

прежде всего в стремлении подчинить описанное международное движение капитала контролю экономической политики заинтересованных стран. При этом нужно учитывать, что позиция правительств является хотя и важным, однако только одним из факторов, оказывающих влияние на международное движение капиталов.

THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

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Despite all considerable changes which have occurred in the world as a result of development after World War Two, Europe continues, to a certain extent, to maintain its key position, especially from the point of view of the preservation of peace.

Two great world military groupings with armies equipped with up-to-the-minute weapons and ammunition, the core of which are nuclear weapons, face each other direct on the European Continent.

The potential possibilities of launching an armed conflict in Europe are substantially enhanced by the dangers and risks resulting from unsolved political problems, the existing foci of tension and the policies of some States.

The efforts to ensure security in Europe are apparent throughout the whole postwar development. However, efforts to lay a solid foundation for European security have not yet been successful. The German problem which is to a certain extent the core of European security is the first to remain unsolved.

In recent years, the problem of European security has again come to the fore, both in Eastern and in Western Europe. The main reasons of this phenomenon consist in the bilateral interest in eliminating, or at least in reducing, the risk of a nuclear conflict and in developing mutual relations by generally admitting the fact that countries with different social systems will exist in Europe side by side for a relatively long time which results in the conclusion of the practical need for a policy of peaceful co-existence.

The main problem today is not the question whether to strengthen and to develop all-European security and co-operation, but the question how to proceed in solving this problem. There is a number of complicated questions involved. Two of them, however, appear to be the main ones: What is the contemporary mutual dependence between the German question and the problem of European security? By means of what system can European security be solved?

In the first question, the opinion is ever more apparent that a stable all-European security cannot be permanently ensured on the basis of a divided Germany, but that this problem which owing to its complicatedness cannot be solved at present must not impede the solution of other urgent topical problems in the field of European security and co-operation and that it is exactly continuous progress in this respect which may create favourable conditions for the solution of the problem of the re-unification of Germany.

As to the second question it would be unrealistic to assume that the system of all-European security could be created through one action, by means of a new edition of the draft treaty on all-European security. Undoubtedly a long and complicated process is involved. The development will not evidently be connected with an immediate liquidation of existing military and political groupings but rather — in case of a favourable international development — with partial agreements which might lessen the risks of a conflict, impede the creation of new dangerous foci and aid in renewing and strengthening international confidence, hence with such measures as were, for instance, the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Through this method, supplemented by the development of co-operation in general and of economic co-operation in particular, a situation may gradually be created when the existing groupings may become „outdated“ in the course of the development and will be replaced by entirely new forms, by a system of security on an all-European scale.

With regard to the strategic significance of Europe and its position in the relations between the two nuclear superpowers — the USA and the USSR — it practically means that the solution of the basic questions of European security is impossible not only without the USSR, the participation of which as a European country is natural, but that it is hardly possible without the USA as well. Under the given strategic conditions

throughout the world, the small and medium sized European countries have only limited possibilities of influence on the development of the strategic situation on a global scale. However, also under the present circumstances they have certain possibilities which are far from negligible. Their suitable activity, their more initiative action in the strategic political „inter-field“ might contribute considerably to the strengthening of all-European security.

The only realistic way toward all-European security is thus based on respecting the existing state of affairs. This state in Europe is primarily characterized by the existence of various social systems, two military and political groupings, and two German States. At the same time it is necessary to observe strictly the basic principles of peaceful co-existence, especially the principle of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every country and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.

In solving the tasks of European security it appears desirable to concentrate attention particularly on the following points:

1. To avoid everything which would sharpen or further complicate the contemporary situation in Europe.
2. To develop relations between European countries regardless of different social systems.
3. To strive for agreements in the sphere of partial security measures.
4. To elucidate ideas for a permanent securing of European security and peaceful co-operation.

Europe should not continue to hesitate. It is time to develop a constructive policy on an all-European scale. This is in the interest of all European countries.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AT THE TIME OF THE BERLIN CRISIS

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The renewal of the strategic independence of the Federal Republic of Germany comparable with the position of power of the German Reich is — at least in the next ten to twenty years — unrealizable. The creation of a developed autarchy military system encounters not only political but also economic and other impediments. It is, therefore, fully possible to judge the possibilities of West German policy only by judging the possibilities of the Western Alliance and the extent to which it is identical with the basic interests of the West German ruling elite.

The Western powers although they have declared their support of the basic theses of West German policy many a time (re-unification, eastern borders, etc.) they have never supported it without reserves. They have become familiarized with the agreeable aspect of a divided Germany although they have protested against it. They were not interested in the military and political equality of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Alliance. The variance between the interests of the Alliance and the interests of West Germany quite expressively appeared in the course of the Berlin crisis, especially around August 13, 1961. At that time, in the shadow of a threat of a nuclear conflict, the reaction of the parties concerned corresponded most to their vital interests and it, therefore, offered an exceptionally valuable testimony to the objective relations of the Alliance to the Federal Republic of Germany.

The alteration in the military ratio of forces by the end of the fifties and the renewal of equilibrium on a qualitatively higher level have increased the United States' interest in *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic of Germany seeks to escape from this zone of danger, among other things, by increasing its pressure on the German Democratic Republic, especially by means of West Berlin. With the ever more delicate strategic situation of the Western allies in West Berlin and with the overall ratio between strategic forces, the West German policy in Berlin is getting into conflict with the American policy which is not interested in being tied down in West Berlin and which, on the contrary, seeks ways how to proceed from the defensive to a more flexible policy.

The late American President Kennedy stood, after the Vienna meeting in June 1961,