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

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Indirect Interventions in Civil Wars: The Use of States as Proxies in Military Interventions

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Abstract: Current research on motivational sources of military interventions in civil wars frequently assumes that states intervene due to direct interests in the civil war country. However, this study argues that there exists a subset of interventions in which weaker powers intervene on behalf of interests which great powers hold vis-à-vis the civil war country. Using the logic of principal-agent theory in combination with arms trade data allows one to identify 14 civil wars which experienced the phenomenon of indirect military interventions. This type of intervention features a weaker power providing troops for combat missions, whereas its major arms supplier is only involved with indirect military support. The analysis is complemented with two brief case studies on the Moroccan intervention in Zaire (1977) and the Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic (2009). Both case studies corroborate expectations as deduced from the proxy intervention framework.

Key words: Proxy interventions; arms trade; civil wars; military intervention; principal-agent theory; great powers.

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Military interventions constitute an essential instrument for states to project power in the international system and alter unfolding dynamics in civil wars for the benefit of the intervener. The Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in 1979 to support a communist leadership (Hilali 2003), whereas the United States militarily supported opposing factions in the conflict to deny the Soviets a foothold (Hartman 2002). France, the United Kingdom, and the United States intervened in unison in the recent Libyan Civil War in 2011 (Adler-Nissen – Pouliot 2014), and Russia and Iran became active in the current civil war in Syria (Wastnidge 2017). Data from the Uppsala Conflict Dataset (Pettersson – Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002) demonstrates that military interventions have consistently occurred throughout the period from 1975 until 2009 and by no means constitute a new phenomenon. The general understanding of these interventions assumes that the intervener has a direct interest in the outcome of the civil war and acts based on its agency. However, the international system is defined by a web of relationships among different countries. Legalists pronounce the equality of states, whereas political science scholars are nuanced about the actual limits of sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Keohane 2005). History illustrates that in

several instances, a state intervened in a conflict but was dependent on the consent of a great power in doing so. Saudi Arabia and the UAE's participation in the civil war in Yemen was supported by US military supplies. The US, in turn, perceives this intervention as an instrument to push back against the Iranian influence on the Arabian Peninsula.[1]

Focussing on the research area of interventions in civil wars, and explicitly on the sub-domain of military interventions, this article challenges the generally accepted view that states intervene to foster their interests vis-à-vis the country experiencing civil war. Kreps (2008: 580) states that *"it is difficult to imagine a case in which a state would commit resources, whether financial or personnel, to a conflict if it has no strategic interest in the intervention. It is also difficult to substantiate based on the historical record. Even parties that appear to have been disinterested had some motivation for participation, whether in side payments, debt relief, international prestige, or coercion."* This raises the question of the determinants of state interests in military interventions. Research in this area has mainly concentrated on goals that are imminent to the civil war country. Findley and Teo (2006) explicitly criticised a recent scholarly discourse for its focus on "phenomenon-centric" explanations of civil war interventions. From this perspective, *"[...] theoretical and substantive interest lies, by construction, in 'what happens to' the conflict"* (ibid.: 828). Therefore, they opted to focus on "actor-centric" explanations and focussed on interventionism as reaction to prior interventions of allies or rivals. Even humanitarian interventions are guided by the interest of the intervener in stopping atrocities occurring during civil wars and are therefore directly linked to the outcome of the civil war (Aydin 2010; Gilligan – Stedman 2003). Furthermore, the "phenomenon-centric" approach has come under strain with the emergence of literature on coalitional warfare (Baltrusaitis 2010; Kreps 2011). Most countries participating in the War in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards had less interest in the civil war itself than in improving relationships with the United States and strengthening alliances. Since several studies use dyadic relationships between the intervener and the target country,[2] the causal effect of advancing interests vis-à-vis the coalitional leader is not accounted for in many quantitative studies.

This study goes a step further and attempts to address the research question of whether military interventions occur based on the intervening country's relationship with an external country which does not directly intervene in a civil war. By direct military intervention, I explicitly refer to on-the-ground military combat which jeopardises the lives of soldiers in contrast to just supporting a conflict actor with logistics, arms, or intelligence. Is a state willing to bear the costs of a direct military intervention, including the risk of casualties, chiefly because of the relationship it enjoys with another power? To answer this question, I propose that we understand a subset of interventions under the concept of *indirect intervention,* which is related to the current notion of proxy interventions. Indirect interventions are such that involve a state intervening with combat troops, but the primary beneficiary of the intervention only participates indirectly with military instruments like logistics, training, intelligence, or arms supply. The concept resembles the notion of coalitional interventions in that it postulates that the interests of the intervener are also shaped vis-à-vis the beneficiary (coalition leader) and not purely by the outcome of the civil war. However, the concept precludes the direct involvement of the beneficiary and postulates that the intervener performs as a proxy for the beneficiary. The purpose of this study is to investigate if the concept of indirect interventions by states can be identified as a separate class of interventions which has been overlooked by current scholarship in the domain of military interventions in civil wars.

To engage with the research question, the following steps have been implemented. In the subsequent section, I first refer to the conceptual understanding of motivational aspects of interventions in current literature and argue why those are insufficient to explain the variety of observed interventions. Here, I take recourse to earlier studies from

the 1980s, when a debate ignited over how to comprehend Cuba's military interventionism during the Cold War. The second section provides a deeper exploration of the connection between the intervening country and its potential beneficiary. It argues that the relationship between the beneficiary and the direct intervener should be understood in the framework of principal-agent theory and that arms trade can be harnessed to indicate principal-agent relationships between two states. In the third section, the methodological approach is specified and explicated. Subsequently, in the fourth section data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and data on arms trade from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) are used to identify indirect interventions as a subset of interventions within the universe of all military interventions. The following section then engages in two descriptive cases studies to evaluate whether the identified cases meet the expectations of the assumed relationship. The Ugandan intervention in the Central African Republic and the Moroccan intervention in Zaire were chosen as the case studies. Lastly, the sixth section concludes the article with implications for further research.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

Interventions in civil wars have enjoyed the interest of scholars for more than two decades. The debate centred around several central themes. One literature strand addresses the motivations of states to intervene with various military, economic and diplomatic instruments in an ongoing civil war (Lektzian – Regan 2016; Regan – Aydin 2006). From this perspective, the focus lies on the intervening country and its relationship towards the target country. A further academic strand explores the effects of interventionism (Shirkey 2012, 2016). Typical questions in this area relate to the duration (Regan 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008) and severity of the civil war (Sousa 2014; Wood et al. 2012) once third states are caught in the dynamics of civil wars. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions are a specific type of military interventionism which has received separate attention as those instances deviate from the logic of unilateral interventionism and are designed by international bodies like regional organisation or the United Nations with clearly defined mandates and troop contribution composition (Karlsrud – Osland 2016; Velázquez 2010). While unilateral and multilateral interventions engender the question of why particular countries intervene in a civil war, in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding literature this question is reframed by focussing on the motivations for troop contribution to international missions.

In this study, I focus on the use of proxies in civil wars, which can be constituted by state or non-state actors (see figure 1). Current research on this topic has concentrated on

Figure 1
The choice of a third state to use state or non-state actors as proxies in civil wars



the use of non-state actors. Brown (2016) understands the rise of non-state actors in proxy interventions as a reflection of structural changes in the international system. In the current polyarchic system, a host of non-state actors with military capabilities provide an extensive reservoir for states to shun active combat. Krieg (2016) identifies in Obama's "leading from behind" doctrine elements that pronounce the use of non-state and state actors to defer costs and risks in the Middle East. Salehyan (2010) and Salehyan et al. (2011) provide a supply and demand model which addresses the question under which circumstances states are willing to use non-state actors as proxies and when non-state actors accept outside help. They find, for instance, that rebels groups forgo foreign assistance when they are at an advantage vis-à-vis their opposing government to avoid sacrificing autonomy. Further research investigates the conditions under which rebel groups defect from the patrons (Popovic 2017), the selection process among multiple rebel groups (Sozer 2016), the disentanglement from rebel proxies (Brewer 2011) and the question of the legitimacy of proxies in the civil war (Szentkirályi – Burch 2018).

However, an underdeveloped research strand in Conflict Studies and International Relations concerns the use of states for the benefit of another state. The most pronounced argument in this field comes from Mearsheimer and Walt (2016), who advocate the use of "offshore balancing" to maintain US hegemony in the world. According to this approach, the United States should abstain from intervening in the affairs of countries in essential geostrategic regions, but instead, the United States should support countries that would guarantee balance-of-power within a region. For instance, Bar-Siman-Tov (1998: 244) identified a "proxy-relationship" between the United States and Israel during the Nixon administration. He further cites Kissinger, who maintained that a strong Israel is necessary for intervening in regional affairs which the United States itself shuns. Krieg (2016: 99) writes that *"[…] if vital US national interests are not directly concerned, the mobilization of partners and allies allows for the sharing of the strategic and operational burden of war,"* thereby hinting at the potential use of states as instruments to advance US interests.[3]

The concept of the use of states as proxies in the specific context of civil wars has been neglected in the past decades with the exception of Dunér (1981) and Dunér (1987). Dunér investigated the question whether the Cuban interventions in Zaire, Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Bolivia, El Salvador and Nicaragua constituted truly independent choices or had to be understood as proxy interventions on behalf of the interests of the Soviet Union. He coined the term "dependent interventionism," which signifies a particular relationship between Cuba and the USSR. In general, both countries shared a similar ideological viewpoint based on socialism. According to Dunér (1987), Cuba itself had intrinsic interests in spreading the ideals of its revolution through the developing world in its pursuit of "anti-imperialism" and its memory of being a victim of imperialism. This type of revolutionary revisionist behaviour was enabled through military supplies from the Soviet Union. However, as Dunér observed, the support to Cuba was not unconditional or unconstrained. The decision-making process in Havana was autonomous, but in several cases, the interventions might have been thwarted when the Soviet Union perceived an intervention as unnecessarily antagonising the United States. A more recent empirically investigated example of proxy intervention is the case of Somalia (Epstein 2017; Menkhaus 2009). Backed by the United States and the US-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1735, Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in December 2006 against the Islamist Court Union (ICU).

To advance the concept of proxy interventions in the case of state actors, I contend that the debate on military interventions in civil war has so far been insufficient because much of the literature is concerned with interests of the intervener in the civil war country[4] but, in contrast, it should include the interests of other existing states in the international system. For this study, I focus on the triangular relationship between the intervening country, the civil war country, and the beneficiary country which endorses the intervention and

participates, however, only indirectly in it. In contrast to the debate on proxy-relationships, I coin here the term *indirect intervention*, which denotes an unequal burden-sharing structure in a military intervention in a civil war and can be understood as a special case of proxy intervention.[5] Accordingly, an indirect intervention refers to the phenomenon of a state (here a great power) being interested in the outcome of a civil war but delegating the use of military combat troops on the ground to another state. The beneficiary itself only provides military supplies and lets the other state implement the hazardous and cost-intensive deployment of troops in the civil war. The indirect military involvement of the beneficiary of the intervention signifies its interest vis-à-vis the civil war country.[6] Figure 2 indicates the locations of indirect interventions in the current debate about interventions in civil wars. In coalitional interventions, the great power intervenes with combat troops and invites smaller powers to participate for varying reasons. Unilateral interventions by states refer to interests of states vis-à-vis the target country but exclude the participation of the beneficiary. Indirect interventions include those instances in which the beneficiary delegates the specific use of ground troops but remains involved through indirect military instruments like the provision of arms, finance, intelligence or logistics.

Figure 2
A schematic conceptualisation of small power military interventions in civil wars. The subsets refer to the degree of great power involvement in the intervention



MEASURING INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS: ARMS TRADE AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY

The greatest challenge in identifying an indirect intervention is in discerning the relationship between the intervening country and the beneficiary of the intervention. Several conceptual difficulties have to be addressed. First, if the intervention occurs, then it might not be clear whether the intervention was conducted because the intervener followed the interests of the beneficiary or because the intervener genuinely followed its own interest which happened to overlap with the interests of the beneficiary. Dunér (1981: 358) makes the crucial distinction between a proxy and an autonomous actor. The former is induced or threatened to implement military missions, whereas the latter coincides with the interests of the patron and is, therefore, able to cooperate in the intervention. Second, the intervention itself can be against the interests of the troop-contributing country. In this case, the beneficiary needs an instrument which would raise the cost of non-intervention so that they would be higher than the costs of the intervention. Salehyan et al. (2011: 735) highlight the desire of rebel groups to maintain as much autonomy as possible about their objectives. Similarly, states as nominally sovereign actors in the international system resist giving up their agency to another state.

I offer in this study the following tentative solution to allow for the measurement of a specific type of what can be understood as an indirect intervention with recourse to principal-agent theory.[7] Following the logic employed by Salehyan (2010) in his work on rebel patronage, and that employed by McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) in their work based on principal-agent theory in an institutional setting, four concepts are relevant for understanding the relationship between principal and agent. Those are adverse selection, agency slack, police patrol, and fire alarm. The first refers to the appropriate choice of an agent which is designated to best carry out its delegated responsibilities. The second concept refers to the possibility that the agent could follow its own interests instead of those of the principal and thereby contradict with its actions the goals of the principal. Police patrol is a technique of constant monitoring of the agent by the principal, and fire alarm constitutes an external mechanism that raises awareness of agency slack to the principal. Whereas adverse selection becomes a crucial ex-ante, police patrol and fire alarm are designed to provide ex-post information about the agent.

To meet the conditions laid out by the principal-agent framework and to address the questions of agency slack and adverse selection, I argue that currently the best measurement of such a relationship is based on arms trade.[8] According to Derouen and Heo (2004), Kinsella (1998) and Sislin (1994) arms are typically sold to countries which have similar foreign policy preferences. This type of trade also creates dependencies from which the recipient cannot briskly turn away. Maintenance requires essential spare parts that are produced in the arms supplying country. The operation of technologically advanced weapons and vehicles presupposes specialised training that is typically provided by the arms supplier. Furthermore, the transfer of arms can constitute an enabling factor for the intervening state.[9] Lastly, the recipient state must anticipate that actions in violation of the interests of the supplier might lead to sanctions. This "locked-in" character of arms trade relationships is hard to overcome and often comes only with high associated costs. Hence, arms supplies exert a long-lasting effect between the provider and the recipient. For the recipient, engaging in foreign policies that contradict the interests of the supplier can be costly. Hence, using arms trade in combination with the principal-agent framework allows for the identification of a pool of potential agents for the principal, which minimises the risk of adverse selection.

A telling case of the sanctioning mechanism and the role of dependency can be observed on the example of Iran under the Shah and Iran after the 1979 revolution. The successful Islamic uprising has changed the relationship between the United States and Iran fundamentally. Under the Shah, the country was one of the major allies of Western powers in the Middle East. During the insurgency in Oman in 1975, Iran participated in the counterinsurgency alongside the United States and the United Kingdom (DeVore 2012). However, with Ayatollah Khomeini as Iran's new leader, opposing foreign policy visions, and the ensuing hostage crisis, Iran became a rival of the Western powers. This translated into active military supplies for Iraq in its endeavour to annex territory from Iran in the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 until 1988. US and UK military supplies to Iran measured in several billions of dollars in the period from 1970 until 1978 and abruptly declined to zero after the successful Islamic revolution.[10] The dependence of Iran on the purchased equipment was telling, as after prolonged fighting its maintenance of the technologically advanced weaponry became problematic (Karsh 2008: 42).

Conceptually, only great powers[11] will be regarded as beneficiaries in this analysis due to their ability to project power worldwide, their interest in extra-regional developments, and their ability to block UN resolutions condemning their interventions, and also because they possess a sizeable defence industry. All these conditions are crucial to identifying meaningful relationships between the intervening country and the beneficiary. First, the beneficiary must have the physical opportunity to intervene. Second, great powers compete on a global scale and are therefore interested in the outcomes of distant civil wars for

political, economic and security reasons. Third, all the great powers used here are at the same time members of the UN Security Council. Occupying this position allows great powers to block UN Security Council resolutions which would contradict their interests in indirect interventions. The intervening country itself is generally a small or middle power which is dependent on arms supplies from great powers. Figure 3 schematically depicts the relationship between the great power, the smaller power, and the civil war country.

Figure 3
Indirect intervention scheme



METHODOLOGY

In accordance with the conceptual discussion of the principal-agent framework and the use of arms trade in the identification process of potential agents for great powers, the following steps were conducted to assess the validity of the concept vis-à-vis empirical data. To identify all cases that fall into the concept of *indirect interventions*, the UCDP dataset of recorded instances of civil wars from 1946 until 2017 was harnessed (Pettersson – Eck 2018; Gleditsch et al. 2002). According to their definition, civil wars are instances of violence in which the government of a state is set against a non-state actor who fights either for secessionism or to overthrow the government. In order for such a conflict to be counted as a civil war, at least 25 battle deaths have to be recorded annually. The civil war dataset was merged with the External Support Data, which is also provided by the UCDP (Högbladh et al. 2011). It includes, in a dyadic format, military interventions from 1975 until 2009 and provides details of the exact form of implementation of the military intervention. These consist of troop deployment, provision of military intelligence, and access to territory, weapons or other types of supplies, including logistics, training of troops, financial support and other relevant supplies that do not fit the prior categories. The resulting dataset consists of all the combinations of civil war states (state b) and intervening states (state a and state c). The information on the types of military instruments allows for the grouping of interventions by whether ground troops were deployed in them or not.

In the second step, arms trade data from SIPRI was retrieved.[12] In the present study arms trade data on volume is used to ascertain which state was the major arms supplier of an intervening country. For each state in a particular year the cumulative sum (or rolling sum) of the past 20 years of bilateral arms trade was calculated. For instance, for a country like Indonesia in 1987, cumulative bilateral arms trade volumes from 1968–1987 were determined. In such calculations the country which shows the comparatively highest arms trade volume is regarded as a major arms supplier. The rule of regarding the past 20 years of arms supply is grounded on two observations. First, countries rarely have only one state as their major arms supplier but can benefit from different providers. This is especially the case for countries which were supported by a group of Western states,

namely France, the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, some arms sales are crucially important and signify a deeper, long-term relationship between two countries. For instance, purchases of jets and tanks, as well as other technologically sophisticated armaments, establish long-lasting relationships due to maintenance requirements, training, and the supply of spare parts.[13] For the definition of a great power, post-Second World War data provided by the Correlates of War project is utilised (Correlates of War 2017). In the present paper, Japan and (West) Germany are not deemed to be great powers because both followed policies of non-use of military personnel abroad and both were militarily subordinated in their alliance with the United States. Consequently, only five states are regarded as great powers here, namely the United States, the Soviet Union (later Russia), China, the United Kingdom, and France. The formula for calculating the arms trade between the direct intervener (a) and the indirect intervener (c) is the following. In the appendix, an excerpt of the data is used to illustrate the identification process of indirect interventions and provides two brief analyses.

$$Cumulatve\ Arms\ Supply_{a,c,t} = \sum_{i=0}^{19} Arms\ Supply_{ac,t-i}$$

In the third step, an analysis of two cases was conducted to validate whether the expectations concerning the triangular interest relationship can be identified in actual military interventions. Since this study proposes a new concept which has not yet been tested before, the approach here follows most closely the notion of "theory-confirming" (Lijphart 1971: 692). Following the advice of George and Bennett (2005) to explicate the scope and parameters of the analysis, the following remarks have to be made. The class of events to be investigated is the set of all identified indirect interventions which were uncovered through the data procedure as mentioned above. The dependent variable, intervention in a civil war, remains constant, and the focus lies on the causal process behind the decision-making process of the (directly and indirectly) intervening country. The guiding questions based on the indirect intervention concept, which is a subset of proxy interventions, refer to the relationship between the intervening state and the beneficiary. They are as follows.

First, does an interest congruence between the intervener and the beneficiary with regard to the outcome in the civil war exist? Second, how does the relationship between the beneficiary and the intervener manifest itself? Third, why does the beneficiary not intervene with troops on the ground? The answer to the first question should also answer the question whether both states had the same interests vis-à-vis the potential civil war outcome. According to the *indirect intervention* concept, the beneficiary should have a more intense interest in the outcome than the intervener. Hence, the direct intervener constitutes a proxy. The second question probes the interests of the intervener towards the beneficiary. Here, we should expect the driving force of interventionism. The interest itself can be of wide range, as Kreps (2008) identified for the particular case of coalitional interventions. Question 3 identifies why the beneficiary did not intervene in the civil war with combat troops. According to the *indirect intervention* concept, one should observe constraints that only allow for indirect military support.

To render the inference from the case studies more robust, I identify two such cases for testing the principal-agent concept which increase their variance regarding the historical conditions (i.e. background variables) within which the cases are embedded (Seawright – Gerring 2008). This allows one to identify whether the concept of indirect interventions is not driven by exogenous factors, for instance the polarity of a system or guiding international norms of military interventions. Hence, one case should be part of the Cold War struggle and the other should refer to the post-Cold War period as in each period different norms regarding military interventionism existed (Finnemore 2003). The overarching norm of non-intervention in domestic affairs was frequently trumped by security interests in

the East-West competition. In contrast, the 1990s and 2000s experienced a more pronounced emphasis on human security and the rising norm of "responsibility to protect." The methodology allows investigation of whether the phenomenon as such exists and can be identified. Only after the validation that the subset of indirect interventions exists as such and can be identified in the proposed procedure in step 1 should large-N analyses be carried out, which can be the focus of future research (Levy 2008).

EMPIRICAL DATA: INDIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN CIVIL WARS

According to table 1, there were 16 civil wars in the examined period which meet the criteria defined by the indirect intervention concept. These civl wars involved 22 countries intervening with combat troops, which at the same time were assisted by their respective major arms supplying great power(s). Of those 22 countries' interventions, the interventions in Afghanistan by Poland and Rumania as well as the Polish interventions in the framework of the War on Terror are artifacts of the coding rules.[14] To put the findings into

Table 1
Indirect interventions with state a supplying troops and state c providing military support without troop commitment.
The period under consideration ranges from 1975 to 2009

Year	Civil War (state b)	Troop Provider (state a)	Indirect Intervention (state c)	Cumulative Arms Supply*
1984, 1986/87	Chad	France	United States	United States: 1.531 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 728 France: – China: 0
1977	Zaire	Morocco	United States	United States: 862 S.U./Russia: 193 United Kingdom: 18 France: 559 China: 0
1979	Uganda	Libya	Soviet Union	United States: 341 S.U./Russia: 13.960 United Kingdom: 343 France: 2.498 China: 0
		Tanzania	Soviet Union	United States: 6 S.U./Russia: 382 United Kingdom: 41 France: 0 China: 303
2009	Uganda	Central African Republic	United States	United States: 9 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 1 France: 0 China: 0

Table 1 – continuation

Year	Civil War (state b)	Troop Provider (state a)	Indirect Intervention (state c)	Cumulative Arms Supply*
1990	Rwanda	Zaire	France	United States: 212 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 3 France: 411 China: 175
1977, 1981/83	Ethiopia	Cuba	Soviet Union	United States: 1 S.U./Russia: 6.044 United Kingdom: 30 France: 0 China: 0
1976	Angola	South Africa	France	United States: 253 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 1.263 France: 2.539 China: 0
1975–1991		Cuba	Soviet Union	United States: 43 S.U./Russia: 5.114 United Kingdom: 30 France: 0 China: 0
1985	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	United Kingdom	United States: 1 S.U./Russia: 6 United Kingdom: 87 France: 7 China: 20
1975–1979	Morocco	Mauretania	France	United States: 0 S.U./Russia: 12 United Kingdom: 5 France: 24 China: 0
2004	Algeria	Mali	United States	United States: 13 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 0 France: 1 China: 7
		Chad		United States: 83 S.U./Russia: 14 United Kingdom: 0 France: 29 China: 0

Table 1 – continuation

Year	Civil War (state b)	Troop Provider (state a)	Indirect Intervention (state c)	Cumulative Arms Supply*
2009	Algeria	Mali	United States	United States: 13 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 0 France: 0 China: 7
1982	Israel	Syria	Soviet Union	United States: 0 S.U./Russia: 22.565 United Kingdom: 1 France: 132 China: 1
1979	Yemen	Ethiopia	Soviet Union	United States: 553 S.U./Russia: 2.122 United Kingdom: 23 France: 67 China: 0
1975	Oman	Jordan	United States	United States: 939 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: 642 France: 15 China: 0
		UK		United States: 8.694 S.U./Russia: 0 United Kingdom: – France: 519 China: 0
		Iran		United States: 14.154 S.U./Russia: 254 United Kingdom: 3.039 France: 191 China: 0
2003	Afghanistan	Poland	Russia	United States: 284 S.U./Russia: 5.710 United Kingdom: 0 France: 0 China: 0
		Romania		United States: 98 S.U./Russia: 1.941 United Kingdom: 152 France: 417 China: 72

Table 1 – continuation

Year	Civil War (state b)	Troop Provider (state a)	Indirect Intervention (state c)	Cumulative Arms Supply*
2001	United States	Poland	Russia	United States: 132 S.U./Russia: 6.871 United Kingdom: 0 France: 0 China: 0

* If more than one year is observed, then the first year of intervention is presented. The values are counted in Trend Indicator Values (TIV).

perspective, in the period from 1975 to 2009, there have been 639 annual unilateral combat interventions in civil wars recorded.[15] However, for a valid comparison, the dataset has to be reduced because it includes interventions by both superpowers – the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union – which by definition cannot be agents of indirect interventions, as well as the coalition interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the global US War on Terror. These missions follow a different participation logic of smaller states than interventions in which the great power is not participating in the conflict with its own combat troops. Hence, the sample of all the combat missions without the participation of the superpowers and without the coalition missions mentioned above records 161 annual unilateral combat missions. In comparison, the sample of indirect interventions from table 2 records 57 annual instances of indirect interventions (excluding Poland and Rumania). Hence, 35 percent of all the observed annual interventions, in which small powers intervened without participation in coalition interventions (France and the United Kingdom are conceptually allowed to be treated as agents of the United States), constitute cases of indirect interventions.

