Emotions and Feeling Rules in Political Discourse. The Case of NATO-Russian Relations over Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

The article highlights the potential of emotions to influence political reality and observes the psychological climate fostered by Russian and NATO leaders over the current NATO-Russia-Ukraine relations. Firstly, it does so by analyzing the occurrence and the frequency of used emotions in political speeches of the Russian Federation and NATO, and commenting on the relationship of the two parties, their shared interests, and their disagreements on various political and security issues, all directly tied to Ukraine as a third party that has stood between these two blocs for many years. Secondly, the authors observe how political leaders use specific emotions in their public speeches to foster their distributive power politics, thus maintaining a particular psychological climate among citizens or member states. Using the public speeches of Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov, representing the Russian Federation, and Jens Stoltenberg and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, representing NATO as its current and former Secretary Generals, the analysis reveals the hidden role of emotions in an individual's discourse and connects them to a broader social and security context. The use of emotions in political communication can shape reality and disguise or, conversely, reveal the intentions of an individual, a group, or an entire state. Producing knowledge about the current war in Ukraine and the reasoning about its outbreak and progress fostered by political leaders (primarily through fear, indignation, and resentment) may be seen as normalizing some of the worst acts of violence. Emotions are therefore considered a powerful, effective, and inseparable tool of political communication, the importance of which is often overlooked.

INTRODUCTION

"But leaving unanalyzed the feelings behind the thoughts, the issues of sympathy and approbation, of solidarity, and, unfortunately, also of hate, is not simply an omission: it is to fail in the very effort of providing a coherent account of social reality."

(KRATOCHWIL 1994: 503)

The intentional use of emotions in political communication is currently on the rise. The significance attributed to language in political communication, along with its frequently emphasized influence on international relations and security, has led to an increasing recognition of emotions as a vital and extensively studied factor that impacts the perception of political reality. Until recently, the importance attributed to language in the field was minimal, as international relations and politics were predominantly studied and analyzed from a traditional perspective (KRATOCHWIL 1994). In this aspect, the underlying context concealed behind words and sentences in political speeches held little or no weight.

However, a notable shift in thinking occurred following the end of the Cold War – it was around this time that language and discourse started to be accorded greater significance, not only as an integral component of culture, but also as a tool that carries, shapes and redefines meaning.

This phenomenon grants language a significant social influence. Through language, for example, politicians can unsettle or instill fear in the public, exacerbate a negative public opinion, perpetuate prejudices, or evoke negative associations (MARKWICA 2018). When it comes to sensitive matters like national and international security, engaging in such actions can result in public condemnation or even an undermining of the given politician's reputation when their manipulative tactics are revealed to the public (YONGTAO 2010). On the other hand, when certain communication elements are used in moderation, they can lead to various political successes. The language in political speeches, for instance, can be utilized to reassure a concerned population, alleviate panic, or foster a sense of unity. Hence, it is evident that language, speech, and communication hold an inseparable and significant position within the political environment and psychological

climate. They possess the ability to influence public perception, shape political agendas, and even impact international relations (IBID.).

Observing emotions in connection with high political representatives offers many possibilities for researching patterns of behavior. As Patalakh (2018) states, if the actor uses strong positive emotions toward his group (or even the state), there is often an opposite emotion towards the others, who are often perceived as rivals or enemies. The result can significantly strengthen positive emotions towards one's own group, while negative emotions towards others multiply considerably. The strong influence of emotions on the actor can cause a loss of sober, factual reasoning. In this direction, historical trauma often plays a role. If it was present in the community in the past, it acquires social significance, influences community behavior, and mobilizes emotions that force the group members to stick together within the same psychological climate, and thus strengthen their identity.

Substantial research has already been conducted on the role of emotions in political discourse (E.G. SANCHEZ SALGADO 2021; BURKE 2017; GUSTAFSSON – HALL 2021; HUTCHISON – BLEIKER 2014). Additionally, many scholars have investigated how political figures can utilize emotions to influence public opinion and manipulate the public in order to achieve their own goals (E.G. CISLARU 2012; WILDMANN 2022; GILL 2016). However, no relevant literature has explored the concept of psychological climate and its formation by individuals in the context of public communication in crisis situations, or specifically in connection with the current war in Ukraine. Psychological climate refers to the overall atmosphere or environment within a particular setting or group that influences the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals within it. It encompasses the collective perceptions, attitudes, and emotions shared by the people in that context, which can greatly impact their well-being, motivation, and interactions. As Rego and Pina e Cunha (2006) define it, the psychological climate can be positive, in which case it fosters a sense of trust, support, and inclusivity, or it can be negative, in which case it is characterized by fear, hostility, and tension. It plays a crucial role in shaping individuals' experiences and can significantly affect their performance, satisfaction, and overall mental health. For instance, a positive workplace climate characterized by support, trust, and collaboration can enhance employee satisfaction and performance. In contrast, a negative

climate marked by hostility or unfairness can lead to stress and disengagement. Even though the authors defined the concept of psychological climate predominantly by applying it to workplaces, it can just as well be applied to international relations and politics.

Conducting research on the psychological climate in relation to political communication during crisis situations has the potential to yield intriguing and credible findings. These findings can greatly contribute to a deeper comprehension of the complex dynamics underlying ongoing international conflicts, which pose a direct threat to global security. The war in Ukraine, initiated by the invasion of Russian troops on Ukrainian territory on February 24, 2022, stands out as a prime example of such a crisis. This conflict not only marks a significant historical event as the biggest war on European soil since the end of the Second World War but also represents a deeply concerning conflict that jeopardizes the sovereignty and very existence of an independent nation. However, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine began well before its escalation in 2022. In 2014, the Russian Federation unlawfully annexed Crimea, a region belonging to Ukraine, and subsequently adopted a confrontational rhetoric not only towards Ukraine but also towards NATO, which had been its historical adversary during the Cold War. Despite the official end of the Cold War, it appears that the mutual misunderstanding, ideological differences, and historical grievances continue to widen the gap between these factions, with Ukraine caught in the middle. This conflict appears to be driven by strong emotions rooted in historical events, indicating that there are deeper underlying factors at play beyond the immediate situation in Ukraine.

