

Poland’s Attitudes and Policy Towards Israel and Palestine after October 7th: Continuity and Change

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ABSTRACT	Poland’s response to the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after October 7 th , 2023, showed considerable continuity, though notable signs of change were also evident. Among the key transformative variables, one can point out: the post-election government change and the consequent realignment with the EU-Brussels stance, and the reorienting public attitudes due to the dramatically deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Gaza that were accompanied by new social phenomena as pro-Palestinian street protests and campus campaigns. The paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of the dynamics of continuity and change in Poland’s relations with Israel and its stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This paper argues that the interplay of international developments and domestic circumstances has led Poland to distance itself from Israel. If this trend becomes a harmonized and institutionalized foreign policy approach, it may ultimately redefine the Poland-Israel relations. Against this backdrop, the paper examines key drivers of this shift and its potential short- and medium-term consequences.
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INTRODUCTION

The Czech Republic and Poland are often understood as having somewhat similar historical experiences and sensitivities in connection with their similar positions in CEE. However, the Polish debate after October 7 shows how these experiences might lead to markedly different narratives circulating in the public sphere than those analyzed in the previous contributions. The public spheres in both countries naturally interpreted the war in Gaza through their own lenses and meaning-making referents. While discursive connections to the Communist past and Russia, and arguments foregrounding human rights could be found in both countries, they were attached to different parties of the conflict as the Polish public sphere reacted more negatively to the Israeli actions. As opposed to the Czech value- and identity-laden debate on Israel, the Polish case also features a perspective more focused on safeguarding Polish interests and Polish citizens. This contribution to the forum thus moves the attention out of the Czech Republic to its northern neighbor, partly to provide a counterpoint to and a comparison with the Czech discourse outlined by the other authors, and partly to highlight intra-CEE differences in the public spheres of two CEE states.

Although Poland's policy vis a vis Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – as often highlighted by state officials – continued to follow the same key policy parameters, it was also gradually marked by significant elements of change. Poland's Middle East policy and relations with Israel have long been shaped by a set of intertwined factors, among which the rich and complex heritage of Polish-Jewish history played a significant role and influenced Poland's view of Israel, which it primarily sees as a Jewish state (MAHLA 2016). Additionally, post-communist Poland's pro-Western foreign and security policy – closely tied to European integration and strategic alliances with the United States – was another factor (ABADI 2005). Reestablishing (in 1991), normalizing, and consolidating positive relations with Israel became a key element of Poland's foreign policy, as the fight against antisemitism was emphasized as a remarkable sign of Poland's democratization (GEBERT 2014). Simultaneously, Poland's support for Palestinian national aspirations remained consistent. Its diplomatic ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), established following Poland's recognition of an independent Palestinian state in 1988, were neither questioned nor reconsidered after the Cold War. In the post-transition period, Poland

aimed to maintain a balanced stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which aligned with the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) launched in the 1990s (SZYDZISZ 2014).

As Poland's European integration progressed, the country aligned with the EU's collective stance on the MEPP. Among the challenges of Poland's foreign policy was the need to reconcile the pressure of Europeanizing its foreign policy with the strengthening of its political ties with Israel (ASSEBURG – GOREN 2019). This challenge was driven by the growing crisis in the MEPP, exacerbated by the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu's successive governments, which supported the occupation and the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank; the activities of radical Palestinian organizations like Hamas and the dysfunctionality of the Palestinian Authority (DYDUCH 2018).

Before October 2023, Polish-Israeli relations were significantly influenced by the dominance of right-wing political ideologies in both countries. Hawkish and nationalist coalitions in Poland and Israel initially fostered a common ground, particularly in their shared critical stance toward the EU and Europeanized Middle East policy objectives (MOLNÁR 2019). However, the ethnonationalist approach to historical memory and international cooperation, and their divergent views on their respective roles and interests soon created challenges (SOKOL 2018; CEBULSKI 2021). This shift was gradually reflected in Poland's attitudes towards Israel on the international stage, where Polish diplomacy has noticeably moved away from narratives explicitly supporting Israel, instead adopting a moderate and pragmatic stance (DYDUCH – MÜLLER 2021). Poland's foreign policy apparatus faced the October 7, 2023 events and their aftermath somewhat at a crossroads. The October 15, 2023 parliamentary elections shifted the power from the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) government to a left-liberal coalition led by the Civic Coalition, with Donald Tusk as Prime Minister and Radosław Sikorski assuming the role of Foreign Minister in mid-December 2023.