Findley and Teo (2006) argued that military interventions in civil wars could increase the probability that a rival state will intervene in the same conflict but on the opposing side. Of the 14 civil wars (excluding the Polish and Rumanian cases), four instances of indirect interventions were met by a rival power. According to the UCDP External Support Dataset, when the Soviet Union conducted an indirect intervention together with Cuba in Ethiopia, the United States supported the opposing Ethiopian Democratic Union indirectly with financial supplies. In the case of Angola, two opposing indirect interventions occurred. Whereas the Soviet Union supported the Angolan government together with Cuba, France provided training to South Africa, which directly intervened in the Angolan conflict. A counter-intuitive picture emerges in the case of Mozambique as in this case rivals on the international stage supported the same conflict actor in a civil war. Here, the Soviet Union and Cuba together with the United Kingdom and Zimbabwe supported the government in Mozambique against the RENAMO rebel group. Lastly, in the case of Israel in the year 1982, the Soviet Union and the Syrian government supported Palestinian groups against the Israeli government. In turn, the United States provided extensive support in terms of weapons, funding, and logistics for Israel. Hence, in only three cases could a genuine counter-intervention be observed.

CASE STUDIES

Zaire and Shaba

This paragraph provides a summary of the Shaba conflict in Zaire. During the turbulent years of the Congo Crisis following the independence of the Belgian Congo in

1960, the resource-rich region of Katanga attempted to secede from the centralised rule in Kinshasa with the help of Belgian troops (van Reybrouck 2016: 334). However, by 1963 the first secessionist rebellion was suppressed by the Western- and UN-supported government of Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu. The rebels fled from the Congo in the second half of the 1960s and regrouped in Angola. The sentiment among the refugees for greater autonomy and independence did not fade away. Organised as the FLNC (Front de libération nationale congolaise), former Congolese refugees infiltrated Katanga from Angola in 1977 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1979). The ensuing First Shaba War drew attention from Western states, in particular, the United States and France. Ultimately, the war was concluded by the deployment of Moroccan troops who were transported by French military aviation (van Reybrouck 2016).[16]

Referring to question 1, on the interests of the beneficiary and the intervening country in the civil war, the following can be stated. After the independence of the Belgian Congo, the US had a crucial interest in upholding the territorial integrity of the Congo as well as keeping it firmly within the Western anti-communist camp. The province of Katanga was already a region of interest for the United States during the Second World War, when local uranium deposits became the source for the first nuclear bombs devised in the Manhattan Project (Williams 2016). During the Cold War, the Congo became a crucial supplier of cobalt, an element vital for the production of military armaments. When the First Shaba War began, Mobutu asked Western powers for military support (Schatzberg 1989). According to Lamer (2013: 98), the French president Giscard D'Estaing perceived the Shaba insurgency as a communist movement which had to be halted. From the French perspective, Zaire constituted its most crucial ally in Sub-Saharan Africa under Giscard D'Estaing (Stuart 1988: 106).

According to Schatzberg (1989), it is difficult to understand the apparent Moroccan interests in Zaire. One could argue that it is because of Morocco's historical ties to the Congo as Morocco participated in its first UN mission there in 1965. However, as he points out, the clearest interpretation is based on the relationship Morocco had with the United States and France. He states: *"Since Zaire had voted against Polisario, Hassan might well have seen this as a chance not only to repay a diplomatic debt, but also to collect 'chits' from both the French and the Americans which could later be redeemed in forms of aid in the Sahara"* (ibid. 332). A similar view is provided by Young (1978: 170), who states that *"Morocco ventured its units partly in the hope of gaining greater Western support in its own annexation of the Western Sahara, as well as in opposition to Soviet policy."* Similarly, Solraz (1979: 293) recognises that *"[Morocco] sent troops to Zaire's Shaba province to protect Western interests"* in his deliberations on whether the United States should sell offensive weapons to Morocco. This indicates that the motivation behind the provision of ground troops in the conflict was less based on the outcome of the civil war than on Morocco's relationship with its two largest arms suppliers.

Investigating question 2, namely, the connection between the intervener and the beneficiary, leads to the following conclusion. In the 1970s the relationship between the troop provider Morocco and the beneficiary the United States was determined by the long-standing alliance between Morocco and the United States as well as the US stance towards Moroccan activities taken in Western Sahara and Morocco's relationship with France. Solarz (1979: 278) called Morocco an *"an old friend of the United States […]"* who put the US in a dilemma with its activities in Western Sahara. Morocco under King Hassan II was keen to become the succeeding administrator of Western Sahara after Spain released its colony. To buttress his ambitions, the king organised the "Green March" in 1975, in which 350.000 Moroccans marched into the territory of Western Sahara. According to Mundy (2006), it was in the interest of the US to support Morocco in the Western Saharan crisis as it proved to be a steadfast ally against Arab nationalism and socialism in the past. Both France and the US protected Morocco from adverse UN

resolutions within the Security Council. Furthermore, the United States engaged in diplomatic talks with Spain with an outcome favouring Morocco in the Western Saharan crisis. As for French-Moroccan relations, France was a member of a joint alliance of intelligence services called the "Safari Club" together with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco (Bronson 2008). It was instituted on the basis of a French initiative and followed the US doctrine of containing the spread of communist governments in Africa at a time when the Carter administration took a more passive stance to US interventionism.

Question 3 evaluates the reasons why the United States did not intervene militarily with combat troops. Various US administrations felt too constrained to intervene directly with troops in the domestic affairs of the newly-independent countries in Sub-Saharan Africa out of a fear of being perceived as a neo-colonial, imperialist power and thereby jeopardising their crucial relations with states that had been former colonies and who formed a sizeable bloc within the United Nations. Therefore, the United States relied on other powers like France and Belgium in the case of the Simba rebellion in 1964 to push back against what was perceived as a communist-inspired uprising (Gleijeses 2010). Furthermore, according to Stuart (1988: 106) the United States was not inclined to intervene with ground troops in Africa under the Carter administration after its experiences with Vietnam. It instead favoured the concept of "African solutions to African problems" and resisted French attempts to draw its ground troops into Zaire. As mentioned in Cooker (1988: 106), the US ambassador to the United Nations Young said that *"after Vietnam, there is almost no way you could get the United States militarily involved in Africa."*

Uganda and the LRA

Historically, the origins of the Lord's Resistance Army date back to the civil war in Uganda in the 1980s (Branch et al. 2010). Soldiers from the Acholi tribe were on the losing side when Museveni's National Resistance Army claimed victory and overthrew Tito Okello from the presidency. Following suppressive moves by Museveni's government against the tribes in the North of Uganda, his support of the Karamojong, a group hated by the Acholi due to their frequent cattle-raids, and the Acholi's distrust of his motives created fertile ground for the galvanisation of armed resistance groups. The regrouping occurred mainly in Sudan, where members of the wider group of Acholi people were living as well. In 1988, the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) emerged, based on spiritual beliefs anchored in traditional values and Christianity (Doom – Vlassenroot 1999). Joseph Kony, apparently a cousin of Alice Auma, the leader of the HSM, began his own rebel group in 1987, which he initially called the Holy Spirit Movement II but later changed its name to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Filling his movement with rebels from the defeated Acholi insurgency groups, the HSM, and the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), he organised the Lord's Resistance Army around himself as a prophetic leader.

Losing its backing from the Acholi people, and the increased counter-insurgency by Museveni's government in Kampala at the beginning of the 1990s pushed the LRA to the brink of extinction but it was saved through military supplies from Sudan (van Acker 2004: 336). The peace negotiations between the LRA and representatives of the Ugandan army broke down in 1994, when for unclear reasons Museveni halted the talks and issued an ultimatum of surrender which was refused by the LRA and led to the resumption of the civil war (ibid.: 337). Retreating from Uganda, the LRA found sanctuary in Sudan, which provided it with training facilities and supplies (Schomerus 2007: 24–25). As compensation, Kony turned against the SPLM rebellion. Faced with this new situation, the LRA became exceptionally violent, including against its own people (i.e. the Acholi). With its abductions of young men and women and use of brutal methods against the civilian population, the international community paid closer attention to the conflict to

the extent that even the International Criminal Court issued warrants against the LRA leaders by 2003 (Branch et al. 2010). From 2008, the region of operation of the LRA stretched from Southern Sudan and the DRC to the Central African Republic, with raids and attacks on villages in all three countries. After the failed Operation Lightning Thunder, in February 2009 Kony fled to the CAR, which was embroiled in its civil war against the Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (Oxford Analytica 2010).

After investigating the relationship between the intervener and the beneficiary, the following can be said (question 2). The operations of the UPDA against the LRA outside Uganda must be considered from the perspective of the relationship between Uganda and its major arms supplier, the United States. For the US, Uganda constituted the hub from which politics in East Africa could be influenced according to its interests (Epstein 2017; Mwenda 2010: 51; Omach 2000: 90).[17] Through Uganda, arms supplies from the US reached the SPLA, which was fighting the Islamic government in Khartoum. Similarly, Museveni supported Paul Kagame, who received military training in the United States, and his Rwandan Patriotic Front with a sanctuary in Uganda and military equipment during the civil war in Rwanda in the early 1990s. Equally, after the joint military intervention by Ethiopia and the US against the Islamic Court Union in Somalia, the United Nations authorised a peacekeeping mission by the African Union in which several thousand US-trained Ugandan soldiers were deployed to support the US-favoured Transitional Federal Government (Epstein 2017: 160).

Regarding the interests of the beneficiary and the intervener in the civil war (question 1), for the United States, the LRA posed an actor that should be targeted based on humanitarian reasons and security interests. In the U.S. President Barack Obama's letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Obama 2011), the LRA was denounced as inflicting violations of human rights through killings, rapes, and abductions. Along these lines, he also stated that *"[…] deploying these U.S. Armed Forces furthers U.S. national security interests and foreign policy […]"*. Foremost, the United States was concerned about the instability the LRA could bring to the region. Schomerus et al. (2011) further argue that Obama acted because of domestic pressure through NGOs, the existence of then recently discovered oil deposits around Lake Albert and the possibility to support Uganda, which was engaged in a counter-insurgency mission against al-Shabaab in Somalia. As stated by the authors: *"so domestic political agendas, which at least did not conflict with broad U.S. strategic interests, are the most probable explanations for Obama's decision"* (ibid.). Referring to question 3, the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, which was passed by Congress in 2010, only allowed for "providing political, economic, military, and intelligence support" (Section 3, paragraph 1). Congress explicitly asked for a supporting mission that did not jeopardise the lives of US soldiers. Within this environment defined by foreign policy interests to intervene but being constrained by domestic considerations and the legislative pressure by the Congress, the United States became militarily active against the LRA in Central Africa as a provider of indirect military assistance. While the mission had already begun in 2008 with Operation Lighting Thunder under previous president George W. Bush, its indirect character was maintend under Obama in 2009 (Schomerus – Tumutegyereize 2009). In 2011, the United States sent over 100 military advisors who were to support regional governments and, in particular, the UDPF in the pursuit of the LRA. Kony was to be apprehended or removed (Arieff et al. 2015).

However, the interest of Uganda in fighting against the LRA in the context of atrocities committed in the Central African Republic (and other countries) was limited. The LRA posed no security threat to Uganda at that time and Ugandan military personnel were not convinced that it was effectively possible to capture Joseph Kony. An observation raised by U.S. military personnel was as follows: *"Although the Ugandan military (Ugandan People's Defense Force or UPDF) is regarded as the most effective of the African forces*

involved, some observers have questioned its capacity and commitment to complete the mission" (Arieff et al. 2015). Also, an assessment shared by some of the U.S. military advisors engaged in the mission was that searching for Kony was like searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack (Bishop 2017). Over time, the Ugandan government lost interest in the fight against the LRA outside its territory and reduced its initial commitment of 4.000 troops to less than 2.000 within 2 years (Schomerus et al. 2011). The joint mission between the US and Uganda ended in 2017 without having captured Joseph Kony but with a significant impact on the capacity of the LRA to conduct future guerilla operations (Cakaj – Titeca 2017).

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In this study it was hypothesised that there exists a subset of military interventions in civil wars in which the intervening country intervenes with military combat troops due to interests that are partially exogenous to the conflict itself but instead relate to other states in the international system. This subset consists of *indirect interventions,* which are characterised by a specific configuration of burden-sharing. Indirect interventions are such in which a country intervenes with direct military instruments while being supported with indirect military instruments by a great power. To substantiate this claim, I argued that the relationship between these two interveners could be understood from the principal-agent perspective, a concept that was already used for the identification of rebel patronage. Using arms trade data from SIPRI and information on military interventions in civil wars from the UCDP External Support Dataset, I identified all the listed instances in which the agent (the recipient of arms supplies) intervened with combat troops on the ground of a civil war country and the principal (the supplier of arms) only partook in the civil war with the provision of intelligence, logistics or other indirect forms of intervention. In the examined period, twenty-two different countries intervened in a civil war while meeting the criteria mentioned earlier.

Two cases were then analysed based on three questions in order to validate whether the assumptions laid out by using the principal-agent concept reflect empirical realities. The historical cases of the intervention of Morocco in Zaire during the First Shaba War and the Ugandan intervention to fight the LRA on the soil of the Central African Republic do not falsify the deduced expectations of the principal-agent framework. In each case, the interest of the intervener in the outcome of the civil war was less salient than its interest vis-à-vis the beneficiary. The beneficiary was, however, constrained and avoided participation with combat troops on the ground. Once the beneficiary country lost interest in the civil war and withdrew (Uganda) or the mission was accomplished (Zaire), then the intervening forces followed suit and were deployed back to their home country without attempting to alter the dynamics of the civil war further. To conclude, the empirical cases illustrate the existence of indirect interventions following the expectations laid out by the principal-agent framework.

The potential limitations of this study provide grounds for further investigating the concept of delegated military interventions in civil wars. First, this study used arms trade as an indicator to identify relationships between principals and agents. However, other indicators might prove more useful for this purpose such as, for instance, foreign aid, formal or informal alliances, or the provision of security guarantees or other perks in exchange for delegated interventions. Second, to precisely identify the primary motivation behind an intervention is challenging. It is upon the researcher to determine which motivations were present and which constitued the actual driving forces since we can only make inferences based on observable data. Hence, more in-depth case studies on diplomatic exchanges between principals and agents such as those conducted by Gleijeses (2010) are necessary to untangle the directionality of interests and the context in which military interventions are embedded.

Additional research can further follow the conceptual underpinnings of the principal-agent mechanisms. First, great powers can draw from a pool of potential candidates. Hence, the selection process of choosing a suitable candidate for a military intervention in a civil war deserves further attention. The question of which factors contribute to the selection process was less researched in the case of states as proxies, but was addressed in the case of non-state actors. For instance, Salehyan (2010: 505) expects that non-state actors who *"[…] share ethnic, religious, and linguistic kinship ties to the state […]"* are more likely to be chosen as its agents. Hence, analogous research is required. Second, in this study, the use of carrots and sticks to induce arms recipient states to do something has been not thoroughly investigated. Hence, case study research could provide valuable information on how great powers used instruments and signalling to maintain control over their agents and how they attempted to prevent agency slack. It is hoped that the critical phenomenon of military interventions in civil wars was further illuminated in this study and that the concept of *indirect interventions* as a form of proxy intervention allows for a better conceptually-driven understanding of civil war dynamics.

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[1] The American Society of International Law (2019) shows how both the Obama and Trump administrations supported Saudi Arabia with various instruments such as intelligence and refueling of jets, as the Houthi rebels were considered a regional threat. It was Congress which stepped in with a resolution to end the military supplies.

[2] Bove et al. (2016), Regan (2002), Regan and Aydin (2006), and Findley and Marineau (2015) as well as Lektzian and Regan (2016) use dyadic data structures between the civil war country and the potential intervener.

[3] However, Krieg (2016) remains focussed on non-state actors in his analysis and does not further pursue the idea of the use of states as proxies or surrogates in greater detail.

[4] An exception in this regard is the literature on coalitional warfare; see Kreps (2011) or Baltrusaitis (2010).

[5] For instance, Krieg (2016) contends that the difference between a proxy intervention and a surrogate intervention is that in the case of the former all military operations are delegated to another actor, whereas in the case of the latter the surrogate complements the military mission in a particular domain.

[6] For instance, Brown (2016: 248) describes how Kennedy had an interest in the South Vietnamese winning the war against their communist counterparts but was very reluctant to send American soldiers into the civil war.

[7] According to Shapiro (2005), principal-agent relationships can be defined by multiple principals. In this study, the scope of principals will be held constant to one principal per intervening country. The reasons are threefold. First, in this study the five great powers, namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, China and France, are analysed as potential principals. Of those five, based on historical rivalry the only potential combination of principals would be the United States, France and the United Kingdom. It would add more complexity to the model at this stage, which would not be justified as the three great powers generally had overlapping foreign policy interests. Second, according to the empirical results, only one case was identified which exhibits the features of multiple principals. Third, as the empirical results show, the relationships between the agent and the principal are frequently dominated by one principal who transfers arms in a much higher magnitude than other great powers.

[8] An alternative measure would be to examine foreign aid or UN voting patterns. In the case of foreign aid, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) argue that foreign aid is provided by donors to states in order to receive political concessions. For instance, Wang (1999) finds evidence that the United States is able to buy off votes in the United Nations with foreign aid. However, the drawbacks of using foreign aid are threefold. First, foreign aid is also distributed for humanitarian, developmental and disaster relief purposes (Heinrich 2013: 423). Hence, it is crucial to distinguish how and to whom foreign aid is distributed. Second, foreign aid is not just provided bilaterally but frequently distributed through international organisations which can function as complements or substitutes for unilateral donors. For instance, in the period between 2002 and 2011 Lawson (2013) identifies 45 countries constituting providers of foreign aid but also 21 international organisations which performed the same function. Third, systematic data is much more sparsely available compared to arms trade data and is often only used for assessments of Western countries that participate in the OECD. For instance, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009, 2007: 270) speak about a *"lack of systematic data"* in relation to foreign aid. With regard to UN voting patterns, the problem is that UN behaviour represents an indictor for foreign policy congruence between states, but UN voting patterns themselves are not causes of a principal-agent relationship between a great power and a small power. Rather, UN voting patterns represent dependencies created through foreign aid. See, for instance, Wang (1999) and Adhikari (2019). For contrary opinions about the effectiveness of foreign aid in buying UN votes, see Kegley and Hook (1991) and Adhikari (2019).

[9] I am not contending that particular weapon type transfers constitute a necessary condition of military interventions. There can be cases in which great powers supply a specific category of weapons that are being used in a civil war by the recipient. However, the argument for arms trade here is to use it as an identifier for a principal-agent relationship with unequal dependencies between the arms supplier (principal) and the receiver (agent). I am equally not assuming that arms supplying states anticipate civil wars in the future, but that they choose their recipients for varying reasons. See Sullivan et al. (2011) and Erickson (2011) for further debate on the selections of arms recipients.

[10] See the data provided by SIPRI: http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php, retrieved on 04. 03. 2019.

[11] I omit the inclusion of regional powers as principals since arms trade is used as the identification criterion of a principal-agent relationship with its underlying dependency of the receiver on the supplier. According to Armstrong (2018), among the top 6 arms exporters (value in billion TIV in parentheses) from 1950 to 2017 are the five great powers and, in the fifth place, Germany (86). The following arms exporters on the list, namely Italy (32), the Czech Republic (31), the Netherlands (24) and Israel (17), are separated by a wide margin from the great powers the United States (673), Russia (588), the United Kingdom (140) and France (121). Out of the great powers, only China (53) is comparatively close to the "followers" in this respect. Furthermore, regional powers are not represented in the UN Security Council, which renders their participation in military interventions in civil wars dependent on the good-will of at least one Security Council member.

[12] See https://sipri.org.

[13] However, such purchases are not frequently conducted due to the high related financial costs. Counting only recent supplies could mean that a great power which only provides small arms to a recipient country would be counted as a major supplier. To prevent obscuring of long-term and insignificant relationships, 20 years are used to approximate a better weighting of influences by the supplying states. Nevertheless, the downside of extending the time period to 20 years is forgoing examinations of swift changes in foreign policy objectives which typically only occur due to major international or domestic changes. Such a historical event is the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the NATO alliance system. Since the Soviet Union was the primary provider to these countries over the course of the 1980s, the change to Western suppliers in the few years at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s could potentially lead to cases in which Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union is counted as the primary supplier of a NATO member. The empirical data will show whether this leads to artifacts.

[14] This is a subjective assessment based on historical knowledge of the cases and is open to debate. The "civil war" in the United States refers to the 9/11 attacks conducted by Al-Qaeda and is coded as an internationalised civil war in the UCDP dataset. Poland joined the coalition forces to fight against the Taliban, who were providing sanctuary for the Al-Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan. Russia, due to the coding rules, is counted as the major arms supplier in this case as NATO membership for Poland was a relatively new condition at the time. The accession was completed in 1999, just two years before the terrorist attacks in the United States. However, Russia initially supported the United States in their fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan; therefore although Poland's intervention in Afghanistan was primarily motivated by its relationship with the US, in the same year it had an interest congruence with Russia. Similarly, as the arms trade volume provided by the US to Poland and Romania did not yet surpass the previous arms volumes of Russia in 2003, the latter is still counted as a major arms supplier in that year.

[15] This number is calculated when double counting of interventions, i.e. interventions in different conflict dyads in civil wars, is accounted for. For instance, Cuba is recorded to have intervened in Ethiopia twice in 1977 as Ethiopia was fighting against both the rebel group WSLF and Somalia in the same year.

[16] The following Second Shaba War similarly ended with a loss for the rebels inflicted by French Foreign Legion soldiers and Belgian paratroopers.

[17] Clark (2001: 270) notes that at the end of the 1990s, the United States ceased to provide military aid to Uganda as a reaction to Uganda's military intervention in the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

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Making Europe Defend Again: The Relaunch of European Defense Cooperation from a Neoclassical Realist Perspective

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Abstract: This article examines the relaunch of European defense cooperation since 2016 from the perspective of neoclassical realism, a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy which explores how domestic political and ideational factors shape national foreign policy responses to international systemic pressures. It argues that while Europe's changing geostrategic and security environment has created incentives for increased defense cooperation, explaining the form and content of this cooperation requires understanding the preferences of key European states, especially France and Germany. The article focuses on two new forms of European defense cooperation: PESCO and the E21, the former inside the EU institutional framework and the latter outside of it. The article argues that these initiatives are explained by the contrast between French and German preferences on defense cooperation, which in turn reflect their divergent national security priorities but also their different strategic cultures, including their differing perspectives on European integration.

Keywords: European defense cooperation, neoclassical realism, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Intervention Initiative (E21), Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), European Union (EU).

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The past several years have witnessed renewed progress on European defense cooperation. Key steps taken include the creation of a European Defense Fund (EDF), which for the first time will use money from the EU budget to support member state investment in joint research and development of military equipment and technologies, and the launching of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which allows willing member states meeting certain defense-related commitments to more closely cooperate in such areas as

military training, capability development, operational readiness, and cyber defense. Ten European states, including Britain, have also agreed to a French government plan – the European Intervention Initiative (E2I) – to create, outside of the EU framework, a joint military force that could rapidly deploy to crisis situations near Europe's borders. Reflecting on these and other initiatives, one European expert opined that *"[a]ll in all, there is [now] more energy and interest in European defense cooperation than at any time since 1999–2004, when the present institutional architecture of [the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP] was established"* (Bentinck 2017). Going even further, in a speech in November 2018 French President Emmanuel Macron proclaimed that when it comes to European defense cooperation, *"We have done more in a year and a half than what has been done since the 1950s"* (Brzozowski 2018).

What explains the *"relaunch"* (Howorth 2017a: 193) of European defense cooperation? Why is it happening now, and why has it taken the institutional form that it has? This article attempts to answer these questions from the perspective of neoclassical realism, a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy which explores the interaction of international systemic pressures and domestic political and ideational factors, examining how the latter shape national foreign policy responses to the former. In particular, it focuses on PESCO and the E2I, which along with the EDF are arguably the most significant recent initiatives in this area because they entail the creation of new operational capabilities which have the potential to enhance Europe's strategic autonomy. The article argues that these new initiatives stem from the interplay of two key factors: 1) significant changes in Europe's geostrategic and security environment which have created incentives for increased European defense cooperation; and 2) the different preferences concerning defense cooperation of France and Germany, the EU's most powerful and important member states. These different preferences, in turn, reflect divergent national security priorities but also different strategic cultures, including differing perspectives on European integration. Also influencing developments is the EU institutional system, which affects intergovernmental bargaining outcomes and the possibilities for defense cooperation within the EU framework, and thus the attractiveness of defense cooperation outside the EU.

The article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reviews various theoretical approaches to explaining the creation and development of CSDP since the late 1990s, and makes the case for neoclassical realism as the most appropriate model for analyzing and explaining European defense cooperation. This is followed by an analytical section on the relaunch of European defense cooperation that contains three sub-sections. The first presents an overview of recent international systemic developments, both global and regional, which have created incentives for increased European defense cooperation. The second examines new defense cooperation initiatives in response to these systemic pressures, focusing on PESCO and the E2I. The third analytical sub-section shows how the intergovernmental agreement on PESCO represents a compromise between French and German preferences, which are shaped by different national security priorities and strategic cultures. The final section summarizes the paper's main findings regarding the usefulness of the neoclassical realist framework for explaining European defense cooperation.

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

European defense cooperation poses something of a challenge for students of European politics and international relations. Traditional or mainstream theories of European integration generally excluded security and defense from those areas in which integration could be expected, and thus did not predict the creation of CSDP (initially European Security and Defense Policy) in 1999. For traditional intergovernmentalists, security and defense belonged to the realm of *high politics* as core elements of national sovereignty

and power which states were unlikely to bargain away or cede to supranational authority (Hoffmann 1966). Likewise, neofunctionalists assumed the *spillover* dynamic, the main driver of integration, would operate chiefly and most effectively in less sovereignty-sensitive *low politics* areas like economic or transportation policy and would be largely absent from the security and defense realm (Bickerton – Irondelle – Menon 2011: 8-9; although see Haroche 2019). Other prominent theoretical or analytical approaches to studying European integration and the EU – federalism, transactionalism, supranational governance, multilevel governance – also largely neglected security and defense issues (Krotz – Maher 2011: 556).