Previous research on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has only scratched the surface when it comes to understanding the significance of emotions in this complex situation. Reinke de Buitrago (2022), for example, focused on investigating the interplay between visuals and emotions, as well as the impact of emotions on behavior and policy. Her study specifically examined how visual framings of the war in Ukraine in (social) media, created by Ukrainians and their Western supporters, contribute to shaping a particular understanding of the conflict, evoking emotions, and mobilizing individuals. Ventsel, Hansson, Madisson and Sazonov (2021) analyzed the power of fear in politics and the military. The authors used the 'Zapad 2017' military exercise, the largest recent Russian war games on

NATO's eastern borders, as a case study to illustrate how fear narratives can be interpreted. They specifically focused on the narratives formulated by Russian official spokespeople in relation to the exercise and conducted a thorough analysis to uncover the underlying meaning-making tendencies. Their research revealed some more sophisticated and indirect ways in which fear is employed to shape perceptions and manipulate outcomes. Also, the utilization of the Russian-NATO relations by Simon Koschut (2018A) served as a prime example of an exploration of emotions within political discourse. These studies suggest that integrating emotions as an additional category of analysis expands the scope of meanings that can be derived from a discourse analysis.

No previous research has comprehensively assessed how the psychological climate is shaped by individuals within the framework of public communication during crisis situations, or particularly in relation to the ongoing war in Ukraine. This article seeks to address this issue and uncover the concealed influence of emotions in an individual's discourse within a wider social or security context by addressing the following research questions: 1) *How frequently were various emotions used in the political speeches of the Russian Federation and NATO?* 2) *How were specific emotions used by the selected political leaders in their public speeches to form the psychological climate as a part of their distributive power politics?* 3) *In what ways did the selected political leaders strategically employ specific emotions within their public speeches to shape the psychological climate?*

The authors explored the political ramifications of emotions in the context of the NATO-Russia relations over Ukraine from 2014 until the present. By applying emotion discourse analysis, they analyzed the usage and frequency of emotions in political speeches delivered by the selected Russian Federation and NATO leaders, specifically focusing on sections that addressed the relationship dynamics, shared interests, and disagreements tied to Ukraine. Furthermore, they observed how the selected political leaders, namely Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov from Russia, and Jens Stoltenberg and Anders Fogh Rasmussen from NATO, strategically employed specific emotions in their public speeches to bolster their power politics and create a particular psychological climate.

Within the realm of political communication, it is commonly acknowledged that emotions can play a significant role in shaping perceptions and either disguising or unveiling the intentions of individuals, groups, or even entire states (CISLARU 2012). In this article, emotions are regarded as a potent and indispensable tool for political communication, whose significance is frequently underestimated. Acknowledging the inherent difficulty of comparing the expressions of individuals representing international organizations and those representing their own states, this analysis presents a valuable contribution to the study of emotions in the context of international politics. Moreover, it enriches the field of the examination of crises by offering a discursive perspective, as discourse is a relevant part of the political and security reality.

The first section of the article develops the debate about the importance of identifying and acknowledging emotions in political communication and the broader political discourse. The second section conceptualizes emotions within the framework of emotion discourse analysis, specifies its operationalization, and explains the selection of the analyzed speeches. Finally, the third section interprets and discusses the emotions used in the analyzed speeches and contextualizes them within the notion of distributive power politics.

EMOTIONS IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The concept of emotions has been generally applied to individuals and their internally experienced feelings. However, how individuals understand their emotions, act based on them, and recognize emotions in others is cognitively and culturally conditioned (CRAWFORD 2014: 537). Thus, emotions are commonly discussed in connection with their ontological and epistemological dichotomy. They can be seen as rational or irrational, biological or cultural, personal or cultural, or spontaneous or strategic (KOSCHUT 2018A: 277). Consequently, emotions are studied as an epiphenomenon, as a source of irrationality, as a tool for strategically minded actors, and most recently as a necessary aspect of rationality (MERCER 2006). The article follows Mercer's assumption that emotion *"can undermine rationality even while it is necessary to rationality"* (IBID.: 299).[1]

Furthermore, the article follows R. Markwica's definition of emotions: *"emotions are transient, partly biologically based, and partly culturally conditioned responses to a stimulus, which give rise to a coordinated process including appraisals, feelings, bodily reactions, and expressive behavior, all of which prepare people to deal with the stimulus"* (MARKWICA 2018: 58). Thus, emotions are ascribed to individuals but performed collectively. When, why, and how emotions appear are questions of socially recognized and learned patterns. Jonathan Mercer advocates the existence of group emotions, which he understands as ideological structures and which, at the same time, create structures of relationships between people as well as larger groups, organizations, or states (MERCER 2014: 521–523).

When we accept the premise of the social life of emotions and *"their existence as socially meaningful elements of human lived experience"* (GUSTAFSSON – HALL 2021: 974), emotions become political. In this context, group emotions as ideological structures are understood through representation (HUTCHISON – BLEIKER 2014). From this perspective, emotions are studied as represented in our expressions, discourses, and social practices, which are influenced by what Hall and Gustafsson called a distributive politics of emotions, which they defined, in connection with Harold Laswell's aphorism *"who gets what, when, how"*, as *"who gets to feel what, when, and how, and whose feelings matter"* (LASWELL 1936).

Authors often focus on the use of emotions in times of crisis – Sanchez Salgado (2021), for example, explored how emotions contribute to comprehending the decision-making processes during crisis situations, and how emotions can manifest and reflect power dynamics and status in various crises (2022). From this perspective, emotions can influence crisis situations by constraining the range of policy solutions considered. Zilincik (2022) expanded this premise and focused on observing the relationship between emotions and the development of a military strategy – emotions can, for example, play a crucial role in maintaining the domestic support for a war effort as they can serve as a powerful motivator for strategists and their societies to persevere until victory is attained. Burke (2017) also contributed to the research of emotion in the political sphere and confirmed the relationship between emotion and sentiment as a driving tool for the creation of the postwar human rights program at the UN.

The second area of research that authors often focus on in this regard is the role of emotion as a tool for public manipulation. According to Cislaru (2012), emotions serve as a rhetorical instrument employed by politicians, media discourse, and even citizens themselves to influence or shape public opinion. As the author states, although both positive and negative emotions can be spread in society, fear, anger, and guilt are among the most shared emotions. This idea was confirmed by Gill (2016), who explores how psychological mechanisms are exploited by social entrepreneurs to advance their own agendas, such as reinforcing in-group bonds, generating a sense of crisis, or retaining power. According to the author, the emotion of fear becomes vulnerable to political rhetoric and manipulation, resulting in what is known as the "biopolitics of fear." The individual use of emotions by politicians is a very frequent topic of academic debate. Kornblit (2022) demonstrates that politicians can harness the power of emotion to foster a sense of collective identity by demonstrating shared authority at both the federal and decision-making levels, expressing empathy towards the populace, and calling for solidarity.

