceptionality and abnormality) enables some of the respondents to avoid the issue of cultural prejudice, because rendering the perpetrator as an exception helps them avoid a biased judgement (BEK Employee 11 2017; German traveller 2017). The program of action may be understood as unsubstantiated and its intentionality disregarded, but this strategy enables one to avoid cultural prejudice, entirely breaking the connection between the threat and the perpetrators’ ethnic identity.

Security

Security Antiprograms

Security antiprograms are devised to counter the programs of action examined. Their contemporary main component, reflected by all groups of human actants, is the idea of the SRA and its enforcement against all actants framed as threats. Security is provided by the fact of control performance itself, which essentially promotes the certainty of a security presence in passengers. The most common expression of a sense of security in passengers was: *“We feel safe, they have checked everything”* (Israeli traveller 2 2017). Security therefore emerges as a product of a chain of translation in place, and the passage of an actant through the procedure by itself is evaluated as sufficient. Unlike the perspective of employees, the travellers’ perspective does not consider the parts of the chain in

place as particularly substantial – everything was checked and therefore none of it can represent a threat because otherwise it would have been labelled accordingly. The sense of good security performance is strengthened in a passenger's eyes when some of the passenger's items have been further scrutinised and allowed, as this process emphasises the possibility of threat identification and its correct assessment; the management's experience also confirms this (French traveller 2017; BEK M&A&C 3 2017). Similarly, some passengers tend to imagine that more scrutiny is involved than there actually is, which makes certain passengers feel uncomfortable and others feel more safe (Czech traveller 5 2017; Belarusian traveller, 2017). As one passenger explains: *"There were controls here I am not even aware of; maybe, yes, there are cameras; maybe I have passed through some detector I have not noticed; maybe, I hope that... yes, I want to feel secure"* (Czech traveller 6 2017).

A similar argument of *"passing the security check"* also emerges among the employees, although here it usually involves the idea of rules. For some employees, following the rules means certain security since they believe the system could not have been designed imperfectly (BEK Employee 5 2017; BEK Employee 12 2017). In an environment where accepting a low-risk probability is considered unthinkable, this notion is usually connected with the idea of zero risk. A similar precautionary notion of zero risk has been criticised by Aradau and Van Munster (2007: 103). Yet, this notion contrasts with system settings based on probability. The zero-risk stance might also lead to inner misunderstandings where insistence on detailed rule enforcement might result in a failure to recognise what is substantial for the particular chain of translation and what is not (BEK M&A&C 1 2017). In this form, the security performance might become commodified, not in terms of the relationship between the contracting authority and the client but in regard to the security performance framed as the procedure performance, as a formalised technique (Abrahamsen – Williams 2009: 5).

However, in other cases, the control is openly acknowledged by both passengers and employees as a risk-diminishing activity based on risk knowledge and evaluation (BEK Employee 10 2017; Swiss traveller 2017). In these cases, the risk form is as described by Abrahamsen and Williams: *"it is a particular way of thinking about and responding to potential dangers. It is preventative, not restorative. Primarily actuarial and calculative, it works by designing and controlling spaces, through the collection of statistics and the production of categories of danger, and by surveillance"* (2009: 5).

The risk perception is also encompassed in the security deterrence antiprogram. The introduction of the control itself importantly raises the threshold for a damaging program of action producing a deterring effect, given that the general public does not fully comprehend the chains of security translation. Nevertheless, the deterrence logic is mentioned only marginally – even by the employees. Yet, this antiprogram could have been understood as a rationale of probability-based control methods. The scarcity and framing of deterrence within the terrain seems to point at a predominant risk perception bias rather than any actual adoption of deterrence.

Protected Actants

The concrete service offered to passengers might be then reflected in the antiprogram and its main goal. Many of the interviewed passengers perceived travellers as the main actants in danger, as in their view, the overall goal of the airport security antiprogram is to *"make all passengers safe and feel safe; you yourself feel more safe when you see these kinds of policies"* (Emirati traveller 2017). These types of answers emphasise the passengers of a particular flight with the important inclusion of the passengers themselves. Importantly, passenger protection in the vital interest of physical survival is also emphasised. This is in contrast with the employees' perspective, where the concern is to define goals in the context of the aircraft or the flight (BEK Employee 5 2017). This framing stresses

the need to ensure suitable conditions for the transportation process. The main actant to be protected against the harmful program here is rather the aircraft or the civil aviation system.

The translation into the secure state is provided by translating the actant itself, as well as by translating all actants on the flight, leading to a personalisation of the security provided. However, this does not erode the negative notion of security translation – for a traveller, security is provided as a trade-off where an unnecessary personal check is performed on him or her just to ensure the same level of control of other passengers (American traveller 2 2017). The translation of oneself is only caused by a failure of the “*act of truth*” (Salter 2005), whereas the translation of others is the factual performance of security (BEK Employee 7 2017; Bulgarian traveller 2017). The argument “*I have nothing to hide*” (Russian traveller 4 2017) centres on the uncertainty about the behaviours of others and being persuaded of one’s own flawlessness. Within the studied terrain, this notion was occasionally also extended not only to the real transportation of threats but to all problems in general (even those not caused by passengers), which seemed to indicate an overall non-compliance with security measures among passengers. One of the responses to the question whether passengers ever experienced some type of problem during the control was: “*No, if one does not carry on anything of that kind, how can one have problems?*” (Russian traveller 5 2017).

So, on one hand, we have the call for protection of the public, which materialises as a personal demand for feeling safe which should be satisfied by the control (Sakano – Obeng – Fuller 2016). The opposite perspective reflects the professional view which perceives the multiplicity of stakes within the framework as well as the legal grounds; for example, Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention defines security as: “[s]afeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference” (ICAO n.d.) and only later specifies what this term entails. The second part of the explanation might result from a practice of interaction where poor compliance of travellers may contribute to a conceptualisation more distanced from individual passengers (BEK Employee 6 2017). Here, individuals are still one of the actant groups to be endangered and protected, but on the other hand, they are not accepted as distinctive individual targets, but rather as passive components of the whole. Nevertheless, not all employees follow this logic and some find a way to frame the task as a guidance or client relationship (BEK Employee 7 2017).