To explain the emergence and development of CSDP, therefore, many scholars have turned to broader theories of international relations. These have tended to emphasize the primary role of either internal or external (to the EU) factors and dynamics. Among the former, liberal theories explain CSDP as resulting from the aggregation of (domestically-generated) national preferences at the EU level (Pohl – van Willigen – van Vonno 2016; Pohl 2013; Richter 2016), while constructivist theories emphasize socialization processes within the EU and the gradual convergence of national strategic cultures (Monteleone 2016; Mérand 2008; Meyer 2006; Giegerich 2006). By neglecting or downplaying the role of international factors, however, *"bottom-up"* (Moravcsik 1997: 517) liberal theories ignore an important source of national preferences on security and defense cooperation, while both liberal and constructivist theories are unable to explain the timing of CSDP developments, especially its creation in 1999 and the renewed progress on defense cooperation since 2016. By contrast, neorealist theories, especially structural realism, have explained CSDP as a logical response by European states to changes in the global distribution of power, with CSDP representing an EU attempt to balance, even if only in a *soft* manner, against unchecked US power in a new unipolar order (Posen 2006; Art 2004; Pape 2005; Paul 2005). Not much evidence of such balancing exists, however, and structural realists appear to have misread the intentions of European states and overestimated the capacity of the EU to engage in balancing, in part because of their neglect of internal EU and national-level factors (Brooks – Wohlforth 2005; Lieber – Alexander 2005; Howorth – Menon 2009).

This article advances a different theoretical approach for explaining European defense cooperation based on the paradigm of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy which explores the interaction of international systemic and domestic political and ideational factors, examining how the latter shape national foreign policy responses to the former. It thus combines the insights of neorealism with those of *Innenpolitik* theories, which focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy. By doing so, neoclassical realism incorporates the analytical richness of classical or traditional realism but attempts to place it within a more theoretically rigorous framework (Schweller 2003: 316). For explaining European defense cooperation, however, neoclassical realism must also take into account the role of the EU as a factor influencing both the formation of national preferences on defense cooperation and the outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining on CSDP.

The basic proposition of neorealism is that the international system, defined as the distribution of power capabilities among its main units, or states (that is, the system's *structure*) under conditions of anarchy (no central government or common power), affects the behavior of states and international outcomes. Beyond this basic starting point, different versions of neorealism posit different effects of the international system on state behavior. *Structural realism*, the original variant developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979), asserts that states tend to respond to unfavorable shifts in the distribution of power (the increased relative power capabilities of others) by engaging in *balancing*, either internally, by building up their own capabilities, or externally, by forming alliances with other states. Waltz does not claim that this will always happen, but only that it should, and that states

choosing not to engage in balancing will be punished. International structure, according to Waltz, rather than strictly determining the behavior of states, only provides "*a set of constraining conditions*" for them to act within; it exerts pressures and creates possibilities, but it cannot tell us how states will respond to these. Instead, *"each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as interactions with them"* (Waltz 1979: 73, 65). However, as Schweller (2003: 319) points out, *"Waltzian neorealism makes no assertions about what domestic processes look like, where they come from, and how they influence the way nations assess and adapt to changes in their environment."* Indeed, by refusing to do so, and by declining to derive a theory of foreign policy from his systemic theory of international relations, Waltz opened the door to, and even created the need for, the eventual emergence of neoclassical realism (Rathbun 2008).

The two other main variants of neorealism have more to say about how states respond to systemic pressures and thus do constitute distinct theories of foreign policy. *Offensive* (or *aggressive*) realism asserts that under conditions of anarchy security is scarce, leading states to think and act offensively. States thus seek to maximize their relative power and ultimately strive for regional dominance or hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). *Defensive* realism, by contrast, assumes that states seek to maximize security rather than power, and that security is more plentiful in a more benign or less Hobbesian version of anarchy. For the most part, therefore, security-seeking states can afford to be relaxed, responding only to relatively rare external threats by taking action to balance against them (Walt 1987; Snyder 1991; Van Evera 1999). Unlike offensive realism, therefore, which asserts the continual dominance of systemic pressures in state behavior, defensive realism asserts that systemic factors can often be safely ignored, or that they are not always the main factors driving foreign policy.

In contrast to neorealism, *Innenpolitik* theories assert that domestic factors are the main drivers of foreign policy. Such factors can include electoral or partisan politics, the organizational structure of governing institutions, the ideological character of national political systems, and the values, beliefs, and psychological characteristics of individual decision-makers. Prominent examples of *Innenpolitik* theories include democratic peace theory, which claims that democracies behave differently than non-democracies, especially in dealing with each other (Doyle 1986), and the *new liberalism*, which views state-society relations as the fundamental source of state preferences and determinant of state behavior in world politics (Moravcsik 1997). According to Rose (1998: 148), while *"[t]here are many variants of [the Innenpolitik] approach, each favoring a different specific domestic independent variable [...] they all share a common assumption: that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country's internal dynamics."* *Innenpolitik* theories thus privilege first (individual-level) and second image (national-level) variables in explaining foreign policy, as opposed to the third image (international system-level) explanations offered by neorealism (Waltz 1959).

Neoclassical realism is a theory of foreign policy (and also international politics, according to some proponents, as discussed below) that *"explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables"* (Rose 1998: 146). It begins *"with the fundamental assumption of neorealists that the international system structures and constrains the policy choices of states"* (Taliaferro – Lobell – Ripsman 2009: 19), and that *"the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities"* (Rose 1998: 146). Both neorealism and neoclassical realism, in other words, "*assign causal primacy to systemic independent variables*" (Taliaferro – Lobell – Ripsman 2009: 19). However, while not abandoning the insights of neorealism *"about international structure and its consequences, neoclassical realists have added first and second image variables [...] to explain foreign policy decision making"* (Schweller 2003: 317). For neoclassical

realists, such unit-level variables play an important role in mediating the impact of systemic factors and shaping national responses to them. According to Rose (1998: 146), for example, the impact of a state's structural position (relative material power) on its foreign policy *"is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level."* Thus, while relative power is the *"chief independent variable"* of neoclassical realism (Rose 1998: 151), neoclassical realism *"locates causal properties at both the structural and unit levels,"* with *"unit-level factors [helping] to explain state external behavior"* (Taliaferro – Lobell – Ripsman 2009: 21). According to Schweller (2004: 164), *"states assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations."* Indeed, he continues, *"states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones"* (Schweller 2004: 164).

Beyond these common basic assumptions and propositions, neoclassical realist studies have emphasized the role of different unit-level intervening variables in shaping national responses to international systemic pressures. In their sweeping overview of neoclassical realist literature, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016: 58–79) seek to organize this wide-ranging list of variables by grouping them into four distinct categories: the images (beliefs and worldviews) of national leaders, national strategic culture, the nature of state-society relations, and domestic political institutions. These intervening variables, they assert, affect three key intervening-level processes – perception of the international system, decision making, and resource mobilization or policy implementation – leading to specific policy outcomes. They also argue that the relative impact of these domestic factors is dependent on the nature of systemic pressures and conditions. When systemic clarity is low, meaning the international system provides limited information about the nature of threats or opportunities and guidance on how to respond to them, and the international strategic environment relatively permissive, meaning threats or opportunities are more remote and less intense, unit-level intervening variables play a greater role. When the opposite is true and systemic clarity is high, meaning the nature of threats or opportunities is clear, as are the optimal policy responses, and the strategic environment more restrictive, meaning threats or opportunities are more imminent and dangerous/ /enticing, the policy choices of states are more constrained and domestic factors play less of a role in determining them (Ripsman – Taliaferro – Lobell 2016: 46–56). Moreover, specific types of intervening variables are likely to have more of an impact in certain systemic conditions than others. In situations of high systemic clarity and a restrictive strategic environment, with a relatively short time frame for making decisions, leader images and strategic culture are likely to have a more important impact on foreign policy choices, while as the nature of threats or opportunities becomes less clear and the strategic environment more permissive, and the time horizon for decision-making correspondingly lengthens, the impact of domestic political institutions and state-society relations becomes more significant, although strategic culture should also continue exerting an important influence over foreign policy planning (Ripsman – Taliaferro – Lobell 2016: 91–95).

Neoclassical realists also differ in how they define their primary independent variable, the international system. In general, neoclassical realism has a more nuanced and richer conceptualization of the international system than Waltzian neorealism, for which the system is essentially its structure, or the distribution of material capabilities among its main units (states), a definition which *"must leave aside, or abstract from, the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions"* (Waltz 1979: 79). For classical and neoclassical realists, however, the international system is also composed of the interactions between units, without the inclusion of which "*the term system has no meaning*" (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 29). According to Schweller (2003; 332), *"The inclusion of interaction in the definition of system allows process variables (such as*

institutions, norms, or rules) as well as structural variables to define the nature of world politics and to have an effect on their operation and dynamics." Ripsman et al. (2016: 40–56), on the other hand, exclude such process variables from their definition of system and focus instead on certain material factors which can modify international structure (*structural modifiers*) such as geography, rates of technological diffusion, and the offense--defense balance in military technologies, as well as the variables of systemic clarity and the nature of the strategic environment mentioned above. Moreover, as discussed below, by arguing that the foreign policies and grand strategies of great powers can affect systemic outcomes and international structure, they also imply that the behavior of such states should be considered a key element of the international system.

As a research paradigm neoclassical realism has evolved since being first introduced in the late 1990s. According to Ripsman et al. (2016: 12), there have been three distinct phases of neoclassical realism: the initial wave of studies, or Type I neoclassical realism, *"which sought merely to fix structural realism by using domestic-level intervening variables to explain away empirical anomalies for structural realist theories"*; a second wave, or Type II neoclassical realism, which *"uses systemic stimuli, moderated by domestic-level intervening variables, to inform an approach to foreign policy more generally"*; and Type III neoclassical realism, launched by their 2016 book, which seeks to develop neoclassical realism as a broader theory of international politics. In Type III neoclassical realism the dependent variable is not just national foreign policy choices and longer-term strategic adjustment but can also include international systemic outcomes and even structural change, which they argue can result from the impact of the foreign policies and grand strategies of the major powers over time (Ripsman – Taliaferro – Lobell 2016: 80–90). Neoclassical realism has thus evolved into a theoretical model which posits an ongoing circular relationship between the international system (the independent variable), domestic-level factors (the intervening variables), and national foreign policies and strategies (the dependent variable), in which the latter has causal effects for, and can help explain changes to, the international system over time.

Neoclassical realism is not without its critics, including those who argue the approach forfeits the spare elegance, and hence distinctiveness, of Waltzian neorealism. By adding domestic or unit-level variables to systemic ones, these critics claim, neoclassical realists have engaged in *"post hoc efforts to explain away the anomalies of neorealism, making use of whatever tools are necessary to plug the holes of a sinking ship"* (in the words of Rathbun [2008: 295], himself a strong proponent of neoclassical realism). The result, critics argue, is a degenerative research paradigm that lacks coherence and is indistinct from alternative research paradigms such as liberalism and constructivism (Vasquez 1997; Legro – Moravcsik 1999; Narizny 2017). In response to such criticisms, neoclassical realists assert that the incorporation of domestic variables extends the limited explanatory range of Waltzian neorealism, which *"makes no claim to explain foreign policy or specific historical events"* (Schweller 2003: 317), thus making neoclassical realism *"a logical and necessary extension of structural realism"* (Rathbun 2008). The sacrifice of theoretical parsimony, they argue, enables a richer and more complete understanding of international politics and the details of specific foreign policy cases (Schweller 2003; Turpin 2019: 5–6). It is indeed this explanatory richness, achieved through the consideration of both systemic and unit-level variables, which makes neoclassical realism an appropriate framework for examining and understanding recent developments in European defense cooperation (Dyson 2016; Haine 2012; Turpin 2019).

ANALYZING THE RELAUNCH OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

In this section, we utilize a neoclassical realist approach to analyze the relaunch of European defense cooperation. We argue that significant changes in Europe's geostrategic and security environment, at both global and regional levels, have created strong

incentives for increased defense cooperation. While neorealism may view such cooperation as a logical response by European states to these systemic pressures, it cannot explain the nature of new defense cooperation arrangements, especially PESCO and the E2I. By focusing on the key role of domestic-level intervening variables, however, a neoclassical realist approach can help us understand why these new defense cooperation arrangements have taken the form and content they have. Specifically, we argue that the agreement on PESCO reflects a compromise between the divergent preferences of France and Germany, the EU's most powerful and influential member states. These different preferences, in turn, are influenced by divergent national security priorities, which are the product of different geographies, threat perceptions, and military capabilities. However, we also identify national strategic culture – understood here in a broad sense as deeply embedded conceptions and notions of national security shared by a society as a whole (Kupchan 1994: 22) and including national perspectives on European integration – as a key unit-level factor shaping French and German preferences on defense cooperation. The impact of the EU institutional system must also be considered, as it affects intergovernmental bargaining outcomes and hence the possibilities for defense cooperation within the EU framework, making the pursuit of such cooperation outside the EU potentially more attractive, and thus helping to explain the E2I.

Europe's Changing Strategic and Security Environment

The systemic pressures currently facing Europe are multiple and multidimensional. At the global level, the international system is transitioning from the relatively brief, post-1989 unipolar order to an increasingly multipolar one, the result primarily of China's rapid economic, military, and political rise and relative US decline. This transition, which was perhaps inevitable in any case, was hastened by the loss of US power and prestige resulting from its military struggles in Afghanistan and Iraq and controversial actions in the Global War on Terror. It was further promoted by the US-centered Global Financial Crisis of 2008, which exposed the flaws of the American economic model and accelerated the shift of economic power and influence *from the West to the Rest*, especially Asia. US strength, as well as America's global image and soft power influence, was also undermined by the gridlock and paralysis of the highly polarized US political system during the 8-year presidency of Barack Obama, which prevented Washington from addressing key domestic social and economic problems. Far from reversing this trend, the *America First* policies of the Donald Trump administration, by alienating others and isolating the United States internationally, and through the negative impact on the US economy of the administration's ubiquitous trade wars, seem destined to reduce US power and influence even further (Zakaria 2019; Drezner 2019).

For Europe, aside from dealing with China's growing economic and political influence, exemplified by the gigantic *Belt and Road Initiative* to build increased infrastructure ties between China and Europe, and the *16+1* diplomatic initiative linking China and European states seeking to benefit from Chinese investments, the main consequence of this global power shift has been its impact on US strategic and foreign policy priorities. After taking office in January 2009, the Obama administration – seeking to extricate the US from costly wars in the broader Middle East, and to offload more responsibility for security in the EU's neighboring regions to its European allies – began planning for a strategic *Pivot to Asia* (Binnendijk 2014). The new strategy was an explicit acknowledgement of the Asia-Pacific region's growing importance for the United States and the global system, and an implicit recognition of the need for a more comprehensive US effort to counter China's growing power and influence in the region. In the end, the Obama pivot did not amount to much, as plans for a more substantial reallocation of military and diplomatic resources were frustrated by budgetary pressures and continued US military involvement in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and by a renewed focus on European security after

Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014. Nevertheless, the new strategy, and the shift of US strategic interests that it signaled, generated concern in Europe that the pivot indicated a loss of US interest in Europe and an abandonment of its traditional focus on European security (Sverdrup-Thygeson – Lanteigne – Sverdrup 2014: 1).

If Obama's Asia pivot increased European concerns about US disengagement and abandonment – accentuated by Washington's reluctance to get involved in conflicts in Europe's neighborhood, like those in Libya and Syria, and its insistence that Germany take the lead in diplomatic efforts to deal with the crisis in Ukraine – transatlantic relations have deteriorated even further since the November 2016 election of Trump. As is well documented, the new president has evinced considerable skepticism of NATO and openly mused about the possibility of the US leaving the Alliance (Barnes – Cooper 2019). He has also expressed antipathy toward the EU, calling it an organization created to take advantage of the US on trade. Trump's attacks on the EU include his public support for Brexit and calls for other member states to follow Britain's example and leave the EU. His administration has imposed tariffs on European exports of aluminum and steel, calling them a threat to US national security, while also threatening new duties on imports of European automobiles. It has also withdrawn the US from international agreements strongly backed by the EU, including the Paris climate accord and the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, while adopting a critical attitude toward international institutions like the UN and WTO and the broader liberal international order that is so crucially important for the EU. On the whole, the Trump administration's rhetoric and actions have created increased European uncertainty about US foreign policy, the future of transatlantic relations, and Washington's commitment to Europe's security. While transatlantic relations may well improve after Trump, many European analysts also understand that long-term structural trends (the rise of China, domestic political changes and demographic trends) pulling America away from Europe suggest the US security commitment could become increasingly tenuous going forward, even under more internationalist administrations (Shapiro – Pardijs 2017: 10–12; Heisbourg – Terhalle 2018).

Moreover, the growing uncertainty about the US and transatlantic relations takes place within the context of a deteriorating regional security environment, with threats posed by Russia's increasingly assertive policies in the East, which were most clearly demonstrated by its 2014 annexation of Crimea and military support for separatist rebels in southeastern Ukraine, and the increased conflict and turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, where the 2011 Arab Spring rebellions have led to continuing instability in Libya and prolonged civil war in Syria. While Russia's actions have challenged the sovereignty and borders of former Soviet states and called into question the post-Cold War security order in Eastern Europe, the turbulence to Europe's south has spurred mass migration to Europe and generated increased fears in many European countries of radical Islamic terrorism, contributing to a growing sense of insecurity and helping to fuel a populist-nationalist backlash against the EU and liberal democracy. Also contributing to growing regional insecurity is continued corruption and instability in the Western Balkans, where a renewed outbreak of ethnic and nationalist violence remains an ever-present danger, and Turkey's authoritarian turn under President Recep Tayyip Erdoðan – especially since a failed coup attempt in July 2016 – which has led to the increased estrangement from Europe of this critical state on the EU's southeastern flank.

Finally, in the context of global power shifts and a more threatening regional security environment, the EU itself has been severely weakened, the result of a series of overlapping and mutually reinforcing crises that have hammered the bloc since 2010, including the Eurozone debt crisis, the massive influx of refugees from the Middle East and Africa in 2015, an upsurge of terrorist attacks inside Europe, and the mounting disintegrative pressures posed by the growth of populist nationalism and Euroscepticism throughout the EU. Perhaps the most shocking development of all was the June 2016 Brexit referendum,

in which a narrow majority of British voters opted to leave the EU, launching months of difficult negotiations between London and Brussels on the terms of Britain's departure and initiating a period of serious political turmoil and paralysis in Britain, while also creating a precedent that other member states might someday be tempted to follow. While Brexit, if it happens, is the most vivid demonstration of the EU's weakened state, depriving the bloc of its third largest economy, one of its two largest militaries, and its substantial diplomatic prowess and weight, the other aspects of Europe's *"polycrisis"* (Zeitlin – Nicoli – Laffan 2019) have contributed to the EU's relative decline in both regional and global terms at a time of shifting global power, increased regional insecurity, eroding transatlantic ties, and the growing assertiveness in European affairs of Russia and China. At the same time, Europe's various crises have motivated EU leaders to find new integration projects, including in the area of security and defense, to demonstrate the EU's continued relevance and vitality, and to strengthen the bloc's internal cohesion at a time of increased insecurity and mounting centrifugal pressures.

European Responses: From common funding and Permanent Structured Cooperation to cooperation outside the EU framework

The systemic pressures discussed above are clearly recognized in Europe and have created strong incentives for increased European defense cooperation. The June 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), for instance, cites global and regional systemic developments as reasons why the EU should pursue greater defense cooperation and achieve the goal of *strategic autonomy* (a term mentioned eight times in the document) (EUGS 2016). The French government's 2017 Strategic Review describes an ongoing *"deterioration of the international environment"* at both the global and regional levels, declaring that *"[c]onverging threats against Europe require Europeans to commit more heavily to ensuring their own security, and to work towards the goal of shared strategic autonomy"* (Republic of France 2017: 15, 56). Similarly, the German government's 2016 Defense White Paper notes that *"Germany's security environment has become even more complex, volatile and dynamic and is therefore increasingly unpredictable,"* thus requiring further European defense cooperation and progress towards building a *"European Security and Defense Union"* (German Federal Government 2016: 28, 76). European states have responded to their changing geostrategic and security environment with a number of new defense cooperation initiatives ranging from instruments for common funding and Permanent Structured Cooperation to cooperation outside the EU institutional framework.

A major step was the approval by EU leaders in December 2016 of the EDF (European Council 2016b: 3–4), with final approval by the European Parliament in April 2019 (Brzozowski 2019). The main purpose of the EDF is to establish and strengthen a European defense industrial base by incentivizing European governments to work together on joint capability projects in order to support the goal of EU strategic autonomy (Besch – Quencez 2019). While the amount of money the EDF will dispose of – €13 billion in the 2021–2027 EU budgetary period, with a small €590 million sum approved for 2019 and 2020 – is relatively modest, its creation is significant because for the first time, money from the EU budget is being used to help fund collaborative defense research and development by the member states (European Commission 2019). It is also significant because of the key role of the Commission in bringing the EDF about, signaling the Commission's growing involvement in the area of defense (Haroche 2019; James 2018; Lavallée 2018).

In addition to the EDF, other recent steps include the approval by EU defense ministers in May 2017 of the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD), an annual review of national defense planning and capability development practices conducted by the European Defense Agency (EDA) with the goal of identifying capability gaps, deepening defense cooperation, and ensuring more efficiency in defense spending plans (EDA 2017),

and the creation in June 2017 of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), a permanent operational headquarters for *non-executive* (mostly training) CSDP missions of up to 2,500 troops (CEU 2017a). The MPCC was initially intended to be a standing EU military operational headquarters (OHQ), but this was opposed by Britain, which, pending Brexit, was still a full member of the EU with veto power, leading to the new institution's downgrading to its current status (Howorth 2017b: 5–6).

The launching of PESCO is potentially the most significant new CSDP initiative. The legal basis for PESCO was established by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Article 42(6) of which permits a subgroup of member states *"whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria, and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area,"* to strengthen their military and defense ties on a voluntary basis in the form of a permanent structured cooperation within the EU framework (OJEU 2012: 39). The PESCO provision remained initially unused, however, as for several years after 2009 Europe's attention focused on the Eurozone debt and economic crisis. Prompted by a deteriorating security environment, discussion of whether to activate PESCO increased within the EU after 2013, including within the context of the HRVP's consultations with member states on the new global security strategy that began in the second half of 2015 (Tocci 2016, 2017). The EUGS, submitted to the European Council in June 2016, did not mention PESCO specifically, but suggested that enhanced defense cooperation between member states, *"[i]f successful and repeated over time […] might lead to a more structured form of cooperation, making full use of the Lisbon Treaty's potential"* (EUGS 2015: 48).

The shocking Brexit vote, occurring just five days before the European Council meeting that endorsed the EUGS, served as a major catalyst for increased defense cooperation. Not only would Britain's prospective departure remove a key obstacle to closer defense cooperation, along with further consolidation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and strengthened internal security and control of the EU's external borders. Increased defense cooperation was also viewed as an important means of demonstrating the EU's continued relevance and vitality at a time of internal crisis and mounting centrifugal pressures. Thus, just days after the Brexit vote, the French and German foreign ministers released a joint letter calling for more European integration, including closer cooperation on security and defense (Ayrault – Steinmeier 2016). This was followed in late July with President François Hollande's announcement of a new French initiative on defense cooperation, in collaboration with Germany, as a means of revitalizing the EU (Barbière 2016). On 12 September, the French and German defense ministers issued a joint paper calling for enhanced defense cooperation and the strengthening of CSDP, *"including the use of PESCO"* (Le Drian – von der Leyen 2016: 6; Euractiv 2016a), which was then discussed at an informal meeting of EU defense ministers later that month (Euractiv 2016b). In early November, the governments of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain issued a joint letter calling for a common European defense policy that would enable the EU to act independently of the United States to deal with external crises (Euractiv 2016c).

Parallel to these efforts, as requested by the June 2016 European Council (2016a: 7), the HRVP developed its Implementation Plan on Security and Defense, which it presented to EU foreign and defense ministers on 14 November. Calling for a *"new level of ambition"* for EU security and defense cooperation, among other ideas the HRVP proposed activating PESCO to enable willing member states to strengthen their military and defense ties (CEU 2016: 2, 6). This idea was endorsed by the European Council in December, with EU leaders asking the HRVP to further develop its proposals in the coming months (European Council 2016b: 4). On the basis of the HRVP's work, on 22 June 2017 the European Council decided to launch *"an inclusive and ambitious"* PESCO, pledging to agree within three months on a list of criteria and commitments that member states wanting to participate would have to meet and a set of concrete capability projects, with further details to be agreed at future summits (European Council 2017: 5).

The main question remaining at this point was how demanding the criteria and commitments would be, and thus which member states would be allowed to participate in PESCO – in other words, what the balance between *inclusive* and *ambitious* would be. A key breakthrough came with the Franco-German Ministerial Council on 13 July 2017, which achieved an initial compromise between Paris and Berlin on the entry criteria and required commitments (Koenig – Walter-Franke 2017: 12). This was followed on 21 July by a letter to the HRVP from Paris and Berlin, also signed by the governments of Italy and Spain and supported by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, and the Netherlands, outlining the required commitments for an inclusive and balanced PESCO (Fiott – Missiroli – Tardy 2017: 25; Biscop 2018: 179, fn. 8). Based on this proposal, work continued throughout the fall, including a series of workshops organized by Paris and Berlin to inform other member states on the entry criteria and the assessment of PESCO projects (Fiott – Missiroli – Tardy 2017: 25; Gebauer – Müller 2017).

On 13 November 2017, 23 member states – all but the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Denmark and Malta – signed up for PESCO, with Ireland and Portugal joining soon thereafter (CEU 2017b). The following month, the participating states released a list of 17 projects aimed at improving military capabilities and the operational capacity of CSDP missions (CEU 2017c). On 14 December, on the sidelines of the European Council meeting held that day, the leaders of the 25 participating states formally launched the new arrangement. On the occasion, Mogherini spoke for many other EU leaders in terming the launching of PESCO an *"historic decision"* on the path of European defense integration (Euractiv 2017). In March 2018, EU defense ministers held their first meeting in the PESCO format, at which they formally adopted the previously announced projects and agreed on a roadmap for assessing and selecting the next set of projects (Gotev 2018). An additional 17 projects were adopted by the Council in November 2018 (CEU 2018).

