

## QUESTIONS OF RATIONALIZATION IN FOREIGN POLICY CREATION

VLADIMÍR PETR

It is the task of the theoretic front to contribute to solving the problem of further development of Czechoslovak foreign policy. Proceeding from the conclusions contained in the resolution of the November plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee<sup>1)</sup>, the Federal Government have expressed in their program proclamation of January 30, 1969, their determination to pursue an active and initiative foreign policy maximally harmonized with our national interests and needs as well as with our international obligations.<sup>2)</sup>

The task of improving, deepening and activating the function of our foreign policy consists of two basic components: the material and the methodological one.

Apart from outlining the basic program and concrete tasks, the fulfilment of the first one — especially under present circumstances — will call for further specific analyses. The gradual normalization of internal development conditions will certainly also be reflected in the sphere of external policy. It will have to be clarified: which possibilities are offered and which demands on external relations of the state are made by the development of our economy, culture, science and technology;

— with which tasks our foreign policy is confronted on the grounds that we are a Socialist country in this highly exposed part of Europe and in the given complicated international situation;

— how to contribute further to the development of mutual cooperation with the other Socialist countries;

— and finally — which possibilities for more active work on the problems of European Security are open to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in bilater-

al relations with some Capitalist<sup>3)</sup> countries. All these points should be the subject of further studies and analyses.

This paper deals with the second component — the methodological problems of the whole complex of foreign policy creation, particularly the problems of rationalizing its creation. Of course, the individual problems of Czechoslovak foreign policy are represented in this context only as concrete applications, whereas the conclusions of this paper are of general character.

Our own experiences of recent years have shown repeatedly, what serious consequences can be brought about by subjectivism in foreign policy creation, how its effectiveness is weakened, the devaluation of results and what human, moral and material harm has been caused by it. The consequences and impacts of foreign policy acts are often so strong that every per cent of increased rationalization in decision-making represents huge savings of values. Let us regard this paper therefore as a partial contribution towards the common need to improve the system of foreign policy creation so as to make possible overcoming of subjectivism in decision-making, to directly form institutional, system guarantees for maximum application of objective criterions and thus to form preconditions for a gradual scientifically based optimum creation of foreign policy.<sup>4)</sup>

4) My studies of methodological problems have been based on the works of socialist as well as on the more numerous bourgeois authors. The foreign policy of a state is certainly class-policy. The foreign policy of Socialist countries therefore cannot adopt the contents of foreign policy conclusions in Capitalist countries. Nevertheless, I am of the opinion that in the methodological sphere it is not only possible but even useful to work on the basis of critical approach to the results and studies even of bourgeois theorists and practitioners. This applies also to some applications of cybernetics in the sphere of social sciences, among others even in the analyses of foreign policy character. As some allusions have appeared in the foreign Press that some Czechoslovak authors are taking over the western efforts to introduce cybernetics into foreign policy, I would like to re-

1) See: Main tasks of the party in the near future. The resolution of the November plenary session of the Communist Party Central Committee, Rudé Právo, November 19, 1968, page 4.

2) Program proclamation of the Federal Government read during the Session of the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly on January 30, 1969.

3) For instance, the conclusions of the European Communist and Workers' Parties Conference on Questions of European Security held in April 1967 at Karlovy Vary represent to us a still unpaid debt.

First of all, if we are to clarify more closely the problems of foreign policy creation, a definition of the role of the objective factor and the subjective factor in foreign policy is necessary.

If the *objective factors* are those that are not dependent on the subject of foreign policy creation, then we call *subjective* those factors, that are dependent on it.

Determination of the *subject of creation* of foreign policy in general and concretely in our country cannot be made without complications. It is generally accepted that the subject is represented by persons, teams, groups of persons and institutions that participate in defining the conception and the concrete decision-making in foreign policy.

They are therefore — if we take Czechoslovakia — the state institutions: the Federal Government in particular, the Federal Assembly, the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the organs of the National Republics. When the leading role of the party is implemented to the final degree its leading organs are essential even in this sphere — from the view of conception particularly the Party Congress and the Central Committee and from the aspect of concrete policy particularly the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee. The respective scientific institutes that prepare analyses and recommendations are, of course, a very important component of the subject of creation.

The development of socialist democracy continues to widen the circle of creation subjects. Apart from participation of the organs and components of the National Front the creation of foreign policy must in some form or another become increasingly a matter of active participation of the people, the working people themselves, for instance through the intermediation of various organizations etc. In this respect the people working in mass communication media play an important and very responsible part.

mark that it would be not only non-scientific but simply ridiculous to try to somehow "automize" foreign policy creation and to try to substitute the party- and class-inspired decision-making. But — as will be shown later — these methods constitute an important aid for more qualified, deeper and knowledgeable decision-making. And in this sense any effort to critically utilize *all experiences* should be welcomed.

The definition of the subject of foreign policy formation is therefore rather broad and flexible. We must moreover state that the process of independent creation is very often not confined to the borders of one's own country. From the aspects of their interests and especially their realistic possibilities few countries are able to globally cover the whole problems of international relations and there are still fewer, that are able to assert their interests to the fullest extent either because their potential does not permit them to realize the respective demands or because they would clash with claims of more powerful countries in the respective actions.<sup>5)</sup>

We often find in the world today that the creation of foreign policy is not an exclusive affair of the organs of a given country<sup>6)</sup> but is more or less considerably supplemented and even substituted by the function of either another state's organs or intra-national organs. There may be the following variants:

— Quite often it is literally an unequal relation of hegemony, where the more powerful state in fact takes over even a significant part of foreign policy creation and the country's own possibilities are confined to rather narrow limits.