Security seems to be stretching in two directions: not only toward the inclusion of oneself but also toward very broad networks of actants – the state and society. The aforementioned inclusion of trafficking moves the idea of security provision toward the state interest, while the passengers, in comparison to the employees, do generally incline toward “*a matter of state*” perception of airport security (Russian traveller 1 2017; Chinese traveller 1 2017; Czech traveller 3 2017).

Mark Salter described this situation as a case where: “*(inter)national mobility is first problematized and then managed*” (2008d: 12). This extension is not made much by the employees, for whom security remains mostly flight-bound, but again it appears more frequently on the part of the passengers. For them, security control entails a border protection directly bound to the control of movement of humans and non-humans, and to the protection of the state within the international environment itself (Slovak traveller 2 2017). When airport security is understood even more broadly as a way to “*enforce the laws of that country you’re in*” (British traveller 2017), airport security then becomes an actant contributing to state sovereignty. For other passengers, this type of extension might reach an even broader community such as a part of mankind as a whole (Pakistani traveller 2017). Nonetheless, such an inclusion points rather at the general idea of the nature of security.

The idea of a threat program of action does not target civil aviation here but the state itself. This trend is also present in other dimensions of threats that are mentioned only

marginally and nearly exclusively by the passengers as the dangers of a specific person's presence in a given state territory. Here the idea of a system failure enabling threat actants to penetrate the state territory connects with the notion of the presence or existence of a threatening program of action by itself. Only the actual arrival of persons labelled as threats or items sharing threat characteristics (especially narcotics) constitutes a threat realisation.

The Nature of the Security Produced

The security achieved after the control in the first order depends on the level of security perceived before. This is so because when no threats are present, and all actants are secure within the general environment, no translation is needed. In these terms, the Czech Republic is a very safe country. According to the Global Terrorism Database, which contains data since 1970, 33 persons died due to terrorism-related causes in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic. This includes 26 passengers of the flight JU367, who had no direct relation to the country (ASN 2018; START: 197201260002' n.d.). Out of the seven remaining casualties, one was a suicide, and another was a victim of a letter bomb explosion in a pool-producing factory that was only questionably labelled as terrorist (START: 201301190012' n.d.; START: 201401150065' n.d.). Even though criticism of the overly extensive security focus on airport security, or at least a perception of a bad focus (Pakistani traveller 2017), is to some extent present among the passengers, including foreigners (Russian traveller 6 2017), the country security profile also influences the perception of the need for security among Czech nationals. The controls in place are often seen as more than satisfactory, and in some cases, the focus on security is criticised on the grounds that it is an empty bubble (BEK Employee 3 2017; Czech traveller 7 2017). This notion is also reflected abroad, where some passengers mention the airport security situation in the country as one of the important aspects of the visit experience (Bulgarian traveller 2017; Swedish traveller 2017). As such, airport security reflects inputs into the chains of translation.

The resulting product of the chains of security translation is then usually rendered as "*psychological*." The employees view this notion rather negatively as something that is not real, that is just a perception, a trick on the viewer. Here, the ontological translation of actants into the secure state is actually not performed; it is not a "*total rupture from the preceding state*" (Latour 1999: 60), or an "*ontological shift*" (Schouten 2014: 28). It is just an illusion of these changes (BEK Employee 9 2017). Although the translation is not performed, the rules must be followed because otherwise the illusion ceases. As one employee said when answering the question of what is security: "*This is such a concept. The people believe that if we've thrown out their water, we have checked them*" (BEK Employee 13 2017). This also renders security as a service to the psychological needs of the crowd.

Passengers accept the promoted service most willingly, even though they also reflect it in psychological terms. For them, the psychological dimension of security means a positive, reassuring feeling that the responsibility, their security agency, has been taken over by a different actant. Security is then a possibility to not pay any attention to safety, not see it and not care (Czech traveller 1 2017; Italian traveller 2017). This again turns security into a service provided, as also framed, e.g., by Gkritza, Neimeier, and Mannering (Gkritza – Niemeier – Mannering 2006: 219). Security then might be evaluated in terms of passengers' "*comfort*" (American traveller 3 2017; Belarusian traveller 2017). The ideal security is thus an 'other-taken' process (Latour 2005: 45; Venturini – Guido 2013) which is clearly present but also invisible: "*Security means that you do not notice it. That is security*" (Russian traveller 1 2017).

Security thus operates with significant agency entrusted by travellers who are willing to take part in an other-taken process and thus subsequently acknowledge their agency

removal and submission to the agency of security (Israeli traveller 3 2017). Relatively similarly to the process described by O'Malley, the security agency is then imposed on the population "*in their own interest*" and accepted by the other party (2006: 419). The agency of security can then serve to promote the security translation. The employees might use the security agency to enforce a particular behaviour or prohibition (BEK Employee 4 2017; BEK Employee 5 2017). The agency takeover also significantly limits the knowledge of travellers about the process and practically disables the agency retrieval in case of conflict. This process is in part endorsed spontaneously by employees who become enlisted actants of airport security agency and sometimes strict rule-followers themselves (BEK Employee 12 2017).

It is also an intentionally applied approach which points out the impossibility of the decision reversion, particularly enrolling the European legislative framework (BEK Employee 13 2017; BEK M&A&C 4 2017). Similarly, security agency might be enlisted even in relations between employees and management, where security might oblige the parties involved to either ease working tasks or comply with rules (BEK M&A&C 1 2017; BEK Employee 10 2017).

Security is understood as a certainty of non-interference with the actant agency, and thus as an assurance of the actant's own preservation, which alludes to the notion of biopolitics, though "positively" formulated (Nishiyama 2018: 3). This phrasing has been clearly formulated particularly by Asian travellers (including those from Russia) but it seems to be shared more broadly (Chinese traveller 2 2017; Chinese traveller 3; Russian traveller 7 2017). As such, security is an essential need of an actant, and in the human context it is understood as the preservation of life (Chinese traveller 4 2017; Russian traveller 2 2017) and an ultimate condition of flourishing (Uruguayan traveller 2017). In the airport security context, these ideas might be entailed in the notion of coming home, where home is the ultimate shelter free of so much as a potential of threat (Lebanese traveller 2017). When one leaves the individualist cultures of Europe and North America, security might be positively seen as an extrapolation of its psychological dimension, as a general environment which "Latouriantly" encompasses not only humans but also actants, where no latent danger is present – a state of tranquillity, happiness and peace of all existence (Chinese traveller 5 2017; Indian traveller, 2017).