While the plans for PESCO were developed within the EU framework, with the involvement of other member states and the HRVP, the final arrangement was essentially a French-German compromise (Biscop 2018: 164). Each side ideally wanted something different. While Berlin favored a PESCO that was as inclusive as possible and involved many member states, Paris desired a relatively small grouping of like-minded states that would be more effective and capable of acting quickly in the event of crises. The key debate thus centered on the criteria for entry and the binding commitments member states would have to make in order to participate. If these were strict and set a high bar, as Paris wanted, a smaller and more ambitious PESCO would result, but if they were relaxed, as favored by Berlin, more member states would be capable of meeting them and a larger PESCO would be possible (Major – Mölling 2019; De France 2019).

In the end, a compromise was achieved that turned PESCO into a process or *"pledging machine"* – in order to join PESCO *"member states would not need to already possess and [be able to] provide a high level of capability or operational assets, but would instead commit to reach ambitious goals"* (Billon – Galland – Quencez 2017: 2). The PESCO Notification submitted in November 2017 thus legally committed participants to increase defense spending, participate in joint capability development projects within the EU framework (CARD, EDF, PESCO), and improve the interoperability as well as availability and deployability of their forces (CEU 2017b: 3–5). To achieve these commitments, each participant agreed to submit a national Implementation Plan that would be assessed annually within the PESCO framework by the HRVP and updated as necessary (CEU 2017b: 9). While presented as a compromise, by adopting a phased approach to meeting commitments with unspecified timelines (Billon – Galland – Quencez 2017: 6), the agreement essentially achieved Berlin's goal of enabling a large number of members states to qualify, with 25 eventually signing on, a larger number than envisioned in the Franco-German proposal (Koenig – Walter-Franke 2017: 13; Biscop 2018: 164). It did so, however, by severely diluting the original ambitions of PESCO and

raising serious questions about what the new arrangement would accomplish (Besch 2018; Witney 2018; Valášek 2018).

French disappointment with the PESCO agreement was a factor in Paris' decision to launch a separate defense cooperation initiative outside the EU framework, the E2I. The E2I was first proposed by French President Macron in September 2017, in a speech at the Sorbonne (Keohane 2017). It entailed the creation of a common intervention force among European countries possessing both the resources and the will to take military action. A key goal of the initiative was, through staff exchanges and joint exercises, to promote the development of a shared strategic culture and military doctrine among participants, thus fostering a shared assessment of threats, enabling members to carry out missions together and permitting a more rapid response to security crises. Being outside the EU framework, the E2I would avoid the restrictions imposed by consensus-oriented EU decision-making rules. It would also be open to non-EU countries, thus allowing participation by the UK after Brexit. Nine European states – France, Germany, Belgium, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Estonia, Spain, and Portugal – eventually agreed in June 2018 to launch the E2I, with Finland later joining (Salam 2018). The E2I states held their first meeting in Paris in November 2018 (Stratfor 2018).

The creation of the E2I reflected French skepticism that PESCO would amount to much, and that it would enable the kind of rapid military reaction to crises in the European neighborhood that Paris viewed as necessary. In essence, the E2I was what France originally hoped PESCO would be, before it was forced to compromise with Germany and accept the more inclusive and less ambitious arrangement preferred by Berlin (Gotkowska 2018: 9). Clearly, the E2I initiative was motivated by French national security priorities and interests: Through it, France hoped to gain the support of other European states for its efforts to deal with security challenges in the EU's southern neighborhood, a region that Paris considered of paramount importance for both French and European security, but this was a task that it was increasingly unable to undertake on its own (Mölling – Major 2018).

While Germany eventually decided to join the E2I, it was not happy about the French initiative. Berlin was concerned that the E2I would undermine EU defense initiatives, especially PESCO. It also worried that the smaller and more exclusive E2I would create divisions within the EU between participants and nonparticipants, thus weakening EU cohesion, something Berlin had worked hard to avoid with its push for a more inclusive PESCO (Mölling – Major 2018). Finally, Berlin feared that through the E2I it would be pulled into French-led military operations abroad, something that clashed with the country's cultural aversion to military intervention and would no doubt be controversial domestically (Stratfor 2018). In the end, however, Berlin opted to join the initiative to avoid further straining relations with Paris, especially in view of the fact that the E2I was an initiative personally supported by the French president, making it a matter of great political importance for France, so that a German refusal to join would be viewed as an affront (Mölling – Major 2018).

Explaining the new forms of European defense cooperation based on the differences between French and German strategic cultures

The different forms of renewed European defense cooperation can be explained in part by the divergent national security priorities and preferences of France and Germany. Geography plays a key role here, exercising an important influence over perceptions of threat to national security. Germany's location in central Europe leaves it more vulnerable to threats from Russia. An eastward-facing Germany thus prioritizes deterrence and territorial defense based on large-scale, heavy-armored units rather than smaller, more flexible forces suited for expeditionary missions (Zandee 2017; Duke 2019: 138). France, on the other hand, is both more physically distant from Russia and more

oriented, by virtue of its geography but also its historical colonial and contemporary demographic ties, towards the south, focusing on security threats emanating from across the Mediterranean, from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the Middle East. France's possession of nuclear weapons also gives it a powerful deterrent against military attack – one not possessed by Germany, which depends on the US and NATO to provide it – which allows it to deemphasize territorial defense. For France, therefore, a key security priority is the ability to rapidly deploy smaller, more agile military forces to deal with crises and instability to its south. However, a militarily overstretched France is no longer able to deal with the challenges of its southern neighborhood on its own and needs European partners, something Paris initially hoped PESCO could provide. The failure of PESCO to fulfill these hopes led Paris to launch the E2I, which provides a basis for European cooperation to create such rapidly deployable forces and thus more directly addresses French security priorities (Mölling – Major 2018; Gotkowska 2018: 9–10, 12).

Also shaping French and German preferences regarding European defense cooperation, however, are divergent national strategic cultures, including differing perspectives on European integration. As it is a victor of the Second Word War and a former colonial power, France's strategic culture displays a readiness to utilize military force to deal with security problems, especially in its southern neighborhood. It also includes a longstanding desire for French and European strategic autonomy from the United States (Irondelle – Schmitt 2013). Germany, traumatized by its catastrophic defeat in the Second World War and bearing historic responsibility for the war and the Holocaust, has a strategic culture that is more pacifist and averse to the use of military force, especially for purposes other than territorial defense. This cultural aversion is reflected in significant domestic political constraints, including strong public opposition to military engagement and the constitutional requirement of parliamentary approval for any deployment of military force (Koenig – Walter-Franke 2017: 8). Germany is also more dependent on the US and NATO for its security, and thus more skeptical of calls for European strategic autonomy (Junk – Daase 2013). As a consequence, while France favored a more ambitious PESCO that would be more operationally capable and effective – more usable, in other words – and that would allow Europe to demonstrate strategic independence from the US, Germany was comfortable with a diluted, more cumbersome and less usable arrangement focused mainly on the longer-term development of military capabilities. For the very same reasons, Berlin is uncomfortable with the E2I, whose potential usability in crisis situations is much more suited to French strategic culture and preferences.

Another key aspect of strategic culture with ramifications for French and German preferences regarding European defense cooperation is different national views on European integration. For Germany, the EU *"has been a central component of Berlin's political and social identity since the end of the Second World War"* (Major – Mölling 2019: 6), and substantially contributing to the deepening and completion of the European Union is an important element of Germany's "*foreign policy reason of state"* (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2016: 377). For Berlin, therefore, a key motivation for increased defense cooperation was to boost the EU at a time of crisis and weakness, and to enhance EU cohesion in the face of growing centrifugal forces within the bloc. A more inclusive PESCO would help achieve these goals, while Berlin feared that a more exclusive arrangement would only further exacerbate intra-EU divisions (Major – Mölling 2019; Billon – Galland – Quencez 2017: 2). The more exclusive nature of the E2I, on the other hand, and the possibility that it could weaken EU defense cooperation plans and undermine EU cohesion, are key reasons for Berlin's uneasiness over the French defense initiative (Major – Mölling 2019: 12–13).

In contrast to Germany, France has traditionally had a more instrumental view of European integration, viewing it as means of augmenting French power and influence in

the world – or as a *"palliative to potential deficiencies in French power"* (De France 2019: 5) – rather than as a central component of national identity and purpose and a framework for national security (although for the argument that French views of European integration are actually more *"schizophrenic,"* see De France 2019). For France, therefore, PESCO was less a political project to strengthen European integration and cohesion and more a means of strengthening defense capabilities in ways supportive of Paris' strategic interests (Major – Mölling 2019: 3), leading it to favor a smaller and more ambitious (operational) initiative. Once it became apparent that PESCO would not meet its security needs, the French government decided to pursue its defense cooperation objectives outside the EU framework in the form of the E2I.

The EU institutional system also influenced the outcome of intergovernmental bargaining on PESCO and France's decision to launch the E2I. Unlike with other decisions on foreign, security, and defense policy where unanimity is required, the decision rules for the launching of PESCO, set by Article 46 of the Lisbon Treaty, require only a qualified majority vote in the Council, making an agreement more likely (OJEU 2012: 40). However, unlike the Commission's prominent role in the process leading to the creation of the EDF, European institutions played only a marginal and facilitative role in the launching of PESCO, with the HRVP's work on this issue providing mainly a framework for intergovernmental discussion. The real dynamic in the launching of PESCO was the bargaining between Germany and France, with other member states being brought in after Paris and Berlin had reached agreement among themselves (Biscop 2018: 163–164, 178–179, fn. 5 and 8). In this bargaining process, however, the EU context was important for the final outcome because of the linkage between defense and other policy issues. In particular, since France needed Germany's support for its proposals to reform EMU – like those for the creation of a budget for the Eurozone and the new post of Eurozone finance minister – it was compelled to defer to Berlin's preferences on the design of PESCO (Gebauer – Müller 2017), choosing instead to pursue the creation of the E2I outside the EU institutional framework.

CONCLUSION

This article has analyzed the relaunch of European defense cooperation from the perspective of neoclassical realism, a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy which explores how domestic political and ideational factors shape national foreign policy responses to international systemic pressures. As this article has argued, the impulse for renewed defense cooperation has clearly come from such systemic pressures, not factors or dynamics internal to the EU, as emphasized by theories of European integration, or the preferences of key domestic actors or processes of cultural dialogue and learning, as stressed by liberal and constructivist theories of international relations respectively. Global structural shifts and corresponding changes in the behavior of great powers like the US, China, and Russia, a more dangerous regional security environment, and the EU's own weakened state as a consequence of the economic crisis, Brexit, and the rise of populist-nationalist Euroscepticism, have all generated incentives for increased defense cooperation. Under these conditions, the decision of European states to pursue such cooperation is in keeping with the expectations of neorealism, which asserts that international systemic change affects the behavior of states and international outcomes. What neorealism cannot account for, however, because of its neglect of domestic or unit-level factors, is the form or content of this cooperation. Instead, explaining defense cooperation outcomes requires an understanding of the preferences on this issue of key European states, which are in turn shaped not just by their international structural position but also domestic political and ideational factors. By taking such unit-level factors into account and examining how they operate as intervening variables that shape national responses to international systemic pressures, neoclassical realism provides an analytical framework

that allows us to explain the policy preferences of key European states and defense cooperation outcomes.

In particular, this article has identified national strategic culture, including views on European integration, as a key domestic variable shaping the preferences on defense cooperation of France and Germany, the EU's two most powerful and influential member states. Along with divergent security priorities stemming from their different geographies and military capabilities, the different strategic cultures of France and Germany led the former to favor a more ambitious and effective PESCO, while the latter pushed for a more inclusive arrangement aimed more at intra-EU cohesion and long-term institution building rather than the creation of a deployable expeditionary force. The outcome, an inclusive and less ambitious PESCO reflecting more the preferences of Berlin, can be largely explained in terms of the bargaining power enjoyed by Germany in the contemporary EU context, with Paris willing to make concessions on PESCO because of its desire for German cooperation on other issues of importance to France, chiefly concerning the reform of EMU and European economic governance. France's disappointment with PESCO, however, also led it to pursue a separate, and possibly conflicting, defense cooperation initiative outside the EU framework with the launching of the E2I.

The key role of strategic culture as a factor shaping national preferences on defense cooperation aligns with the expectations of neoclassical realism concerning the relationship between international systemic pressures, the independent variable, and domestic intervening variables, with the nature of the former determining the relative importance of different categories of the latter. In terms of the model developed by Ripsman et al. (2016: 91–95), we can characterize the nature of systemic pressures presently confronting Europe. Systemic clarity can be classified as medium – while the nature of the threats facing Europe is fairly clear and widely agreed upon, we have seen key states prioritize them differently; nor does the system provide much guidance on how to respond to them beyond the general need for more defense cooperation – but the nature of the strategic environment is relatively permissive, in the sense that threats are not existential or exist mainly in the medium to long term. In this situation leader images should be less influential than in crisis situations; however, the relatively compressed time frame for decision making – most key decisions on new defense cooperation initiatives have been made within a three-year period – means that state-society relations and domestic political institutions should have relatively less of an impact, except perhaps in an anticipatory sense. This leaves strategic culture as the intervening variable most likely to influence national preferences on defense cooperation over the period being examined, as this article has indeed determined. Assuming little change systemic pressures, however, while strategic culture will remain an important factor influencing national preferences, the influence of domestic political factors, including institutional structures, public opinion, and electoral politics, is likely to grow over time as defense cooperation efforts proceed. A sharp change in the nature of the systemic pressures confronting Europe, however, including perhaps a convergence of views on the priority of different security threats, or the emergence of a more restrictive (threatening) strategic environment, could alter the relative influence of these various domestic factors yet again.

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The Women, Peace and Security Agenda: The Unfinished Story of Feminist Revolution versus Compromise in Global Politics

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Abstract: The adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS) in 2000 has prompted the development of an extensive WPS scholarship within the field of feminist International Relations. The dynamic scholarly debate is characterised by certain tensions between two feminist groups – the radical revolutionary one which advocates a redefinition of the global order and is more sceptical of the agenda, and the pragmatist one accentuating the compromise towards the existing peace and security governance. This article explores the two main subjects of the WPS research – the discourse and implementation, as they have been informed by the revolutionary and pragmatist approaches. The article shows that while the academic inquiries into the WPS discourse reveal disappointment with the compromises made regarding the revolutionary vision, this disappointment is also present in the literature on implementation. The latter literature nonetheless acknowledges feminist pragmatism as a way forward given the realities on the ground.

Keywords: UNSCR 1325, Women, Peace and Security Agenda, feminist critique, revolution, pragmatism

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During the last two decades, the global peace and security governance has seen an unprecedented spread of new gender norms falling under the umbrella of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS). This agenda's very foundation lies in the transnational women's activism, which led to the adoption of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325[1] in 2000, the first ever resolution that calls for women's participation and inclusion of gender perspective in peacebuilding, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and post-conflict recovery. It is also the first of such thematic Resolutions of the Security Council, the world's highest international body in charge of peace and security. On these grounds, this achievement was applauded as a milestone, a watershed (e.g. Anderlini 2007: 7), a revolutionary moment or a potentially revolutionary moment, as it could

transform ways of understanding how security is conceived, protected and enforced (Cohn et al. 2004: 137). From this platform, it was possible to imagine a radical reform of peace and security governance, and it was celebrated as such (Kirby – Shepherd 2016a: 249).

The WPS agenda is centred around the key pillars of implementation, defined as the areas of action – participation, protection and prevention, the gender perspective and relief and recovery.[2] In 19 years, the normative WPS framework was augmented to include ten Resolutions,[3] influencing advocacy, policy-making and practise across the globe. The WPS agenda has also been extensively explored by academics, and the research grew into the new sub-field of feminist International Relations (IR). Engagement with the WPS agenda has not been uniform in theory, concept, or practise and there is no consensus either on the desired direction of progress or on which part of the agenda is the most crucial to such progress (Kirby – Shepherd 2016a: 250). The underlying characteristics of the WPS scholarship are certain tensions stemming from the diverse forms of feminist knowledge present in the academic debate. Louise Olsson and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis (2015: 2) observe that at the basis of these critical debates on UNSCR 1325 lies the fact that from an early period in the emergence of 1325, an uneasy alliance formed between those who seek to understand and reform the international community's work to contribute to gender equality, and those who strive for a more radical reorganisation of the world structure. The resulting tight spots, variously referred to as epistemological differences between feminist discourse and empirical research (Olsson – Gizelis 2014: 2), between the two broad feminist camps of peacebuilding sceptics and critically engaged pragmatists (Duncanson 2016: 10), or, similarly, between feminist revolution and pragmatism (True – Davies 2019: 6), can be traced throughout the extensive WPS scholarship, having evolved since the adoption of the foundational Resolution 1325.

In other words, whereas one group of feminist scholars is more empirically- or practise-oriented, seeking WPS reforms in favour of women on the ground, the other, more radical group calls for a reorganisation of the contemporary peace and security order to pursue the feminist vision of peace. The radical or revolutionary approach of the latter envisions a paradigm shift away from the neoliberal model of governance that is seen by revolutionary feminist scholars as prioritising profit over people, exacerbating inequalities, supporting militarism and patriarchy, and furthering war, conflict, environmental degradation and climate change (WILPF 2014 as cited in Duncanson 2016: 67). Duncanson (2016: 11) nonetheless argues that both of these camps are critical scholars wishing to transform the current political, social and economic structures. The divide is more about how to achieve the transformation – whether to work as *insiders* or *outsiders* to the contemporary international order and its security institutions (see Hawkesworth 2006 as cited in Duncanson 2016: 11).

The concept of transformation, transformative agenda or transformative change is indeed very frequently used in the WPS literature by both groups. "Transformation" can refer to the internal changes within the existing peace and security structures, as well as to the more radical one *"beyond the power of internal strategy"* (Kirby – Shepherd 2016b: 392), meaning the paradigm transformation mentioned above. That said, the concept of transformation is more frequently used, sometimes interchangeably, with the revolutionary approach, although not explicitly. It is not that the critical pragmatists lack a transformatory agenda, but they might vary in the degree to which they advocate for transformatory change (Duncanson 2016: 11). To make it more complicated, it is not always entirely clear how scholars envision transformative change or transformative potential within the WPS framework. There is no consensus among feminist scholars about the extent to which the transformation of global governance is possible, what form it should take, and indeed to what ends global governance could and should be transformed (Waylen 2008: 254). To give an illustration from the broad WPS community, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), an organisation at

the heart of the WPS agenda, envisions transformation in revolutionary terms as a total worldwide disarmament, including the dismantling of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (Kirby – Shepherd 2016: 390–391), while those advocating a more compromised approach focus on an insider's engagement in transformative changes within such institutions as NATO (e.g. Bastick – Duncanson 2018; Wright 2016).

In this article, I review the WPS debate in the light of these two approaches to the global peace and security order, the pragmatist one accentuating compromise, and the radical revolutionary one, which is much more sceptical to the WPS agenda. More precisely, I strive to explore how the agenda's potential to either be co-opted by the existing order of international peace and security governance, or radically redefine and revolutionise this order is viewed by scholars who researched two traditional spotlights of the WPS scholarship – the discourse and implementation of the WPS agenda. The focus is thus on how the literature sees the specifics of the WPS discourse and implementation and their differences and commonalities in compromising with or counteracting the international peace and security order. The article shows how the disappointment with the WPS being too much about compromise at the expense of revolution, which is apparent in the conceptual enquiries into the WPS discourse, is reflected also in the academic assessment of the WPS implementation practises. Nonetheless, there is an apparent shift in the latter literature towards acknowledging feminist pragmatism as a way forward given the realities on the ground.

By mapping the WPS literatures' approach to the international peace and security order, I aim to streamline the debate for those who seek to understand this complex and dynamically evolving feminist agenda, be it emerging scholars, policymakers or practitioners. The literature is approached chronologically, in accordance with the development of the WPS scholarship from the early conceptual critique to the more recent empirical research assessing implementation. Since the number of academic books and articles on WPS is enormous, the focus is especially on literature that touches upon the tight spots of the WPS debate.

The article proceeds in three steps. First, I introduce the genesis of Resolution 1325 and place it in the context of the revolution versus compromise debate. Second, I discuss how the literature views the WPS agenda's conceptual framework while focussing on its official discourse, and third, I look at how it views implementation, considering in both cases the divide between the pragmatist and revolutionary approaches. The concluding text summarises the WPS debate in the context of the existing tensions and unanswered questions and touches on possible avenues for advancing the WPS research.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE WPS AGENDA

The adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 is widely regarded as a historical moment which gave a foundation to the broader WPS agenda. The genesis of 1325 is well documented in the literature, with emphasis given to the role of advocacy networks, as well as to the global security climate of the 1990s, which provided the preparatory ground. Understanding the WPS agenda and the acclaimed revolutionary potential envisioned by advocates of UNSCR 1325, nonetheless, requires placing it against the background of the international peace and security processes vested in the powerful Security Council.

Many scholars emphasise that Resolution 1325 was not adopted in a vacuum (e.g. Chinkin 2019: 26). The post-Cold War environment supported women's movements and emancipatory opportunity structures that allowed for the production of normative agendas such as Children in Armed Conflict and Protection of Civilians (Tryggestad 2014: 54). UNSCR 1325 was among the group of these thematic resolutions adopted between 1998 and 2000, which marked the beginning of a new era of UN peacebuilding (Klot 2015: 730; Chinkin 2019: 26). Seeing it in retrospect, it was also still the time of the decade of optimism before the turn back towards militarism and national security in the wake of

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Chinkin 2019: 34). The role of feminist advocacy networks in the genesis of 1325 is widely recognised and documented (e.g. Cohn et al. 2004; Cockburn 2012). Cockburn (2012: 49) considers Resolution 1325 as *our* feminist achievement, explaining that it may well be the only Security Council Resolution for which the preparatory groundwork was entirely done by civil society and non-governmental organisations.

However, it would be misleading to consider this agenda new to the women's movement. Rather, Resolution 1325 brought it to the highest security institution but its history goes back to the 1915 Hague Congress of Women, which outlined the vision of general disarmament and *permanent peace* (Otto 2018: 105; Kirby – Shepherd 2016a: 250). The Congress established the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, the predecessor of WILPF, which was at the centre of the advocacy network for UNSCR 1325. Members of this network were organisations with different profiles, and it is worth mentioning that out of these, only the Hague Appeal for Peace and WILPF are explicitly anti-war, anti-militarist, and pro-disarmament, and of the two, only WILPF also explicitly identifies itself as feminist (Cohn 2008: 196). While the groups in the network advocated as a coalition, talking about the international arms trade, *militarism*, or, even worse, militarism's relation to masculinities, as WILPF wanted to do, was deemed by these groups to be too *political* (Cohn 2008: 197). It is significant to note that the self-censorship of this coalition foreclosed even the possibility of conversation with member state delegations about these issues (Cohn 2008: 197). It is therefore not surprising that some women from this network were self-critical afterwards for its failing to address these issues, especially after seeing what the Resolution has become in practise (Cockburn 2012: 49, 55). The critiques of militarism, military budgets and military priorities were curtailed and reformulated into positive calls for women's participation and a gender perspective in peace and security, to fit the practises and expectations of the UN and the Security Council (Gibbings 2011: 532), where the dominant paradigm holds a world made up of states that *defend* state security through military means (Cohn 2008: 197).

The institutional processes leading to the adoption of UNSCR 1325 further diluted the radicalism in UNSCR 1325. According to Felicity Hill and Maha Muna, who were both involved in the campaign to pass the Resolution as part of the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security (NGO WG), NGOs sought to shift the focus from women as victims, though without losing this aspect of conflict, to women as effective actors in peace and peace building (Cohn et al. 2004: 132). Nonetheless, the message of the NGO WG had been diluted in the process of working in a coalition with UN bureaucrats and officials of Member States, who at every stage pressed realism on the activists, stressing the limits of what the Security Council was likely, at best, to take onboard (Cockburn 2007: 148). To push their agenda forward, the NGO WG adopted the UN's positive and uplifting language norms of women as peacemakers (Gibbings 2011: 533).

It seems from these accounts that the WPS agenda has from its outset departed from the revolutionary path, albeit still being regarded as potentially revolutionary. The price of bringing the pillars of women, peace and security into the security agenda of the UN Security Council may have been the high one of losing the transformative potential sought by civil society (Otto 2015, as cited in Chinkin 2019: 34). However, the following parts of the article show that the tension between revolution and compromise has remained an unfinished story, preoccupying the WPS scholarship from discourse to the research on WPS implementation.

THE WPS DISCOURSE

The global success and promotion of UNSCR 1325 as a breakthrough policy and advocacy tool was, soon after its adoption, overshadowed by academic critiques problematising the Resolution's discursive construction of gender and security. Most of this literature is

guided by the feminist vision of peace, building on the revolutionary change envisioned by advocates of 1325. These critiques largely dismiss UNSCR 1325's potential for a radical redefinition of the international peace and security system and the gender power relations that maintain this system, warning instead that its problematic conceptualisation maintains the status quo and allows the agenda to be co-opted by militaries. A similar critique persists towards the follow-up WPS norms, although the most recent Resolutions are viewed with some optimism.

The Foundational Resolution 1325: Feminist Activism Co-opted by the Security Establishment

In the years following the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the relevant scholarly critique concentrated on the discursive construction of gender in this Resolution, problematising its grounding on essentialism and binary opposites. With the concept of gender inextricably linked to the one of security in UNSCR 1325, a further feminist critique emerged contesting the norm's conventional framing of security. Especially in the course of the norm's diffusion and adoption by various organisations, including militaries, and with the slow progress achieved on the ground, WPS scholars started to question UNSCR 1325's silence on militarisation, militarised masculinity, and the war system in general. These lines of critique constitute the basis of the revolutionary approach which is widely present in the feminist academic production on Resolution 1325.