The paper aims to examine the internal socio-political dynamics, focusing on domestic public attitudes, debates, and narratives surrounding the conflict and its implications for Poland (and Europe). It also highlights symbolic instances where state authorities engaged with domestic audiences, responding to societal demands. The paper argues that a specific

interplay of international developments and domestic circumstances has driven Poland to distance itself from Israel and its strategic foreign and security objectives, which is probably the most prominent symptom of the change. The *distancing phenomenon* that is noticeable both internally and internationally, if consolidated into more harmonized and possibly institutionalized patterns of foreign policy practices, may, in a longer time perspective, effectively redefine the nature of Poland's relations with Israel in both a bilateral and a multilateral – namely European – perspective. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to identify key drivers of this *distancing phenomenon*, as well as to address its potential short- and medium-term consequences.

THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION – ‘OUR PEOPLE FIRST’ – DISTANCING BY EMPHASIZING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

A careful observation of Poland's stance towards the escalating Israeli–Palestinian conflict reveals that immediately after October 7, the primary focus of Polish authorities and public opinion was on safeguarding their country's own nationals remaining in the conflict zone. The public reactions, which crosscut with the peak of the electoral campaign, emphasized the diplomatic obligations towards Polish citizens rather than the overreaching international political preferences of Poland (MSZ PL 2023A). Poland was among the very first countries which organized a state-sponsored evacuation operation coordinated by their military forces, which ensured that by mid-October, every Polish citizen wishing to leave Israel (MFA RP 2023b) was evacuated. The relatively swift evacuation mission, which involved 1,504 citizens (DOWÓDZTWO GENERALNE 2023), was well-received domestically as a fulfillment of the fundamental duty of foreign service – serving the national interest by assisting and protecting the country's citizens. At this same time, Polish authorities also identified 29 Polish citizens, including 18 children, who requested an evacuation from Gaza (RPO 2023A; MFA RP 2023C). As time passed and the Israeli retaliatory operation in Gaza intensified, impatience and concern grew, which was evident both in the statements of Polish politicians and the broader public discourse. During the meeting hosted by deputy foreign minister Paweł Jabłoński on November 6th with the ambassadors of Egypt, Israel, and Palestine, the minister stressed that “the evacuation of Polish citizens from the Gaza Strip remains a priority for the Polish authorities” (IBID.). The operation took place on November 12th, but it

included only 18 out of the 29 people. The remaining 11 Polish citizens of Palestinian origin were hoped to be evacuated in another round, but this was blocked by Israel, and the mission was not continued (RPO 2023B). ‘Polish Palestinians’ and their families expressed deep disappointment, accusing the authorities in Warsaw of treating them as second-class citizens (MIKULSKA 2023).

Meanwhile, the families of the Israeli hostages kept in Gaza, who sought to intensify the international political and diplomatic pressure to support the efforts leading to the release of their relatives, approached Polish authorities regarding this matter. The most publicized story of this sort, that of the well-known and highly respected educator and historian Alex Dancyg,¹ highlighted that among the kidnapped Israelis were other individuals with Polish citizenship and some whose families had petitioned Polish authorities to confirm their right to citizenship in absentia. Despite efforts undertaken by Poland’s diplomacy, including multilateral actions in coordination with the American administration (WHITEHOUSE 2024), this did not lead to the release of the hostages, notwithstanding the fact that the fate of the Israeli-Polish hostages had taken a dramatic turn. Only one of them, Almog Meir Jan, was rescued alive. Alex Dancyg was confirmed dead, as were Elad Katzir, Amir Cooper, Chaim Peri and Yotam Haim, who was among the three hostages killed by IDF ‘friendly fire’.