The power of emotions can be observed not only on the individual but also on the state and international level. Hall (2015) defines the concept of emotional diplomacy and explores how state actors strategically use emotional behavior to influence how others perceive "them". Emotions used in political discourse are, according to the author, not only cheap talk but also a relevant strategy for states to use to defend their interests and position in the international arena. Emotions therefore enter the decision-making process in realms of economic and military aid, great-power cooperation, and even the use of armed force. Hall examines three distinct types of emotional diplomacy: those driven by the emotions of anger, sympathy, and guilt.

A somewhat more abstract and extensive concept of emotions was defined by the author Claire Yorke (2020). It is the concept of atmospherics - the author investigated to what extent a correct reading of the mood and emotions of the population is important for building a more effective policy. Similarly, Beauregard (2022), who focused on the long-term effects of emotions in the study of international relations, defined the term "emotional intensity" as a term that encompasses the length of the emotion, the intensity of the physiological arousal, repeatedly reliving the emotion,

strong urges to take action, and extreme behavior. When applying this concept to the adoption of economic sanctions against Russia during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the author explained how emotions can support and foster cooperation against the "enemy".

ANALYZING EMOTIONS

Although there is currently quite an extensive number of works that link international relations, politics, and security with the phenomenon of emotions and acknowledge their importance, there are still doubts about how to systematically research them. Recently, two comprehensive monographs have been published that try to fill this gap and propose several relevant methods (VAN RYTHOVEN – SUCHAROV 2019; CLÉMENT – SANGAR 2018). To choose a sufficient method, Clément and Sangar (2018) suggest first identifying the analytical position of emotions by placing them within three overarching questions:

● What effects do emotions have on other empirical phenomena (such as perceptions or behavior)?

● Why and how are specific emotions used by political leaders and institutions?

● How to detect the inseparable yet partly hidden role of emotions within larger discursive dynamics?

It is important to note that these questions are not mutually exclusive. The research questions asked in the introduction of the article are ontologically focused on the discourse, specifically the political discourse. Thus, can be placed within the second and third questions asked above. Subsequently, emotion discourse analysis, as defined by Simon Koschut, was chosen as a relevant method to be applied in the article.[2] Koschut links political discourse with emotions and applies them to a wider political or security context. There are also other authors who have employed the connection between discourse and emotions in their research during the last two decades (E.G. AHÄLL – GREGORY 2013; EBERLE – DANIEL 2019; EDKINS 2003; ROSS 2014; SOLOMON 2014; VAN RYTHOVEN 2015).

Nevertheless, Koschut's emotion discourse analysis represents a comprehensive methodological framework for studying emotions that

allows one to portray the role of emotions that reinforce *"relational structures of dominance and resistance but can also lead to transformations of social hierarchies in world politics"* (KOSCHUT 2018B: 495). The framework is based on three steps: *"(1) selecting appropriate texts, (2) mapping the verbal expression of emotions, and (3) interpreting and contextualizing their political implications"* (KOSCHUT 2018A). The present article follows these steps.

Selecting Appropriate texts

To obtain appropriate and relevant data, a collection of credible documents or speeches was required. For the Russian speeches, the annual addresses to the Federal Assembly were used as the main source of the data analysis. The annual address is made in front of the Russian Parliament, which is called the Federal Assembly. Although the addresses do not have any legal force, the head of state, as the main custodian, summarizes a current internal and foreign problems and proposes subsequent solutions to them for the upcoming years. The addresses are influential not only for members of the parliament but also for other authorities of the Federation and the whole society because the solutions and visions mentioned during the addresses by the president are seen as proposals for changing already existing policies or new policy concepts. As the speeches are about both domestic and foreign affairs of the given year, only the parts about foreign affairs were chosen for this study. Apart from the annual addresses, Putin's speeches given at the Valdai Discussion Club were also analyzed. This Moscow-based think-tank represents a famous discussion forum closely associated with President Putin, where formal meetings are held annually and topics of international relations, politics, and security are commonly discussed. Furthermore, the speeches of Sergei Lavrov and Vladimir Putin from the Munich Conference were also analyzed, as the conference serves as a meeting point between the Russian leaders and other European and world leaders. Furthermore, Putin's published article from July 2021 about the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians and his speeches from the 21st and 24th of February 2022 were also included in the analysis as they represent a peak of the conflict right before the war. The total number of the relevant Russian speeches in the pre-invasion period was 29.

To provide a complex illustration of the role of emotions in the policy-making process, a few documents from the post-invasion period were observed as well. More precisely, to compare different phases of the emotional discourse of President Putin, the authors added the following speeches to the analysis: "The Victory Parade on Red Square" from May 2022, "The Address by the President of the Russian Federation" from September 2022, and "The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly" from February 2023.

To obtain relevant data from NATO speeches, we selected and analyzed various documents. The focus was put on the NATO Annual Reports and official Addresses to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, both of which were delivered by the Secretary-General, and represent the most formal documents commenting on various security challenges and issues. Apart from them, important data were extracted from press conferences and releases that respond to current events in real time and are therefore suitable for capturing raw emotions in texts. NATO Speeches and Remarks also appear to be suitable data sources and are usually arranged when it is necessary to comment on important events over time. Some interesting conclusions can also be drawn from the panel discussions, where it is common that experts outside of NATO address security and political issues, and thus contribute to the relevance of the discussion itself. The total number of relevant NATO speeches in the pre-invasion period was 38.

Similarly, as in the case of Russia, three post-invasion NATO speeches were added to the analysis to see how the emotional discourse of Jens Stoltenberg either remained consistent or changed over time. More precisely, the following documents were analyzed: "A statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the International Crimea Platform" from August 2022, "the Keynote speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Berlin Security Conference" from December 2022, and "the Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on the release of his Annual Report" from March 2023.

All the data were obtained from the archives of the official websites of the Russian Federation and NATO (<HTTP://EN.KREMLIN.RU, HTTPS://MID.RU/EN/, HTTPS://RUSSIAEU.RU/EN, AND HTTPS://WWW.NATO.INT>). *All the data were from the period from 2014, when the Russia-Ukrainian crisis started with the annexation of*

Crimea by the Russian Federation, to 2023, when the world already witnessed one year of the war in Ukraine, but with one exception: Putin's famous speech at the 2007 Munich Conference. The authors started the analysis of the texts in March 2023, and almost 2 months were devoted to this stage of the research.