One of the most common critiques of UNSCR 1325 questions the Resolution's representation of women as vulnerable, and often coupled with children and civilians (e.g. Carpenter 2005; Charlesworth 2008; Otto 2006; Shepherd 2008; Vayrynen 2004). Feminists have long argued that fixing 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990) as eternally protected is closely related to the maternalist discourses that see *women*, by virtue of their association with motherhood, as *naturally* more nurturing, peaceful and protective (Shepherd 2008a: 119). Moreover, the language which emphasises women's role as mothers is linked to an assumption that they are inherently peaceful, situating women (but not men) as civilian caregivers (Carpenter 2005: 306). This essentialist view of women as mothers, nurturers, and communal peacemakers has the potential to push post-conflict societies back to the status quo in terms of traditional gender roles (Hudson 2009: 61). This representation also functions to define men as responsible for protecting *their* women and children and the nation as a whole (Shepherd 2008: 115).[4]

The sceptical group of scholars has further identified some passages of 1325 as problematic for considering gender as a women's issue while also ignoring its relational and intersectional value (Charlesworth 2008; Heathcote 2014; Otto 2006; Shepherd 2008; True 2010; Vayrynen 2004). For some scholars, through the productive discursive power of its framings, 1325 produces certain types of masculinities and femininities, normalising binaries and fixed ideas about gender practises (Vayrynen 2010, quoted in Duncanson 2016: 35). So, whilst the Resolution was hailed as a transformatory triumph, the relations of inequality remain uncontested in it, which in reality means the Resolution is used as a way of co-opting gender activism to preserve the existing gender status quo (Puechguirbal 2010: 184). What is more, the Resolution represents women as a uniform group with uniform needs, failing to address the complex intersections of gender with race, ethnicity, sexuality, physical ability and religious privilege, and how this manifests in specific post-conflict communities (Heathcote 2014: 52). This is further reinforced by the invisibility of men as diverse and differently privileged actors (Heathcote 2014: 52). The word men is not used in the document, despite its textual representation of gender (Shepherd 2008: 116). The crucial point of this critique is that if ideas about women are to change, ideas about men must also change (Otto 2006: 160). Scholars challenge also the the fixing of women as victims of violence as it functions to reproduce a conceptualisation of both gender and violence that is theoretically and practically dangerous (Shepherd 2008: 123). This

gendered construction denies women the agency extended by Resolution 1325 while perpetuating the feminisation of peace, and pacification of women (True 2010: 199).

All the sceptical accounts above suggest that the Resolution's discursive construction of gender prevents the realisation of the revolutionary potential envisioned by the advocates of the norm. This critique caused some frustration among feminists from the UN and NGOs focusing on effective implementation of the norm, who see it as an overanalysing or abstract theorising which does not lead to strategies for action (Duncanson 2016: 36, 42). Even some scholarly responses written in the first several years after the adoption of 1325 still try to elevate its positive aspects, arguing that the Resolution simultaneously acknowledges the very real horrors of women's experiences in war and the scandalous lack of attention to women's need for protection, while also making women's agency vibrantly visible (Cohn et al. 2004: 139). Nonetheless, even the more optimistic feminists such as Cohn soon became disillusioned, seeing the revolutionary limits of the norm in its approaches to security (Cohn 2008; Cockburn 2012; see also Duncanson 2016: 33).

Many feminist scholars guided by the revolutionary approach emphasise that with militarism left in place, UNSCR 1325 is dependent on existing militarised structures and processes of international peace and security (Cohn 2008; Cockburn 2012; Olonisakin at al. 2011). These authors argue that to change the relationships between the masculinised protectors and the feminised protected would ultimately require a profound transformation and reordering of the international structures that promote peace and security (Willet 2010: 147). In view of that, many scholars point at the contradictions inherent to 1325 (Cockburn 2012; Cohn 2008; Otto 2014). Cockburn (2012: 54) warns that whilst the UN was created to put an end to war, 1325's wording and provisions leave it co-optable by militarism. Duncanson (2013: 28) explains that these feminist sceptics see not only an inherent contradiction in using soldiers to achieve peace, but also that the problem is that soldiers defend and in part constitute a system which is fundamentally unjust. These critiques suggest that such a system is left unchallenged by UNSCR 1325 and hence, the revolutionary opportunities are missed. In her widely cited lines, Cohn (2008: 198) argues that the focus on protecting women in war, and insisting that they have an equal right to participate in the processes and negotiations that end particular wars, both leave war itself in place rather than pushing for an intervention that would try either to prevent war, or to contest the legitimacy of the systems that produce war.

In a similar vein, a number of authors highlights the WPS agenda's failure to re-conceptualise security in feminist terms to include not just physical, but also structural, economic, and environmental security.[5] This means that the root causes of conflict and violence are ignored (Basu – Corfontini 2016; Ruby 2014; Otto 2014), albeit addressing these is seen as key to sustainable peace together with demilitarisation and disarmament (Chowdhury Fink – Davidian 2018: 161). The frequent criticism here targets the neoliberal macroeconomic policies of the existing peacebuilding framework. The main point of critique is that UNSCR 1325 fails to adequately challenge a global system in which neoliberal notions of development are married to and dependent on militarism and militarisation (Basu – Corfontini 2016: 15). Duncanson (2016: 11), however, argues that this group of feminist sceptics has too often focussed on identifying neoliberalism as the problem that prevents progress without considering how to challenge it, and that their critique is too harsh and dismissive of the importance of the small wins. She tries to build on both the revolutionary and the pragmatist camps, suggesting their potential synergies and increased collaboration (Duncanson 2016: 11).

The Follow-up WPS Resolutions: From Problematic Protection to Meaningful Participation

The scholarly critique of the conceptual framing of the WPS norms continues, as the agenda has expanded to a total of ten Resolutions by 2019,[6] although these are not analysed

in such detail and to such an extent in the literature as UNSCR 1325. Foremostly, the revolutionary camp problematises the predominant focus of the Security Council on prevention of and protection from sexual violence in conflict, arguing this approach reinforces the militarised approach to security at the expense of a long-term prevention. The Security Council largely reverted to its protective script of women as victims of the sexual violence of armed conflict in its second thematic WPS Resolution, UNSCR 1820, adopted in 2008, and later reaffirmed it in UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1960 and UNSCR 2106 (Otto 2014: 163). By choosing to focus on sexual violence, the Security Council reasserts its role as the protector, reinvigorating a narrative of gender that supports militarism and justifies the hegemonic use of power in a crisis, both deeply anti-feminist projects (Otto 2009: 17). Chloé Lewis (2014: 215) acknowledges certain progress in Resolution 2106's explicit reference to men and boys, including male survivors, but she further argues that overall, the Resolution still reinforces the problematic narrative of male perpetrators/female victims. Scholars also stress that the Security Council's main focus on protection has come at the expense of strengthening participation and women's agency. As Kirby and Shepherd (2016b: 380) note, only UNSCR 1889 and 2122 focus primarily on participation issues, while four of the remaining WPS Resolutions address violence prevention and protection (Resolutions 1820, 1888, 1960 and 2106); the exception here is UNSCR 2242, which is relatively balanced.

Some scholars writing from the revolutionary position note that the overwhelming focus on protection and violence prevention has detracted the WPS agenda from long-term prevention. Prevention was originally framed as conflict and war prevention, yet over the years it has been changed to prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (Anderlini 2010: 15), steadily shifting from a general opposition to war to a limited focus on civilian victimisation and war crimes, and even to an accommodation with military operations in cases where it was deemed sufficiently cognisant of *human security* (Kirby – Shepherd 2016b: 391). It is the *prevention* in the sense of sustained social change to undo the conditions that produce violent conflict in the first place which is absent (Kirby – Shepherd 2016b: 391). There is almost nothing in the agenda on the root causes, the political economy of violence and its role in preventing participation, in contrast to the weight given in the WPS Resolutions to women in the security sector, and conflict-related sexual violence as a weapon of war and later a weapon of terror (Chinkin – Reese 2019: 24).

On the other hand, there is an apparent tendency to elevate the transformatory potentials of the follow up WPS norms. Scholars, for instance, acknowledge that some of the follow up Resolutions provide opportunities for transformative change, as there is a certain shift towards the language of empowerment and agency. In UNSCR 1888, women are recognisable as positive actors and putative agents, whose participation is expected to transform the security sector, which continues in a similar vein in UNSCR 1889 (Shepherd 2011: 508). Otto (2018: 114) refers to two *empowerment resolutions*, arguing they work hard to make up for some of the lost ground: UNSCR 1889 particularly demands attention to improving women's socioeconomic conditions through access to education, justice, and basic health services, and UNSCR 2122 affirms that sustainable peace requires a holistic approach that integrates political, security, development, human rights, the rule of law and justice activities. Heathcote (2014: 12) similarly argues that UNSCR 2122 opens some transformative possibilities but adds that the focus on women's participation needs to shift to addressing the problem of the over-representation of men in post-conflict institutions, resisting gender essentialism by responding to the diversity of women's lives, and acknowledging the gendered normative assumptions of the Security Council itself. Some progress is apparent from the most recent Resolutions' language of *meaningful participation*, as advocated by NGOs such as WILPF, which illustrates the evolving meaning-in-use of WPS (Davies – True 2019: 12). There is clearly some optimism in these accounts of the transformative potential provided by the discursive constructions of the newer

Resolutions. At the same time, however, as Shepherd (2011: 511) cautiously notes, recognising women as actors does not automatically ensure that those same women necessarily have the agency-capacity to act.

Scholars also respond to the emerging areas of concern covered by the newer Resolutions. Ní Aoláin (2016: 276) notes, for instance, that with UNSCR 2242, the WPS agenda leaves the line of conventional conflict for the first time as it is expanded to include the context of terrorism and countering violent extremism (Ní Aoláin 2016: 276). The emphasis on women's participation in the prevention of terrorism and violent extremism in 2242 changes the nature of prevention as it has been constituted thus far in the adopted Resolutions (Shepherd 2019: 107). Some authors nonetheless warn of the risk of instrumentalisation and securitisation of women's rights in the efforts of countering terrorism and violent extremism (Ní Aoláin 2016; Chowdhury Fink – Davidian 2018). Then again, Shepherd (2019: 106) indicates an important shift in Resolution 2242 – from the articulation of women as agents of violence prevention to the articulation of gender equality and women's empowerment as a precondition for effective violence prevention, which seems to be in line with Cora Weiss's idea of *"abolishing war"* rather than *"mak[ing] war safe for women"* (Shepherd 2019: 106). There is also an emphasis in 2242 on the engagement of men and boys as partners in promoting women's participation, which represents new possible futures for the WPS agenda (Shepherd 2019: 107). Chowdhury Fink and Davidian (2018: 162) similarly describe UNSCR 2242 as an opening, explaining that if the WPS principles were applied, the increasing convergence could be an avenue to ensure a focus on prevention, demilitarisation, and human rights. These arguments seem to suggest that some of the revolutionary ideas have been projected into Resolution 2242.

But overall, the literature on the conceptual framing of the follow up WPS Resolutions goes from strong scepticism to a softer tone with some optimistic accounts and less opposition to the current peace and security architecture. Kirby and Shepherd (2016b: 391) argue that the narrowing of the WPS aims regarding prevention mentioned above, is one of the consequences of the radical WPS voices being muted in the contemporary WPS discourse. In other words, while the WPS framework has been expanding, the revolutionary voices, which were so present in the academic discourse on 1325, were toned down. Otto (2018: 106) also admits that the WPS agenda has come at some costs to feminist goals, one of them being the softening of the feminist opposition to war, evidenced by the shift from aiming to end all wars to making wars safer for women. On a similar note, Pratt and Richter-Devroe (2011: 493) conclude ten years on that rather than transforming international security agendas, 1325 marginalises the more radical anti-militarist feminism in advocating for international peace and security. This development is closely linked to the implementation of the WPS agenda, which is discussed in the next part. As Kirby and Shepherd (2016b: 391) point out, the state-centrism and bureaucratic frameworks behind the agenda make a revival of the radical WPS practically impossible, as it would require a fundamental redefinition of the very idea of peace and security, and of the actors competent to bring it about.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WPS AGENDA

The implementation of the WPS agenda has come under academic scrutiny more recently with the growing evidence-based research. The implementation debate builds to some extent on the conceptual critiques, demonstrating that the problematic narrative of the WPS Resolutions has translated directly into policies and practises on the ground. Nonetheless, even though the radical starting points are not entirely absent, there is an apparent shift among scholars towards a more pragmatist approach when assessing the WPS implementation in various contexts. As said by Davies and True (2019: 6), a feminist pragmatist approach is an opening that was not there before and would not be there if we pushed for a *perfect* version of what the normative WPS agenda should look like in a local

adaptation. Hence, there are many scholars critiquing the protection focus or the neoliberal peacebuilding, while at the same time suggesting pragmatic solutions within the existing peace and security frameworks. To best reflect the evolving critique of WPS implementation, this part is organised according to the persistent debate on the key pillars of WPS and also according to the main actors engaged in the agenda from its international, regional, and national to its local implementation.

The Pillars of Implementation: The Narrow Focus on Violence Prevention and Protection

The underlying principles of Resolution 1325 – participation, protection and prevention, the gender perspective and relief and recovery – have informed the implementation of the WPS agenda and the scholarly research in this area. These pillars of implementation have been in various degrees projected into policy and practise. While assessing the implementation progress on the ground in different conflict-affected contexts, scholars particularly criticise the global tendency to reduce the areas for action to protection, while other pillars are side-lined. The main argument underpinning this debate is that the narrow protection focus is victimising, marginalises women's participation and undermines women's agency. This debate thus largely mirrors the earlier discursive critique of the construction of gender, as the conceptual flaws directly affect the implementation practises.

Ní Aolian (2011: 108) explains that although Resolution 1325 has been influential in the effort to bring gender mainstreaming into peacekeeping operations, it has not revolutionised actual practises in the field, nor has it served to address women's needs or unravel the masculinities inherent in peacekeeping operations, which may in part be connected to the norm's broader conceptual bias. Scholars have especially problematised the focus on protection in relation to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) at the expense of participation and prevention. This perception has been so widespread among scholars and practitioners that Kirby and Shepherd (2016b: 380) talk about a chronic protection–representation dilemma as a legacy of UNSCR 1325.

While academics do not deny the urgent need to respond to CRSV, they have gathered much empirical evidence to demonstrate that reducing WPS to protection supports women's victimisation and passivity at the expense of women's agency (Hudson 2010; Kreft 2016). Kreft (2016: 23), for instance, analyses the gender components in 71 UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs), concluding that actors appear to turn to the prevalence of sexual violence in conflict for guidance in designing gender-mainstreamed peacekeeping mandates, which is harmful because, as important an issue as it is, sexual violence captures only one dimension of gendered conflict for women. One case where this is particularly apparent is MONUSCO's[7] authorising mandate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which, in response to rampant sexual violence, emphasises the protection of women only at the expense of their participation (Kreft 2016: 23). A similar case shows that donor agencies' narrow focus on sexual violence against women in the DRC resulted in a lack of interest in maternal health care, women's economic empowerment and political participation (Eriksson Baaz – Stern 2010, quoted in Krause 2015: 112). Drawing on field-based expertise in DRC, Dönges and Kullenberg (2019: 162) conclude that despite the increased attention to gender vulnerabilities, the risk is that UN peacekeeping still implements protection with the same tools – predominantly male soldiers. The emphasis on protection has brought no considerable progress to the widespread problem of CRSV, from protection to dealing with accountability and prosecution of perpetrators, including peacekeepers (Krause 2015; Coomaraswamy et al. 2015).

This literature thus shows how the conceptual weaknesses of the gender construction, as defined from the revolutionary position, are reproduced in practise. At the same time, this implementation critique rarely challenges the existing peace and security architecture but rather, it tends to shift to compromise and to the possible solutions within this

system. Some scholars seem to search for solutions to the problem of overcoming the protection-participation dilemma. Kreft (2016: 23) suggests countering the selective activation of UNSCR 1325 by emphasising the universality of the norms of women's agency in all post-conflict contexts and divorcing these norms from the occurrence of sexual violence which can be incorporated under the theme of the protection of civilians in conflict. Others propose to pay attention to women's participation when addressing protection from sexual violence in order to strengthen gender equality and thus weaken the basis for rape (Krause 2015: 101) and also in order to recognise that women are unlikely to be able to participate effectively in peace and security governance if their immediate security environment is compromised by the prevalence of sexualised and gender-based violence (Kirby – Shepherd 2016b: 381). Kirby and Shepherd (2016b: 381) suggest a more complex and holistic approach which seems in line with the revolutionary logic, arguing for connecting protection from and prevention of violence to participation at multiple levels and across the various processes involved in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, and recognising that the WPS agenda ranges across the spheres of economics, justice, security and formal politics.

Along with this participation-protection debate, academics problematise the existing limited participation itself, principally for being instrumentalised and reduced to quantitative targets. Research shows that participation of women in peace negotiations and that in peacekeeping operations are the action areas of WPS which have shown the least progress (Coomaraswamy 2015; Miller et al. 2014; Gizelis – Olsson 2015). Overall, participation is very slowly on the rise in peace operations, and women's inclusion in peace processes lags behind (Gizelis – Olsson 2015: 12). Today, of the approximately 125,000 peacekeepers, women constitute 3% of military personnel and 15% of police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions, compared to the years between 1957 and 1989, when a total of only twenty women served as UN peacekeepers (Karim – Beardsley 2017: 17). Nevertheless, many scholars (Coomaraswamy 2015; Enloe 2017; Kirby – Shepherd 2016b) question the narrow quantitative indicators for failing to address the concrete dynamics of gendered power, reinforcing rather than challenging the essentialist ideas about women's nature being pacific and consensual (Kirby – Shepherd 2016b: 375). This goes in contrast to the earlier discussed shift in discourse which goes beyond women's mere presence towards a 'meaningful' participation, which is yet to be seen in practise (Paffenholz 2019: 157).

Women's participation has also received considerable criticism for being instrumentalised in practise as having an added value to peace (Olsson – Gizelis 2015; Cohn et al. 2004). Although academics have warned that the effectiveness argument can divert from the core problems of gender inequality in contrast to the rights-based approach (see, e.g., Olsson – Gizelis 2015: 5), it has been widely used in policy and practise. In this regard, Davies and True (2019: 5) argue from the pragmatist position that a major compromise is that between a feminist, rights-based approach that advocates for women's equal participation in peace and security and opposes military solutions, and an instrumental approach that sees gender equality as a means to the ends of security, stability and military effectiveness. Such a pragmatist approach has brought feminist scholars closer to the research on institutions of global security governance, including militaries such as NATO, which is promoting UNSCR 1325 to achieve operational effectiveness (see, e.g., Wright 2016). Here the pragmatists accept that both the rights-based and the instrumental approach have the potential to recognise gender-specific experiences and impacts of conflict as well as the need to prevent conflict in ways that enhance women's agency (Davies – True 2019: 5).

Prevention of conflict, however, has become the *"poor little sister"* of the normative WPS agenda, with a largely ambivalent approach on the part of the Security Council to women's role in conflict prevention, and likewise, with little conversation in academic and

policy-making circles on women's potential to prevent conflict (Kapur – Rees 2019: 136). During the discussion for the Global Study, women from different parts of the world expressed concerns that too much attention and resources have shifted towards militarised security and short-term protection of civilians, and too little focus has been paid to long-term prevention and structural changes, including disarmament (Coomaraswamy 2015: 190–216). Accordingly, this narrowing of the WPS agenda has failed to fulfil its transformative potential (Coomaraswamy 2015: 231). A similar situation is in the area of *relief and recovery*, as this pillar is seen as a siloed latecomer (O'Reilly 2019: 196) and the most underdeveloped, under-researched and misinterpreted of the four WPS pillars (True – Hewitt 2019: 178). Yet, relief and recovery means *"building back better"* and is thus closely linked with achieving the transformative potential by addressing the structural causes of violent conflict and building a long-term structural foundation for peace, but the efforts toward this goal have so far been a failure in the WPS agenda (True – Hewitt 2019: 178). This is something that has preoccupied WPS scholars more recently, leading to some progressive discussions among academic circles focussing on addressing structural inequalities and root causes of conflict and violence through the focus on socioeconomic conditions that affect women's participation in peacebuilding (Cohn – Duncanson 2017; Duncanson 2016; Heathcote 2014; True 2014). This scholarly debate, discussed in the following part, is largely informed by the pragmatist approach or, as Duncanson says, tries to build on both camps.

WPS in International, Regional, National and Local Practise: From Scepticism to Pragmatism

Like the debates around the key pillars of implementation, the early literature on various practises from international to local levels tends to compare the performance to the original revolutionary claims, contesting especially the liberal peacebuilding paradigm for serving as a deadlock to progress. Nonetheless, more recent scholarship is characterised by some compromises that feminists made with the current peace and security order. As Davies and True (2019: 5) put it, the feminist pragmatist approach is a middle path for the ambition of WPS against the harsh political realities. In view of that, there are tendencies to concentrate on the small wins and everyday work which can result in transformatory change (e.g. Duncanson 2016).

A considerable amount of WPS literature concentrates on the overall WPS agenda in the context of the state-based system of international peace and security, dominated by the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. It is precisely this international order that the more radical voices seek to challenge that has provided the base for implementation of the WPS agenda. Chinkin and Rees (2019: 24) argue that while the normative WPS framework exists, the implementation is painfully slow due to the combination of the systems and institutions which have undermined the agenda: the UN security system, the global arms trade system, the neo-liberal exploitative economic system and the systems for countering violent extremism and anti-terrorism systems. In this regard, academic circles question especially the prevailing political-military approaches rather than socio-economic ones, and the neoliberal economic policies that inevitably accompany post-conflict development, while being critical toward approaches of states and other international actors.

Scholars argue that the majority of international actors continue to follow the orthodox aid, trade and investment paradigm, where a donor might fund gender-sensitive peacebuilding projects inspired by 1325 but the same donor's geo-political interests often lead it to support military expansionism and/or neoliberal policies that are at odds with the overall peace and security in the very same country (Duncanson 2016: 139). This is the case with the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and, more recently, Ukraine (see, e.g., Al-Ali – Pratt 2006; Shepherd 2006; O'Sullivan 2019). The critique of neoliberalism has proliferated since 9/11, questioning especially the international discourses around the war on terror and neoliberal

interventions (see, e.g., Shepherd 2006; Al-Ali – Pratt 2006). While there has been evidence that women on the ground themselves want programmes that integrate peacebuilding with economic empowerment, the opposite usually happens in the rapid rebuilding of the post-conflict economic structures, which is often based on liberalisation of the economy and market reforms (Coomaraswamy 2015: 170). Furthermore, the academic critique scrutinises the neoliberal logic applied by international actors through WPS policies such as National Action Plans (NAPs). Shepherd (2016: 10), for instance, examines the NAPs drawn up by six countries that have considerable military involvement in an ongoing conflict and high levels of military spending, concluding that outward-facing NAPs, such as those produced by the USA, the UK and Australia, tend to focus on making 'war safe for women' rather than demilitarisation strategies and thus perpetuate the very dynamics of militarism and elite-centric security governance that the feminist revolutionary approach seeks to challenge. Also, a consistent critique is aimed at the insufficient implementation of 1325 due to the lack of political pressure and the resource scarcity associated with neoliberal peacebuilding (Coomaraswamy 2015; Olsson – Gizelis 2013; Olonisakin – Barnes – Ikpe 2011).[8]

This critique toward the system has nonetheless caused some frustration among the WPS community. Duncanson (2016: 90) explains that many scholars have been trapped in their critique by simply admitting that WPS ultimately cannot achieve the feminist vision of security because of the dominance of neoliberalism. Others, while accepting the importance of this debate, believe we need to go beyond seeing neoliberalism as the problem (e.g. Duncanson 2016; Otto 2014; Prügl 2015). There are many recent proposals to find common ground and build bridges (Olsson – Gizelis 2014) and to overcome the compromise versus revolution divides particularly by concentrating on the small wins and everyday work which can also result in transformatory change (see, e.g., Duncanson 2016; Kirby – Shepherd 2016b; Otto 2014).

Among such scholars can be counted those researching mainstreaming of the WPS agenda by insiders in institutions of global and regional security governance such as the UN (Dersnah 2019), NATO (Wright et al. 2019) or national armed forces of countries such as Australia (Wittwer 2019) or Sweden (Kronsell 2012). These pragmatists assert that although militaries and security sectors may entrench a militarised approach to WPS by using it for operational effectiveness, they are at the same time invested in WPS, which can lead to institutional transformation (Davies – True 2019: 6). A closer look at NATO's Military Gender Advisors, for instance, shows that these are far from feminists wasting their time, as the revolutionary feminists would put it, but as feminist insiders they inevitably bring small wins to the established institutions in terms of being more attentive to power dynamics between men and women, both their own and those in society (Bastick – Duncanson 2018: 20). The argument is that this alone will not achieve the transformative vision of feminist peace without war, whilst we still have a world where militaries are being used to address profound insecurity, and Military Gender Advisors may help militaries to do this better (Bastick – Duncanson 2018: 21).

Some scholars argue that NATO has made more significant progress in integrating gender in security and defence than the European Union (EU) (Guerrina et al. 2018). Emerging research shows that the EU, despite claiming to be a normative power in gender equality issues, is lagging behind in mainstreaming gender beyond employment and social affairs into its external relations (Guerrina et al. 2018; Guerrina – Wright 2016). Guerrina and Wright (2016: 309) attribute this situation to the lack of a clear EU external identity, and to the fact that the EEAS is still in its infancy. Other scholars demonstrate that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), long neglected in scholarship on gender and security, has been relatively successful in expanding its gender policy from soft to hard security, despite some challenges (Jenichen et al. 2018a; see also Jenichen et al. 2018b). Another research shows that the OSCE played a key role in bringing

attention to the widespread problem of gender-based violence in the conflict-affected Ukraine (O'Sullivan 2019: 16). The focus on these institutions of existing peace and security governance comes, nonetheless, rather late, with the implementation debate turning largely to compromise.

While trying to go beyond the revolution versus compromise dichotomy, some scholars stress how important it is for feminists to rediscover their focus on practises, initiatives and institutions on the ground, and their material effects, as well as the gendered logic in discourse (Duncanson 2016: 91). With that in mind, it is crucial to examine in concrete contexts how feminist ideas are being integrated into neoliberal rationales and logics, what is lost in the process and what is perhaps gained (Prügl 2015: 615). In other words, it is about taking neoliberalism as a starting point, and looking at *when* and *how* measures to enhance the protection and the participation of women start to transform structures of inequality in long-lasting ways (Duncanson 2016: 11; see also Bergeron et al. 2017; True 2015). In practise, for instance when it comes to the resources discussed above, these scholars suggest there needs to be more explicit attention to the way neoliberal policies have direct impact on budgets and public finance to the detriment of women's rights and security (Duncanson 2016: 125).