One could, however, argue that neither the fate of the ‘Palestine Poles’ nor that of the ‘Israeli Poles’ captured the Polish public opinion as intensely as the issue of ensuring the safe return of Poles from Israel immediately after the Hamas attack. First, this reflects the tendency of shocking events to gradually fade out from the public agenda. Secondly, it could be argued that Palestinians and Israelis with Polish citizenship were, to some extent, perceived as ‘others’ or at least as less like ‘one of us’ and rather as sides of the conflict.

In April 2024 a Polish volunteer with the international humanitarian organization World Central Kitchen, Damian Soból, was killed in an Israeli drone strike. Israeli politicians and diplomats commented on the event by saying it was a type of “unintentional accident” that “happens during war time” (POLITICO 2024). While Israeli Ambassador Ya’akov Livne expressed regret, he did not issue an apology. Both the strike and the Israeli authorities’ response provoked critical – and later outraged – reactions

from the Polish public, media, and politicians from both the ruling and opposition parties. PM Donald Tusk criticized Livne's handling of the matter, calling for a formal apology and a "full and immediate explanation" of the tragedy, along with compensation for the victim's family (*RZECZPOSPOLITA* 2024). President Andrzej Duda called Livne's comments "outrageous," adding that the ambassador had become "the biggest problem for Israel in relations with Poland" (PAP 2024A; 2024B).

The Israeli ambassador was summoned to the Polish MFA in a diplomatic gesture expressing dissatisfaction and condemnation. Deputy Foreign Minister A. Szejna confirmed Poland's firm stance and announced an official diplomatic note protesting the killing of the Polish aid worker. Foreign Minister R. Sikorski, in discussions with his Israeli counterpart, called for an impartial investigation and emphasized the Polish prosecution's involvement, framing the incident in criminal terms (*MFA RP* 2024B). Poland continued its efforts in this matter, which culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in June 2024 concerning the events of April 1, 2024 in Gaza (*MFA RP* 2024C).

The killing of the humanitarian worker resonated strongly in the Polish public sphere and played into the confrontational style of communication between the diplomats of both countries – which was particularly heated in April–May 2024 – and the preexisting animosity in the mutual Polish-Israeli relations. Moreover, the strike was connected with humanitarian concerns, particularly the protection of human rights during war-time, which always had a high priority in Poland, yet gained new meaning in the context of Russia's full-scale aggression in Ukraine. Poles, witnessing the tragedy of Ukrainian civilians, were deeply concerned about the fate of civilians deprived of food, shelter, and basic civil services such as health-care and education. These parallels between the two wars – the 'Russian war in Ukraine' and the 'Israeli war in Gaza' – which were established in the Polish public narratives then influenced the Polish-Israeli relations. In connection to that, albeit indirectly, two further points resonated in public discourses: 1) Israel's reluctance to provide military support to Ukraine and 2) its refusal to explicitly condemn the Kremlin. Both were transformed into a Polish grievance against Israel for its stance on Ukraine and arguably influenced how the public saw the war on Gaza (*HASZCZYŃSKI* 2024B).

However, one of the key narratives surrounding the death of the Polish volunteer D. Soból, and the earlier evacuation operations, focused on ethno-national sentiments and highlighted Poland's commitment to protecting "one of our own". In this respect, the lack of compassion shown by the Israeli official in response to the death of the Polish volunteer was widely seen as deeply disappointing. In the following public debate, a new cognitive and emotional context of the mutual relations was defined.