CONCLUSIONS

Employing ANT premises, this article explores the nature of threat and the positive form of security delimitation as two end-points of security translation in the particular case of LKPR. This theoretical-methodological underpinning allows one to explore distinct aspects of security provision and explain the role of the materiality-ideas interplay in moulding the form of contemporary security practice. Similarly, security is portrayed as a setting-specific practice with its particular form and content shaped by continual negotiation. Multiple heterogeneous actants play significant roles in this negotiation, including security agency itself.

Specifically, the article discusses identified threat programs of action focused on the idea of inflight explosions, pointing at the causes for this program saliency resulting from the materialities of a plane and the explosives themselves. The article witnesses a broadening of the program of action toward terminal security, which is manifested particularly as a divergence in the perception of the object of protection between the employees and passengers. A similar divergence is found between the concept of passengers and the civil aviation system as protection priorities. Terrorism is identified as an underlying threat program conceptualised in the field in a way that reflects its tactical scope, and variations of the program, but not its political intentionality. The article also discusses an essentialist understanding of terrorism entailing the notion of unnaturalness and the possibility of threat identity identification through the chain of translation in

place. This notion is contrasted with the idea of the cultural rooting of the term – the second aspect identified. Consequences for the practice in place are indicated where this notion contributes to specific security practices and assumptions embedded deeply into the contemporary security system. Moreover, the contemporary practice therefore contributes to building the shared societal vision of terrorism, with important consequences – in terms of not only security but also politics.

The article further discusses the security antiprogram, positively identified as a service. The term “positive” implies an outreach of the factual state provided by the security check and proposes security as an agency. This notion enables one to describe its nature, but also crucially to further explore security agency production and its subsequent tangible impacts resulting from the practice in place, particularly in regard to the authority and prescriptive powers granted to security in this manner. Security identified in psychological terms is found to imply diverging notions between travellers and employees. The positive delimitation of security is framed as a security agency take-over proposed to the traveller, which concurrently serves as a security enforcement tool. Security as an agency take-over then provides an opportunity for actant non-interference with the threat. This enables one to explore a case of security commodification and to understand the changing grasp of security, as it becomes a commodified interest of an individual, but concurrently remains framed as a state affair by many of the actants included.

Similarly, the possibility of the security performance perception failure is shown. The article stems from an empirical inquiry and understanding of security, connecting the ANT ideas of the chain of translation, program and antiprogram. Specifically, the understanding of threats in relation to the antiprogram has been newly conceptualised in the article. This conceptualisation is then further refined into four types of threat programs of action employing either a system failure based on an insufficient performance within a particular chain of translation, on the ability to detect a particular material characteristic, or on the failure to predict and counter an unexpected program of action. Lastly, the threat is identified as the presence of a program of action itself.

Doing this, the article represents one of the cases where ANT-based fieldwork enables climbing the ladder of abstraction and thus contributes to showing the explanatory value proposed by this approach. As such it contributes to posing a counter-argument against reservations expressed in this regard by Barry, Nexon and Pouliot (Barry 2013; Nexon – Pouliot 2013).

The image of security proposed is based on following the non-human actants as well and witnessing how they form the chain of security translation in everyday practice. It is therefore shown how the non-humans directly impact the threat program of actions and the security antiprograms, either via their technological capabilities (explosive detection) or raw materialities (an airplane or explosives). The article shows how these actants actively produce what is contemporarily understood as threat and security. This would not be possible if we built solely on discursive approaches. Even in instances where the agency of non-humans was not witnessed directly but identified through an interview, this identification has been based on actual experience of human and machine interaction. This notion can be evaluated and conceptualised only through the analytical perspective employed.

Further, ANT, similarly to the discursive approaches, aims at reproducing ‘the world of the actants.’ In contrast to them, it reflects their activities, not their speech acts; the nonhumans which lack language are therefore invited to shape such a network as well. For this reason, the lexical means employed by the actants are not decisive. This can be seen as another advantage of ANT.

Nevertheless, the research would have profited from an even more balanced access to all groups of actants, which could have been provided, for example, by structured analyses of the direct output from particular technologies. This could build, for example, on the ideas proposed by post-ANT research interested in network analysis of this type of data

(e.g. Venturini 2012). However, a systemic access to this level of data is considered even more sensitive than traditional qualitative methods.

Similarly, from the traditionalist point of view, a more quantitative approach would bring stronger and more directly generalisable outcomes. However, it would be much harder to approach the actants followed here, or even impossible. Furthermore, by focusing on one case, the article pays attention to actual experience and its fine detail and as such the article proposes a comparative background for further research of airport security. The article explores a specific case of security production, presenting an instance of a temporal on-site situation where there is “an essentially contested concept, a controversy that is never settled, where the agreement over the definition of threats means a way to counter them and where the enactment of protection is a result of crossing interests” (Schouten 2010: 2).

Even more importantly, by exploring threat and security in a focus moderated by ANT, this article points out the importance of inquiry into security agency and exploration of setting-specific practice. Moreover, this mode enabled us to identify also broader societal consequences of the distinct form of security understanding, which could be further enhanced by mapping parts of the airport security landscape not treated here, such as cargo security and contracting authorities, perimeter protection specificities, or particularly the interplay among multiple security forces present within the area.

¹ LKPR is an official abbreviation of the airport's name used by the International Civil Aviation Organisation, which is an United Nations Specialised Agency (for a full listing of codes see: ICAO 2012).

² This term will be employed throughout the article, even though Latour himself uses the terms actant and actor interchangeably, as is proven in the name of the Actor-Network Theory itself. The term actant is employed by him only in special emphases on the mixed nature of actors/actants (for another example of the mixed use, see the page following the term definition: Latour 2005: 54–55). The words “actor” and “agent” were left in the present paper only when they were included in quotations.