Importantly, this conversation within the WPS scholarship has brought attention back to the origins of feminist IR by emphasising the need to reconnect the WPS agenda with economic security, particularly by bridging the current divide between feminist security studies (FSS) and feminist political economy (FPE) (Elias 2015: 406; see also True 2015; Sjoberg 2015; Bergeron et al. 2017).[9] An FPE perspective expands the WPS agenda by directing our attention toward the long-term prevention of conflict and violence as it emphasises the gendered globalised structures that contribute to violence and conflict, such as gender-biased macroeconomic policies, supply chains, labour markets, and political norms (True 2015: 422). These structures are modifiable, and where they can be shown to be causal of violence, WPS policy changes could be devised to significantly reduce the incidence of widespread sexual and gender-based violence (True 2015: 422). Hence, the task that seems the most urgent now is to provide accounts of implementation about how specific economic processes deepen gendered structural inequalities in war/postwar contexts (Bergeron et al. 2017: 3). Otherwise there are concerns that even if the WPS agenda were ever fully implemented, gender-equitable peacebuilding would be unlikely to occur because even the best peace agreement can be (and often has been) radically undercut by the political economic processes of postwar reconstruction (Bergeron et al. 2017: 3).

There are indeed signals of growing attention to women's economic empowerment as the neglected but crucial element of engendering peacebuilding (Duncanson 2016: 152). A group of feminist scholars has been focussing on how economic and social conditions affect women's participation in peace building, aiming to dig deeper into the structural problems and root causes of conflict (e.g. Duncanson 2016; Cohn – Duncanson 2017; Heathcote 2014; True 2014; Ní Aoláin et al. 2011). There are also signs of closer cooperation among scholars and practitioners in this area, for instance the work done on social and economic rights in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mlinarević et al. 2017). Moreover, new research has been emerging on the parallel peacebuilding of grass root organisations and their interactions with international actors through financial assistance and implementation of NAPs, exposing what has worked for the local population and what has not (e.g. Reiling 2018; Bassini – Ryan 2016).

CONCLUSION

The adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the nine follow up Resolutions has prompted the development of an extensive WPS scholarship within the field of feminist IR. The scholarly debate has been very rich and dynamic as well as full of tensions arising from

the distinct feminist starting points. This article explored the two main subjects of the WPS research – the discourse and implementation, as they have been informed by the revolutionary and pragmatist feminist perspectives on international peace and security governance.

The study started by introducing the evolution of UNSCR 1325 as a potentially revolutionary agenda advocated by feminist networks. Their vision of transformatory change towards *permanent peace* has been, however, confronted with the conventional peace and security governance of the Security Council. This has been widely discussed in the WPS discursive literature, which was guided predominantly by the revolutionary approach. The presented overview of the WPS discourse first shows that academics problematise UNSCR 1325 for essentialising and victimising women and failing to challenge the militarised security structures with the feminist vision of peace. Secondly, it illustrates that the later discursive research on the follow-up Resolutions further endorses these earlier concerns about the dominant protection focus and victimising nature of the WPS normative framework at the expense of long-term prevention and participation. At the same time, there is a slight optimism among scholars about the shift in narrative of the newer Resolutions towards *meaningful* participation and women's empowerment as a prerequisite to the effective conflict prevention advocated by the revolutionary camp.

There is a relative consensus in the literature that the conceptual framing of the WPS norms has directed the focus of the implementation. As the part on implementation indicates, there is overwhelming evidence that the conceptual flaws prioritising protection from sexual violence in conflict have harmed women's agency and steered the practise away from the much-needed participation and long-term prevention, allowing the agenda to be co-opted by the militarised structures of the peace and security governance. Hence, there are many commonalities in the sceptical discursive and implementation research, suggesting that the problematic narrative based on essentialisation, victimisation and militarised security has been reproduced in policy and practise.

On the other hand, the implementation debate also reveals that given the political realities and the agenda's protection focus, the revolutionary feminist claims have been largely compromised in today's practise. The broad camp of scholars guided by the pragmatist approach suggests other possible WPS trajectories which can result in transformative changes. They emphasise the engagement of feminist insiders in institutions of global security governance, as well as local practises that bring small transformative gains. Some of these pragmatists at the same time try to overcome the revolution versus compromise divide. More precisely, rather than dismissing the problematic liberal peacebuilding, they take it as a starting point and look at the small wins that can be achieved within this peace and security framework. What is more, they highlight the socioeconomic aspects of peacebuilding, aiming for a broader feminist security that digs deeper into the structural problems and root causes of conflict, which is in line with the original feminist visions.

It is clear that the WPS agenda has been shaped by and benefited from the feminist debates and the diverse forms of feminist knowledge present in them. The indications that the discourse of the newer Resolutions has progressed in response to the feminist revolutionary critique are very important, although it would require a separate study to see how feminist knowledge indeed translated into the normative WPS framework. It is apparent that as the WPS agenda is reaching its twentieth anniversary, the story of revolution versus compromise remains unfinished and will resume as the agenda further evolves. Davies and True (2019: 6) admit that possibly the most important question of this moment is: *"Should we persist with a mainstream agenda that seeks compromise rather than revolution, and how can we pursue the mainstreaming of WPS without undermining essential reforms?"* The answer to it could be that while the implementation might be taking a more pragmatist path, it is crucial to keep the radical elements alive. In a world of increasing militarisation and anti-gender tendencies, but also increasing women's

organising and feminist foreign policies, it is important to insist on the vision of permanent peace, as it seems to be precisely the revolutionary voices supporting it that can push the agenda forward.

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[1] In the text, I variably use the terms UNSCR 1325 and Resolution 1325 when referring to this Resolution, and the terms WPS Resolutions and WPS agenda when referring to more than one Resolution from the series of ten.

[2] The literature variously refers to three or four pillars or themes, which may also include relief and recovery, the gender perspective, peacekeeping and/or the normative dimension (see, e.g., Kirby – Shepherd 2016a).

[3] Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).

[4] As J. Ann Tickner (1992: 182) argues, the relationship between protectors and protected depends on gender inequalities; a militarised version of security privileges masculine characteristics and elevates men to the status of first class citizens by virtue of their role as providers of security.

[5] Most feminists see security in mutidimensional and multilevel terms, meaning that there are different types of security: physical, structural, economic and ecological (see, e.g., Duncanson 2017; Tickner – Sjoberg 2013; True 2009).

[6] The tenth Resolution – 2493 – was adopted on October 29, 2019, at the time of the finalisation of this article.

[7] The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

[8] According to the Global Study (Coomaraswamy 2015: 373), in 2012–2013, just 6 per cent of all aid to fragile states and economies targeted gender equality as the principal objective, and in the case of peace and security specific aid, the corresponding figure was only 2 per cent.

[9] J. Ann Tickner (1992) identified three main dimensions to "achieving global security" – national security, economic security, and ecological security: conflict, economics, and the environment. Yet, as feminist IR research evolved in the early 21st century, more scholars were thinking either about political economy or about war and political violence, but not both (Sjoberg 2015: 408).

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Jakub Eberle: Discourse and Affect in Foreign Policy. Germany and the Iraq War

1st edition. London and New York: Routledge, 2019, 144 pages, ISBN 978-1-13-859689-4.

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The book *Discourse and Affect in Foreign Policy* was written by Jakub Eberle, who is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in the Czech Republic. Eberle is well positioned for such a research since his areas of expertise include German foreign policy, international relations theory and international political sociology. These are all subjects that are important for writing a book on discourse in German foreign policy.

The goal of this book is to bring the attention of academic research to the importance of emotions and affect in political decision-making and to demonstrate this subject on the case of German policies. The book contributes to the literature focussing on discourse analysis and takes it in a new direction by analysing not only linguistic characteristics, but also affect. The research on discourse is growing in the 21st century, especially in critical studies. This is happening because scholars realised that it is important to look not only at what kinds of policies are adopted but also at how the politicians, media and even the public talk about the subjects of interest. It is now well known that discourse is important and can influence reality – be it through support for new policies, support for certain leaders or the spread of hate or fear among the public. While the literature on discourse is growing, the literature taking affect into consideration has been limited so far; in fact, this literature came into existence only recently. Affect is based on fantasies and emotions so we cannot think that all actions performed by politicians are only rational, as was assumed in the past. We have to take affect into consideration when analysing discursive politics, because humans are emotional beings and politicians are no exception. This is the main idea of the book, the idea that makes the book very innovative. It fills a gap in discourse analysis, which mostly focusses on linguistic characteristics or context, but so far only rarely on affect, emotions and the subjective and irrational part of discourse.

Eberle's book fulfils two purposes. Firstly, it creates an innovative methodology that allows us to study not only language but also affect. Secondly, he uses this methodology to explain Germany's behaviour during the Iraq War in 2003. While Germany refused to participate in the war and said "no" to the United States when it requested its participation, as is common knowledge the Germans still supported the war logistically by providing the United States with military bases and providing technology to the United States' allies that were involved in the war. Eberle says that these contradictory politics can be explained by an analysis of the affects involved. His book clearly shows that there is state behaviour that cannot be explained by analysing discourse merely on the basis of its language, but which can be explained by looking at the related affects.

Eberle's book is divided into six chapters. The first three chapters focus on introducing the theory and methodology of the book, and the other three chapters analyse the discourse in German foreign policy in relation to the Iraq War. Eberle draws on the Essex School and especially the Lacanian theory of the search for a perfect identity in his study. This theory states that every subject desires a perfect identity that would make it whole. However, achieving this identity is impossible and thus it is always fragmented. It is fragmented between its discursive and affective sides.

Eberle presents the idea of logics. First, he introduces the concept of social logics that *"recover the meaning and pattern of coherence of a discursive formation or a practice, characterise it in terms of what it is about, who participates in it and what is at stake"* (p. 22). Social logics are thus contextual. Second, he presents us with the concept of political logics. It captures the reproduction of a discourse. The discourse can either be offensive and challenge the existing setting or be defensive and attempt to preserve the existing setting. The last concept introduced by Eberle is the concept of fantasy and fantasmatic logic. It is the most important concept for the book and its innovative methodology. Fantasy *"captures the affective dimension of subjectivity and helps to bring the excessive dimension of the Lacanian real into the discourse-theoretical framework"* (p. 26). Fantasy is the subjective side and it promises to recapture the whole identity, which is, however, impossible to achieve. Fantasies present the ideal and the obstacle to achieving it. They are very clear-cut. Eberle uses example of the immigrant crisis to make the idea of fantasies clearer to readers. In the immigration crisis fantasies, there is the ideal of national and cultural renewal and it is perceived as being prevented by problems caused by immigrants. The fantasy also provides a clear solution – do not take any immigrants in. Fantasies are also often transgressive – in the example of the migrant crisis, immigrants are seen as harassing and raping local women. However, fantasies are also often contradictory (since fantasies are not rational), and thus the immigrants can be portrayed as both sexually active rapists and very religious individuals. This supports the feeling of hate towards immigrants. The author also explains that fantasies are not necessarily something that is outside of reality; they are rather clear-cut and simplified pictures of reality that help one to make sense of it. They are used to help us understand who we are and what our identity is as well as what is threatening our identity and how we can make it whole.

Next the author proceeds by explaining the German situation and its contradictory politics and then focusses on each of the three logics in the German case. The social logics that were used in the German discourse were: state sovereignty, peaceful resolution and international communities. Germany thus wanted to be viewed as a sovereign state which does not take orders from other countries, as an actor which is not war prone but supports peaceful resolutions and, at the same time, as an actor which can fulfil its responsibilities resulting from its position in the international community. Eberle looks at how the political speakers are using the three social logics that he identifies and how these presentations are different for the government and the opposition. In the next, fifth chapter, he focusses on the political logics and on how the discourse was created. He identifies two different views of the Iraqi crisis, which each created a different discourse that fit their respective interpretation of the war. The first is the anti-war discourse, which portrayed Germany as a sovereign state that tries to preserve peace by opposing the war and which is acting according to international law and has the support of the majority of the states in the international community. The second is the anti-isolation discourse. This discourse was mostly voiced by the opposition, which criticised the German position because it feared that it could lead to Germany's isolation in the international community.

The sixth chapter analyses three different fantasies of the German discourse. The first is titled "*Imperial crusade and Armageddon on the Tigris: fantasising 'American war'"* (p. 108). This is a connection of two strategies – one that sees America as a war-prone country and one that perceives war as something evil. The fantasy then sees a peaceful world as an ideal in which Germany can reach its full identity; however, the American war creates an obstacle to this ideal world and Germany thus needs to oppose it. The second fantasy is titled *"Ghosts of the past: fantasising Germany's 'special path'"* (p. 115). This fantasy sees Germany's position in the world as a liberal-democracy as ideal and as being threatened by isolationism. In this fantasy, if Germany will not ally herself with the United States it is at risk of repeating its past and becoming an undemocratic state once again. The last fantasy Eberle presents in his book is *"Cannibal and monster: fantasising*

'Saddam'" (p. 118), in which Saddam Hussein is portrayed as a threat to peace and democracy that needs to be removed.

Eberle's book is very innovative in terms of discourse analysis and moves the research on discourse further. It can be used as a frame for future research and as an explanation of the behaviour of actors in foreign policy and international relations in general. It points out that the current research on the topic is not enough and that it is insufficient to study only language when studying discourse. The strong side of this book is that it not only focusses on a specific German case, but, most importantly, builds a new theoretical frame and contributes to the limited literature that is already starting to recognise the importance of emotions and affect in foreign policy analysis. It has to be seen as a work of theoretical literature that uses Germany's decisions about its involvement in the Iraq War only as a case whose purpose is to demonstrate and explain the theoretical innovations introduced by the book. The presence of the German case study is also very useful because it makes it easier for readers to understand the methodology and theory developed by this book. It is already well explained in the first three chapters, which lay out the methodology and theory, but if we are still unsure about something after reading them, it all becomes perfectly clear when we look at the application of the methodology in the last three chapters, which focus on the German case study.

However, if we were interested in the book as a source of information on German foreign policy, it could have been more robust. The German case is elaborated well enough to demonstrate the use of the new methodology and the role of affect in discourse and foreign policy. It also fulfils the goal of explaining the contradictory politics in Germany prior to the Iraqi War (the contradiction of negative discourse and positive actions). The book provides examples of arguments presented by the media, the government, and the opposition and offers some quotes. Nevertheless, in order to understand the German foreign policy at the time well, I would prefer even more empirical evidence and a more detailed explanation of the discourse. On the other hand, the main goal of the book seems to be the development of an innovative methodology, and the author himself acknowledges that there is need for further empirical research on the book's topics. The goals of the book are to demonstrate the importance of affect and emotions and to develop a new methodological frame, which the book has done very well. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in discourse analysis, and it is a necessary tool that we should all have in our libraries.

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Zuzana Buroňová is a PhD candidate at Metropolitan University Prague. She focusses her research on terrorism discourse in Anglosphere countries. She is writing her rigorous thesis at Charles University, where she also gained her Master's degree in Security Studies. She is attempting to create a new alternative counterterrorism model in her thesis.

Hilary Appel and Mitchell A. Orenstein: From Triumph to Crisis: Neoliberal Economic Reform in Postcommunist Countries

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 243 pages, ISBN 978-1-108-43505-5, (IIR library code 62 654).

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Under the mechanism of competitive signalling, governments introduced liberal economic reforms not only for any inherent benefits they might offer, or in response to external coercion, but also to signal an attractive business environment to foreign investors.
Appel – Orenstein 2018: 116

After 30 years of democratisation and transition, the current political and economic situation in postcommunist countries in Europe and Eurasia changed its course away from neoliberalism. The countries in the region have recently experienced a surge of economic nationalism and populism. Hungary and Poland, the leading neoliberal reform frontrunners in the region, began to dismantle their neoliberal policies as governments offering an alternative came into power there. *From Triumph to Crisis*, Appel and Orenstein's latest book, argues that the early works of literature on transition did not identify the key mechanisms of transition within the context of globalisation (Appel – Orenstein 2018: 173) and therefore failed to accurately predict the successful implementation of neoliberal policies in this region. The authors try to explain the enduring triumph of neoliberalism in this region from 1989 to 2008 and its decline after the global financial crisis by a mechanism of "competitive signalling" (p. 4).

The authors, Appel and Orenstein, have started their careers writing dissertations on postsocialist transition, particularly looking at privatisation and policy reform in Czechia, Poland, and Russia. Hillary Appel is a Podlich Family Professor of Government and a George R. Robert Fellow at Claremont McKenna College. Her research focusses on tax policy reforms and privatisation. Her 1998 PhD dissertation was on *Mass Privatisation in Post-Communist States: Ideas, Interests, and Economic Regime Change.* Appel has published widely on politics and economic changes in Eastern Europe and Russia; her works on these topics include *Tax Politics in Eastern Europe: Globalisation, Regional Integration and the Democratic Compromise* (2011) and *A New Capitalist Order: Privatisation and Ideology in Russia and Eastern Europe* (2004). Mitchell A. Orenstein is a Professor and Chair of Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. His research focusses on pension reforms, and his PhD dissertation was titled *Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe* (1996). Orenstein has published numerous books and articles, including *Privatising Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform* (2008). What they have in common is their perspective of an ideational approach (ideational approaches tend to claim that ideas matter more than other material factors do) in comparative politics and the political economy of the postcommunist space. They view neoliberalism primarily as a hegemonic ruling idea. Their new book, *From Triumph to Crisis,* reflects their positions and the way of their ideational contribution to the debate.

The authors begin with the questions that inspired the book. According to them, postcommunist European and Eurasian countries' (PCEECs) *"embrace of neoliberal policies*

remains the great unexplained mystery of transition" (p. 3). The authors insist that early theories of transition did not identify *"the key mechanisms of transition and therefore failed to predict the triumph of neoliberalism"* (pp. 3–4). The authors agree that the international early works of the literature on the topic are excellent as they provide evidence of the extent of countries' compliance with international norms. However, they cannot explain why many PCEECs went *"far beyond international norms and expectations in the implementation of neoliberal reforms"* (p. 14). Early works of literature on transition did not take into account global factors such as the external and competitive pressure to join the international economy. Therefore, the book aims to offer a focussed analysis of why neoliberal reforms went much further beyond the imperatives of EU integration and the Washington Consensus, why competition was such a powerful force in the PCEECs, and why their neoliberal enthusiasm ended with the global financial crisis in 2008.

The authors, influenced by the constructivist-ideationalist approaches, argue that the unexpected endurance of neoliberal reforms and their belated decline after the financial crisis in 2008 could be explained by a mechanism of "competitive signalling" (p. 4). This mechanism was about sending signals to investors to attract external financial assistance. As the authors write, there was a competition between PCEECs to make their economies more attractive by embracing neoliberal reforms. Unlike other pre-existing theories based on domestic political-economic struggles, Appel and Orenstein claim that PCEECs were engaged in competitive signalling and thus emphasise the importance of international integration, the hegemony of free-market ideology, the competition for capital to compensate for their Communist legacy, and their access to markets (p. 173). The authors claim that neoliberal reforms in this region progressed much further and faster than expected as the PCEECs were desperate for capital and had to compete with one another as well as Asia and Latin America for investment. International Financial Institutions (IFIs) played a crucial role in this by creating indices such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's "Transition Indicators" and the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business Index." They measured not only the individual countries' progress towards implementing neoliberal policies – which involved rewarding upgrades in various rating systems (p. 18) – but also their business environments and climates for investors. International organisations' evaluations were important for the PCEECs as foreign investors would base their decisions upon them. A "cross-national competition" (p. 50) emerged in the PCEECs. While other mechanisms also existed, as the authors claim, *"competitive signalling turned out to be the crucial mechanism enabling liberal economic reform to endure and intensify in the PCEECs"* (p. 174).

From Triumph to Crisis is divided into seven chapters and structured in a highly interpretative manner. The authors attempt to periodise the history of neoliberalism from its triumph to its alleged decline. The book begins by introducing the dynamics of liberalisation. Then the second, third, and fourth chapters discuss three phases of neoliberal policy adoption: those of the Washington Consensus, Europeanisation and avant-garde neoliberalism. Chapter 4 especially examines the avant-garde neoliberal reforms such as the flat tax and pension privatisation, which were rejected in Western Europe and North America due to controversies but adopted in the PCEECs in the 1990s and 2000s. The fifth chapter further explores the competitive signalling mechanism and examines the relationship between foreign direct investment and neoliberal policy adoption. The authors carefully analyse FDI inflows to PCEECs as well as explaining how the EBRD and the WB promoted neoliberal policies through the incentive of FDI. The sixth chapter addresses the crisis of neoliberalism after the global financial crisis and the rise of alternative paradigms, namely populism, nationalism, state capitalism, and neo-development statism (p. 161). This chapter is particularly important as here the authors explain why the process of competitive signalling and neoliberal enthusiasm came to an end after 2008. The authors argue that the 2008 global financial crisis was an important incident for neoliberalism in

the historical context as it significantly weakened the path of neoliberal reforms and undermined the ideological hegemony of neoliberal ideas. The investment inflows to the PCEECs that had encouraged and rewarded neoliberal policies suddenly ceased in what economists call a "sudden stop" (p. 142). The chapter further analyses the decline of public confidence and the reversal of avant-garde neoliberalism. The seventh chapter then revises the early literature on transitions and concludes with the authors' main arguments.

One of the weaknesses of the book is that the authors ignore the fundamental insight that national differences are significant. Their treating the PCEECs as a homogeneous region to prove their thesis about the triumph and terminal crisis of neoliberalism could lead to confusion. Although postcommunist European and Eurasian countries share some similarities and legacies after the collapse of communism, the divergence in the post-communist world is substantial, especially that between Europe and Eurasia. Since the end of the Soviet Union, the countries have undergone a variety of transformation paths. For instance, Europeanisation was one of the motivating factors as the EU accession process required the adoption of many neoliberal reforms and programmes. Central European countries looked for strong integration with the European Union and Europe in general as the region was *"culturally western, politically in the east and geographically in the centre"* (Kundera 1983: 2). However, as the authors write, some countries such as *"Belarus, Russia, and the former Soviet Central Asian states proved less interested in the European project"* (Appel – Orenstein 2018: 66). Belarus was one of the countries that most avoided neoliberal reforms and the majority of its economy *"remained in the state hands"* (p. 139). Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan's massive natural resources made neoliberal policy reforms less vital there (p. 118). Russia even launched the Eurasian Economic Union, its own version of the European Union, in Central and Northern Asia and Eastern Europe to increase the economic integration with its member states. Even if we only talk about the post-Soviet states, there have been contrary political developments among the former Soviet republics. Countries such as Georgia and Ukraine represented meaningful democratic breakthroughs and changes whereas the remaining majority of post-Soviet republics still have shades of authoritarian regimes. Moreover, there are facts that set Russia apart from other post-Soviet states. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation as the former imperial centre had *"greater human resources and policy-making experience compared to other countries"* (Fritz 2007: 286). Its GDP, land territory, and population were larger than those of all the other republics put together.

Appel and Orenstein specifically address neither the varying levels of neoliberal reforms of the PCEECs nor the different ways that the countries signalled to external actors. The authors write that *"the vector of reform was very much the same: neoliberal transformation and international integration"* (Appel – Orenstein 2018: 185). However, the idea of inter-temporal periodisation into homogeneous waves made the text unable to grasp the inter-spatial variation in a more nuanced way. What is more, the book is rich in tables and graphs visualising the differences of the PECCEs in terms of price liberalisation ratings and trade liberalisation ratings (p. 43); large-scale privatisation ratings (p. 44); voucher privatisation (p. 51); pension privatisation and flat tax reforms (p. 94). However, the authors mostly interpret the general trends as a whole despite significant differences. The variation should be more carefully studied as the study examines twenty-seven countries over two decades. The groups of countries in the region – namely the Visegrad states; the Baltics; the Balkans; and the European former Soviet Union states, the Central Asian former Soviet states, the Caucasus, and Russia – all have different features.

Nevertheless, *From Triumph to Crisis* is both an interesting and an important work of economic and political science. The book proposes a theory that tries to explain the enduring triumph of neoliberalism between 1989 and 2008 from different perspectives. It analyses the ideational determinants of economic policymaking in postcommunist Europe

and Eurasia by examining the early oversights of transition theory. The three types of sources it utilises – global databases on economic freedom, interviews with experts and international organisations' documents (p. 12) – provide a wide range of information and cases. Scholars and researchers doing work on the course of the postcommunist transition, neoliberal reforms, and international integration would certainly find this book interesting and useful. It would help them to better understand the challenges of the present day, namely the emergence of economic nationalism and populism.

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Da Yeun Lee has completed her internship as a research assistant at the Institute of International Relations Prague. She holds an MA in East European Studies from the Free University of Berlin and a BA in Politics and East European Studies from University College London. Her research focusses on democratisation and political and economic transition in former communist states.

Ioannis Armakolas and James Ker-Lindsay (eds.): The Politics of Recognition and Engagement: EU Member State Relations with Kosovo

1st edition. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020, 245 pages, ISBN 978-3-030-17944-1.

Author: Jolyon Naegele.

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This collection of 11 academic essays examines the responses to Kosovo's declaration of independence by nine EU member states in order of perceived support/constructiveness: ranging from the strongest supporters, the United Kingdom and Germany, to two of the weakest recognizers: the Czech Republic and Poland as well as all five EU non-recognizers: again from the most to the least supportive of Kosovo: Greece, Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus and Spain.

The study is co-edited by Ioannis Armakolas (PhD), an Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics of South East Europe at the University of Macedonia, in Thessaloniki, Greece, and James Ker-Lindsay, a visiting professor at LSEE/LSE and the author or editor of over a dozen books on secession and recognition, including The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession: Preventing the Recognition of Contested States, and *Kosovo: the Path to Contested Statehood*. The two co-editors co-authored the first chapter, *"Kosovo, EU Member States and the Recognition-Enlargement Nexus"*. They set out that the *"volume is the result of a major project carried out between 2016 and 2018"*, in which with the support of the Kosovo Open Society Foundation, ten contributors were brought together for two workshops in Pristina, during which a methodology was defined that was intended to *"maximize the comparative value of this work"* (p. 11). Dr. Ker-Lindsay authored the chapter on the UK and Dr. Armolakis authored the chapter on Greece. The other eight contributors, Agon Demjaha, Julia Himmrich, Tomáš Dopita, Jarosław Wiśniewski, Milan Nič, Paul Ivan, Isabelle Ioannides and Ruth Ferrero-Turrión, authored the chapters on the policies of their respective states. Each chapter sets out chronologically the decision-making process of a given EU member state, showing the domestic and regional political challenges in recognizing or not recognizing Kosovo, the related lobbying efforts, including by Pristina, Belgrade and Washington, as well as the extent of the EU-member state's recent engagement or non-engagement with Kosovo's institutions.