— In some instances the ruling circles themselves give up for various reasons and in a wider or more limited sense the individual creation of foreign policy and actually pursue in this sphere only a mere application of the stronger partner's foreign policy activities.

— Relatively rare in the present world is the case, where the leadership of the

---

<sup>5)</sup> Here I do not have in mind only such a country, for instance, that is in fact subordinated to the interests of another country — a super-power or a certain block of countries. I am thinking of the quite frequent fact that in the given context of international relations a small country is not able to ensure its safety and therefore concludes a defence pact with other countries. In such a case the building of common organs with certain authorities means that in the given area a part of the authorities (and this applies even to the corresponding part of foreign policy formation) is entrusted to a certain common or an overall national organ.

<sup>6)</sup> Not only in the sense of due regard to international law or objective reality of the world, but directly from the aspect of an individual creation of foreign policy.

country pursues its own policy in questions of its exclusive interests and claims the right to equally participate in the common creation of foreign policy in all those spheres where there exist common interests of several countries. Basically this corresponds with the postulates of Socialist Internationalism.

I am of the opinion that therefore Czechoslovakia, following these principles, could and should apply the above cited relations in its foreign policy creation. I would like to point out that the Socialist Countries' foreign policy will be the more effective, the more it will be enriched by experiences and acquired knowledge of all partner countries, by experiences that reflect maximally the complicated reality in international relations and the whole complex of interests and needs of the countries belonging to the world's Socialist Community. In this direction it is therefore the task of our foreign policy that our well-founded and substantiated opinions participate equally as well in the complex of analysis as in the formation of common causes in the Socialist countries' foreign policy and exert influence by cogent argument and a high level of recognizing objective reality.

*The objective factors* are exogenous as well as endogenous. The exogenous consist particularly of the proportion of power and the formation of political economic, military, cultural and ideological relations in the given area and also in the broader world context, this being from the point of view of the status quo as well as the long-term trends of the individual partner's foreign policy and the forming of bilateral and multilateral unions etc.

From endogenous factors let us cite particularly the sphere of economic, scientific and technological, political, defence, cultural and other possibilities, interests and needs of the state, the realization of which is connected with external relations and the total of which therefore determines the scope, potency and external interests as well as needs of the state itself.

This shows that the conditions, the situation in which foreign policy becomes effective, into which it steps as well as the range of the country's external needs are determined by objective factors. Consequently the scope of realistic possibilities is determined by the mutual interaction of these two factors. It is true in

the sphere of international relations — as it is for the whole sphere of social relations — that contrary to natural phenomena the realization of possibilities does not happen incidentally nor automatically, but on the basis of their transformation into volitional acts of people (persons, groups of people, social institutions, parties, classes, nations, states and groups of states).<sup>7)</sup>

With them lies the responsibility for the proper formation of foreign policy, the creating of its conception, the setting of *targets and designs*, the acceptance of certain *decisions* and their realization, of course. The objective factors therefore do not directly participate in the creation of foreign policy but only through the intermediation of subjective factors. They can however be applied in two different, contradictory ways.

Either they are recognized and understood from the aspect of interaction with other objective factors as well as from the point of view of their development in time — and then the preconditions for the subjective factor acting in line with the objective factors are given. Or they are ignored and incorrectly interpreted or not properly evaluated by the appropriate subjects and then the volitional act of the subject clashes with the objective factors. According to character and extent of the object of this collision the conflict results in either a partial failure of the foreign policy action, in the wrecking of plans and designs, in the disability to realize the aim — or this collision can have a catastrophic effect. A lasting or basic disability of the subject to recognize and correctly analyze the objective factors calls inevitably for a fundamental change of conception and it could even lead to paralyzing the subject or to its substitution by another subject.<sup>8)</sup>

Even here the huge role of subjective factors is evident. Dependent on these are the *recognition* of objective reality, understanding of individual factors and their interactions, the laws, tendencies

---

7) Compare also Sergijev, A. V., *Nauka i vněšnjaia politika. (Rol objektivnych faktorov v meždunarodnykh otnošenijach)*, Znanie, Moskva 1967, page 16—17.

8) This is to be understood in the wide range of possibilities: beginning with replacement of persons, over changes in the system of creation, the fall of the Government, the whole management system — up to the defeat of the given state.

and trends of development, recognition and *analysis* of realistic *possibilities*, the setting of such targets that represent an optimum realization of needs within the framework of objectively existing possibilities and last but not least the *realization* of the set aims with adequate means and methods so as to reinfluence the development of objective reality in required direction. Therefore the subjective factors have a *decisive significance* for qualification and success of the whole process of foreign policy creation.

In addition I would like to point out that the conception itself of the subjective factor is relative. What for one country or for one subject of foreign policy creation is a subjective factor, is an objective factor for its partners in the international arena — that is for other subjects.

I would like to mention that sometimes the subjective factor is understood in a very limited way — as influence of moral and psychic factors in foreign policy, *as the influence of personalities*, their profiles, character, temperament, mental capacity, on the forming of foreign policy in the respective countries. Even if this limited conception of subjective factors has not been taken as a basis in my paper I regard it necessary to deal with it briefly, at least.

We often meet with overvaluation of this factor in bourgeois literature. Some works explain quite frequently even whole development periods, including foreign policy, by the influence of a certain personality, his personal qualities, approach etc. and they more or less refrain from analyzing the objective social determination of the given personality.