A pivotal example of this development was a two-hour online interview with Ambassador Y. Livne conducted by Robert Mazurek, a well-known journalist and political commentator who openly acknowledges his pro-Israel sympathies. Despite these sympathies, the conversation, held just two days after the tragic death of D. Soból, took on an emotional and, at times, confrontational tone. As the tensions rose, Mazurek criticized Livne for his alleged anti-Polish bias. He argued that the ambassador's refusal to condemn the tragic event, apologize, or denounce Israeli Foreign Minister Yisrael Katz's remark that Poles "*sucked anti-Semitism with their mother's milk*" (EURONEWS 2019) signalled a rejection of honest Polish-Israeli relations, fostering anti-Polish prejudice instead (ZERO 2024A). In a follow-up article titled "*Israeli Ambassador: Who He Is and How He Came to Warsaw. A Controversial Diplomat with Russian Roots*", policy expert Agnieszka Bryc traced the personal story of Yacov Livne. Bryc highlighted the assumed anti-Polish and pro-Russian sentiments of the ambassador and his revisionist approach to history, which came close to Kremlin narratives (BRYC 2024). Both Bryc and Mazurek were well-versed in Polish-Israeli relations, having participated in several debates and being respected by experts. Their opinions were also closely followed by the broader public, while their argument strongly resonated in the wider debate. As noted by another public opinion leader, "*it's hard to say whether the Israeli attack on the convoy in the Gaza Strip had the greatest impact on Poland's stance toward Israel. But without a doubt, Ambassador Jakov Livne's response to Polish reactions after the attack eliminated fears of accusations of anti-Semitism. Livne pushed the argument of anti-Semitism to the point of absurdity, which, sadly, also made genuine anti-Semites feel emboldened*" (HASZCZYŃSKI 2024A).

The mutual *distancing* was also noticeable in another gesture. The following day after the interview, which electrified the Polish public debate, Mazurek issued a personal statement. Apart from commenting on the

interview's unconventional course and reception (the material had over 1.2 million viewers and was commented on by almost all the media in the country), he also referred to the change in Polish-Israeli political communication. Wearing a T-shirt featuring the image of Shevah Weiss – the charismatic and widely respected Israeli ambassador to Poland (2001–2003) – he stressed the change in Polish-Israeli relations, which, in his view, are increasingly less rooted in the nostalgic atmosphere of the Polish-Jewish history, as both countries are becoming more and more distant from one another (ZERO 2024B).

According to Polish journalist Krzysztof Stankowski, the arrogant way in which the Israeli ambassador communicated with the Polish public resulted in the rise of support for Palestine causes in Poland (IBID.). Public opinion polls from April 2024 confirmed this assessment. When asked, "Who should Poland support in the ongoing conflict?", 66.7% of the respondents believed Poland should remain neutral. Only 6% favored supporting Israel, while 10.9% supported the Palestinians, with this figure rising to 20% among respondents aged 40–49 (KACPRZAK 2023).

This sheds light on a new phenomenon in Poland's perception of Israel and the Middle East conflict. For the first time, Polish cities saw street protests related to the conflict, with a notably higher turnout on the pro-Palestinian side. Additionally, Polish academic campuses became hotspots for pro-Palestinian activism. In May 2024, students launched occupation strikes at various universities, including Jagiellonian University in Krakow, the University of Warsaw, and the University of Wrocław, rallying under the informal "Academy for Palestine" movement. Their demands included severing ties with Israeli academic institutions. Initially, the protests received some degree of acknowledgement and acceptance from the faculty members and university authorities. This, however, changed over time as the occupational protests continued and became disruptive to the normal functioning of the campuses and more radicalized in terms of the form and content of the protesters' demands and lack of readiness for negotiation. What stands out in the 'records' as an unprecedented outcome of the pro-Palestinian student activism is the public and institutional legitimization of the protest movement by university authorities and their broader communities. This is particularly evident at Jagiellonian University and the University of Wrocław, where there has been a notable condemnation of the civilian

casualties, accompanied by empathy for the Palestinian cause (JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY 2024; UNIVERSITY OF WROCLAW 2024).

Nevertheless, except for the case of the activists, the process of distancing among Poles applied to both the conflict itself and the parties involved. The key mechanism at play here was the apparent difficulty in identifying with either side. While earlier circumstances stemming from Polish-Jewish history provided a basis for greater sympathy towards Israel, the Israeli conduct in Gaza, combined with the Israeli communication with the Polish public, reversed this trend. This, in turn, interacted with the country's foreign policy and its evolving international relations orientation.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION – ‘DISTANCING’ BY ADVOCATING FOR MULTILATERALISM AND A NORMS-DRIVEN WORLD ORDER