³ This applies to cases where the item is not directly connected to a particular identity (e.g. that of a policeman), but even in cases where it is connected to an identity, the utmost caution is applied as the combination of place and object is seen to produce a particular vulnerability.

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- Russian traveller 3 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 21. 8.
- Russian traveller 4 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 21. 8.
- Russian traveller 5 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 21. 8.
- Russian traveller 6 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 8. 8.
- Russian traveller 7 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 21. 8.
- Saudi traveller (2017): Interview with author. Prague 14. 8.
- Slovak traveller 1 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 7. 9.

- Slovak traveller 2 (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 1. 8.
- START (N.d.): Incident Summary for GTDID: 197201260002, n.d., <<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197201260002>>.
- START (N.d.): Incident Summary for GTDID: 201301190012, n.d., <<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201301190012>>.
- START (N.d.): Incident Summary for GTDID: 201401150065, n.d., <<https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201401150065>>.
- Swedish traveller (2017): Interview with author. Prague 1. 8.
- Swiss traveller (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 31. 7.
- Uruguayan traveller (2017): Interview with the author. Prague 31. 7.

Note

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Jan Hornat: Transatlantic Democracy Assistance. Promoting Different Models of Democracy.

1st edition. London: Routledge, 2018, 216 pages. ISBN: 978-1-138-35087-8.

DOI: <<https://doi.org/10.32422/mv.1605>>.

In the recent decades, measures aimed at promoting democracy in foreign countries have been part of the regular toolkit of foreign policy in many countries, especially those belonging to the global North. Despite that, this area has so far remained somewhat under-researched, both in International Relations and in International Law doctrine. Moreover, most scholars who have engaged with democracy promotion have done so from a particular standpoint. Concentrating on the demand side of the scheme, they have discussed the effects and efficiency of various strategies employed to promote democracy. The book under review is one of the exceptions to this rule. Zeroing in on the supply side of the scheme, the author considers what motivates certain States and other actors to promote democracy and which type of democracy they want to promote.

The focus lies on two actors – the United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU). The author seeks to demonstrate that “*the source of the different strategies and tactics applied by the US and EU institutions in promoting democracy is the divergence in the definitions of democracy formulated in their democracy promotion agendas*” (p. 3). The book is based on the PhD dissertation that the author, Jan Hornát (Hornat in the book), who works as an assistant professor in North American Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Charles University and as a research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in Prague, successfully defended at the former institution in 2017.

Whereas the book often refers to democratic promotion, its primary interest pertains to a narrower concept invoked in its very title, that of democratic assistance. Using the scholarly definition proposed by Zeeuw and Kumar (2006: 20 as cited on p. 7), the author defines democratic assistance as “*the non-profit transfer of funds, expertise, and material to foster democratic groups, initiatives and institutions that are already working towards a more democratic society*”. Democratic assistance thus presupposes the presence of pro-democratic forces or pro-democratic moves within the target country, though these forces or moves do not need to be part of the official establishment. Democratic promotion is, on the contrary, a broader concept encompassing “*all activities engaged in by external actors to encourage the development of democracy within the given country*” (Wetzel – Orbie – Bossuyt 2015, as cited on p. 6).¹ Military intervention to oust a non-democratic regime and to build up a new, democratic one, would fall under this latter concept but not under the former. The book is, however, not always consistent in its terminology and the terms democracy promotion and democratic assistance are often used interchangeably.

From the methodological perspective, the author sides with the constructivist approach which “*admits the explanatory and even causal power of ideational (socially constructed) factors in foreign policy-making*” (p. 15). Constructivism accepts that foreign policy can be both material/interest-based and ethical/value-based. It is particularly interested in the latter category. Constructivism assumes that whether and how States promote democracy and what type of democracy they promote is determined by their own identity. This identity, on its turn, is socially constructed through speech acts, discourse and social interactions. When engaging in democracy assistance, States project and at the same time reproduce, and sometimes also revise, their identity. They do so in a dynamic interaction with significant Others, i.e. with the States that are considered morally inferior due to their non-democratic or less democratic nature. While striving to change the identity of

such Others, States reconfirm, or revise, their own identity. Thus, democratic assistance is an important part of setting boundaries between Us and Them and of determining who Us and Them are at any given moment of time.

The author also invokes the concept of ontological security, which has recently become rather influential in International Relations and Security Studies. Ontological security (security-as-being) as opposed to physical security (security-as-survival) relates to the protection of the entity from threats directed against its identity and self-conception rather than from purely material threats.² The projection of one's conception of democracy abroad, entailing the effort to make the Other (Them) similar to Us, serves as one of the instruments that help strengthen ontological security.

This theoretical framework explains why States engage in democracy assistance. It does not, however, in itself reveal what type of democracy concrete States (or other actors) seek to promote and to which means they resort while doing so. To find answers to these questions for the two actors under consideration in the book, the US and the EU, the author undertakes three consequential steps. First, he describes, and compares, the US and EU identity as reflected in their respective models of (internal) democracy. Secondly, he shows how these models shape the two actors' approaches to democracy assistance in foreign policy. Finally, he looks for the evidence of these approaches in the key conceptual documents and operative programmes adopted by the US and the EU.

What is somewhat missing in the book is an analysis of how the US and the EU actually perform "in the field". It is true that adding this dimension might shift the focus from the supply side of democracy assistance to the demand side, which is much more diverse due to the plurality of, and differences among, the target countries. It is also true that the actual performance could hardly be studied solely through the methods of desk-based research, on which the book currently relies. Yet, one may wonder whether the US and EU models of democracy assistance can be defined solely in light of what these actors *are* and what they *say*, without taking into account what they actually *do*. In the relational, interactional scheme of identity formation that the author embraces, this *doing* is not limited to a mechanical implementation of pre-conceived models but, rather, implies a creative testing, and potential reassessment, of such models.

As noted above, the primary ambition of the book is to show, and explain, the differences in the models of democracy assistance assumed by the US on the one hand and the EU on the other hand. The author shows sensitivity to the distinct natures of the two actors, one being a State and the other a supranational organization. Yet, he assumes, and rightly so, that these distinct natures do not make the policies that the two actors engage in, incommensurable. For the purposes of the comparison, he introduces a triple typology of approaches to democratic assistance – along the lines of political vs. developmental, top-down vs. bottom-up, and substantive vs. procedural. Whereas the first typology primarily relates to the type of democracy the actors intend to promote abroad, the other two concentrate more on the means and processes through which they plan to do so.