Nevertheless these works contain numerous interesting perceptions, political conclusions and analyses in spite of overvaluing the personality factor. In this context may I remind you of the rich index of literature on John Fitzgerald Kennedy.<sup>9)</sup>

The representatives of the Behaviourist School particularly seek the causes for certain foreign policy positions of the state in anthropological, psychological

<sup>9)</sup> See for instance Schlesinger, A. M. jr., *A Thousand Days*, John Fitzgerald Kennedy in the White House, H. M. Co., Boston 1965. Gardner, G. C., *The Quotable Mr. Kennedy*. Abelard-Schumen, N. York, London, Toronto 1962. Burns, J. M., *John F. Kennedy, A Political Profile*, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc. N. Y. 1961 etc.

and emotional peculiarities of personalities.

The endeavours to explain changes in political tendencies in the first place by changes of personalities and by their personal qualities are conceivably applied even when judging the policy of Socialist countries. Kissinger, for instance, characterizes the attitude of the American Press towards the start of a more active policy of peaceful coexistence on the part of the USSR in the middle of the 50ties, with the following words: "After a decade of Soviet unyieldingness the Press was almost united in stating that Soviet politics have ripened due to the personal charm of one man."<sup>10)</sup>

Up to now Marxist literature has rather rarely dealt with the factor of personality in the political sphere, including foreign policy. Our publications of passed years contain only few works devoting at least secondary attention to the function of personalities in foreign policy creation.<sup>11)</sup>

But they deal only with personalities of the Capitalist world. And yet, the development in our country, for instance, has in recent years shown very vividly, what a not to be underestimated role is played in policy creation — internal or foreign — by the political profiles of personalities, particularly as carriers and spokesmen of certain social tendencies and trends and how important are their characters, personal qualities etc. even in unchanged social-economic character of society, i.e. within the same Communist party.

Some time ago a book was published in the USA, which tried to acquaint the reader in an attractive way with profiles of "people in power, their closest assistants and with the human aspect of their institutional implements".<sup>12)</sup>

Even more so it seems logical that for a citizen of a Socialist country the political and personal profiles of his leading representatives, their attitudes, methods

<sup>10)</sup> Kissinger H. A., *The Necessity for Choice, Prospects of American Foreign Policy*, Harper and Brothers, New York 1960, pages 181—182.

<sup>11)</sup> For instance Čierný, J., *General, Svoboda, Praha 1967*. Volek, J., *Meze odvahy, politický profil J. F. Kennedyho* [Limits of Courage, Political Profile of J. F. Kennedy], NPL Praha 1965.

<sup>12)</sup> Kraft, J., *Profiles in Power, A Washington Insight*, The New American Library, N. York 1966.

and ways of participation in the creation of policy should not be covered by the anonymity of an institution. This is also necessary for the desirable relationship of confidence. Of course, this does not apply solely nor in the first place to the foreign policy formation.

A remarkable inducement by a Hungarian author to Marxist studies of the role of personality has recently appeared in Soviet literature. The demand is formulated "to form such a Marxist theory of personality, which would uncover the intermediary links between the particular interest and the seemingly purely individual motives, just as between the particular interests and the ideology".<sup>13)</sup>

*The process of foreign policy formation has four stages — schematically expressed:*

1) *Getting to know* objective reality, i.e. at least such a quantity and quality of information as is sufficient for a reliable judgement of the objective factors' influences, the analysis of which is indispensable for stating the realistic possibilities.

2) *Analysis* of objective factors from the aspect of their mutual relations and development tendencies.

3) Determination of correct designs, setting of *objectives*, an optimum program, the conception — that is: *decision-making*.

4) *Realization* of conclusions in practice, fulfilment of set tasks, reaching of determined objectives.

The *criterion of effectiveness* in foreign policy creation is the relation between realistic possibilities, basically given by the resultant of objective factors on one hand and between the set targets and their realization on the other hand. Shortcomings in foreign policy creation usually do not practically appear before the fourth stage — the stage of realization. The respective components of the subject of formation are therefore quite often lead to seeking the reasons of the shortcomings just in this realization stage. But that is a gross error, which distorts the view on the effect of objective factors and prevents removal of mistakes. In reality the shortcoming may originate in any of the stages and only a thorough analysis of each stage can uncover the mistakes. If we, for instance, classify the effectiveness of foreign policy creation

by a rate which is near the optimum solution (100 %), it becomes clear that the shortcomings from previous stages are more or less completely transferred into the higher stages and there is a priori no chance of an effective correction. A certain correction of shortcomings caused in previous stages is possible, but not their full compensation.<sup>14)</sup>

Neither can decisions of the highest quality or a more precise realization of the objectives compensate the original shortcomings in information. Every case of failure or limited success in realization does therefore not call for mere criticism or analysis of inconsequence in the realization stage but for a much broader analysis, to find out in which components, in which stage the decisive errors have appeared.<sup>15)</sup>

The resulting effectiveness of foreign policy creation is therefore *in principle* given by the effectiveness total of the individual stages. It is therefore essential to ensure at all stages of the formation process an optimum effect in the given conditions and to build up a system, which would provide a maximum guarantee of high effectiveness in the individual stages of foreign policy creation and thus in the whole system.

Allow me a few more details concerning the individual components:

*The truthful recognition of objective reality* becomes a more categorical demand as the complexity of this reality and particularly of the internal interactions of its components rapidly increases. Thus the quantity of information, necessary for its recognition, increases like an avalanche. We have already pointed out that every per cent decrease in the rate of recognition is transferred further and

14) If, for instance, the quantity and reliability of information reaches only 60 % of the indispensable state, this cannot be compensated by a "correct analysis". The analysis proceeds in this case from some inaccurate, incomplete or even erroneous information and therefore cannot be correct. On the contrary, the shortcomings are continually added.