In immediate response to the October 7th Hamas atrocities, Polish politicians mostly expressed solidarity with Israel and its citizens, condemning the attack as an “act of war” and extending condolences to the victims’ families (WP.PL 2023). Yet already on October 10th, Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau, when participating in an EU foreign ministers’ meeting, emphasized not only Poland’s condemnation of Hamas’ “barbaric acts” but also called on the EU “to explicitly show its protest against the attacks by both sides targeting civilians” (MFA RP 2023A). Moreover, he emphasized Poland’s support for maintaining the EU assistance to Palestine, citing the need to stabilize the West Bank and provide humanitarian aid to Gaza (IBID.). This has been further emphasized in a statement by Poland’s MFA released on October 18 calling Hamas and Israel to de-escalate the conflict, protect civilians and condemn the “unacceptable toll of innocent civilian lives” (MFA RP 2023D). Later diplomatic interventions contributed to a more consolidated narrative in which “Poland strongly condemns terrorist acts and other criminal activities by Hamas[...],” yet “any military action must be carried out under the applicable rules of international and humanitarian law, ensuring the protection of the civilian population” and “strongly condemning actions which take the form of[a] collective punishment inflicted on innocent residents of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank” (MFA RP 2023C).

As noted in the introduction, the events of October 7th occurred just a week before Poland’s parliamentary elections on October 15th, which led

to a transition of power and the formation of a new left-liberal government, which assumed power only on December 13th. The two-month governmental transition obviously impacted Polish diplomacy and its international performance, which, during this time, was rather reactive. It could be argued that Poland lacked any meaningful policy priorities other than protecting its own citizens at this time. The absence of a 'solidarity visit' to Israel by Poland's highest representatives (e.g., the Prime Minister or the Minister of Foreign Affairs) could be a consequence of this. However, the lack of an official conversation between the newly appointed Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, and his Israeli counterpart after the former assuming office in December indicated a more profound distancing. What is worth noting is that the Polish ruling coalition's criticism of illiberal tendencies has positioned them as natural opponents of Netanyahu's government.

Nevertheless, Donald Tusk's government, with Radosław Sikorski heading Polish diplomacy, stated that its Middle East policy would maintain continuity while introducing certain changes. In his first conversation with his Israeli counterpart, Israel Katz, on January 10, 2024, Sikorski expressed Poland's *"unwavering solidarity with Israel in the wake of Hamas's attacks"* but emphasized *"the obligation to keep the military response moderate"* (MFA RP 2024A). This signalled continuity, but also a strong emphasis on the EU's position. Sikorski himself adopted a more proactive approach at the European level (E.G., MFA RP 2024E, 2024F) and aligned his position with an emphasis on the two-state solution (EU EEAS 2024). Poland's foreign policy, both conceptually and operationally, thus shifted towards a more Europeanized *modus operandi*. While it was not simply anti-Israeli and/or pro-Palestinian, it became much more moderate than before.

At the same time, Poland was vocal on some of the polarizing issues, especially the recognition of Palestinian statehood which Poland has maintained since 1988. A closer look at Poland's UN voting patterns on MEPP-related issues, however, reveals a notable shift. Historically, Poland often leaned toward Israel, abstaining in key votes such as that on Palestine's UNESCO membership in 2011, the 2012 UN GA vote on upgrading Palestine's status to a non-member observer state, and the vote on a 2017 resolution following the U.S. decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem (KALHOUSOVÁ – RUBÍNOVÁ 2020). Most recently, already during the first post-October 7th UN GA debate (OCTOBER 27, 2023), namely the debate on a ceasefire

in Gaza and Israel's actions in occupied territories, Poland again abstained (DOBOSZ-DOBROWOLSKA 2023). Its unequivocal support for Palestine at the UN GA vote in May 2024, indicated a shift in its foreign policy orientation and a significant element of novelty in its relations towards Israel.

This change was noted by Israel. The Israeli ambassador to Poland again sharply criticized Poland's move, stating that *"this is a wrong and harmful decision for security, stability, and for Poland"*, which is a continuation of *"the 1988 Soviet-led anti-West decision of recognizing [the] 'Palestinian state'"* (LIVNE 2024). Yet, Minister Sikorski responded firmly, emphasizing that it is Poland itself, not foreign ambassadors, that decides on its interests, and pointed out that Poles do not appreciate a patronizing tone (NFP 2024). Sikorski recalled similar argumentation when commenting on Ireland, Spain and Norway's announcements regarding their intentions to recognize the Palestinian state (REUTERS 2024).