Mapping the Verbal Expression of Emotions, Their Interpretation and Their Contextualization

The authors looked for occurrences of emotions[3] in the given texts, with a focus on their frequency. Due to the amount of pre-selected texts, the Atlas.ti software was used for this purpose. Based on Koschut's framework (2020: 9), the authors looked for specific emotion terms in various forms, such as nouns, verbs, or adverbs. Then they searched for emotional connotations, emotional metaphors, comparisons, and analogies. In this case, a phrase, a sentence, or a whole paragraph could be interpreted as expressing an emotion. It was also possible to mark multiple emotions in the same part of the text. The focus was also put on the intentions of the speakers – what the narratives behind the emotions were, why specific types of emotions were used, what the implications of repeatedly used emotions for the political reality could be, what the audience could "feel" from the speeches, etc. All of that leads to emotional othering, stigmatization with naming and shaming and showing the intertextuality and performativity of emotions (KOSCHUT 2020: 10–12). This helped to contextualize the emotions across the discourses of the selected speakers.

Even though the authors followed the divisions of specific emotions provided by Demszky et al. (2020) during the mapping of the verbal expressions of emotions, the appraisal processes in emotions need to be acknowledged to adhere to specific emotions in their explicit or implicit form within a given text. The term "appraisal processes in emotions" means how the authors stuck to selected emotions, or specifically, how the connotations, analogies, etc. evoked emotional reactions which could be seen as subjective interpretations. Therefore, it is important to show examples of such appraisal processes along with examples of mapped emotions to transparently show the whole process. As Koschut stated, *"By making the emotional potential of the text explicit and transparent via text insertion, the reader may either ascribe to my particular reading of the text or*

reach an alternative conclusion and, in the latter case, may wish to empirically challenge the analysis put forward here" (KOSCHUT 2018A: 290). The following sections discuss what the results mean according to the observed political reality. They discuss excerpts from the analyzed speeches and comments and correspondingly show how NATO and Russian leaders have gradually formed a psychological climate based on mostly recognized emotions.

ANGER, RESENTMENT AND OUTRAGE AS EMOTIONS OF INJUSTICE AND MISAPPREHENSION

At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin's proclamations about the Western partners mirrored the feelings of the Russian leadership and further Russian activities on the international stage. He openly expressed his anger and bitterness toward the NATO countries. He made the statement *"Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason, those who teach us do not want to learn themselves"* (PUTIN 2007). Putin's indignation is emphasized by his use of the phrase 'constantly being taught' and the reference to NATO members, whom he does not consider to be eligible role models. Anger is also the main feeling connected to the topic of NATO enlargement, for which Putin uses the term 'expansion'. A process of expansion may evoke negative connotations as it may refer to encroaching and intruding on the territory of other nations. The NATO enlargements after 1990 are also seen as causes of guilt and regret, and the feeling of injustice is present every time the Russian leaders talk about NATO. *"I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?"* (PUTIN 2007). Putin explicitly talks about a provocation from NATO and the rhetorical question emphasizes what Putin portrays as an obvious fact, namely that NATO considers Russia as a threat. In 2014, when the NATO-Russian relations over Ukraine escalated, Putin again fostered anger through indignation, misapprehension, and disappointment. On several occasions, he claimed that Russia understood the actions of NATO as a threat because Russia was being fooled repeatedly. All of this was while Russia was still open to dialogue and improving relations. In his 2014 speech, he stated, *"We understand what is happening; we understand that these actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian*

integration. And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our colleagues in the West. We are constantly proposing cooperation on all key issues; we want to strengthen our level of trust and for our relations to be equal, open, and fair. But we saw no reciprocal steps" (PUTIN 2014). In this excerpt, Putin stressed the unity of Ukraine and Russia while blaming and showing anger toward the West for not responding to Russia's initiatives.

Another example of a speech expressing anger is a 2015 speech by Sergei Lavrov. In this speech, Lavrov warned against the spread of neo-Nazism in Ukraine. The warning related to a repeated reproach, indignation, and, once again, expecting misapprehension from the NATO counterparts. As he put it, *"Regretfully, our Western colleagues are apt to close their eyes to everything that is said and done by the Kiev authorities, including fanning xenophobic attitudes. […] Those statements failed to evoke any reaction in the Western capitals. I don't think present-day Europe can afford to neglect the danger of the spread of the neo-Nazi virus"* (LAVROV 2015).

Both Putin and Lavrov previously repeatedly stated that NATO identifies Russia as its enemy; however, they were cautious about directly calling NATO an enemy or an aggressor. That position changed in 2018 with the then Russian progress in weapons development – Putin moved his anger to a new, more specific phase when he changed his rhetoric and called NATO a potential aggressor. *"I hope that everything that was said today would make any potential aggressor think twice since unfriendly steps against Russia such as deploying missile defenses and bringing NATO infrastructure closer to the Russian border become ineffective in military terms and entail unjustified costs, making them useless for those promoting these initiatives"* (PUTIN 2018).

Lavrov's speech in 2019 instigated anger and evoked deeper resentment by referring to the "links in a chain" that are halting all Russian intentions to improve the mutual relations between Russia and NATO. Furthermore, he expressed disappointment with the unsuccessful cooperation initiatives for forming common spaces between the EU and Russia for areas ranging from economy and justice to science and education, which were once again halted by the European states. *"The illegal bombing attacks on Yugoslavia, its partition and the unilateral recognition of Kosovo independence, which recurred state borders on the continent for the first time after WWII, support for the armed coup in Kiev, the reckless expansion of NATO and*

the deployment of US ABM defenses, the EU's refusal to accept the reciprocal visa renunciation decision that had been coordinated between Moscow and Brussels, and the discrimination of Russian PACE deputies are like links in a chain" (LAVROV 2019). This sentence evokes anger in all its parts, as, for example, 'illegal bombing attacks' refers to breaking a taboo, 'partition and the unilateral recognition' refers to an action without the other side's consent, 'reckless expansion' refers to threatening the whole regional system of balance of power, and 'refusal to accept' and 'discrimination' refer to unjust treatment.

At the 56th Munich Security Conference in 2020, Lavrov reaffirmed Russia's position towards Europe and the NATO activities there. However, this time, his indignation, misapprehension, and disappointment were covered up by the hostility expressed in his warning to stop defining Russia as a threat, which could be understood as a serious deterrence. Thus, both anger and fear can be felt in his speech. In his words, *"The credibility crisis is especially acute when it comes to European affairs. The escalation of tension, the eastward advancement of NATO's military infrastructure, the unprecedentedly massive military exercises near Russia's border, and pumping inordinate amounts of money into defense budgets create unpredictability. The Cold War patterns have once again become a reality. Before it's too late, it is time to say no to promoting the 'Russian threat' phantom or any other threat for that matter, and to go back to things that unite us"* (LAVROV 2020). In this excerpt, Lavrov emphasizes the hostility by using the words 'escalation', 'advancement', 'unprecedentedly', 'inordinate' and 'unpredictability', all of which refer to NATO actions.