15) Coming back to our example, where we have reached 60 % as far as completeness and reliability of information are concerned, it is doubtless a relatively very good result if the total rate of effectiveness does not fall under 50 %.

13) Garay László, Istoričeskij materializm i problema ličnosti, Voprosy filosofii No 9, 1968.

necessarily diminishes the total rate of creation effectiveness.

Information can never be absolutely complete. But that is not even necessary.

In the first place it is essential to have at our disposal information that describes the *character and the development* of the given phenomenon as completely as possible. A vast amount of information or a surplus is usually a hindrance in processing and sometimes even distracts attention in the wrong direction. We simply need such information and such an amount of information to minimize information entropy connected with the studied problem, where a decision has to be made.

This, of course, is a theoretical demand. In practice the whole matter is usually more complicated. For instance the designs of our adversary can never be absolutely clear. The precondition of his rational decision-making does not always have to be fulfilled.

The building-up of a necessary information system is certainly not simple. The information system is not built ad hoc for every problem to be solved. The information system forms something like a permanent hinterland — an infrastructure, which must be continually kept ready to solve the most diverse cases. We must therefore respect certain general principles based on the analysis of:

a) *what* information is indispensable for decision-making;

b) *how* to ensure a system of permanent *up-dating* of information;

c) in what way and according to which system should the information be *stored* from the viewpoint of shortest accessibility;

d) there is something like a synthetic requirement to determine a rational flow of information so as to get *truthful* facts in *appropriate* time to *proper* people.

The requirement of an optimum foreign policy creation in this component therefore calls for an effective system of data collection and classification, its documentation, accessibility, possibility of updating and processing in different variants. In this respect serious shortcomings are still to be found in our country, which instead of being removed have rather deepened in past years. Data collection and processing represent a seemingly non-political, boring activity and are therefore carried out more or less incidentally, not systematically or scientifically. It would be essential to achieve a fundamental change in this sphere with

the help of up-to-date methodology and technology.

It certainly remains an open question, whether it would be rational to build-up an independent information system for the sphere of external relations. The most effective method seems to be in making this system a part of a unified state information system, which would be built for all state organs.

Similar systems have already come into existence in the world. In the Soviet Union, for instance, the system of collecting and analysing scientific and technological data is on a high level. In the United States of America the President ordered on October 12, 1965, the introduction of an integrated programming, planning and budgetary system (P.P.B.S.) in the Executive sphere, the Department of State included.<sup>16)</sup>

Diebold also speaks about endeavours to create a specific Foreign Affairs Programming System (F.A.P.S.) with the objective of bringing together all the strands of United States activities and resources, country by country, to give both the Secretary of State and the Ambassadors a coherent instrument of command and control.<sup>17)</sup>

According to the same author a special advisory group was charged with developing a Programming-Planning-Budgeting System (P.P.B.S.) for the State Department in cooperation with various institutes, institutions and teams of experts. A full P.P.B.S. cycle should be introduced as an experiment for the region of Latin America by fiscal 1969.<sup>18)</sup>

The whole history of international relations is marked by the influence of the shortage of reliable information on the mistakes of foreign policy activity.

Let us have a look at one example mentioned by Diebold in the described paragraph:

After Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland, Austria, the border regions of Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovakia herself, the USA has decided on a policy of non-intervention against these aggressive actions. The author explains that this had

<sup>16)</sup> Compare: Diebold, J., Computers, Program Management and Foreign Affairs; Foreign Affairs, October 1966, page 125.

<sup>17)</sup> See same source, page 128.

<sup>18)</sup> same source, pages 131—132.

been caused by three fundamental conclusions:

1) — that Hitler could not threaten Europe, because Germany did not possess the means for all-out war;

2) — but that Hitler possessed enough power to make an intervention against him too costly;

3) — that Hitler after he achieved Germany's immediate demands, would live in peace with his neighbours.

The author explains that the first two conclusions were based on information which was inadequate and therefore lead to entirely wrong conclusions.<sup>19)</sup>

The problem of *analysis*:

A correct analysis is an essential condition for reaching a high effectiveness of the subjective factor, provided that there is sufficient quantity and quality of information.

It is necessary to classify the mutual relations of factors, the weight and perspective of individual factors, to determine the correct trend of further development and on this basis to study the various possibilities of further developments and the question as to what action to take.

Indeed analysis acquires an ever more significant role and has become one of the most important preconditions of correct decision-making. In spite of all this, analytical activities as a basis for rational creation of our foreign policy have been severely underestimated in the past years. This was probably one of the reasons for decreased effectiveness of decision-making itself and of the proper function and role of our foreign policy.

The analysis consists of two stages:

a) the fundamental, *long-term analysis* carried out by the scientific bodies. It has to recognize the laws of the international development as a whole as well as of individual regions and individual problems, on the basis of systematic long-term conception studies of phenomena in their historical and logical sequence. This part of the analysis bases its respective recommendations etc., on these long-time studies of international phenomena.

In this section certain results have been achieved in Czechoslovakia. Even in our country team-work has proved successful. But at present this basic analytical component is still very isolated from the real creation of foreign policy. It would therefore be advisable to make better use of the form of a direct social commission

even in this sphere and to use this also as a basis for approaching the problem of financing such research.

The problems of a fundamental long-term analysis, based on scientific research, have their own logic and its scope by far surpasses the possibilities of space which we can devote to it in this context.

b) — More attention will be devoted to the questions of *operational analysis*, which is more closely linked with the process of foreign policy creation. This component has gradually become a Cinderella in our system of foreign policy creation. Independent study groups have been united into a single complex with a political operative section of its own, i.e. they were subordinated to this operative section. This was a very problematic step to take. At first sight the direct connection of operative section and analysis seems to have some attractive aspects, but if we follow through logically we find more negative than positive moments.