Political approaches build on a narrower conception of democracy as a system which is centred around political participation. The emphasis lies on ensuring an equal access to this participation through a set of the first generation, i.e. civil and political, human rights. Developmental approaches rely on a broader conception of democracy in which procedural equality (equal participation) should be matched with substantive equality (equal opportunities). Here, attention is shifted to the socio-economic context and to the second generation, i.e. economic, social and cultural, human rights. The relationship between democracy and human rights would deserve closer scrutiny in the book, which seems to treat the two concepts as inter-related (that is warranted) or even virtually identical (that would not be warranted).

The distinction between the top-down and bottom-up approaches stems from a different understanding of "*the dynamics that drive the process of political transition*"

(p. 32). Whereas the former stress the role of political elites, the latter see the main driving force in grassroots movements and civil society. This optic determines which entities in the target State become the main partners in, and beneficiaries of, the programmes of democracy assistance. The third typology, that between substantive or maximalist and procedural or minimalist approaches, is the least clearly explained in the book. It seems to closely mirror the first typology (political vs. developmental) but to do so on an operational level. Procedural approaches are thus oriented on elections as the main tool of political participation, and substantive approaches are directed towards “*a political system that ensures a multitude of rights and services*” (p. 42).

The author argues that the two actors discussed in the book, the US and the EU, embrace two different models of democracy assistance and that the differences stem from their diverging preferences with respect to the three pairs of approaches. The US opts for the so-called *empowering* model, which relies on the political, bottom-up, procedural approaches. The EU on its turn favours the so-called *embedded* model, which is based on the developmental, top-down, substantive approaches. The author repeatedly recalls that the two models herald general preferences and default settings rather than exclusive modes of action. The two actors can therefore at instances resort to measures that fall under the model predominantly held by the other, without negating, or frustrating, their own primary choices. As the sections dealing with the conceptual documents and operative programmes reveal, such “deviations” are not that uncommon. Reality, as is often the case, defies clear categorizations. What actors say is already much more diverse than what they would be expected to say based on the argument presented in the book. What they do might be even more diverse. It is in this context that an insight into the actual practice could be particularly helpful. It could confirm that the “deviations” are simply natural variations from the argument reflecting the multifarious nature of reality rather than signs indicating that the argument has a somewhat limited explanatory power.

That the US and the EU adhere to non-identical models of democracy assistance results, in line with the constructivist approach introduced above, from the different identities of the two actors. As Simoni (2010: 30 as cited on p. 16) aptly puts it, “*the Transatlantic partners simply have different preferences due to self-defined identities within the larger international and transatlantic context*”. Building on Simoni, the author, in quite a comprehensive and persuasive way, explains how these identities have been shaped and reshaped on the two sides of the Atlantic. He contrasts the US self-image of an entity constructed from the ground up and endowed with a special democratizing mission, with the self-image of the EU, which sees itself as a cautious civilian power built primarily from the top (so far). He also argues in what is one of the most interesting sections of the book that the two actors have to a large extent intentionally sought to form their own identities in contradistinction to each other, not so much to compete with, as, rather, to complement each other. This argument gives rise to interesting questions as to whether, and how, this complementarity operates in the field of democracy assistance. Such questions, though not completely unaddressed in the book, could be elaborated upon in more details.

The book under review is an important contribution to the emerging research in democracy assistance. Despite the fact that it introduces certain complex concepts, it is easily accessible to readers, including those from outside the International Relations discipline. The author makes clear and at the same time nuanced arguments. When seeking to substantiate these arguments, he proceeds in a well-organized and logical way and relies on compelling evidence. One may have doubts about certain facets of the argumentation, especially those which would merit closer scrutiny in the book (see above). This, however, does not diminish the overall value of the book, which will certainly be of great interest not only for scholars and students of International Relations but for anyone who wants to understand how value-based or value-promoting foreign policy works. Provided that the

Czech Republic has traditionally portrayed itself as an ardent champion of such policy, the book will certainly resonate especially well with the audience in the author's home country. This country would, in fact, be an interesting case study in case the author decides to expand his analysis to individual EU (or other) States and to ponder how the identities of these States shape their foreign policies or what their foreign policies bespeak about their identities.

Veronika Bílková

¹ The reference does not indicate the place of the quotation in the original article.

² See Rumelili, Bahar (2013): Identity and and Desecuritisation: The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological and Physical Security. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 52–74, cit. in the reviewed book, p. 17.

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Karin Aggestam and Ann E. Towns: Gendering Diplomacy and International Negotiations.

1st edition. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 301 pages, ISBN 978-3-319-58681-6.

DOI: <<https://doi.org/10.32422/mv.1606>>.

Editors Karin Aggestam and Ann Towns offer a compelling and in many ways pioneering analysis of the position of women in diplomacy and in international negotiations, and how the practices and norms in diplomacy are gendered. To date, the research of both descriptive and substantive representation of women in diplomacy has been very limited and this volume makes an important contribution to addressing this gap.

The editors are both experts on gender in foreign policy. Karin Aggestam is professor of political science and holds the Samuel Pufendorf Endowed Chair at Lund University. She is also a visiting research professor at Monash University and honorary professor at the University of Queensland, Australia. Ann Towns is an associate professor in political science at the University of Gothenburg and a Wallenberg Academy Fellow. She leads a research project on gender norms, practices and hierarchies in diplomacy. This volume is particularly valuable in terms of the effort made by the editors to step outside Europe and North America and draw in examples from other parts of the world. The result is that they bring together original contributions from a diverse range of International Relations scholars.

Using case studies of specific countries and international negotiations, the contributing authors in this book address three main research questions: 1. Where are women in diplomacy located and positioned? 2. To what extent and how are diplomatic practices and norms gendered? 3. How does the practice in diplomacy change with a broader and more diverse group of diplomats?