In January 2022, before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Lavrov, still following his 'links in a chain' narrative, expressed his outrage as the USA and European countries imposed unilateral sanctions on Russia and supported Ukraine. *"We only need to review the ever more provocative military maneuvers near our borders, the efforts to draw the Kiev regime into NATO's orbit, the supplies of lethal weapons to Ukraine, or how it is being incited to direct provocation against the Russian Federation. In this context, demands that we stop holding exercises on our own territory – something we have an uncontestable right to do – sound particularly cynical. The double standards in this situation are beyond reason, but we have, unfortunately, long since become used to it"* (LAVROV 2022). Here by using words such as 'provocative', 'orbit', 'lethal', and 'provocation', Lavrov emphasizes his explicit outrage towards NATO.

Furthermore, he expresses Russia's determination to continue with its actions and a justification for them by using the phrase 'an uncontestable right to do'.

The time when it was 'too late' happened to be in February 2022. Firstly, on 21 February Putin recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Lugansk People's Republic. In his speech from this day, he clearly stated that the continuing 'links in a chain' from the Western counterparts did not provide any other option for the Russian Federation but to sound the last deterrence note before the invasion. He stated that *"NATO documents officially declare our country to be the main threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Ukraine will serve as an advanced bridgehead for such a strike. If our ancestors heard about this, they would probably simply not believe this. We do not want to believe this today either, but it is what it is. I would like people in Russia and Ukraine to understand this"* (PUTIN 2022A). Putin's outrage can be felt in his characterizing Ukraine as a bridgehead for a NATO strike against Russia while calling out to the common ancestors of both Russia and Ukraine.

Contrary to the case of Russia, where anger in many of its forms was present during the whole analyzed period, in the case of NATO, its anger could be perceived mainly right before and after the outbreak of war in February 2022. It was connected to the low effectiveness of NATO's efforts to keep an open dialogue with Russia and its readiness to defend itself if Russia attacks any member of the Alliance. As Stoltenberg stated, *"The Russian regime is aggressive abroad and oppressive at home. Any Russian aggression will come at a high price. With serious political and economic consequences for Russia"* (STOLTENBERG 2021). He repeated this idea in 2022, when any attempt to have a constructive dialogue with Russia was seen as almost impossible, emphasizing that diplomatic channels were then currently closed: *"NATO Allies have worked for a meaningful dialogue with Russia for many, many years, Russia has walked away from that dialogue. So that is not functioning. It is not possible to have a meaningful dialogue with Russia when they are conducting an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine"* (STOLTENBERG 2022A). The outrage is emphasized by the repeatedly used words such as 'aggressive', 'oppressive' and 'illegal'. Furthermore, similarly as in the Russian case, here anger is evoked mainly because of disappointment with the other side and its reluctance to communicate.

AFFECTION, CARING AND COMPASSION
AS THE EMOTIONS OF UNITY AND SOLIDARITY

As mentioned earlier, in the pre-invasion NATO speeches, the emotions of affection and caring were the most dominant emotions that appeared in the given documents. These were strongly present in the NATO speeches since 2014 – following the annexation of Crimea, NATO sought to express its unequivocal support for Ukraine, and support its efforts to make free decisions and choose its future. At the same time, NATO emphasized the importance of Russia's recognition of Ukraine's new development. The situation was similar in 2015, when NATO needed to show that, despite its condemnation of Russia's efforts, the Alliance's goal was to maintain open communication with the Russian Federation and seek a solution to the dispute. At the same time, NATO again openly supported Ukraine as an invaded country. Efforts to show NATO's merits in relation to its common history with Russia came to the fore: *"We are continuing to stay very focused on how we can work with Ukraine. Our support for Ukraine is taking place now. So we continue to support a negotiated solution to the crisis"* (STOLTENBERG 2015). In this paragraph, affection and caring are expressed by the will of NATO to support Ukraine and seek a solution to the crisis. Stoltenberg indicated that NATO stands by Ukraine in this conflict and is determined to continue in its support.

These emotions can be found in all the analyzed NATO speeches throughout the years. However, right after the invasion, NATO had to carefully clarify the meaning of its support, as the wrong narrative would mean placing NATO members at the brink of war. Therefore, it was trying to express its support and compassion for Ukraine, but with emphasis on the fact that NATO was not currently part of the conflict and therefore did not plan a military conflict with Russia: *"We condemn the attacks on civilians. We provide support to Ukraine. At the same time, NATO is not part of the conflict. NATO is a defensive alliance. We don't seek war, conflict with Russia"* (STOLTENBERG 2022B).

A few months after the invasion, the discourse moved towards the position of Ukraine in the conflict and its importance for maintaining global security: *"Ukraine has suffered six terrible months of the war. But you have also shown your incredible ability to resist brutal aggression. To strike*

back, retake territory, and impose major costs on Russia. There can be no lasting peace if the aggressor wins. If oppression and autocracy prevail over freedom and democracy. So the best way to support lasting peace is to support Ukraine" (STOLTENBERG 2022C). In Stoltenberg's speech, compassion is strongly present in the form of admiration for the resistance of Ukraine in the crisis while it is suffering oppression. By his saying phrases such as *"your incredible ability to resist brutal aggression",* this emotion comes to the fore as a central rhetorical element.

At the end of 2022, NATO repeatedly stressed the need to stay focused and take Russia as an equal and powerful partner to which the rhetoric and actions of the West should be adapted: *"Thanks to the heroic resistance of the Ukraine people [sic], and the unprecedented support from NATO Allies, Ukraine has made significant gains. But we should not underestimate Russia. Russian missiles and drones continue to rain down on Ukrainian cities, civilians, and critical infrastructure. Causing enormous human suffering, as winter sets in"* (STOLTENBERG 2022D). In this particular paragraph, affection, caring and compassion are expressed by using phrases with strong adjectives such as *"heroic resistance", "unprecedented support"* or *"significant gains"*, which indicate the power of the partnership between NATO and Ukraine. On the other hand, the phrase *"causing enormous human suffering"* highlights the compassion towards the people of Ukraine.