Nonetheless, when reviewing² the initiatives and activities of Polish diplomacy over the past months, it appears that Israel's war in Gaza and the escalating regional conflict were not priorities of the Polish foreign policy agenda. Although these issues were present in political and diplomatic discourses, they took a backseat to matters such as the situation in Ukraine, the migration crisis and, most of all, the efforts of advancing security co-operation within existing institutional frameworks, particularly NATO.

Poland, as a member of the EU and NATO with its own history of occupation and war, supports the international liberal order but also considers geopolitical factors. Therefore, Poland's position on the situation in the Middle East needs to be seen also in the context of the developments in its eastern neighborhood, particularly Ukraine. Since the war in Ukraine began, Poland has become one of Ukraine's main allies, providing diplomatic and military support to it. Poland's support for Palestinian self-determination shall be seen as part of its broader commitment to resolving international conflicts based on international law. Given its history of occupation and brutal conflicts, Poland emphasizes civilian protection and adherence to the laws of war. In regard to both Palestine and Ukraine, it advocates for the protection of the civilian population and supports solutions based on the recognition of a multilateral liberal order rather than on politics of unilateralism and power. On the other hand, the eruption of

the war in the Middle East was also seen in Poland as a part of the re-focusing of American efforts and resources from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, which Poland's politicians and public opinion have seen as a major security threat.

Those considerations shed light on the course of the recent political and diplomatic turmoil related to the possible attendance of the Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu at the 80th anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz German Nazi death and concentration camp when he was facing the risk of being arrested under an International Criminal Court warrant. At first (in December 2024), Poland's MFA officials publicly expressed their stance on the potential execution of the International Criminal Court's warrants, as Poland is not only a signatory to the Rome Statute, but recently (December 3rd, 2024) it concluded an Agreement with the ICC on the Enforcement of Its Sentences. Importantly, Poland's diplomacy was highly interested and active in the execution of the arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin issued by the ICC judges in March 2023. Later, however, with the active engagement of President A. Duda, the Polish government stance shifted toward enabling senior Israeli officials to attend the Auschwitz memorial service and even ensuring their attendance with a blanket guarantee of security to all. In an attempt to explain this controversial and highly contested move, two main arguments were presented. The first one referred to the upcoming presidency of D. Trump – a critic of the ICC and a supporter of Israel – and Poland's security strategy, which is heavily based on Euro-Atlantic ties and the aim to maintain or even expand the US political interest and military presence in Central Eastern Europe. The second argument referred to Polish politicians' fear of massive accusations of antisemitism (coming from the worldwide Israeli/Jewish Diaspora and the relevant American political circles).

CONCLUSIONS

The article considered developments occurring at both the international and domestic levels, with particular emphasis on the evolving attitude of Polish society towards the ongoing conflict and its parties. Poland's shifting attitudes and preferences underscored, on the one hand, the significance of emotions. On the other hand, they revealed the interesting process of connecting two unrelated conflicts. Both phenomena contributed to and fueled the process of "distancing from Israel", which already started with the diplomatic crisis of 2018 unfolding around historical memory disputes. Yet the process itself was primarily driven by domestic dynamics. At the same time, Poland's shift toward the "Palestinian cause" appeared more closely aligned with Warsaw's preference for safeguarding a normative, multilateral international order grounded in international law and indirectly resonated with Poland's engagement in advancing Ukraine's interest in the international fora. However, taking into account a broader perspective of analysis, one can see that this change may not be permanent. On the contrary, factors such as the strategic perception of the role of the United States in shaping the security regime in Central and Eastern Europe and the still significant socio-cultural proximity to Israel may lead to a correction of the preferences manifested by Poland.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Alex Dancyg emigrated from Poland to Israel in 1956 and later settled in the Nir-Oz kibbutz, from where he was kidnapped on October 7th.
- 2 The assumption is based on a careful examination of the frequency, content, and scope of communications from Poland's foreign policy institutions – information, event reports, and statements on the Middle East – publicized through official social media channels and websites, including those of the President, the Government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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