Analysis ceases to fulfil its objective function when carried out under the influence of the operative section.

It becomes more or less a matter of purpose which often concentrates more on finding reasons for a certain decision than on increasing its correctness and effectiveness. The intelligence analyst is described by professor Elder<sup>20)</sup> as memory, long range weather forecaster, theoretician and human UNIVAC of the Department of State.<sup>21)</sup>

In the above mentioned book he analyses the character, significance and priority of information and analytical components in the American Department of State (see: particularly the 3rd chapter of the book). Professor Elder describes five basic functions fulfilled by the analytical component.

1) an alerting function — calling attention to potential situations which may endanger the national security;

2) an evaluating function, sifting and sorting out the unvaluable or undependable information;

3) an analytical function, requiring studies of information in some depth to

20) Robert E. Elder, professor of political sciences at Colgate University, head of the Colgate — Washington study group.

21) Elder, R. E., *The Police Machine*, The Department of State and American Foreign Policy, Syracuse University Press, 1960, page 45.

19) same source, pages 131—132.

see what it means for the interests of the state;

4) a collection function, assisting and participating in the processing of raw information and getting it to those who need it;

5) an external function, including the presenting of the politico-socio-economic intelligence viewpoint to other agencies carrying out intelligence activities.<sup>22)</sup>

Building-up of an independent analytical body is an indispensable precondition for real rationalization in foreign policy. It is important to base this activity on a strong brain potential of qualified people, but it is equally essential to gradually multiply the possibilities of human brains by application of up-to-date technology and methods of analysis. If we have stressed the use of computerization in connection with data collection and data processing, for instance, it acquires a doubled importance in the sphere of analysis. Competent authors have rightly stressed that the present and future role of the computer is far more significant for analyses, decision-making and experimenting than for data processing.<sup>23)</sup>

One of the accompanying phenomena of our increasing backwardness in the Revolution of Science and Technology is the fact that using up-to-date technology in social and scientific fields is still looked upon rather as a futurological problem by quite a number of executive workers in responsible jobs. One of the frequent objections is that for instance foreign policy has to be made by people and not by machines. But that of course, is a very primitive misunderstanding of the significance of modern methods, including the mathematical ones, and of the possibilities of making use of modern technology, including computerization.

It should be stressed over and over again that the application of up-to-date methods, including computerization, does not at all aim at replacing the human factor by a mechanical one. On the contrary, the demands on the human factor are much higher. Not only from the intellectual point of view but also with re-

gard to his moral standard. The application of modern methods does not in the least produce a universal remedy substituting the decision-making subject, on the contrary, it demands much more from the subject. But at the same time the preparation for making a decision has considerably higher qualities. And that is the most important thing.

In reality paradoxical consequences are brought about by stressing the human factor as an argument against proper utilization of up-to-date scientific methods and modern technology. Indeed indignation over the fact that we should work with a "mere" model of objective reality, leads in fact to direct experimentation with the fates of people — hundred of thousands and millions, not to mention the gigantic material consequences.

Working with models really requires simplifications of the endlessly complicated objective reality. We choose only those elements and relations for building a model that are relevant for solving the question we are trying to answer. Even this choice can be influenced by a subjective view, of course, and it is essential to work systematically and with responsibility.

A model has its structure (elements, mutual relations) and behaviour pattern (reactions to impulses from outside). A model of this kind enables us to study its dynamics in various and varying conditions within reasonable limits (given by the reliability of the model's structure and the knowledge of the laws of its behaviour). On this basis different variants of action can be verified.

It is my firm opinion that working with models deserves all efforts if it is able to help even to a small degree to improve and add precision to decision-making; to discover weak links in presupposed solutions in time and mainly without serious consequences to people and to prevent carrying out of such actions.

But little effort has been made so far to adapt existing methods of modelling situations and their dynamics (including mathematical methods) and no support has been given by respective organs and institutions.

We have thus reached the threshold of a decision and now we must return to some problems of analysis. One of the greatest dangers is a *biased analysis*. The decision itself is already clearly a matter of purpose — meaning that it follows certain, mainly class interests. Class approach, of course, must influence

<sup>22)</sup> See: above mentioned book, pages 45—56.

<sup>23)</sup> Compare: Katz R. L., Knight K. E., Massey W. E., Harlan R. L., *The Computer in Your Future* — from the volume *The Nature and Scope of Management*, Scott, Foresman and Co., USA 1966, page 312.



the analysis, as far as the total methodology is concerned (it must first of all study the relation and position of the class forces). But it must strictly avoid a priori deductions and work "sine ira et studio". This shows, why analysis should be divorced from decision-making.

*The analysis of designs* and of the presupposed reaction of the other party, i.e. other countries with whom our designs come into interaction, must be an important component of analytical activity. The practice of recent years provides us with quite a few examples of really surprising lack of this decisive link in the analysis. The causes are to be found rather in strong information entropy than in analysis itself. A truthful analysis definitely requires reliable information, including verified reports from the source of its origin.<sup>24)</sup>

*The variants of possible development*, i.e. the possible approach to the solution of the given problem and the analysis of presupposed consequences should be the result and enumeration of the analysis.

One of the most difficult elements of the analysis is to compare the individual variants of one's own approach with the various possibilities of one's adversary. And therefore particularly this sphere calls for well thought out methodology decreasing to a minimum the subjectivistic approach to evaluation and particularly to subsequent decision-making.