In March 2023, more than one year after the invasion, Stoltenberg emphasized the unity of NATO and its plan to accept new members which had expressed a request to join. Stoltenberg, therefore, expressed that Russia's efforts to reduce the influence or tarnish the reputation of NATO had not been successful even a year after the conflict began: *"He [Putin] thought he could break NATO unity. But NATO Allies are standing strong and united, and providing unprecedented support for Ukraine. And he wanted less NATO. But he has got exactly the opposite. More NATO"* (STOLTENBERG 2023).

In the case of Russia, the emotions of affection and caring were slightly present only in a few speeches – mainly to promote and support the bond between Russia and Ukraine and show that the two nations were and still are close to each other. The article by Putin published in July 2021 about the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians can be seen as an unprecedented manifesto of distributive power politics of emotions. In the

analyzed speeches from the previous years, the references to unity were mostly in connection with Russian internal domestic issues. However, in the article, Putin expresses a strong unity with Ukraine: *"It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people"* (PUTIN 2021B). Here affection and caring are expressed by his use of strong and powerful phrases such as *"hearts and the memory"* or *"the blood ties that unite millions of our families".* The emotions are even more strengthened by his use of words and sentences indicating the unity of Russia and Ukraine, such as "together", or *"we are one people".*

Such a feeling of unity with Ukraine was seen as *"a historical, political, and security predicate for invading it – if and when that ever became necessary"* (RUMER – WEISS 2021). Amplified emotions of unity and belonging were used along with the moving Russian troops near the Ukrainian borders as a manipulative form of deterrence.

FEAR, ANXIETY AND APPREHENSION AS EMOTIONS OF URGENCY AND DETERRENCE

The emotion of fear was primarily present in the analyzed speeches through tertiary emotions like fright, panic, anxiety, tenseness, and apprehension. In both cases, these emotions were employed by the speakers to create a sense of urgency or deterrence, while also demonstrating a sense of responsibility and genuine concern for the current situation or events. In the 2016 speeches, when Russia's relations with the West were very tense, mainly due to the unfavorable situation in Syria, NATO verbally pushed for a dialogue between the two sides, as well as pushing for the Alliance and its members to respond flexibly to new security challenges: *"…when tensions are high as they are now I think it is of particular importance that we keep channels of political dialogue open with Russia […] and we have to adapt when we see that our security environment is changing…"* (STOLTENBERG 2016). When Stoltenberg explicitly says, *"tensions are high"* and *"our security environment is changing"*, emotions of fear and anxiety come to the fore in this particular speech. Even though the choice of the selected words is quite modest, the context indicates the increasing nervousness of NATO members.

At the same time, NATO was beginning to step up efforts to show that it is ready to defend itself if Russia attacks any member of the Alliance. This point has gradually intensified over the years, along with the point of the low effectiveness of NATO's efforts to keep an open dialogue with Russia: *"…We worked for a strategic partnership with Russia, but then Russia decided to use force against neighbors. We saw it in Georgia, but we saw it also in Ukraine. And this is Russia's decision that they have chosen not to cooperate, but to confront"* (STOLTENBERG 2018). In this particular sequence, apprehension and fear are the main emotions present in the speech. Stoltenberg stressed the previous conflicts in which Russia was involved and expressed that the next confrontation is still on the table.

Furthermore, emphasis was placed on showing why NATO is an influential rival to the Russian Federation. Stoltenberg clarified that NATO is a major guarantor of security in Europe and the world: *"To keep our people safe in today's unpredictable world, we must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defense. This is a collective responsibility. Because we are only as strong as our weakest link"* (STOLTENBERG 2021). Anxiety coming from the Russian activities can be also seen in the phrases that aim to show how strong, powerful and united NATO members are. It is a common strategy in hiding the real negative emotions which can make the states look weak.

The emotion of fear played a crucial role in highlighting the alliance's dedication to being proactive and adaptable in the face of emerging security challenges: *"We live in a time of uncertainty. We cannot predict the next crisis. So we need a strategy to deal with uncertainty. We have one. NATO. One for all, all for one"* (IBID.). These feelings became even more intensified in the post-invasion period – the fear of being dragged into the conflict can be seen in some passages of the speeches, where the determination to face the aggression is accompanied by an awareness of possible losses on both sides: *"We must stand ready to do more. Even if it means to pay a price. Because we are in this for the long haul"* (STOLTENBERG 2022). As words such as *"uncertainty"* and the plural pronoun *"we"* are repeated, the fear can be felt in this paragraph, indicating the need to cooperate in order to overcome Russian threats.

In a similar vein to the discourse of NATO countries, the war in Ukraine holds broader implications for Russia. In the speeches of Putin and

Lavrov, it is not solely about Ukraine, but it is rather a catalyst for transforming the flawed international system and safeguarding the future of the Russian population. Fear serves as a powerful driving force behind these motivations. However, it is noteworthy that the Russian discourse often veils the emotion of fear, as other emotions are employed to mask true intentions and sentiments in it. For example, in 2022, Putin's speeches tried to emphasize the need for unity as the fundamental premise for Russian survival, but still, the emotion of fear is evident in some paragraphs: *"The threat grew every day. Russia launched a pre-emptive strike at the aggression. It was a forced, timely, and the only correct decision. A decision by a sovereign, strong, and independent country"* (PUTIN 2022C). Similarly to the previous example, here fear and anxiety are the primary emotions stressed by words such as "threat", "strike" or "aggression". Russia took these actions to strengthen its position and to show how powerful it is.

The latest Address to the Federal Assembly was given in February 2023, a year after the invasion of Ukraine, and it expressed similar emotions: *"One year ago, to protect the people in our historical lands, to ensure the security of our country and to eliminate the threat coming from the neo-Nazi regime that had taken hold in Ukraine after the 2014 coup, it was decided to begin the special military operation. Step by step, carefully and consistently we will deal with the tasks we have at hand"* (PUTIN 2023). Apprehension was also strongly present in Putin's speeches – in this particular example, the Russian president explained his violence as a necessary step to keep his country safe and sovereign, while stressing negative words such as *"threat"* or *"neo-Nazi regime"*.

PRIDE AND OPTIMISM AS EMOTIONS OF HOPE AND SECURITY

In the preselected speeches, joy was found to be present solely in the speeches of NATO, manifesting as either the secondary emotion of pride or the secondary emotion of optimism. Interestingly, joy was not identified in any of the speeches delivered by Russia. Over several years, NATO representatives have maintained an optimistic outlook on Russia's relationship with the West and the alliance itself, firmly believing that cooperation is inevitable and only a matter of time: *"NATO decided to suspend practical cooperation with Russia, but we have decided at the same time to maintain, to continue political dialogue with Russia. It is about how to use what we already have,*

and that is the NATO-Russia Council [...] because we never closed or suspended a political dialogue with Russia" (STOLTENBERG 2015). Stoltenberg expressed the emotion of optimism by still having both options open and ready – not only the military response but also the diplomatic activities. The hope still present in this conflict is the main feature of several NATO speeches.