The book is structured in two parts. The first part focuses on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and primarily addresses the first question, drawing on examples of women's representation in diplomacy from the USA, Sweden, Turkey, Japan, and Brazil. The second part focuses on international negotiations. Here, women as negotiators and their possible impact are tracked using examples of peace negotiations in Israel, the UN, the Council of the EU, and the former Soviet Union.

Diplomacy has been and arguably still is a strongly male dominated area where women are generally underrepresented, especially at a higher level. It is not surprising that, in terms of women's representation at MFAs, diplomacy shows clear patterns of both vertical and horizontal gender segregation, with less women in higher positions and also in posts that are considered more prestigious. The volume provides strong evidence of a striking pattern of women in support positions and men in core functions across the countries examined.

In their analysis, the authors make an important distinction between the descriptive and the substantive representation of women. Whereas descriptive representation refers simply to counting, substantive representation implies a certain influence over the policy agenda, especially in the area of promoting gender equality.

In their opening chapter "Where Are the Female Ambassadors? Gender and Status Hierarchies in Ambassador Postings", Aggestam and Niklasson address the descriptive representation of women. Using a unique set of data from 2014, they show that out of 7000 ambassadors from the top 50 highest GDP states, only 15% were women. To illustrate that not all postings are equal but that there is, in fact, a hierarchy between different posts in diplomacy, and to differentiate between them in this respect, they use

the category of “prestige”. The authors work on the assumption that the most prestigious posts are those situated in the most economically and militarily powerful countries. While they consider the assumption “unproblematic”, it is worth noting that it is reflective of the hierarchy within an ultimately patriarchal and strongly gendered system.

In their closing remarks, Aggestam and Towns briefly outline the history of women’s participation in diplomacy. Whereas from the 16th to the 18th century, it was not uncommon for women with links to the royal courts to take on a role in diplomacy, both formal and informal, in the 19th and especially the 20th century, with the professionalization of diplomacy and its shift towards MFAs, women were deliberately prevented from joining this profession. The analyses of MFAs from different parts of the world suggest that women first joined the Foreign Service in the first half of the 20th century and that the ban on married women serving as diplomats was lifted in some countries in the late 60s or early 70s. In the US, for a long time only white males were considered appropriate candidates for diplomatic positions, and until 1971 there was an unwritten rule that prevented married women from serving as diplomats (Bashevkin: 47). Brazil lifted its prohibition on women diplomats only in 1954 (de Souza Farias – do Carmo: 110). Turkey never introduced a formal marriage ban in regard to diplomatic positions but the lack of family friendly policies arguably kept women away from this profession (Rumelili – Suleymanoglu-Kurum: 91).

As Aggestam and Towns rightly point out, the main role for women in diplomacy in the 20th century was that of the “diplomatic wife”. Modern diplomacy was built on a specific model of a heterosexual relationship where the woman serves as a mediator of informal diplomacy: as a host, she provides an environment in which her husband, the diplomat, can build relationships with his counterparts. As in other areas of society, women were pushed into the private sphere, deprived of their own income and formally and informally prevented from entering the public sphere, and official, and paid, posts in diplomacy.

Even though we still live in the aftermath of this model, there has been a clear shift in diplomacy, perhaps triggered by greater diversity, in terms of focussing also on the needs of the diplomatic spouse. It is excellent that this volume reflects on the fight for recognition and regulation of the work of “diplomatic wives” and includes the “private sphere” in the analysis as these factors clearly play an important role in the representation of women in diplomacy and their decision-making. In the case of Sweden, we can see that issues such as spouses’ employability and retirement pension entitlement, which enable them to maintain a level of financial independence, had been addressed as early as 1970 (Niklasson – Robertson: 75). On the other hand, in 2014, Brazil still did not provide any policy or support that would enable diplomats’ spouses to find employment. Furthermore, the authors of the chapter on Brazil link the low representation of women in the Brazilian diplomatic service to the emphasis placed on women as carers in Brazilian society (de Souza Farias – do Carmo: 120).

If there are only a few women in diplomacy, there are even fewer women engaged in peace negotiations. In her chapter on this topic, Paffenholz notes that women’s participation in peace processes remains one of the most unfulfilled aspects of the UN women, peace and security agenda. The author argues that the UN Resolution 1325 (and the follow-up Resolutions 1889 and 2522) constitute a real breakthrough in the focus on women’s participation in peace negotiations. She also observes a recent shift from “counting women to making women count”. Although gender quotas have proved effective in increasing women’s representation, they have not necessarily increased their influence at the negotiation table.

Another possible explanation of the low representation of women in peace negotiations suggests that crisis or emergency settings may give rise to an institutional preference to forgo formal structures. Gender roles in times of conflict tend to be more polarized and

are used to “legitimize” the overrepresentation of men, as the military is associated with a certain type of masculinity. Aggestam and Towns argue in the concluding chapter that many diplomatic activities take place in homosocial environments dominated by men and that some are even informal or confidential. This lack of structure and transparency in peace negotiations as well as unofficial male networks contributes to the fact that women are strongly underrepresented in peace negotiations. Also, on the example of east-west negotiations after the fall of the Soviet Union, Svedberg shows that both the west and the Soviet negotiation teams were male only and that being male was the main condition for entering the negotiation. Men were considered superior and leadership, as such, was seen as a masculine quality.

Women are also systematically underrepresented in the EU Council. Naurin and Naurin bring an original analysis of the descriptive representation of women in EU committees and working groups. They found a surprising result: that the new member states (those of the 2004 and later accessions) actually send more women than the “old” member states. A less surprising finding of their study is that there are fewer women in higher-level committees and “hard” areas such as CSDP or JHA. It is not clear whether this horizontal segregation is a result of self-selection or of a gendered institutional structure, and the authors call for further research into this. Similarly counter-intuitive results challenging the overall pattern come from Japan. Flowers shows that whereas the number of women in the Japanese MFA is very low as less than 10% of the ambassadors are female, over 50% of the members of Japanese delegations to the UN are women. Again, it is a subject for further research to provide an explanation why.