The purpose of this study is to show that the issue of recognition vs. non-recognition of Kosovo among EU-member states should not be seen in binary terms. The differences among the recognizers as well as among the non-recognizers are substantial. Some recognizers – in the case of this study, the Czech Republic and Poland, due to both domestic political influences and their traditionally close ties with Belgrade – are perceived as actually more passive in their engagement with Kosovo's institutions than two of the non-recognizing EU member states: Greece and Slovakia. This compendium is a landmark in examining the individual positions of EU member states, albeit it only deals with one third of them – it explores not only the grounds for either their recognizing or not recognizing Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008 but also the degree of their subsequent engagement with Kosovo. It is thus a valuable work; the chapters on the stances of the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania Greece and Cyprus, about which the literature outside of these countries to date has been quite limited, are particularly

insightful. The authors also note the coordination among the *"soft non-recognizers"* Greece, Slovakia and Romania on issues such as Schengen visas.

Some of the sourcing is problematical. Citing sources by merely referring to them as a *"European diplomat"*, a *"British official"* (pp. 53–55), "*German government officials"* (pp. 78–79), a *"former senior diplomat"* (p. 104), a *"Slovak official"* (pp. 152, 155, 162), etc. is excessively vague. It risks some authors finding themselves in an echo chamber, where an unclear number of anonymous sources hampers the reader's ability to judge the authority and determine the actual number of sources. If multiple diplomats from a single country were used by an author, they should have been more clearly identified as separate sources. Greater clarity should have also been provided regarding whether an anonymous source had actually been directly engaged in the issue of recognition. Despite providing chronological accounts, institutional memory can be remarkably weak a decade or more after a policy was set, and the justification for the policy may well have changed in the interim as key elements or details were forgotten or rewritten; officials move on to other posts and are replaced by newcomers, who all too often may lack a full understanding of their office's past reasoning. Moreover, perceptions of and stances on very basic issues such as the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence or the continued validity of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) can differ even within one specialized office. No two diplomats from a given country, and no two international civil servants from a given organization are likely to provide identical, off-the-record explanations or justifications for a policy. Hence, the book would have benefitted had the net been cast to encompass a broader selection of critical views and were it clearer to the reader that a cited official had actually been directly engaged in the decision-making process or in relations with Kosovo after the declaration of independence.

Although Kosovo gets its own chapter, which on the whole is well argued, Serbia does not. Instead, references to Belgrade's Kosovo policy are scattered throughout the book, above all in the chapter on the UK's recognition of Kosovo. Greater attention could have been given to Belgrade's role of *spoiler* or *mischief-maker* in relation to Pristina, former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić and his successor, Ivica Dačić. They have persuaded undecided states not to recognize Kosovo and have lobbied recognizing states to either rescind their recognitions or claim that they had not in fact recognized Kosovo in the first place. To date, Belgrade has persuaded over ten percent of the states which recognized Kosovo to withdraw their recognitions: Suriname, Burundi, Papua New Guinea, Lesotho, Comoros, Dominica, Grenada, the Solomon Islands, Madagascar, Palau, Togo and the Central African Republic. In addition, several states which senior Kosovo officials had claimed had informed them of their decisions to recognize Kosovo subsequently asserted that they had never done so: these include Nigeria, Uganda, São Tomé e Principé and Equatorial Guinea. In this connection, it should be noted that present and past foreign ministers of Kosovo, including Skender Hyseni, Behgjet Pacolli, and Enver Hoxhaj, repeatedly erred in speaking to the media about imminent recognitions by naming the countries or regional associations of states in question, thereby inadvertently tipping off their Serbian counterparts, who lost no time in jetting off to the countries in question and using a variety of arguments, in many cases successfully, to persuade their interlocutors to desist from recognizing Kosovo. These included a) not wanting to undermine the deliberations of the International Court of Justice in The Hague prior to its 2010 ruling on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence, b) not wanting to undermine the dialogue with Pristina, c) recalling Belgrade's traditional solidarity with members of the Non-Aligned Movement, d) recalling ex-Yugoslavia's Cold War-era weapons supplies to national liberation movements, e.g. to the ANC in South Africa, and e) allegedly providing financial/business incentives as a *quid pro quo* for either not recognizing Kosovo, withdrawing recognition, or renouncing recognition of Kosovo.

Although no EU-member states have retracted their recognition to date, Czech President Miloš Zeman, while on a visit to Belgrade in September 2019, called for the Czech Republic to de-recognize Kosovo, an option that Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and Foreign Minister Tomáš Petříček have so far dismissed. Former Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg has argued that it is impossible to de-recognize a country. However, in the unlikely event that Prague were to retract its recognition of Kosovo, would Poland and Hungary follow?

The term *unilateral declaration of independence* or *UDI* in reference to Kosovo crops up repeatedly in many of the chapters of the study. The co-editors argue in a footnote on page 1 without offering any reference supporting their argument that *"in legal terms, a unilateral declaration of independence is a neutral term to describe any act of secession that occurs without the consent or agreement of both relevant parties: the seceding territory and the 'parent state', as the territory it is seceding from is usually known."* I would argue, however, that the term as applied to Kosovo is anything but neutral. Rather, it is inaccurate, politically colored, and has been one of Belgrade's mantras in objecting to Kosovo's independence. Historically, "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" is what the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, backed by the Union of South Africa termed its own secession from the UK in 1965. This first modern UDI was denounced by the UK, the British Commonwealth and the United Nations. This was due to Southern Rhodesia having been governed by its white community, which made up five percent of the population; Rhodesia as its secessionist rulers had renamed it in 1964 remained *de jure* a British colony until black majority rule was achieved, enabling the establishment of the internationally recognized state of Zimbabwe in 1980. As the chapter on Cyprus notes, the declaration of independence by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 also constituted a UDI, was recognized only by Turkey, and was roundly condemned by the UN and its member states. The Cyprus chapter also notes that Cypriot politicians have been at pains to point out that Kosovo's and Northern Cyprus' declarations of independence were not comparable. Thus, the term UDI has a distinct air of illegitimacy and implies virtually unanimous opposition by the international community.

In contrast to Southern Rhodesia and Northern Cyprus' UDIs, Kosovo's declaration of independence came following the conclusion of a process intended to negotiate a resolution of Kosovo's status led by the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo, the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari. Moreover, Kosovo's declaration was thoroughly consulted with the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany and Italy, known as the Quint, which choreographed and supervised the drafting of the declaration, the lists of speakers and guests at the ceremony of the adoption of the declaration, the design of Kosovo's flag and its text-less anthem. Hence Kosovo's declaration of independence, which was neither unilateral nor condemned by the United Nations, was internationally coordinated and supervised.

Regrettably, the author and/or editors of the chapter on Germany has/have put the term "UDI" in the mouth of German President Franz-Walter Steinmeier, when in fact he said something rather different. Steinmeier's address to the Bundestag on 20 February 2008, cited in the chapter on Germany, contains no use of the term "UDI" but rather summarizes Berlin's frustration with the lack of an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina despite the efforts of Germany and other Quint members. In fact, Steinmeier said, *"For nine years we sought an amicable solution, something everyone would have preferred to the procedure we now face. But this proved impossible. That is why we have to show responsibility in a situation where we cannot escape by abstaining, even if that is what some would prefer. We need to work together now to support Kosovo and its people and, whatever situation we come up with, we need to make the most of it: [achieving] the democratic rule of law with European values not only in Kosovo but throughout the Western Balkans."*[1]

A reference in the study to the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) non-binding opinion of July 2010 on the legality under international law of Kosovo's Declaration of

Independence is misleading. It should be recalled that the ICJ took up the matter after Serbia decided to circumvent the UN Security Council and approach the General Assembly (GA) to request a ruling from the ICJ. Much to Belgrade's surprise, the ICJ ruled that the declaration was legal under international law. The argument that the ICJ did not take a position on whether Kosovo was a state or not is disingenuous as the GA did not put this question to the ICJ. Hence the court was under no obligation to provide an opinion on the matter.

Numerous states had delayed their recognition of Kosovo at the behest of the Serbian Foreign Minister at the time, Vuk Jeremić. He had urged states to desist from recognizing Kosovo until after the ICJ ruling, convinced that the court would rule in Serbia's favor. In the immediate aftermath of the ICJ ruling, US and EU negotiators, in an effort to prevent Belgrade from seeking support for an ill-advised new GA resolution, persuaded Serbian President Boris Tadić and Foreign Minister Jeremić to agree to a more constructive GA resolution which would call for the launch of an EU-led, US-supported dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Inevitably, this new, open-ended dialogue was immediately seized upon by Belgrade in all further discussions with non-recognizers as grounds not to recognize Kosovo pending a successful conclusion of the dialogue, thereby further reducing new recognitions to a trickle. While the dialogue made some headway in 2013 and even subsequently, for multiple reasons it has proven to be an unreliable vehicle to achieve genuine progress in overcoming differences and finding lasting solutions and has repeatedly fallen victim to domestic political considerations in Pristina and Belgrade.

Only a fleeting mention is made in this study of the EU Planning Team (EUPT), which had a year on the ground in Kosovo to prepare for the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which in turn only took over responsibility for peace and justice from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in December 2008. The EUPT proved itself ill-prepared for the reality that in the wake of Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, five of the then 27 EU member states would not recognize Kosovo. This lack of unity forced a substantial dilution of EULEX's mandate. Belgrade and the Serbs in northern Kosovo quickly realized that without unified backing through recognition of Kosovo by all 27 of the EU member states, EULEX's deployment would be easy to resist. EULEX was thus thwarted in its efforts to achieve full operational capability in Kosovo's four Serb-majority (98%) municipalities north of the Ibar River (North Mitrovica, Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić), where after independence the international police and justice mission's active engagement was needed at least as much as everywhere else in Kosovo.

In conclusion, although the list price risks making this work inaccessible to many practitioners, and despite a few shortcomings, including the absence of a chapter focusing on Belgrade's efforts to lobby against Kosovo's recognition, and the use of the misnomer "UDI" to describe Kosovo's supervised declaration of independence, this study is nevertheless a valuable handbook which explains in detail the individual paths of nine EU-member states in deciding whether or not to recognize Kosovo as well as in their relative engagement or non-engagement with independent Kosovo.

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[1] This quote is my translation of the transcript citation in footnote 44 on p. 70. The original source of the transcript is: Deutscher Bundestag (2008): Plenarprotokoll 16/144. Stenographischer Bericht 144. Sitzung 16. Wahlperiode. Berlin, 20. 2. 2008, p. 15189.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY

Jolyon Naegele worked for 14 years as a political analyst for the UN peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (2003–2017), and previously reported on East Central and Southeastern Europe for Voice of America (1984–1994) and RFE/RL (1996–2003).

Rosemary Kellison: Expanding Responsibility for the Just War: A Feminist Critique

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There is an interesting debate going on in the field of reflections about morality and war, also known as the just war theory. Starting as a religious (especially Christian) tradition of thought, just war theory gained a significant strength in the 20th century, when it served as an underlying theoretical framework for international law and agreements such as the Geneva Conventions, the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions and the International Criminal Court. The main classical book in the field is Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars* (2015; first published in 1977), where he presents the orthodox or classical version of just war theory. However, major parts of the theory have been recently contested by the so-called revisionists, who argue that certain constitutive aspects of the classical just war theory, like the division between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* principles or the collective ontology, are not suitable tools for moral reflections about war.[1]

The book called *Expanding Responsibility for the Just War: A Feminist Critique* (2019) by Rosemary Kellison provides another important insight into the lively debate about morality and war. Kellison is an associate professor of philosophy and religion at the University of West Georgia and she has written several articles about just war, violence and ethics of war. In this, her first book, as the subtitle suggests, she tries to present a feminist critique of the just war theory. As Kellison acknowledges at the beginning of her book, feminists have largely failed to engage the just war reasoning as a tradition (p. 9) and being among the first ones who tries to enter the field, she introduces an account that largely differs from the usual understanding of just war. However, as she notes: *"I seek neither to deconstruct just war reasoning nor to propose an alternative to it, but rather to engage in a feminist immanent critique of it"* (p. 13).

After a brief overview of the feminist debate on war and also after structuring the book within this debate, Kellison presents three identifying characteristics of feminist ethics that she will employ in her discussion about just war. First, she argues for a different understanding of human personhood. According to Kellison, in the contemporary just war debate, human personhood consists primarily in a claim to inviolable rights derived from humans' natural autonomy and rationality. As opposed to that, Kellison focuses her attention on personhood as embedded within and constituted by social relationships. Second, she understands morality as a set of practices maintained in the context of social relations rather than a universal and objective reality one can often find in the contemporary just war debate. As she writes: *"Morality is something that people do"* (p. 35). And finally, she recognises that relations among people are not relations of equality and reciprocity, and therefore morality cannot be properly distinguished from power. Specifically, one group of people is made much more vulnerable in the context of war because of their particular situation within power relationships and that is civilians living in areas where violent force is being used. Kellison argues that contemporary just war reasoning denies the violence of war by suggesting that many forms of harms are necessary or unavoidable and there has not been much of a discussion about the harms that war itself may do to persons, their relations and communities. For that reason, Kellison devotes most parts of

the book's discussion to the issue of responsibility for harm to noncombatants, claiming that powerful individuals and collective agents who inflict harms during war should recognise them and respond to the vulnerable persons they harm.

The different account of personhood is crucial for Kellison's arguments. Understanding persons in terms of rights leads to a certain understanding of what it means to observe the just war criteria that focuses primarily on the fulfilment and the prevention of violation of various persons' rights. There are two main implications of this account, which Kellison describes in the second chapter. First, a significant amount of harms which are not easily described (or even cannot be described) in terms of rights violation are unrecognized and therefore are left out of the discussion. Second, there are ways of evading the responsibility for harms in terms of rights violation in the just war tradition such as the double-effect principle. Kellison reminds us that just war criteria not only restrain violence, but also justify and enable it, and with the possibilities of evading responsibility for harms, the criteria serve as a sort of list of rules which actors' actions have to be consistent with in order for them to bear no responsibility for the negative outcomes of these actions.

The picture changes significantly with Kellison's understanding of persons as relational, which is discussed in the third chapter. According to Kellison, to describe persons in abstract and universal terms neglects some of the most basic aspects of what it means to be a person. Violence is not only about the violation of one's rights. Some of the violence people suffer during wars can be best described in terms of the harms it inflicts on bodies and relationships as constitutive elements of human personhood. In order to recognise the numerous forms of harms caused by wars, Kellison offers a collection of testimonies of harmed persons as the best way to do that.

For example, she presents the testimonies of civilians living in North Waziristan, Pakistan, an area targeted by RPA strikes under the Obama administration, in which they describe *"emotional breakdowns, running indoors or hiding when drones appear above, fainting, nightmares and other intrusive thoughts, hyper startled reactions to loud noises, outbursts of anger or irritability, and loss of appetite and other physical symptoms ... [as well as] insomnia and other sleep disturbances"* (p. 87). Elsewhere, she presents a different type of harm which is unrecognised by the contemporary just war reasoning, and that is avoiding activities such as gatherings at funerals or at mosque services due to the higher chance of those gatherings being targeted. Sometimes, the avoiding of certain gatherings can have significant implications for the functioning of the community. Kellison mentions the case of jirga, a meeting in which male members of the community come together and discuss social issues. Since jirga is a gathering of adult men, it has a higher possibility of being the target of a signature strike. Therefore, many people avoid holding or attending jirgas, which, in Kellison's words, threatens a central practice of the maintenance of the moral community.

In these parts of the book, Kellison is able to connect a theoretical and abstract discussion about morality with everyday practical reality. It is arguably one of the best features of her book. Also, it is worth mentioning because the discussion about just war and the debate between traditionalists and revisionists quite often seem to be purely philosophical without a proper regard for the actual empirical reality of war (see, e.g., the critique of revisionists' abstract reasoning in Rigstad 2017).

However, this does not mean that Kellison does not pay enough attention to theoretical and purely philosophical reflection. Chapter four of her book, devoted to a discussion about intentions, is probably the most theoretical one in the book. She offers her own feminist reinterpretation of the concept of intention, which is one of the central tenets in the just war tradition. In her view, intention is socially constituted and instantiated in practices rather than a disembodied and private momentary thought, as the just war theory tends to understand it. Her approach leads to the extension of intention and thus also to the extension of responsibility. She also points out that her view is different than those of

authors like Andrew Fiala (2008) or Talal Asad (2010), who share with Kellison concerns about the just war understanding of intentions.

The last two chapters deal with the expansion of responsibility for the types of harms that are not recognised in the rights violation approach of the just war theory. According to Kellison, many harms which are nowadays considered to be a part of collateral damage, should be reclassified, and instead of trying to evade responsibility for harms during war, the just war theorists should adopt an approach that would expand the responsibility towards noncombatants and civilians. To do that, Kellison presents some concrete and practical proposals, which should be taken into account.

The first step to taking responsibility for harms inflicted on other persons is to be able to recognise the harmed persons as persons. Kellison writes: *"if civilians in a particular place are not easily recognized by others as fellow humans, then they are not protected by the same norms that protect humans from violence"* (p. 33). This means that if people look different, speak different languages and belong to different cultural and religious communities than many Americans, they do not have to fit easily into many Americans' frames of personhood. Kellison mentions the case of Faheem Qureshi, a Pakistani child who was permanently injured in one of the RPA strikes and never had his harm acknowledged. She writes: *"After Obama apologized for a 2015 RPA strike that killed two al Qaeda hostages, one American and one Italian, Qureshi asked, 'Are we not the same human beings as these two Westerners who were killed?'"* (p. 199).

Kellison presents other proposed practices that would make it easier to recognise these types of harms and take responsibility for them such as (public) mourning for the ones who were harmed, accurate recording of the inflicted harms and body counts followed by a transparent reporting of those data, the issuing of public apologies, fair monetary compensations and many more. All her proposals are in line with the second aspect of feminist ethics mentioned above, according to which morality is first and foremost a human practice, something that people do. What is more important, though, is that none of these proposals somehow disprove the just war theory, and its reasoning can be reconstructed to accommodate the relational view of persons that Kellison advocates. She says: *"When just war reasoning is practiced from a perspective that emphasizes human relationality and resulting expanded responsibility, these practices are consistent with its norms"* (p. 200).

In spite of the indisputable qualities of the book, there are two main objections that can be raised against it. Taking into account the ongoing debate outlined in the first paragraph of this review, it is a little bit disappointing that Kellison does not enter this debate properly and ignores a large part of it. It even seems like she missed the fact that the debate is taking place.[2] It is true that her account differs from the understanding that is common to both traditionalists and revisionists, and so it makes sense for her to talk about one just war tradition; however, in different parts of the book, she touches upon questions that are highly relevant for the debate (see, for example, pages 14, 34, 67, 68, 107, and 146) and it could be easier for the book to gain attention within the field if it was willing to engage in this debate. Even if the dispute may not seem significant from Kellison's perspective since both accounts are close to each other (again, both views share the understanding of personhood in terms of rights), there are authors who put forward similar views such as Pattison (2018) with his non-ideal morality of war. Given other resemblances between Pattison and Kellison and the fact that Kellison sometimes mentions an interesting notion which is relevant for the debate, there seems to be an unutilized potential for making the book even more attractive for its readers.

The second objection is related to the organization of the text and the writing style. It seems that Kellison sometimes repeats herself, and the construction of the text and the chapters lacks a certain "red line". While the general structure of the book is perfectly understandable, some of the concrete discussions about specific topics are a bit chaotic.

A frequent practice is that Kellison presents a concrete issue, then adds some other notions to it, presents it again and repeats it one more time, and these repetitions are often in different parts of the book (the discussion about the double-effect principle could be an example of this). It would be less confusing for the reader if all the parts that discuss a single aspect or similar aspects were in the same place. However, as if Kellison was aware of it, she quite often provides links and references to what was said in the previous parts of the book and what will be discussed in the following ones, which helps a bit with the orientation.

Notwithstanding some of the shortcomings mentioned above, *Expanding Responsibility for the Just War: A Feminist Critique* is a well-written, in-depth analysis and feminist critique of the just war reasoning with an immense understanding of even small nuances of the debate. This is not an introductory book so a reader who is not familiar with the just war theory might get lost in some of the discussions about certain principles or traditions. However, for those who are acquainted with the major arguments and have some understanding of the tradition, the book provides an enormous amount of original insights and arguments. It also comes at the right time, as recently the classical view of the just war theory has been challenged from many different perspectives and there are serious concerns about the future of the theory that underlies so much of the international law. If this is not the right time for presenting a radically different view to the debate, I do not know what is.

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[1] Jeff McMahan is considered to be the main proponent of revisionism (see his book *Killing in War*, published in 2009). For a good overview of the debate see Lazar (2017).

[2] Kellison mentions McMahan as the critic of the traditional theory in a footnote on page 14 and then mentions the "revisionist school" related to McMahan and Frowe on pages 65–66. All the variations in the "school" as well as many other authors and their arguments are neglected.

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Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk (eds.): The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa

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The Palgrave Handbook of Peacebuilding in Africa, edited by Tony Karbo and Kudrat Virk, represents the collective work of a group of authors who focus on the theme of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping and peacemaking. The Handbook provides a critical perspective on issues facing species programmes and regional organisations in building sustainable peace in Africa. Dr Tony Karbo is one of the main creators of the book and is co-founder and Executive Director of the N'Zarama Centre for Peacebuilding based in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. He has taught in many universities in the Great Lakes region and many other parts of Africa and intensively worked with organisations operating in conflict zones. The another editor of the publication, Dr Kudrat Virk, is a researcher at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa. She also previously served as an Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution in Cape Town, South Africa.

The book comprises of a series of essays from leading scholars and experts on Africa, including practitioners such as diplomats. Besides the editors, its authors include prominent African professors such as Adekeye Adebajo, who is Director of the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and Kwame Akonor, who is Associate Professor of Political Science at Seton Hall University, New Jersey, in the United States. Among those based outside the African continent are Professor Kenneth Omeje, who is Senior Research Fellow at the John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for African Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom, and Research Fellow at the Centre for African Studies at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, in South Africa; Professor Ismail Rashid, who is Professor of History at Vassar College in New York; Professor Oliver P. Richmond, who is Professor of International Relations and Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Manchester in the United Kingdom; and Professor Douglas A. Yates, who is Professor of African Studies at the American Graduate School (AGS) in Paris, and Professor of Anglo-American Law at the University of Cergy-Pontoise, which i salso in France. Other contributions were provided by scholars and practitioners such as Francis M. Deng, Ibrahim Gambari, John L. Hirsch, James O.C. Jonah, Augustine Mahiga, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Margaret Vogt, and Brigadier General (Professor) Dan Kuwali.

The aim of the book is to present the theory and practise of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War. The publication combines thematic analysis and case studies and includes a wide range of interesting opinions on the subject. Against the background of large global changes and the renewing of Pan-African thinking, the publication seeks to contribute to the search for a *"-new concept-?* of *Pax Africana*, which would strive for respecting the principles and standards beneficial to peace and collective security in Africa. The authors try to find the answers to whether the efforts to institutionalise the African Union (AU) contributed to building sustainable peace on the continent, and how to confront new obstacles which threaten peace.

The book is divided into six parts and twenty-five chapters. In the first part, Professor Ali A. Mazrui describes the theory and practise of *Pax Africana*. The second part deals with conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The topic of mediation as a form of conflict prevention- is analysed in the seventh chapter, which is also in the second part. The perspective of the United Nations and the UN Security Council on issues of sustainable peace building is dealt with in the third part of the book, which considers the impact of the Economic Community of West African States in a related context. The fourth part, which is connected to the previous one, is focussed on the controversial responsibility of peacekeeping missions, which also affects the health sector. An interesting chapter in this part is the one where the authors analyse narratives based on Hollywood depictions of peacekeeping efforts in Africa. The following part deals with the issue of peacebuilding by utilising knowledge from the fields of political economy, gender and inequality, thus capturing a new perspective of the topic. The final, sixth part considers the role of external actors in creating peace; for example, one of the discussed topics is the role of Great Britain in Africa.

In 1967, Professor Ali A. Mazrui, one of Africa's leading political scientists, published a book with the title *"Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition."* The reviewed book's first chapter, by Tony Karbo, discusses it. Mazrui's concept of peace and safety in Africa stands on the idea of the ended struggle for independence from colonial rule. The transformation of this ambition for peace remains a challenge, which is reflected in the efforts of the African Union (p. 3). According to Mazrui's view, *Pax Africana* is based on the idea that Africans provide peace for the continent itself with its own material and financial means. Against the background of the Cold War, Karbo also discusses questions related to disarming, non-violent resistance, security cooperation and the role of the UN as the enforcer of international peace and security (p. 4). The initial chapters of this publication show that progress in the search for *the "new" Pax Africana* carries important implications for policy at the continental and regional levels in Africa. In this context there are several questions left unanswered; Has the vision of the new *Pax Africana* been realised? What is the future of *Pax Africana*?

In relation to the issue of Pan-Africanism and peacebuilding, the second part of the book advocates the structural changes at all levels of the continent. The emphasis is put on the state reconstruction being responsive to the needs of its citizens. The essential criterion is the support of international partners for the development and promotion of human rights and justice for everyone. As the Afro-optimist Tim Murithi (2007: 1) explains, the AU was created as an institutionalisation of the ideals of Pan-African thinking. Since 2002 the AU achieved progress in peacebuilding and stabilisation of the continent. The book describes the engagement of the AU in several complex peacekeeping operations, for example, those in Somalia since 2007.