One of the possible aids is the theory of strategic games.<sup>25)</sup> It is generally known that the mathematical apparatus of the theory of strategic games has not yet been satisfactorily worked out, particularly for the non-zero-sum games that are of special significance in international relations. The quantification of phenomena is also particularly difficult in international relations. But the methodology of these games itself gives us some very valuable aids for improving the quality of the analysis. Even the necessity to consider all possibilities of one's own actions and the actions of one's adversary [i.e. "rational" as well as "irrational" possibilities], to evaluate all their mutual relations, gives one rather substantial

instruction on how to maximally exclude improvisation in the preparation of serious decisions and how to study all aspects of the problems and to adopt optimum solutions.

At the conclusion of this brief excursion into the questions of analysis the requirement of complexity of the analysis must be mentioned. This requirement does not apply to the necessity of considering all aspects of the given problem. It is also necessary to correct the analysis itself by opinions of partner countries in questions of a broader, international political significance. Only then we may regard the analysis as sufficiently generally valid, verified by a broad scope of experiences.

Even in the stage of data collection and data processing the respective working groups should proceed in international cooperation and exchange of information. It is therefore more to be desired that the respective scientific institutes, especially those of Socialist countries should closely cooperate particularly in long-term, perspective analysis.

Making possible exchange of information and harmonizing of conclusions at this stage represents a significant precondition for facilitating the coordination of decision-making itself.

*Decision-making* is closely connected with analyses and follows it. In fact a correct analysis gives directions for decision-making. It must lead up to the variants of the solution. If the analysis is not scientific, then the decision-making is not based on exact methods.

Before we turn to the problems of the decision-making process in detail, we must deviate a little. At this stage of the foreign policy creation process (according to the character of the problems being solved, and even earlier during the process of analysis) the line of analysis of

<sup>24)</sup> Let us recall, for instance, the crisis in the region of the Near and Middle East in Spring 1967, where the military action of Israel, its force and effect were a surprise not only to Arab countries, but even to us and the other Socialist countries, that were oriented for a peaceful solution of this conflict.

<sup>25)</sup> Examples out of more recent literature: R. Duncan Luce, Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decision*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, London, G Chapman and Hull, 1957. The articles of V. Sojak — *Strategy of Peace in the Journal International Relations* No 3/1967, pages 39—42 and V. Janků, *Possibilities and Limitations of Peaceful Coexistence Policy*, Svoboda 1967, pages 166—168 offer some information of this country concerning the application of zero-sum games or non-zero-sum games in the sphere of analysis in the field of international relations.

exogenous factors is joined by another branch which is indispensable in foreign policy creation, but this paper will not discuss it in detail. It is the analysis of endogenous factors, the analysis of the potential and external interests of the country itself — i.e. economic, political, cultural, military and other interests. We can no longer picture a rational foreign policy creation without a proper analysis and application of the influence of endogenous factors. Here I would like to remark that the influence of this factor on our foreign policy creation was considerably diminished in this country in the past years. And yet, Lenin already has stressed the organic connection between foreign and internal policy.<sup>26)</sup>

A. V. Sergijev, candidate of philosophical sciences, has rightly stressed the interconnection between the internal and the external activity of the state. He points out the mutual dialectic influence of these functions. He states that the main objective of foreign policy activity of any class is "the securing of most favourable foreign policy conditions in order to reach their internal political and economic objectives".<sup>27)</sup>

In contradiction with this lawful Marxist postulate the direct links between internal political and particularly economic needs of the state and foreign policy creation had been in fact reduced in past years and this also influenced the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One of the basic conditions for consequent fulfilment of the function of our foreign policy in the further *Socialist development* of our country is to revive these links<sup>28)</sup> and to create a system ensuring an organic relation between realistic objective needs of the country, particularly the needs of further economic, scientific and technological, cultural and political development on one hand and the creation of foreign policy concerning Socialist, Capitalist and De-

veloping countries on the other hand.

It can rightly be said that the state's foreign policy interests in fact form the initial impulse — the social commission — to study certain foreign policy problems or to work out a certain question. From the methodological point of view however it is advisable to keep separate both the branches (the analyses of endogenous and exogenous factors) in the proper creation process till the later stages of the analysis (study of action variants) or even until the stage of decision-making.

It is true even for the second branch that the interests of one's own country must be brought into the indispensable correlation with international interests — for instance with interests emerging from the need to continue strengthening the Warsaw Treaty System, cooperation in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and other bilateral and multilateral agreements etc.

And so finally in the stage of decision-making the substantiated variants, i.e. recommendations for foreign policy activities, meet with the well motivated external needs and possibilities of the state. The complexity of the thus united branches requires a high quality decision-making process. Moreover it becomes essential to rationalize even the structure of the decision-making organs. It would be desirable — from the theoretical point of view — that the quantity and quality of information, represented by the combined knowledge and experience of the individual members of the organ responsible for immediate decision-making in foreign policy activities should be approximately equal to the information entropy of the given problem at the stage of decision-making.<sup>29)</sup>

The Government as a whole and — on the party level — the Presidium of the Central Committee as a whole secure the evaluation of the given problem in broad social connections. There would be advantage however in creating a specialized flexible and qualified body, acting as supplementary organ of the Government, as a sort of Council for External Relations and thus make possible a qualified *preparation* of decision-making in

<sup>26)</sup> Compare: Lenin, Complete Collected Works, in Russian, book 30, page 93.

<sup>27)</sup> Sergijev, A. V., *Nauka i vněšnja politika [Roľ objektivnych i subjektivnych faktorov v meždunarodnych otnošenijach]*, Znanie, Moscow 1967, page 22.