The second research question asks to what extent and how practices in diplomacy are gendered. The volume offers some overarching narratives that apply to diplomacy in general, which are supplemented by the anecdotal evidence dispersed through the various national case studies. Diplomacy as an institution is not organized in a manner that facilitates work-life balance and dual-career relationships. This is more damaging to women than to men. Aggestam and Towns suggest that robust parental leave policies and childcare provisions are needed in diplomacy. The institutional culture also needs to change. It would, for instance, benefit from increased participation of fathers in the care of children or less emphasis being placed on long working hours. The experience from Turkey suggests that in high positions, hegemonic masculinity still prevails and women need to adapt to masculine norms in order to advance their careers. There is also a hesitancy to put women at risk in violent contexts, and fears that women cannot network effectively in a male-dominated environment. In Brazil, where strongly traditional gender roles prevail in society, there is a view that women should not pursue demanding careers that compromise their role as mothers.

Women in diplomacy are significantly underrepresented but the numbers are growing. Sweden, for example, has reached gender parity and in 2014, women dominated some political units at the MFA. The third research question in this book asks what effect the increased diversity has on the practices in diplomacy. This is probably the area where further research is needed the most. For instance, the initial research suggests a correlation between a higher representation of women in peace negotiations and sustainability of peace. However, as the authors rightly note, much more research is needed to corroborate such a result.

This book addresses the gap in research on the important questions of not only how many, but where exactly women are positioned in diplomacy, and exactly what roles they take on. Its main strength and contribution is that it opens a new field of research and brings data from different parts of the world. Because it is a pioneering research, there are many more related areas that need further research, and the editors identify a number of these themselves. For example, it would have been welcome if the case studies had included an African country. Also, it would be very interesting to secure a dataset on the

numbers of women in diplomacy from a longer period of time so as to be able to monitor trends in development. However, researchers in this field often face challenges in securing primary data for their analysis so their options are, understandably, limited.

This excellent book would be of interest to scholars in the areas of international relations, diplomacy and gender studies as well as practitioners of diplomacy and international negotiations.

Jarka Devine Mildorf

Matteo Vergani: How Is Terrorism Changing Us? Threat Perception and Political Attitudes in the Age of Terror.

1st edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, 174 pages, ISBN 978-981-13-4053-6.

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Terrorism, the indiscriminate use of violence against government targets as well as civilians to express a political, ideological, or religious view, is not a foreign concept to the international system. However, since the September 11th attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., terrorism is perhaps in the spotlight more than ever. Vergani's book aims to show how the perception of the threat of terrorism erodes civil liberties, sows doubt about the loyalties of immigrants, and heightens the left-right ideological divide.

Matteo Vergani is a postdoctoral researcher at Deakin University, Australia, and Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization. His expertise in the field of extremism and hate with a focus on empirical evaluation of prevention and reduction programs is clearly visible throughout his book *How Is Terrorism Changing Us? Threat Perception and Political Attitudes in the Age of Terror*. Vergani's main thesis is that threats of terrorism, especially within a multicultural society, can change people's political attitudes, thus leading to the adoption of draconian measures which are anti-democratic and undermine the rule of law. When this tendency is pushed to its limits or breaking point, otherwise democratic societies which usually respect the rule of law and democratic values are forced to adopt anti-democratic legislation and laws that further promote the "Us" versus "Them" dichotomy within the society. Vergani's analysis points out three specific situations in which the "Us" vs. "Them" attitude is enhanced by the threat of terrorism. For example, under the right conditions, governments can increase support for draconian policies and anti-system attitudes. Second, governments in democratic societies can exacerbate the differences between ideological and religious groups. And, finally, when the threat of terrorism is associated with out-groups, the out-groups erode the trust between immigrants and their host societies in multicultural democracies.

Vergani defends his thesis by examining two theoretical mechanisms – social and individual – to explain how the perceived threat of terrorism can change people's political attitudes. Those two theoretical mechanisms consider the following questions: who are the people within a society impacted by terrorism, meaning are they part of the "in" groups or "atomized" individuals; what does terrorism trigger, that is, does it trigger a sense of belonging or does it lead to a quest for the meaning of life and advancement of the terrorist's causes; and finally, what is the process? Does terrorism threaten group identities or does it lead to a psychological existence of terror?

Vergani's book is composed of eight chapters, and these are divided into two parts. The first part is composed of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. In it, Vergani examines the impact of media exposure on the perception of the threat of terrorism and the reasons why journalists tend to prioritize terrorism over other news topics. Obviously, journalism in the twenty-first century has become more sensationalized, and as a result, whatever "bleeds" leads in the headlines. Also, sensationalized news stories have a tendency to catch the short attention span of readers and ignite their passion or hatred against the "Others."

Terrorism is a cancer that will not go away despite a whole-of-government approach to defeating it in a society. Vergani defines terrorism as a form of psychological warfare that aims to reach political objectives, and states that it is used because it is perceived to

be an instrumental means to achieving those aims (p. 12). Based on Vergani's definition, terrorism has multifunctional objectives when perpetrated by sympathizers of the terrorists. One such objective is to instill fear and resentment in multicultural societies. This can be examined by looking at the social and individual mechanisms through which terrorism can change people's political attitudes. While most individuals are more likely to die from a chronic disease such as diabetes or chronic heart disease than to die in a terrorist attack, a mere mention of the word terrorism strikes fear into the hearts and minds of individuals regardless of whether their society has or has not been a victim of a terrorist attack. The actions perpetrated by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant bring fear and a sense of vulnerability to a country's citizens despite their government's efforts to protect them.

Why does terrorism cause more fear in individuals than an ordinary criminal attack on the streets? This is not simply a rhetorical question. Vergani argues that there are three reasons for why the perceived threat of terrorism could become a real threat. First, deaths at the hands of others provoke more moral outrage than accidental ones. Second, the very objective of terrorism is to terrorize a population through the media, since the media reports make the population see a terrorist attack as an unpredictable event that could hit anyone anywhere. Finally, terrorism aims at maximum publicity and political impact (p. 31). Vergani's three reasons highlight the fact that acts of terrorism have both a political and an emotional effect. From a political viewpoint, terrorists want to show citizens and governments alike that they do not have total control of the situation. In terms of the emotional aspect, terrorism instills fear in the hearts and minds of citizens. Their resulting sense of despair and inability to carry on their daily activities without looking over their shoulders can overcome them.