NATO was well aware that the establishment and preservation of security and peace in the European region required the active involvement of Russia, which was previously regarded as an equal partner: *"...but we don't want confrontation with Russia, we don't want a new cold war and we will continue to strive for dialogue and [a] more constructive relationship because we think that it is important for us but in the long run [it] also will benefit Russia and all of us living here in the Euro Atlantic area"* (IBID.). NATO remains optimistic about the long-term relationship with Russia, as the cooperation of these two sides is required and necessary for international security.

As tensions escalated, however, NATO gradually relinquished this optimism and instead began to highlight the values and accomplishments that the alliance had achieved collectively: *"NATO is active. NATO is agile. NATO is adapting. And we have just implemented the largest reinforcement of collective defense since the end of the Cold War, with high readiness of troops"* (STOLTENBERG 2019). In the last selected example, the emotion of pride is strongly present through the highlighting of how powerful and ready NATO is. The strategy is evident – to deter Russia from escalating the conflict even more.

SADNESS, DISAPPOINTMENT AND GUILT
AS EMOTIONS OF FAILURE AND ADVOCACY

The speeches primarily conveyed the emotion of sadness through the secondary emotion of disappointment and the tertiary emotion of guilt. In the case of NATO, Stoltenberg has consistently attributed the prolonged absence of a mutual dialogue to Russia's lack of interest in cooperation, placing the blame on it for both sides' inability to establish a meaningful communication: *"We worked for a strategic partnership with Russia, but then Russia decided to use force against [its] neighbors. We saw it in Georgia, but we saw it also in Ukraine. And this is Russia's decision [:] that they have chosen not to cooperate, but to confront"* (STOLTENBERG 2018).

In 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine, sadness was the most dominant emotion in the speeches of NATO: *"We are facing a new normal in European security. Where Russia openly contests the European security order. And uses force to pursue its objectives [sic]"* (STOLTENBERG 2022A).

An important moment was when Stoltenberg admitted that any attempt to have a constructive dialogue with Russia would probably not be successful, emphasizing that the relevant diplomatic channels are currently closed: *"NATO Allies have worked for a meaningful dialogue with Russia for many, many years, [but] Russia has walked away from that dialogue. So that is not functioning. It is not possible to have a meaningful dialogue with Russia when they are conducting an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine"* (IBID.).

Both Lavrov and Putin, much like their NATO counterparts, would frequently assign blame to the opposing side for the escalation of tensions, pointing fingers at the other side as the cause of the increased strain. In 2016, Lavrov pointed to the deteriorating relations and the persistent refusal to cooperate from the NATO side: *"I think it is obvious to everyone that the baffling complexity of entwined conflicts and expanded conflict areas require a coherent mutual approach. However, joint efforts are being hindered by artificial restrictions, much like NATO and the EU's refusing full cooperation with Russia, creating the image of an enemy, and arms deployment to harden the dividing lines in Europe that the West had promised to eliminate. It appears that old instincts die hard"* (LAVROV 2016).

In 2021, the main theme of the Valdai Discussion Club was the 'Global Shake-up in the 21st Century'. Putin opened his contribution by stating that *"we are living in an era of great change."* He claimed that this change started *"about three decades ago,"* when the Russian Federation had to adjust to the new way of being. Here, he fostered feelings of disappointment with and attributed guilt to the Western countries: *"A search for a new balance, sustainable relations in the social, political, economic, cultural, and military areas, and support for the world system was launched at that time. We were looking for this support but must say that we did not find it, at least so far. Meanwhile, those who felt like the winners after the end of the Cold War (we have also spoken about this many times) and thought they climbed Mount Olympus soon discovered that the ground was falling away underneath even there, and this time it*

was their turn, and nobody could 'stop this fleeting moment' no matter how fair it seemed" (PUTIN 2021A).

On 24 February 2022, Putin summarized what he and Lavrov were saying the past couple of years. The long-lasting sense of injustice and disappointment resulted in the necessity of the invasion. In his narrative, the responsibility for it lies on Ukraine, which was drawn into NATO's sphere of influence and thus represents a direct threat from the USA, the 'empire of lies' as Putin called it: *"It is a fact that over the past 30 years, we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border"* (PUTIN 2022B).

In September 2022, when Putin announced a partial mobilization, he only confirmed and continued with the discourse on emotions of guilt: *"They turned the Ukrainian people into cannon fodder and pushed them into a war with Russia, which they unleashed back in 2014. They used the army against civilians and organized a genocide, blockade, and terror against those who refused to recognize the government that was created in Ukraine as the result of a state coup"* (PUTIN 2022D).

Even in 2023, Putin's rhetoric did not change much: *"Let me reiterate that they were the ones who started this war, while we used force and are using it to stop the war"* (PUTIN 2023). As is evident from his recent speeches, Putin persistently shifts the blame onto the West and the alliance, actively rationalizing his actions as a justified response to NATO's activities: *"We are defending human lives and our common home, while the West seeks unlimited power"* (IBID.).

Sadness, disappointment and guilt were accompanied by anger in all the speeches. Both NATO and Russia used these emotions to advocate their decisions and actions derived from their opponent's incompetence and malpractices.

CONCLUSION

Misuse of emotions risks normalizing certain feelings as societal standards and influencing the psychological climate and public opinion so that they would align with a leader's vision. Internationally, the emotional conduct of political leaders not only represents their nations but also has the potential to shape foreign perceptions and relationships. The strategic use and misuse of emotions by political figures can escalate tensions or foster antagonism between nations, which underscores the importance of scrutinizing their role within the political and security domains.

The article emphasized the occurrence and frequency of used emotions in the political speeches of the Russian and NATO leaders. Consequently, it also emphasized how the leaders used specific emotions in their public speeches and statements to form a psychological climate as a part of their distributive power politics.

The results of the emotional discourse analysis showed that the leaders of both NATO and Russia used emotions relatively consistently. Over the years the emotional discourse has not changed, except that in 2022 and 2023, there was a slight change in the preference and frequency of the used emotions – due to the outbreak of war in Ukraine. In both cases, the speeches of the specific political figures were focused on current political and security events. At the same time, the emotions served either to confirm their position in relation to the second or third party or to justify their actions (present or future).