<sup>28)</sup> But this applies to all stages of the foreign policy creation process — beginning with the first stage of systematic data collection and data processing on economic and other needs of the country and ending with the stage of realization.

<sup>29)</sup> In fact a request of this kind could not be realized under the conditions existing in past years. That was another source of serious shortcomings including the expressive subjectivism in the very beginnings of *decision-making*.

fundamental questions and even decision-making on questions of relatively smaller importance.<sup>30)</sup>

I regard this institutional suggestion as a logical outcome of the given theoretical thoughts, but a more detailed analysis of this question is a rather specific problem and requires special study. In this context let us therefore regard it only as a suggestion. Let us now return to the methodological aspects of the decision-making stage in the creation of foreign policy. A rather rich bibliography on decision-making problems exists in the world today. But most of these works discuss decision-making in the field of economic management. Some of the general relations are valid even for the sphere of international relations and it would be necessary to adapt them to the management in the sphere of foreign policy.

Let us briefly look at some of the fundamental principles of rational approach to the problems of decision-making.

---

<sup>30)</sup> This is only a working title, of course. Members of the Council should become preferably those (and only those) people, whose experience and knowledge in the field where they work could optimally fill up the information entropy. The following Government officials should be members: the Prime Minister of the Federal Government, the Ministers and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, National Defence, Interior (from the Intelligence section), Planning (eventually the Chairman of the Economic Council). As an advisory body of the Government the Council could naturally not substitute political decisions of the respective party organ, but it would be desirable that the respective Secretary of the Central Committee entrusted with the section of international relations should also be a member so that the individual points of view might be based also on the knowledge of the situation in the international Communist Movement and in the international social organisations. It would evidently be an advantage if also a representative of the respective scientific institution would be a permanent member of the Council. Moreover the Council could invite other representatives of the Federal or the Republic's organs — for instance the Minister of Culture and certainly experts, particularly from the ranks of scientists — to take part in the discussions.

In decision-making we are very often confronted with the *problems of information entropy*. The respective management system has to decide a question where the quantity of information at their disposal does not supply them with data, necessary for finding a definite attitude and where not even the total amount of information to be found within the group representing the given management system can fill in the existing grade of indefiniteness. In this case the management system as a rule gives an impulse for obtaining further information.<sup>31)</sup>

If the thus obtained amount of information would be equal to the information entropy (and that would, of course, be the ideal case), then an explicit decision would be the result.

Otherwise it is necessary to calculate with a larger or smaller *factor of uncertainty* in decision-making, which can be gradually decreased in the process of realization only. It is a general rule even in this sphere that in current routine cases, in relatively simple questions where a rich complex of information is at our disposal the presupposed result can be expected almost with certainty. But as soon as the result depends on *several variables*,<sup>32)</sup> then the uncertainty of the action increases, as the possibility of information entropy cannot be excluded.

Finally there are cases, where the uncertainty can be even one of the fundamental or dominant factors. That is true particularly when the majority of factors depends on the alien subject and only the minimum of factors is given objectively. This applies especially to cases where the initiative rests with the adversary or partner and where we must calculate in our actions with a high uncertainty rate in his designs.<sup>33)</sup>

---

<sup>31)</sup> For instance: another analyses of some partial problem which is a condition for correct decision, concerning the suggested step in the sphere of foreign policy.

<sup>32)</sup> either materially, i.e. everywhere where a wide and not easily perceptible complex of international problems with complicated mutual relations and links must be considered, or where strong dynamics of the phenomena make it difficult to foresee the subsequent development.

<sup>33)</sup> On a general level the problem of uncertainty in decision-making has been explained in the study of E. Dale, *New Perspectives in Managerial Decision-*

One of the significant methods to decrease information entropy and thus to lessen the uncertainty in decision-making, is the above-mentioned method of *modelling*.

The significance of modelling (the mathematical modelling included) has already been pointed out in connection with the problems of analysis. The method of modelling acquires special significance in the following three cases:

*First of all*, when we have to choose one of several possible or recommended variants. Such cases belong in fact to the sphere of analysis and it would be desirable that the analysis should present sufficiently qualified variants for decision-making.

*The second case* being the preparation of a new suggestion, of a new initiative, particularly when the affair in question is of rather long-term, fundamental and difficult character. Let me illustrate this by two examples.

Example 1: Economic interests and needs of the country have resulted in the impulse to work out a suggestion of initiative concerning the improvement of the Mutual Economic Assistance Council's activity. After preliminary processing of necessary data and their analyses — for the other countries' as well as for our own country's needs and possibilities — a suggestion is worked out.

It would certainly be possible to present it to our partners immediately, but in that case we run the danger that its shortcomings could become the motive for refusal. Let us assume that it is the supreme interest of our country to submit a suggestion as perfect as possible which really would be realistic and also acceptable, since the interests of Czechoslovak national economy call urgently for the given solution. Here we can use modelling to verify the quality of our proposal. A static model clarifies all mutual relations and links. The dynamic model then serves to illustrate the ways of the proposal's gradual realization, the consequences of its effect in mutual economic relations and in the economies of the individual countries concerned and most important in the economy of our own country.

If it is indispensable to realize the proposal *gradually*, because the start of certain activities depends on the conclusion of other activities, on the creation

Making, published in the above mentioned volume *The Nature and Scope of Management*.

of certain preconditions, the model should be worked out with the aid of a network, the analysis of which gives us an illustrative view of the critical links in the whole system that are a prerequisite of success.