In the second part of the book, composed of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Vergani examines the effects of terrorism on people's political attitudes, primarily in terms of the social construction of reality based on media representation. This is an important discussion for the field of International Relations and the study of terrorism. The threat of terrorism, either perceived or real, does not exist in a vacuum. Bernard Cohen, the dean of American communication theory, in his book *The Press and Foreign Policy* (1963), stated that "*the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about*" (p. 13). Vergani also emphasizes the importance of the media in his book, arguing that the media makes an important contribution to magnifying perceptions of threat, especially in countries where there is no direct experience of terrorism (p. 33). In other words, the media's images of terrorists as powerful and threatening, increase the fear and citizens' preference for negotiations rather than military action. Conversely, when the news frames the terrorist act as an injustice, the viewers experience more anger, and consequently they increase their support for aggression.

Another important contribution to the existing literature on terrorism is Vergani's discussion of how the threat of terrorism creates in-groups and brings people together in the spirit of solidarity in moments of chaos. Think of the post-9/11 United States, where citizens, without much thinking, overwhelmingly supported the passage of the PATRIOT Act by members of Congress only to later realize that the devil was in the details of the bill. However, as Vergani succinctly explains, "*the threat of violence makes people cling to the group of belonging and its values and traditions, and it boosts aggression against the enemy, both real and perceived*" (p. 22). The perception or fear of terrorism creates an "Us" versus "Them" political environment which leads to nations adopting a strategy of tension. This strategy of tension is used by political groups or political parties to create an atmosphere of chaos to demonstrate the need for the State, which has a legitimate monopoly over the use of force, to impose draconian laws and regulations to control human behavior, regardless of whether the laws and regulations are necessary. The strategy

of tension “*is a form of political engineering*” (p. 24). That is to say, it is a strategy which motivates the political action used by political parties to achieve some desired effect on the social and political system. Perhaps the best examples of this are the U.S. President Donald J. Trump’s anti-immigration policy and his transgender ban on the military, whose aim is to foment discord and ignite his political base into action in light of the loss suffered by the Republican Party in the 2018 general elections for the House of Representatives. The discussion of “Us” vs. “Them” as a political tool within society was first introduced by the political scientist Harold R. Isaacs in his book *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change* (1975). In it, Isaacs argues that the “We” in society are perceived as having all the good attributes that society should embrace and value, while the “Other” or “Them” are the undesirable, the rotten totem, the untouchable of society.

Vergani’s strategy of tension also highlights the fact that the perceived threat of terrorism can change people’s attitudes when it triggers in-group and out-group identities that resonate with the current political environment as seen in much of Europe, in the United States, and, most recently, in Brazil with the election of Jair Bolsonaro. In order to validate his position, Vergani relies on two theories of mass communication theory, namely, agenda setting and priming theory. Agenda-setting is the ability of the media to highlight issues it considers important, thus making politicians and viewers see the issue as important as well. Agenda-setting theory dates back to 1922, when the newspaper columnist Walter Lippman called our attention to the fact that the media had an awesome power to present images to the public. Priming theory, on the other hand, argues that the way in which politicians propose to counter the threat of terrorism becomes a key criterion for evaluating them in the minds of the voters. Vergani points out that watching emotional news reports about terrorism on TV has a greater emotional impact than watching news reports about the same events accompanied by less emotional imagery.

The last important contribution to the terrorist literature by Vergani is his discussion of the market-oriented and public-oriented media systems as promoters of the threat of terrorism, either real or perceived. According to Vergani, “*commercial media companies are particular keen to underline the emotional implications of terrorism news, more than public-owned media companies*” (p. 76). The market-oriented media system operates on the basis of if it “bleeds,” it leads. The function of the media in a market-oriented media system is to entertain or provide infotainment, not to educate the public consumers. Television shows such as *The Maury Povich Show*, a television program that deals with sensationalistic topics such as individuals attempting to discover the paternity of children, became popular in the U.S. since they do not require much thinking or analysis. They are purely infotainment. Also, tabloid journalism prevails in a market-oriented media system due to its focus on strong emotions and attempts to captivate the audiences through the exaggeration of negative information, sensationalism, and shock.

While Vergani’s book is a welcome contribution to the terrorism literature, there are a few shortcomings in it. For example, the book lacks a discussion of terrorism as a national security concern. Terrorism is an important issue that cannot be dissociated from the nation-state. Therefore, the book would benefit from a discussion of how terrorism as a national security issue makes the nation-state more vulnerable, thus further fomenting the dichotomy and separation between “Us” and “Them”. Another shortcoming from a communication theory point of view is the absence of any discussion of the explosion of open-source information as a contributing factor in the rise of websites promoting the sick ideology of terrorism. Lastly, Vergani misses an important topic of discussion regarding the media in the twenty-first century: the rise of “deepfakes.” “Deepfakes” are highly realistic and difficult-to-detect digital manipulations of audio or video. Those “deepfake” videos which are widely produced by ISIS and Al-Qaeda include digitally manipulated audio or video material that is designed to be as realistic as possible. Those

so-called realistic images, which are essentially fake, could be a powder keg waiting to be ignited by any other social and political issues in a society (Zegart – Morell 2019).

In conclusion, Vergani's *How Is Terrorism Changing Us?* is a long overdue and important contribution to the study of political terrorism and mass media communication. I recommend this book to anyone interested in comparative politics or international relations. Vergani's book calls attention to the fact that the "*perceived threat of terrorism pushes significant segments of the society to adopt more authoritarian views that are security-focused, aggressive and simplistic*" (p. 152). Those views promote short term gains and political capital; in the long run, however, they undermine the rule of law and democratic values. Furthermore, authoritarian views and anti-establishment attitudes are the foundations of populism. As Vergani succinctly pointed out, "*Trump's electoral base, dominated as it is by older white voters with less formal education, is characterized by poorer physical and mental health, depression, and disappointment which potentially make them even more vulnerable to perceived threats*" (p. 156). While the anti-establishment attitude is clearly embraced by Trump's supporters, it is also further alienating the "Others." Welcome to the brave new world of the twenty-first century.

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