In the case of Vladimir Putin and Sergej Lavrov, the most recognized emotions were anger, sadness, and fear. This indicates the presence of long-unheard and unresolved emotions as a part of the thinking of the Russian officials. These strong emotions may influence the Russian identity and serve as a driving force for Russian activities at home and abroad. Compared to the NATO speeches, the Russian ones seem much more emotional and inconsistent, as they emphasize a negative perception of the world. In the context of the whole analysis, this seems to be a tool to justify the actions of the Russian Federation, which are based on an effort to help the nation, the people, and the world. The emotions of affection and caring were present only in connection to the internal unity of the

Russian Federation and the unity and sense of belonging between Russian and Ukrainian people.

On the other hand, Stoltenberg and Rasmussen strongly emphasized the composition of speeches that promote unity and cooperation and express an opinion that affects all members of the Alliance. This strategy is a logical tool that underlines the grouping of many nations into one whole while emphasizing their common power and influence in the world. Such mild communication covering the emotions of caring, affection, and compassion that is not provocative, offensive, or arrogant aims for a de-escalation of tensions and a search for compromise. An important aspect of NATO is building a good image of the Alliance globally, primarily through solidarity, support for the weak, and expressing sympathy when the situation is challenging. In the case of Ukraine, this was particularly present in statements that condemned the Russian actions and supported Ukraine's independence and freedom.

Nevertheless, in both analyzed cases, emotions of joy and optimism were not present at all when each side referred to the other. Pride was present only in connection to their own capabilities or, in the case of NATO, praising Ukraine as a protector of shared values. For Putin and Lavrov, the NATO activities were not surprising or expected, just disappointing. As for Stoltenberg and Rasmussen, their position towards Russia could be referred to as 'pray for the best, prepare for the worst'. Consequently, the psychological climate spread by the analyzed leaders lacks the most important emotions needed for a stable and prosperous relationship, such as joy and empathy in all their forms expressed towards others. On the contrary, the formed psychological climate supports the positioning of NATO and Russia as adversaries without a chance for their mutual recognition and understanding.

In conclusion, it is also important to note that the conducted analysis has several limitations. Firstly, emotions concerning international relations are still not widely acknowledged as a significant research factor, which poses challenges in both theoretical and empirical approaches. Along with that, another limitation is the subjective nature of emotions, which can compromise the objectivity of the findings. Additionally, the lack of a universally accepted definition of emotions and a standardized

empirical research approach hampers progress in this field. Therefore, further research in this area depends on improving the theoretical framework and developing more robust methodologies that could be not only plausibly reproduced but also accepted by scholars from various schools of thought within IR but also other disciplines.

ENDNOTES

1   This assumption is derived from findings in neuroscience during the 1990s, when emotions ceased to be understood as a factor influencing negative or positive rational thinking, but became *"important components of rationality"* (Mellers et al. 1999: 343). Authors from various fields who hold this opinion widely refer to the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues (Damasio 1994, 1999, 2007; Damasio et al. 2000, 2005).

2   It was defined, for example, in his works "No Sympathy for the Devil: Emotions and the Social Construction of the Democratic Peace" (2018b), *The Power of Emotions in World Politics* (2020a) and "A Critical Perspective on Emotions in International Relations" (2020b).

3   Emotions were considered as specific categories in the analysis. It is crucial to be aware of their "fuzzy boundaries" (Fehr – Russell 1984; Shaver et al. 1987). As Fehr and Russell stated, *"everybody knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition"* (1984: 464). Therefore, the emotion categories were selected based on social psychology studies exploring the hierarchical organization of emotion concepts and specifying so-called prototypes of basic emotions (Shaver et al. 1987; Parrott 2001). They expand on studies about the set of basic or primary emotions that underlie biological substrates (Ekman 1992; Epstein 1994; Izard 1977; Plutchik 1980; Roseman 1984; Tomkins 1978) with the sub-clusters of socially conditioned understandings of emotions. Specific emotion categories can be thus seen as "the result[s] of repeated experiences" (Parrott 2001) that conceptualize people's knowledge about emotions. The list of emotions recognized in the hierarchical cluster analysis by Shaver et al. (1987) together with some additional emotions that were recognized by Demszky et al. (2020), which were used as emotion categories for the emotion discourse analysis, can be found in appendix. Specific emotions are understood here according to how they are defined by Demszky et al. (2020: 4051).

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APPENDIX

SHAVERS TREE-STRUCTURED EMOTION CATEGORIES WITH ADDED CATEGORIES OF SECONDARY EMOTIONS FROM GOEMOTIONS

Basic Emotion	Secondary Emotion	Tertiary Emotion
	Irritation	Annoyance, Agitation, Grumpiness, Aggravation, Grouchiness
	Exasperation	Frustration
	Rage	Anger, Fury, Hate, Dislike, Resentment, Outrage, Wrath, Hostility, Bitterness, Ferocity, Loathing, Scorn, Spite, Vengefulness
Anger		
	Envy	Jealousy
	Disgust	Revulsion, Contempt, Loathing
	Torment	-
	Disapproval	-
Love	Affection	Liking, Caring, Compassion, Fondness, Affection, Love, Attraction, Tenderness, Sentimentality, Adoration
	Lust	Desire, Passion, Infatuation
	Longing	-
Fear	Horror	Alarm, Fright, Panic, Terror, Fear, Hysteria, Shock, Mortification
	Nervousness	Anxiety, Distress, Worry, Uneasiness, Tenseness, Apprehension, Dread

Joy	Cheerfulness	Happiness, Amusement, Satisfaction, Bliss, Gaiety, Glee, Jolliness, Joviality, Joy, Delight, Enjoyment, Gladness, Jubilation, Elation, Ecstasy, Euphoria
	Zest	Enthusiasm, Excitement, Thrill, Zeal, Exhilaration
	Contentment	Pleasure
	Optimism	Eagerness, Hope
	Pride	Triumph
	Enthrallment	Enthrallment, Rapture
	Relief	-
	Approval	-
	Admiration	-
Sadness	Suffering	Hurt, Anguish, Agony
	Sadness	Depression, Sorrow, Despair, Gloom, Hopelessness, Glumness, Unhappiness, Grief, Woe, Misery, Melancholy
	Disappoint	Displeasure, Dismay
	Shame	Guilt, Regret, Remorse
	Neglect	Embarrassment, Insecurity, Insult, Rejection, Alienation, Isolation, Loneliness, Homesickness, Defeat, Defection, Humiliation
	Sympathy	Pity
Surprise	Surprise	Amazement, Astonishment
	Confusion	-
	Curiosity	-
	Realization	-

Source: Imran et al. (2022). Table based on Demszky, D. et al. (2020).

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