Example 2: An impulse to reconsider the possibility of a new initiative in questions concerning the creation of a System of European Security is given by: the analysis of the situation in relations among European countries; the need to strengthen peaceful contacts among the countries; the needs and interests of one's own country's security and the security of the states belonging to the world's Socialist Community.

After preliminary processing of data on political, military, economic, cultural and ideological as well as other factors, concerning the present situation in Europe, after the analysis of existing history of efforts undertaken to create a System of European Security — an analysis must be made where the total characteristics, the evaluation of the world development and the designs of other countries are taken into consideration. The conclusions of the analysis should and must be confronted with the opinions of corresponding authorities in the partner countries and the final result are the variants of possible action. We proceed even here from the assumption that in the given situation we are strongly interested that the proposal should not be refused, but instead at least gradually realized. Let us assume that the affair in question is very far-reaching politically and in addition very complicated. It concerns the security interests of the other Socialist countries and it is indispensable to ensure that this security would not be decreased in any of the realization stages of the proposal. On the other hand the proposal must be without question acceptable and even attractive for our partners. The dynamic model enables us to verify in the first place from this aspect the influence (and form) of the individual development stages and thus makes possible the precision of the proposal from the point of view of minimizing risks for one's own country as well as ensuring acceptability by the other party. Modelling makes possible a more qualified decision-making and better working-out of the realization plan.

*The third case*, where modelling can be applied successfully to make the proper decision-making process more precise, is when we are to evaluate a proposal submitted to us by the other party. Let us

presume a situation where the other party has presented a proposal concerning a certain question. The proposal makes a rather good impression at first sight, but it is very important and far-reaching and it is therefore essential to verify it sufficiently. We wish to evaluate its advantages and drawbacks, its acceptability or inacceptability as quickly as possible and to discover hidden stumbling blocks or tricky points of the submitted proposal. The model facilitates carrying out of a thorough analysis, taking into consideration all connections and consequences as well as possible influences in the course of subsequent development. We thus are enabled to make a more qualified decision whether to accept or not to accept the new proposal, or whether to submit a proposal of our own.

It is not sufficient (and often cannot be) to state unequivocally, what to do. Decision-making based on scientific analysis cannot proceed solely on the assumption of "hitting the bull's eye". The possible deviations must be considered and the *extent of allowed deviations* either in one or the other direction and their values must be known. This value is not always a symmetric function.<sup>34)</sup>

This principle has acquired a great significance in practical foreign policy, if we plan, for instance, a certain foreign policy initiative. It is a serious step, the success of which would favourably influence the further development of international relations. In practice the consequences of a possible failure do not appear until the process of the development itself. This must be prevented by analyzing the possibility of failure or full success in advance. Let us assume that we have to choose from two alternatives — in this case. In one of them the impact of the action is to be strengthened and more pressure exerted. In that case however, the risks of the action increase. The second alternative is to

quickly find a compromise which again includes the threat of weakening the international prestige or decreasing the participating countries' support. If we complete such an analysis, if we evaluate possible deviations from the expected solution — in advance — and state the extent of allowed deviations in both directions, we acquire the possibility of making the realization of the action more precise.

*The realization* is relatively one of the best prepared components in the creation of foreign policy and is supported by extensive experience. The shortcomings are more or less in the previously explained tendency of trying to blame this stage for all the failures.

Let us look only at some important facts and principles in this sphere:

The principle of *adequacy* of means and aims is generally accepted. If we pursue less important partial aims, it is not advisable to use implements out of proportion for reaching them. The comparison with medical science is quite frequently cited. Modern medical science never uses surgery, if the same result can be obtained by normal treatment.

The same applies to the method with which we face the actions of our adversary by actions of our own. Here too, we must choose adequate means. It is, for instance, desirable that the forces of our country and the countries of the whole World Socialist System should be able to face not only globally but concretely the respective pressures of the international imperialist forces in all spheres, i.e. to face the ideological pressure or economic pressures with adequate means. Of course, even in this sphere a certain replacement is possible, but we could hardly regard the use of military means adequate when our adversary uses economic or other methods of pressure.

The realization must be supported by the setting of a certain working schedule. Even in this case modern methods, for instance modified critical path method can be applied, which permit concentrating attention on exactly those links, the delay of which (or shortcomings in their realization) would threaten the fulfilment of our objectives.

An important demand on the realization stage is the necessity of feed-back. It is necessary to confront the achieved result at every stage. A proper realization plan must offer the possibility of changing over to another variant, for instance to another tactic, if the original one proves

<sup>34)</sup> Let me illustrate this in the following well-known allegory — the problem of the squirrel on the greenhouse. When shooting at the squirrel we must take into consideration that we might miss. The only risk in an upward deviation is not hitting the squirrel, but a downward deviation also carries the risk of shattering the greenhouse. That means, that the optimum aiming, calculating with the risks, will not be at the centre of the squirrel, but slightly (by a calculable value) higher.

ineffective or if a change of general conditions occurs during the realization.

Every realization must be analysed. This has been quite often forgotten in practice. The analysis is carried out only in case of failure and is often influenced by subjectivist influences. We know two types of analyses, the continual analysis which is an analysis based on feed-back and the resulting, concluding analysis. To make an analysis objective we must base it — as we have already stressed — on analyses from all stages and it must concretely find out which faults at what stage have caused failure. Only thus failure in one action can become the basis

and precondition of succes in a future action.



I am quite aware of the fact that the suggestions contained in this article cannot be realized at once. But I once again return to the idea, that the sphere of foreign policy is a sphere of such importance and sensitivity that every increase in rational decision-making in this sphere represents significant material, political and moral values. These are sufficient reasons for the problems to become the object of rational efforts.