The seventh chapter of the second part deals in an original way with the importance of non-violent approaches to conflict resolution, namely with the mechanisms of mediation. This type of conflict resolution mechanism offers all the sides of the conflict an opportunity to come together and find mutually beneficial achievements. In the book, the Kenya National Dialogue serves as an example of mediation being utilised; in this case it was used for the purpose of solving the problem of the riots during the presidential elections in 2007–2008. Knut Lundby considers mediation as *"a broader and more general concept applied to acts and processes of communication with technical media"* (Lundby 2009: 13). From the point of view of media studies, Lundby (ibid.) claims that institutional practises or modes of social interaction cannot be transformed in the long term by a process of mediation. In the mentioned Kenyan case, mediation was used in the sense of conflict prevention whereas the chapter's author Njoki Wamai presents a set of activities to prevent conflicts in Africa. One of them is that of a secured mediation team, which uses domestic movements (local civil society groups, politicians, business leaders, ordinary citizens,

eminent African personalities) as a source of support. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan led the mediation process on this basis. The Kenyan example illustrates a successful cooperation between leaders in business, religion and politics with the active involvement of citizens (p. 120).

The challenges faced by the UN and the AU in the area of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, are based on planning, logistics and coordination of actions. Successful activities in Darfur (Sudan), Liberia and Sierra Leone, where cooperation has been established between African continental and regional organisations and the UN, are positively portrayed in the third part as examples of ways to effectively maintain peace (p. 461). In the following chapters in the fourth part, the authors elaborate on the negative aspects of intervention in conflict areas. The thirteenth chapter, by Kwame Akonor provides an example of this as it deals with the case of the sexual abuse and exploitation of Congolese women and girls by peacekeepers of the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly MONUC, now called MONUSCO) (p. 236). This part puts the core of the main theme of peacebuilding in a controversial and problematic light and it is very important to talk about it in this regard. Presenting this negative side reminds the reader that in the process of peacebuilding there is always a danger of misusing power.

The fifth part of the book points out that in the process of peacebuilding in Africa it is necessary to deal with the problems arising from inequality, poverty, unemployment, marginalisation and the lack of inclusive development. In order to reach effectiveness and sustainability through the activities of peacebuilding, the processes of political reconciliation, transitional justice, rehabilitation, reintegration and socio-economic development must also be included in the related efforts. According to Oliver P. Richmond, the effectiveness of transformative peacebuilding depends on making changes at all levels of society – political, economic, social and cultural (p. 456). The authors of the book rightly highlight that peacebuilding in a war-torn country is a complex process, which demands examining the real seeds of the given conflict, in order to understand its causes. Each conflict must be analysed on the basis of an individual approach to a certain existing problem. Its solution then lies in a process with a multidimensional character.

The last chapters, which make up the sixth part of the book, deal with the role of external actors, who play a key part in supporting efforts to maintain and build the peace in Africa. In this part of the book the peace and security issues are analysed not only through the geospatial concept but also through cooperation with external partners. For example, this part contains a description of the case of the violent conflict in South Sudan in December 2013. The authors highlight the supportive role of the UN, the European Union (EU) and the United State of America (USA) during the negotiation processes and their efforts to resolve the crisis. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) monitored violations of human rights and provided humanitarian aid. The USA, Great Britain and Norway have also expressed their support for the ongoing peace process, which included financial subsidies. Besides the already mentioned countries, China also played a key role in the support (p. 461). The involvement of many actors in such processes requires consideration and careful management of their various interests, as well as frequently changing approaches to peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Meanwhile regional actors are focussed on their short-term and long-term interests that they seek to prioritise, which can complicate the efforts to achieve, build and maintain peace. However, the fundamental idea is that international partnership and mutual support are essential for sustainable peacebuilding in Africa (p. 459).

The concept of peacebuilding in Africa does not belong to new fields of study. For decades, Africans faced violent conflicts while the UN, the AU and Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) stood at the forefront of efforts to achieve peace in the affected countries. Many of these countries are facing a difficult political and economic

situation requiring a sophisticated institutional arrangement and new government structures.

The reviewed publication contains a great summary of the main ideas on conflict management. In it, the problematics of peacebuilding are investigated from a multidisciplinary point of view, so the book is composed of essays that belong to diverse fields such as international relations, political economy or sociology. This summary is very beneficial and provides knowledge of peace making from many perspectives.

Although the book touches upon many of the social science disciplines in connection with its topics, the authors do not include the field of media studies and its relevance to the conflict – related areas in their studies. The connection between media and conflict has recently been more requently discussed, and an examination of this relation would surely find its place in this book too. Currently, more and more authors deal with the media and its influence in conflict areas. Many concepts related to this have emerged in the field of peace journalism (a pioneer in this area of study is Johan Galtung [1965: 1–4]) and development journalism (see McQuail [2005: 178]).

Due to the multidisciplinary focus of the authors, this publication may be of special interest not only to students of the humanities and social sciences, but also to experts on Africa's peace, security and governance and policymakers involved in this area.

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Dambisa Moyo: Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth – and How to Fix It

New York: Basic Books, 2018, 296 pages, ISBN 978-0-465-09746-3.

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In this seminal work, *Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth – and How to Fix It,* Dambisa Moyo offers a daring blueprint for why democracies are failing and how to fix this problem for future generations. Moyo holds a Doctorate in Economics from Oxford and a Master's from Harvard. She is the author of three other New York Times Bestselling Books: *Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What It Means for the World* (2012), *How the West Was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly and the Stark Choices Ahead* (2011), and *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa* (2009).

Moyo's main thesis is that the democracies of the twenty-first century, especially Western democracies, cannot deliver economic growth and prosperity to their electorates without undergoing major and substantial reforms (p. xx). Moyo also contends that without fundamental changes to the nature of democracy and its institutional attributes, democratic politicians will struggle to address the numerous headwinds the global economy faces today (p. xx). Moyo does not propose that we let democracies wither away. Instead, she suggests that nascent democracies need to prioritise creating growth over immediate devotion to some paradigm of democratic perfection.

Edge of Chaos is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the imperative of growth. Moyo argues that economic growth is about satisfying the most basic individual human needs. Chapter 2, "A Brief History of Growth", asks an important question: why is it that some countries have successfully grown, while others have not grown enough to become wealthy despite the fact that those countries are endowed with natural resources? Chapter 3 discusses the challenges facing many democratic societies and the urgent need to address those challenges before it is too late. Those "hurricane headwinds" include but are not limited to: high levels of debt, natural resource scarcity, misallocation of capital, declining quality of labour, and, most importantly, a disinvestment in education. Chapter 4 discusses the wrong economic policy approach of protectionism. According to Moyo, in the postwar period, globalisation and its central tenets have been a major source of economic growth, and not protectionism, as preached by some economic pundits (p. 80). Chapter 5 discusses the challenge to liberal constitutional democracies and the political recidivism taking place around the world whereby citizens are freely choosing to elect authoritarian leaders and regimes through the democratic process (p. 121). Chapter 6 discusses the perils of political myopia. As politicians continue to think in terms of reelection cycles, decisions are made without any consideration of their long term impact. In Chapter 7, Moyo provides ten suggestions to strengthen our democracy in light of the challenges it is facing in the twenty-first century. In the concluding Chapter 8 Moyo argues that *Edge of Chaos* rings the warning bell regarding the major risks and challenges that the global economy faces and how ill-prepared leaders are for the future (p. 228).

Richard Haass, the President of the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* (2017),

has pointed out, *"the world is not Vegas."* In other words, what happens in the world will have a direct impact on the United States. Moyo further explains that in an interconnected world of anemic growth, other countries' crises will become our crises, whether they take the form of terrorism, income inequality, refugees, the resurgence of infectious diseases, or illegal immigration. As a result, governments will grow ever more fragmented and weak, further undermining an already fragile international community. Moyo is unwaveringly anti-protectionist and anti-isolationist. While President Trump or Treasury Secretary Mnuchin can claim that a trade war with China has no direct impact on the U.S. economy, reality tells us another story. Protectionism results in an indirect tax for U.S. consumers. As the trade war between the U.S. and China escalates, soybean farmers in Iowa are having a difficult time selling their product. Furthermore, protectionism is usually accompanied by higher unemployment, lower economic performance, and staggering living standards in the United States and elsewhere.

With the implosion of the Soviet Union and the end of communism, the "end of history" was announced. Liberalism with its strong emphasis on deregulation and a laissez-faire economy approach was sold out as the panacea to all the world's problems. In the post-Cold War world, democracy meant freedom, prosperity, and economic growth. As Moyo points out, growth enhances the living standards of both individuals and society. Under a democratic society driven by economic growth, governments would be able to fund and enhance public goods – education, health care, national security, and physical infrastructure. Also, a democratic and growth driven society would be a magnet for foreign direct investment and innovation that would act as a springboard for improved living standards and progress (p. 9). However, not all countries follow the path of democratisation and prosperity prescribed by Moyo. Some countries resort instead to being a liberal democracy in name only with a parasitic head of government siphoning off the state's coffers for their own personal enrichment and that of their cronies. The state became their fiefdom. Those individuals in power represent a plutocratic insurgency. Plutocratic insurgents do not wish to destroy the state. Instead, they attempt to coopt the state and use it for their own personal gain. They use lawyers and lobbyists and corruption, rather than armed struggle, to create a shadow government in pursuit of their personal interests (Bunker – Bunker 2019).

Moyo also discusses what she calls *"the seven hurricane-strength forces bearing down in the global economy"* (p. 40). Those tectonic shifts in the world economy, if not addressed properly and early, could devastate economic gains and prospective futures. For example, Moyo discusses how disinvestment in education is slowly eroding the superpower status of the United States. Quoting from a U.S. Department of Education report entitled *A Nation at Risk,* she points out that *"[o]ur [the United States'] once unchallenged pre-eminence in commerce, industry, science and technology innovation is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world. The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a nation and people"* (p. 57). Another major tectonic shift in the U.S. economy is the introduction of more technology to previously manual labour activities, especially within the automobile industry in the so-called Rust Belt region of the United States. Moyo contends that technology is putting workers, particularly the low-skilled ones, out of work. The consequences of this trend is that people in the lower-income ranks are exposed to the threat of technology, and this fuels another headwind that is undermining economic growth, namely, income inequality (p. 67). Income inequality is a hindrance to economic growth in any society. While the income for those at the top has increased, wages for those at the bottom have remained flat since wages are not adjusted for inflation. Thus, in the United States, the average income of the top 1 percent is fourteen times higher than the average income of the rest of the population (p. 68). Another direct consequence of income inequality is the lack of social mobility for those individuals at the bottom of the economic ladder. Those are the individuals *"tired of wishes, empty of dreams"*, to quote Carl Sandburg's

magical phrase. They are the *"working poor"*, who are invisible in America (Carl Sandburg quoted in Shipler 2004: x).

Another important issue discussed by Moyo in her book is the relationship between poverty and democracy. It has been well established that economic growth is a prerequisite for democracy and not the other way around (p. 118). However, today most democracies around the world are not truly democratic in the sense of the *polyarchal democratic* tradition.[1] Instead, as Moyo points out, while statistically the world is more democratic today, over 70 percent of these democracies are deemed illiberal (p. 212). While we have more democracies today, most are so-called illiberal democracies. According to Fareed Zakaria (1997: 22), illiberal democracies are *"democratically elected regimes often re-elected or reinforced by referendums that ignore the constitutional limits of their power and deprive their citizens of basic rights and liberties"*. In the case of the United States, we are witnessing in the twenty-first century a sort of political recidivism among the electorate. This electorate, mostly poor and uneducated, have their political rights suppressed by those in power in order to prevent a change in the status quo of the political system. This occurs in a political system that provides those in power with a life of luxury at the expense of the masses. The political elite behave like parasites, sucking the life out of the system to continue to enrich themselves and their cronies. This illiberal political system becomes their private fiefdom. Moyo explains that *"more years of unqualified electorates and poor-quality leaders will lead to worsening poverty and conflict as society becomes more unequal and more deeply split"* (p. 227).

Given the grim picture painted thus far, are we supposed to be passive observers of our democratic decline? Should we accept the fact that greater powers, just as they have risen, will also eventually collapse? Moyo's response is unequivocally no. She contends that we solve the problem of a lack of economic growth by overhauling our democratic political systems, rather than reforming capitalism or economic models (p. 210). Moyo's solutions to the problem of reforming our democratic political systems fall into two categories. Some actions target politicians and political institutions while others target voters. It is important to remember that Moyo's recommendations do not guarantee that the vicissitudes of our democratic political system will be improved. They are simply suggestions. They are necessary but not sufficient. As any student of democracy knows, there are no quick fixes for complex issues.

According to Moyo, there are ten actions that should be undertaken to improve the quality of our democratic systems. First, policymakers should bind their governments and their successors more firmly to policies (p. 170). That is, elected officials should adhere to the principle of legislative supremacy, which means that no legislature can pass a law that a future session cannot repeal (p. 176). Second, the United States must revisit its campaign finance in light of the Court's decision in *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission*. In that case, the Court ruled that political spending is a form of protected speech under the First Amendment, and the government may not keep corporations or unions from spending money to support or denounce individual candidates in elections. The third action, which is perhaps controversial, is that in order to improve the quality of lawmaking, officeholders should be paid salaries competitive with those of private-sector leaders, as well as performance bonuses (p. 179).

The fourth action is to alter the electoral cycles in order to give elected officials longer terms in office to discourage the short term thinking approach of policy making in which politics is a zero-sum game. Fifth, while Moyo proposes longer terms in office, she also advocates that politicians be subjected to term limits. Moyo explains that any politician granted a position of authority or power for multiple decades risks slipping into complacency and reduced accountability (p. 184). The sixth proposed reform is even more controversial than proposition number three. According to Moyo, a more discriminating approach toward who is eligible to run for office should be implemented. The idea behind

such a proposal would be to exclude those leaders who are narrowly political in their outlook because they lack real world experience. This would upgrade the quality of those who occupy political office (p. 186). The seventh proposed reform is to push for democracies to reduce the number of non-contested, or safe, seats in legislative elections. The eighth proposal is to address declining voter participation by making voting mandatory. While elections in many parts of the world are usually held either on a holiday or on a weekend, in the United States voting is not mandatory. So voters must either vote during their lunch hour or after work when they have already endured an eight-hour shift.

Voters have developed great political apathy toward politicians and voting. The recent wave of voting suppression in regard to minority voters, especially in the poorest Southern states in the United States, is illustrative of why voters are more apathetic than ever toward democracy. Thus, the ninth proposal for enhancing democracy is to find ways to educate the electorate regarding the impact of policy choices (p. 197). Finally, Moyo proposes that voting should be weighted. She proposes that voters be divided into three categories: the unqualified, the standard qualified voter, and the highly qualified voter (p. 198).

Moyo also addresses the importance of the media as an agent of social transformation in the political process. Moyo is particularly concerned with media outlets with an ideological orientation. As she states*, "an ideological media imbues and reinforces a culture of short-termism among politicians and political classes through a twenty-four-hour media cycle"* (p. 204).

The strength of Moyo's book lies in the chapters addressing the problem of how to fix our democracy in light of the political recidivism going on around the world. Her proposals fall into two categories. Some are targeted at politicians and political institutions while others are targeted at the voters themselves. While those proposals are Weberian ideal types, their implementation is another story since in order for them to be implemented, politicians and their policies would have to take into consideration long term goals. Long term goals do not benefit politicians who are running for reelection every other year, especially in the United States. This is perhaps the greatest weakness of the book. Some of its recommendations are so far out that their implementation would not be beneficial to politicians. Therefore those recommendations would be dead on arrival to members of the legislature.

In *Edge of Chaos,* Moyo highlights the challenges and risks that must be overcome in order for democracy to prosper in the post-Cold War international system. While the challenges are many, we should not reverse our path toward democratic consolidation. I recommend Moyo's book to any student or practitioner of world politics, and also to economists and world leaders. Moyo provides a good place from which to begin by calling our attention to, and defining clearly and succinctly, the nature of those obstacles. We fail to act on them at our own peril.

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[1] According to Robert A. Dahl, a polyarchal democracy is a political system with six democratic institutions: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship.

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Anthony Burke and Rita Parker (eds.): Global Insecurity: Futures of Global Chaos and Governance

London: The Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 379 pages, ISBN 978-1-349-95144-4.

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The book *Global Insecurity: Futures of Global Chaos and Governance*, edited by Anthony Burke and Rita Parker, offers a complex introduction to current global trends that evoke questions about our security not only on the national or regional levels, but also on the global and planetary levels. It presents a wide collection of essays written by nineteen leading Australian scholars in security studies, international relations and politics, some of whom are also former government policy advisors or state officials.

The book is divided into an introduction and three mains parts containing 19 chapters altogether. The first part is theoretical and discusses the concept of global security. The second part is about specific global agendas dealing with various global threats, such as climate change and ecological degradation, pollution, the economic crisis, gender violence, transnational terrorism, nuclear weapons or transnational crime. The final, third part opens questions about the future of national security, the role of states, and especially the reformation of global institutions.

The main theme of the book is what Joseph Camilleri, the author of its second chapter, called "the globalization of insecurity". Although there are some positive global trends, the authors point out the most alarming examples of global threats in order to portray the necessity and unavoidability of changes in the current international regimes. Those changes must be well understood and accepted by world leaders and general society, and, most importantly, successfully implemented within society. The difficulty and complexity of this issue is what the book's subtitle (*Futures of Global Chaos and Governance*) relates to. The predicted global chaos is connected to the critical character of the book, as it criticises not only the negative side effects of the interconnected capitalist world economy, but also the insufficient global agendas and policies treating those effects according to outdated security approaches.

Contrary to the traditional security approaches, and bearing in mind the planetary consequences of the insecurities, the authors of the book claim to look at the *"global governance problem through new lenses"* (p. 3). They all accept the importance of the broadening and deepening of the security agenda. Moreover, they are also willing to *"rethink the very foundation and architecture of international security"* (p. 3). This willingness is mainly obvious in the Part I of the book, titled "Conceptualizing Global Insecurity". This part is divided into four chapters, each referring to different theoretical concepts, such as the globalization of insecurity, the feminist political economy of violence, post-human security, and security cosmopolitanism. Anthony Burke explains their selection for the purpose of the book. He argues that these diverse theories converge on some core understandings, such as *"the systemic and processual nature of global insecurity, the need to address complex insecurities through profound structural and normative change, and the need for new kinds of analysis, ethics, and governance to address our common global challenges"* (p. 4).

Chapter 2, "Insecurity and Governance in an Age of Transition", written by Joseph Camilleri, elaborates on the phenomenon of the globalisation of insecurity. The author portrays the current era of transition as moving away from the state-centric approaches of

security towards new concepts of policy-making and governance arrangements, where armed non-state entities have been emerging, and above all else, a new psychological climate has been created. *"Agency has come to be exercised by old entities (states) within shifting boundaries and in new ways (e.g. cyber warfare) as well as by new entities (subnational and transnational) in ways both old and new"* (p. 26). Such a dichotomy generates inadequate governance frameworks, which result in the governance deficit. The author offers an integrated policy response which modulates the state-centric security paradigm. It contains a whole-of-governance and a whole-of-society framework with a requirement of a new pedagogy.

Chapter 3, "Global Violence and Security from a Gendered Perspective", written by Jacqui True and Maria Tanyag, offers a feminist theory as another alternative framework for studying global security. Specifically, it describes gendered insecurities by using a feminist political economy analysis of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS). The topic of the WPS is later elaborated on in a case-study in chapter 8. Although feminist theory is a well-established approach in many studied areas, the area of global security still would require a deeper study and broader acceptance of feminist researchers.

Chapter 4, "Post-human Security", written by Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, outlines several different security approaches. It firstly describes the traditional and critical approaches, which are later problematised by ideas of post-humanist approaches. In general, post-humanist approaches emerged as *"a reaction against the view of human exceptionalism (or anthropocentrism)"* (p. 68). The chapter also provides a basic introduction to approaches such as the new vitalism influenced by Gilles Deleuze, the vital materialism of Jane Bennet, the hybridisation of Bruno Latour and his Actor Network Theory (ANT), political ecologism, the de-development perspective, eco-feminism, complex ecologism, and critical post-humanism.

Chapter 5, "Security Cosmopolitanism and Global Governance", written by Anthony Burke, represents the last theoretical chapter dedicated to the conceptualisation of global security through the lenses of security cosmopolitanism. The author raises a question about a problem that *"is the major focus of this book: how to effectively, justly, and fairly respond to systemic, globalized forms of insecurity with improved approaches to national policy and regional and global governance"* (p. 85). Burke sees an answer to this question in cosmopolitan ethics, which should counter the failings of a state-centric way. Moreover, he points out the main finding of the book, which is univocally proven in all its chapters, namely the lacking effective systemic responses to the analysed issue areas. Burke also offers multiple reasons for such ineffective responses, such as *"power politics, poor institutional design, and inadequate analytical and ethical paradigms in policy-making and global governance"* (p. 93).

Demonstrations of specific areas with lacking systemic responses are provided in Part II, titled "Global Agendas". This part consists of twelve chapters, each analysing the efficiency of existing global governance regimes in regard to specific security areas and how these regimes incorporate the globalisation of insecurity into their agendas.

Chapter 6, "Global Ecology, Social Nature, and Governance", written by Simon Dalby, and Chapter 7, "Framing Global Climate Security", written by Mary E. Pettenger, deal with environmental agendas. Chapter 6 examines the development of the global climate agenda since the Cold War, which is connected to the age of the Anthropocene. This age encompasses what Victor Calaz called the Anthropocene gap. It is the gap *"between existing technology and political arrangements on the one hand and on the other, the rapidly changing social nature in which we now make our lives"* (p. 105). Furthermore, the chapter puts emphasis on the initiatives of geopolitical ecology and ecopolitics as a prerequisite for effective international political actions. However, it also points out that they may not be enough to fill the gap and adds a new localism as an example of a grassroots initiative. Chapter 7 focusses on framing climate change as a security threat,

specifically on the pragmatic, intersecting and apocalyptical frames and how these frames advance or restrain *"positive global responses to mitigate and adapt to climate change"* (p. 134).

Chapter 8, "The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda at the United Nations", written by Laura J. Shepherd, examines the WPS agenda, outlines its main obstacles and proposes how they may be resolved. In general, the author cautiously but optimistically evaluates the current state of the WPS agenda. The remaining challenge for the established pillars of the WPS agenda is to create a balance in the ensured protection provisions of the agenda for boys and men without disadvantaging girls and women, or a balance in depicting the many roles that women can represent in a conflict, from an agent of change to a victim or a perpetrator of violence.

Chapter 9, "Children, Conflict, and Global Governance", written by Katrina Lee-Koo, is concerned about the United Nations' abilities to develop successful global governance architectures for protection and better living conditions for women and children all around the world. It explicates how children's capacity to be politically active may have a helpful or destructive impact on the development of their communities. It argues that children are *"a custodian of peace"* (p. 172), who can be *"a strong, peace-building constituency"* (p. 171) and lay down *"the foundations of a sustainable peace"* (p. 172). All this is possible only if we start to look at children as vital participants of their societies and provide them with the right incentives in order to ensure their rights are globally respected and understood accordingly.

Chapter 10, "Global Weapons Proliferation, Disarmament, and Arms Control", written by Marianne Hanson, Chapter 11, "Challenges Facing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", written by Tanya Ogilvie-White, and Chapter 12, "Restraint and Governance in Cyberspace", written by Greg Austin, are all connected with the traditional security approaches focussing mainly on national security and high politics. However, the real and possible impact of certain weapons and the development of the human rights agenda have been reorienting the notion of security towards human security with humanitarian obligations. These three chapters examine the new psychological climate, defined by Joseph Camilleri in Chapter 2, which was derived from the dichotomy of old and new.

Chapter 13, "Pandemics and Dual-Use Research", written by Rita Parker, and Chapter 14, "Advocating Global Health Security", written by Sara E. Davies, deal with biological and health security issues, such as dual-use research and questions of ethics, pandemics or biological weapons, and propose steps toward reducing these types of insecurity. Moreover, Chapter 14 is based on a discourse analysis of two international health initiatives, the Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), and portrays how securitisations of health issues are operationalised and framed.

Chapter 15, "The International Governance of Forced Migration", written by Savitri Taylor, Chapter 16, "Three Generations of International Human Rights Governance", written by Morten B. Pedersen, and Chapter 17, "The UN Security Council and the Problem of Mass Atrocities", written by Alex J. Bellamy, provide a critical insight into existing but underdeveloped or ineffectual international regimes dealing with the protection of not only people in need, but also all people as rights holders.

Part III, titled "Reforming Global Institutions", represents the concluding part of the book, which, as its title hints, calls for a reformation of the current unsuitable international institutions and regimes. The critique of the current status of the global and national security is elaborated in the last two chapters. Chapter 18, "The Future of National Security and the Role of States", written by Allan Behm, and Chapter 19, "The United Nations and Global Security", written by Rita Parker and Anthony Burke, summarise the new security problems fostered by globalisation, which generate *"an entirely new security landscape for which most nation states are ill prepared"* (p. 327). Furthermore, Chapter 18 analyses

this new phenomenon and offers several reasons for the state's deficit, which are based on the arguments stated by Burke in Chapter 5. The chapter also criticises the international organisations as unable to fulfill current needs of global society because they are, like states, still locked in the post-WWII era. Then, Chapter 19 analyses the United Nations as an example of such an organisation, and what challenges this global institution faces. Specifically, it calls for a reformation of the Security Council in terms of membership and representation because of the globalisation of new security issues. It claims that the Council *"suffers from a quadruple legitimacy deficit: performance, representational, procedural and accountability"* (p. 364).

The collective of authors successfully fulfilled the main aim of the book, which is to introduce the reader to the most alarming global security threats of this century and how those threats reconceptualise the traditional understanding of security. The book does not aim to create a new theoretical approach but it rather offers a number of already existing theories which accept the planetary importance of securitisation, and which the authors consider to be necessary for understanding it. Although all the provided approaches share similar fundamental premises and can be framed as critical constructivist from the international relations perspective, the book does not provide any deeper synthesis of them. Furthermore, the book critically evaluates various existing global agendas dealing with current global threats as negative consequences of globalisation. However, the last part only briefly outlines some solutions to insufficient global agendas. Nevertheless, it proposes a discussion for reformation of global institutions and calls for a further debate on and further studies of global security.

The complexity of the book with its numerous theoretical approaches and case studies means that the book does offer an introductory knowledge to the studied phenomenon. For a deeper study of it, a reader has to look for other works by the authors, but lists of such works are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, I recommend the book to university students or starting PhD students, as well as members of the general public interested in the topic.

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